

History of the Freedom Movement in India - Vol. 3

R. C. MAJUMDAR

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FIRMA K. L. MUKHOPADHYAY
CALCUTTA

HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA

VOLUME III

BY

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DEDICATED
TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE
WHO LIVED AND DIED
FOR
THE FREEDOM OF INDIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Preface

BOOK IV

THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM—1919-1945 NON-CO-OPERATION AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

CHAPTER I. THE YEAR 1919

I. Rowlatt Bills	1
II. The Emergence of Gandhi as Political Leader of India	
1. Early Career in South Africa	4
2. Satyagraha	7
3. Satyagraha in India	10
4. Agitation against Rowlatt Bills	14
5. The Jallianwalla Bagh and Martial Law in the Panjab	16
i. Lahore	22
ii. Gujranwala	23
iii. Kasur	23
iv. Amritsar	24
III. The Government of India Act	
1. The Reform Bill	43
2. The New Constitution	45
IV. The New Constitution and Indian Politics	49

CHAPTER II. THE KHILAFAT AGITATION 55

CHAPTER III. THE NON-CO-OPERATION MOVEMENT

I. Inauguration of the Movement by the Khilafatists	67
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II.	Adoption of the Non-co-operation Movement by the Congress	85
III.	The Nagpur Congress (December, 1920)	96
IV.	The Nagpur Programme	
1.	Constructive Work	101
2.	Boycott	
i.	Volunteer Organization	105
ii.	Boycott of Councils	106
iii.	Boycott of Law-courts	107
iv.	Boycott of Schools and Colleges	108
v.	Miscellaneous	112
3.	The Policy of the Government	112
4.	Gandhi and the Ali Brothers	114
5.	The Militant Attitude of N.C.C.	121
6.	Boycott of the Prince of Wales	124
7.	Repressive Measures of the Government	131
8.	Reaction against Government Policy	137
9.	Efforts for Peaceful Settlement	142
V.	Civil Disobedience	
1.	Ahmadabad Congress	147
2.	Reactionary Attitude of the Viceroy	149
3.	Gandhi's Declaration of Non-violent War	151
4.	Retreat of Gandhi and the Collapse of N. C. O.	155
VI.	The Government and the People during N. C. O.	
1.	The Oppression by the Government	165
A.	Two Cases of Unprovoked Assault	170
i.	Chittagong Gurkha Outrage	171

Table of Contents	ix
ii. Matiari Firing	171
B. Wholesale Arrests	172
C. Lawlessness Outside the Courts	174
2. The Excesses Committed by the People	175
VII. The Success and Failure of N. C. O.	185
VIII. Offshoots of Non-co-operation Movement	
A. Moplah Rebellion	190
B. Satyagraha for Reforms in Religious Institutions	200
C. The Assam Coolie Exodus and the Chandpur Outrage	203
D. The Nagpur Flag Satyagraha	205
E. Bardoli No-Tax Satyagraha (1928)	205
IX. Non-co-operation after Gandhi's Arrest	
1. Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee	207
2. The Council Entry	209
3. Split in the Congress	218
4. Rise of the Swarajya Party within the Congress	221

CHAPTER IV. POLITICAL EVENTS (1921-1928)

I. Reforms at Work	227
II. The Swarajya Party	232
III. Political Activities outside the Congress	
1. Different Political Parties	261
2. The Commonwealth of India Bill	265
IV. Hindu-Muslim Relation	

1. The All-India Muslim League	271
2. Communal Riots	276

CHAPTER V. BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDIA

I. British Government	287
II. The British People	293
III. The Government of India	295
IV. The Anglo-Indians	300

CHAPTER VI. THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT

A. Events Leading to the Movement

I. The Simon Commission	307
II. Attempts made by Indian Leaders to Draft their own Constitution	311
III. Other Activities in 1929	318
IV. The Viceroy's Declaration of 31 October, 1929	322
V. The Congress Session of 1929	325

B. The First Phase of the Movement

I. Violation of Salt Laws	335
II. The Terrorism of Government	341
1. Repressive Laws	342
2. Arrests	342
3. Terrorism by Government	343
III. The Epic Struggle at Dharasana and Other Events	359

C. The Round Table Conference

I. The First Round Table Conference	368
II. Gandhi-Irwin Pact	372

III. The Congress	381
IV. The Second Round Table Conference	395
D. Resumption of Civil Disobedience	
I. Reactionary Policy of the Government	397
II. The Part Played by Non-Official Europeans	406
III. Repressive Measures of the Government	409
IV. General Review of the Situation by India League Delegation	414
E. The Reign of Terror in 1932	422
I. Treatment of Women Resisters	426
II. The Use of Excessive Force	436
III. Firing on Crowds	441
IV. Raids and Searches	444
V. Beatings in Lock-ups	446
VI. Other Forms of Police Excesses	448
VII. Conditions in Jail	453
VIII. Newspapers	463
IX. No-Tax Campaign and Police Raj	463
F. The End of Civil Disobedience	472

CHAPTER VII. REVIVAL OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

A. The First Phase (1923-8)	
I. Bengal	488
II. The United Provinces	492
B. The Second Phase (1928-34)	
I. Bengal	
1. The Chittagong Armoury Raid and its Repercussion	495

2. General Review of Revolutionary Activities	504
II. Revolutionary Activities Outside Bengal (1928-34)	
1. Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association	511
2. Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta	513
3. The Lahore Conspiracy Case and the Hunger Strikes	517
4. Revolutionary Activities after 1929	520
5. General Review	524

CHAPTER VIII. INDIAN POLITICS (1934-37)

I. The Framing of the New Constitution	530
II. Revival of the Swarajya Party	532
III. The New Legislative Assembly (1935)	542
IV. Muslim Politics (1930-35)	544
V. The Congress (1935-36)	
1. The Socialist programme of Jawaharlal Nehru	554
2. The Congress Ministry	559
3. The Muslims and the Congress Ministry	561
4. The Congress (1938-39)	577

CHAPTER IX. THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND INDIAN POLITICS

I. The Leading Events of the War (1939-45)	594
II. The Congress Reaction to the War	596

III. Resumption of Civil Disobedience	600
IV. British Policy (1940-41)	609
V. The Japanese Menace and its Reaction on Indian Politics	612
VI. The Cripps Mission	622
VII. Quit India Movement	
1. The Genesis	633
2. "Quit India" Resolution	639
VIII. The Violent Outbreak of 1942	
A. The Nature of the Outbreak	646
1. Midnapore (Bengal),	653
2. Ballia (U. P.)	656
B. The Repressive Measures by the Government	657
C. Character and Organization	661
D. General Review	672
IX. Non-Congress Politics, 1943-45	
1. The Muslim League	678
2. The Communist Party	683
X. British Attitude after 1942	692

CHAPTER X. SUBHAS BOSE AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY (I. N. A.)

I. Subhas Bose in Europe	700
II. Indians in South-East Asia	703
III. Subhas Bose in the East	709
IV. The Status of I. N. A.	715
V. The I. N. A. Campaign in Indo-Burmese Frontier	
1. General Plan	717
2. Subhas Brigade	719
3. Gandhi and Azad Brigade	725
4. Imphal	728
5. General Review of the Campaign	730
6. The last phase	735

BOOK V

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER I. NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT

I. The British Decision to Quit India	741
II. Setting the Stage	746
III. The Cabinet Mission	754
IV. Negotiations for an Interim Government	767
V. The Direct Action of the Muslim League	776
VI. Interim Government	779
VII. The Constituent Assembly	788

CHAPTER II. FREEDOM AND PARTITION OF INDIA

I. The Congress Leaders Accept Partition	795
II. The Transfer of Power	803
III. The Congress Accepts Partition of India	808
IV. Indian Independence Act	814
V. The Inauguration of Independence	817
Footnotes	821
Bibliography	859
Chronological Table (1919-1947)	874
Index	889
Map to illustrate I.N.A.	
Campaign	Between pp. 720 and 721.
Errata	

REFACE

This, the concluding volume of the *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, begins with the emergence of Mahatma Gandhi as the leader of the movement in 1919 and traces its history up to the achievement of freedom on 15 August, 1947. During the first fifteen years of this period Gandhi was the most dominant figure in Indian politics and was the sole guide of the whole movement. Even after that period he was a force to reckon with and, though not always directly at the helm of affairs, was not unoften the power behind the throne. It is inevitable, therefore, that a review of Gandhi's career would form the principal subject in this volume. In performing this task the historian is confronted with a difficulty which is almost unique in character.

This is due to the fact that Gandhi combined in himself the dual role of a saint and an active politician. He has been called by some 'the most saintly among politicians', and by others, 'the most political saint.' This shows the paradoxical nature of his personality. Whether such combination is good or bad need not be discussed here, but it poses a serious problem to the historian. One's attitude towards a saint or view of his personal conduct and career is a matter of devotion and personal opinion. But one's judgment on the public career of a political leader rests upon certain assumptions and expectations of a norm of conduct to be followed by him. The former is based upon faith, pure and simple, while the latter requires logical reasoning untrammelled by any personal sentiment or belief. The historian has nothing to do with the first, and is concerned only with the

second aspect. Unfortunately, Gandhi's followers did not make this distinction and gave unto the political leader what was really due to the saint. This confusion, pervading all ranks of Congressmen from the highest to the lowest, has so much distorted public view of Indian politics since 1920 that it has now become wellnigh impossible to make a rational historical survey of the course of political events, without first clearly exposing the curious mentality which made Gandhi a sort of indissoluble composite of spiritual and political leadership.

This is best illustrated by the implicit faith in, and unquestioning obedience to, Gandhi, the leader of the Congress Party, shown by even very highly eminent persons. They mostly belonged to two categories. The first comprised those who willingly surrendered their conscience and judgment to the safe keeping of the political *Guru*. These have been described by Abul Kalam Azad with reference to some members of the Working Committee of the Congress in the following words: They "would not oppose Gandhiji even when they were not fully convinced,...were generally content to follow Gandhiji's lead....They rarely tried to judge things on their own, and in any case they were accustomed to subordinate their judgment to Gandhiji. As such discussion with them was almost useless. After all our discussions, the only thing they could say was that we must have faith in Gandhiji. They held that if we trusted him he would find some way out." Azad has included in this category, specifically by name, three eminent leaders of the Congress, including Dr. Rajendra Prasad, and has added that his view was based on "long experience."*

The second category consisted of those who fell a victim to the magic charm of Gandhi even though they fumed

* Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 75.

and fretted at his obsolete views and inexplicable or irrational dogmas repulsive to their own independent judgment. Such strange influence of Gandhi over his followers has been very frankly and lucidly explained by the most distinguished among them, namely, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Some of these utterances of Nehru have been quoted in this volume (pp. 65, 475, 487, 557).

Strangely enough, Gandhi himself was fully aware of this mentality of his followers and publicly condemned it in the statement he issued on 17 September, 1934, a part of which has been quoted in pp. 537-8 of this volume.

This kind of absolute devotion and self-surrender has been highly extolled by certain religious sects and nobody need quarrel with them. But when it forms the basis of political action and is cited as justification for doing things not approved on rational principles, it becomes difficult for a historian to appreciate the laudable sentiments of the disciples. The inevitable effect of such sentiments was that the great political leaders of the Congress came to look upon Gandhi as a superman, who was infallible and acted by instinct, not logic or reason, and therefore should not be judged by the ordinary standards which we apply to other political leaders. This has been very frankly stated by Pattabhi Sitaramayya, one of the most devoted followers of Gandhi (p. 66), as well as Jawaharlal Nehru, who wrote that "Gandhi was a unique personality and it was impossible to judge him by the usual standards, or even to apply the ordinary canons of logic to him" (p. 487). No wonder that lesser men looked upon Gandhi almost as a divine being, the truth of whose words and views must not be questioned on any account.

As I have explained (p. 487), a true historian cannot uphold such a doctrine or proceed on this basis when judging of Gandhi as a political leader. A mystic or saint—such as Gandhi undoubtedly was—is beyond the

purview of political history, but in dealing with Gandhi as the great leader of the Indian National Congress, a purely political organization fighting for freedom from British yoke, history must apply to him the same standards of judgment and criticism as have been applied to all other personalities, great or small, who have played any role in political affairs. Sober history must subject the public life of Gandhi to a critical and rational review without passion or prejudice, uninfluenced in the least by personal feelings of admiration or devotion, and, above all, by a disposition or proneness to believe as right and proper whatever he might have chosen to do or say. Such history must begin by discounting the halo of semi-divinity—and therefore also of infallibility—which was cast round Gandhi during his life and continues to a large extent even now, thanks to the propaganda to exploit his name for political purposes.

I yield to none in my profound respect for Gandhi, the saint and the humanitarian. But as the author of this volume, I am only concerned with the part he played in the struggle for India's freedom from the British yoke. I have necessarily to view his life and activities, thoughts, and feelings primarily from a narrow angle, namely as a politician and statesman leading a great political organization which was not intended to be a humanitarian association or World Peace Society, but had been formed for a definite political object, namely, to achieve India's freedom from political bondage. It has been my painful duty to show that, looked at strictly from this point of view, the popular image of Gandhi cannot be reconciled with what he actually was. A historian must uphold the great ideal of truth which was so dear to Gandhi himself, and if we delineate the political life of Gandhi with strict adherence to truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, it will, I believe, be patent to all that Gandhi was lacking in both political wisdom and political strategy—as we commonly understand

these terms—and far from being infallible, committed serious blunders, one after another, in pursuit of some Utopian ideals and methods which had no basis in reality. It will also be seen that the current estimate of the degree or extent of his success bears no relation to actual facts.

I am not unaware of the rude shock that such treatment would give to a large section of Indians and the great probability that they would curse or at least denounce the author without perhaps even going through the book itself. But I am sustained by two considerations. In the first place, I have sincerely tried to uphold the dignity of history by telling the truth as it has appeared to me in the light of such judgment or intellect as God has vouchsafed to me. I have done no less—I could do no more. Secondly, the adverse criticisms I have made against Gandhi—and the most serious ones at that—have almost all been upheld by one or more of his most admiring devotees, perhaps in some unguarded moments of their lives or when they were free from the magic influence of their political Guru. It has been my endeavour to keep this fact constantly before the readers by extensive quotations, so that I may not be accused of any deliberate ill-will or malice against Gandhi. I have thus quoted, in support of my criticisms, those of even such devotees as Pandit Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, C. R. Das, Rajagopalachari, and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, among others, not to speak of hostile critics like Subhas Bose, Sir Sankaran Nair, K. F. Nariman, and Ambedkar. The adverse criticisms by the devotees were, of course, merely occasional lapses which did not affect in the least their unflinching faith in the leadership of Gandhi. Nevertheless, the quotations of their views would prove that I cannot—and I certainly do not—claim any credit and do not deserve discredit for originality in the views condemning Gandhi, however unpalatable they might appear to be when taken together in the mass.

In order to enable the reader to appreciate or assess properly the views on Gandhi expressed in this volume, I would like to explain here my general estimate of Gandhi as a political leader which is naturally obscured in the text by the narration of events in a chronological order.

Since 1919 the Indian National Congress, under the leadership of Gandhi, had developed into a fighting machine and revolutionary organization, non-violent in character but of tremendous strength and potentiality, on account of the mass support behind it. The ground for the popular upsurge was prepared beforehand as described in the preceding volume, but Gandhi's magic personality and saintly character, which has always a great appeal to Indian masses, transformed the latent energy of the people into strenuous political activity in an astonishingly short period of time. The two new weapons with which Gandhi decided to fight were Non-violent Non-co-operation and Civil Disobedience—the two outward manifestations of the great principle which Gandhi described as *Satyagraha*. It was an old principle which, according to Gandhi, was preached by the Indian sages of yore, but he was the first to use it in politics. The nature and object of *Satyagraha*, as expounded by Gandhi, has been indicated in pp. 7 ff. It would be obvious to anybody who understands its real significance that none but a saintly person can really observe it in actual life, and it was beyond the power of ordinary men, including even those who played a prominent role in Indian politics under Gandhi's leadership. They made no secret of the fact that they adopted Non-violent Non-co-operation as a political expedient but not, like Gandhi, as a creed. Gandhi himself admitted, even late in life, that none of his followers believed in *Satyagraha* as a creed, though some accepted it, as a political expediency in the absence of any more suitable way to fight the battle of India's freedom—implying thereby that they would change it the

moment they felt that some other course of action would be more helpful in achieving freedom. This was the reason why, as Gandhi himself admitted, "even 14 years of trial have failed to yield the anticipated result."

There is a popular notion, sustained by catching slogans, that Gandhi achieved India's freedom by the method of *Satyagraha* and thus laid down for the subject peoples all over the world a unique method for gaining independence without bloodshed. Of course, Gandhi's own statement leaves no doubt that *Satyagraha* had never any fair trial in India's struggle for freedom, and, as such, cannot claim any credit for it.

But there were other deep-seated differences between Gandhi and his followers. He placed the cult of non-violence above everything else—even above the independence of India. During the Second War he grew uneasy at the possibility that the British might grant independence to India, for that would mean India's participation in violent warfare (p. 602). To him the Congress was a humanitarian association or an organization for the moral and spiritual regeneration of the world, and its aims and activities were to be regulated accordingly. But his followers looked upon the Congress as a purely political body whose sole object—and *raison d'être*—was the achievement of the freedom of India. To Gandhi, not only was independence of India a minor issue as compared with the principle of non-violence, but, it is painful and strange to relate, he was even prepared to postpone *Swaraj* activity if thereby he could advance the interest of the Khilafat (p. 96). It is on a par with his statement that he would, "in a sense, certainly assist the Amir of Afghanistan if he wage war against the British Government" (pp. 65-6 and f.n.), meaning thereby that India should not oppose the Amir if he invaded British India. Gandhi's conception of nationalism was also very peculiar. He fully approved of Muhammad Ali's

standpoint that one must "be a Muslim (or Hindu) first, and an Indian afterwards (p. 825, f.n., 16). As a matter of fact Gandhi realised, late in life, that a wide gulf had always separated him from his followers though they all submitted to his authority. This has been clearly explained by Pyarelal* and need not be discussed here. This fact would have been apparent to Gandhi long before if the Congress were guided by him on democratic principles. But Gandhi was a dictator who could not tolerate opposition. In 1930 he deliberately excluded from the Working Committee of the Congress those who differed from his views (p. 330). In his lengthy statement issued on 17 September, 1934, Gandhi said that 'if the Socialist Group gained ascendancy in the Congress he could not remain in it (p. 538). Later, when one of his momentous decisions was opposed by Azad and Nehru he demanded that both should leave the Working Committee, and even formally wrote to Azad asking him to resign the Presidentship of the Congress (p. 639). The scene that he created after the meeting of the A. I. C. C. at Ahmadabad on 27 June, 1924 (pp. 249-50), hardly befits a democratic leader. It is difficult to improve upon the following words with which Pyarelal, a close associate of Gandhi, has described the resulting state of things : "Gandhiji came to the conclusion that his personality was acting as an incubus and smothering free self-expression in the Congress and thereby arresting its natural growth, so that from being 'the most representative and democratic organisation' it stood in danger of degenerating into an organisation 'dominated by one personality' in which 'there was no play of reason.' They could never realise the full potency of truth or non-violence that way. For that they had to learn 'to think and act naturally.'** This fully supports

* *Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*, Vol. II, Chapter II.

** *Ibid*, p. 18.

what has been said above of blind faith in Gandhi. One of his admiring devotees referred to him as "beloved slave-driver" (p. 558). Gandhi realized at long last that slave-driving may be an agreeable pastime and a great source of strength to a leader, but it does not pay in the long run. For, like ordinary slaves, the slave-followers of Gandhi gradually turned against his leadership and revolted against his authority.

It is not often realized by many that since the failure of the 'Quit India' movement Gandhi's political influence waned more and more as the achievement of freedom approached nearer and nearer. He had very little share in the Congress negotiations with Cripps and practically none in those vital and momentous decisions which finally led to the freedom of India.

That Gandhi played a very great role in rousing the political consciousness of the masses nobody can possibly deny. But it would be a travesty of truth to give him the sole credit for the freedom of India, and sheer nonsense to look upon *Satyagraha* (or *Charka*, according to some) as the unique weapon by which it was achieved. As mentioned above, Gandhi's followers could not wield this weapon forged by him and therefore it never came into play. A successful *Satyagraha*, as conceived by Gandhi, would necessarily mean that the British had given up their hold on India in a mood of repentance or penitence for their past sinful acts in India. But of this we have no evidence whatsoever.

The two great ends of Gandhi's life, to which even the freedom of India was a subordinate one, were to inculcate in the masses the spirit of non-violence and to bring about unity between the Hindus and Muslims by a change of heart. He failed miserably in both and realized it only too well at the fag end of his life. The cult of non-violence never took root in the hearts of the people. Even during the lifetime of Gandhi it was definitely aban-

done by new leaders like Jayaprakash Narayan in 1942, and it has not played any role in Indian politics ever since even under the stewardship of the devoted followers of Gandhi. As regards communal relations Gandhi began his political career by forging the closest bond of amity and co-operation between the Hindus and the Muslims such as had never been witnessed before. But it suffered a complete metamorphosis within a few years, and before Gandhi passed away he had the mortification to witness bitter hatred and hostility between the two communities growing from bad to worse every day—unprecedented in the annals of Indian history after the end of Muslim rule. The failure of his life's task was emphasized by a series of contests between the two communities, accompanied by the most horrible deeds of cruelty of a brutal nature, as if there was a fight between two savage races capable of no thought but that, regardless of all considerations of justice or mercy, their enemies should be exterminated.

The failure of Gandhi to achieve his two great ideals was almost inevitable. In the first case he did not make due allowance for human nature, as it is and always has been. As regards the second, he accepted, as fact, a purely imaginary fraternity, and completely ignored the fundamental differences between the Hindus and Muslims based on history, culture and tradition to which frequent reference has been made in these volumes. But though he failed, his earnest and life-long devotion to these two noble causes evokes our highest admiration, and his precept and example will always be stored as priceless treasures in India. He should not be judged merely by the result of his actions, but the high motive that inspired him should also be taken into account.

The failure to achieve the two great ideals of non-violence and Hindu-Muslim unity led to the failure of Gandhi's third ideal, namely, to maintain the political unity

of India. For the cult of violence and communal strife were mainly responsible for the creation of Pakistan. As usual, Gandhi held fast to his ideal almost till the last, when his dream of a united India was rudely shattered by the action of his own followers. The tragedy of Gandhi's life was that these members of his inner council, who followed him for more than twenty years with unquestioned obedience, took the fatal steps leading to the partition of India without his knowledge, not to speak of his consent. Pyarelal mournfully observes: "Such a thing would have been inconceivable in olden days. Even when he was ranging over the length and breadth of India they did not fail to consult him before taking any vital decision"* Whether Gandhi was right and his followers wrong, does not concern us here. But it certainly shows that reason ultimately took the place of blind faith and devotion to Gandhi.

We may also refer to a few other cherished ideals of Gandhi. One of them was the universal adoption of *Charka* or spinning wheel and *Khaddar* or home-spun cloth. These might be economically helpful to certain classes, but the whole thing was carried to a ridiculous excess when, failing voluntary acceptance, at Gandhi's insistence, regular spinning was endowed with a mystic power and made an essential qualification for the membership of the Indian National Congress, and habitual wearing of *Khaddar* a necessary qualification for holding any office in the Congress organization. This was indeed a unique feature in a political organization, to which posterity will look back with amazement, not unmingled with a certain amount of amusement, as the idiosyncrasy of a great political leader. No wonder, that in popular view the semi-religious cult of *Charka*** shortly came to be regarded as a panacea for all evils—political, economic and social—from which India was suffering. That myth has been exploded and the *Charka* is now

* Ibid, p. 35. ** Known as *Sūtra-Yajña*.

mostly heard of only in connection with the ceremonial function on the death or birth anniversary of Gandhi. But the *Charka* was really a symbol of Gandhi's undisguised contempt for, and open hostility towards, mechanised industry of all kinds, and a yearning to return to the primitive life which India led two thousand years ago. He elaborated these and his other socio-economic ideals in the *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule*, written by him as far back as 1908 or 1909. When G. K. Gokhale, whom Gandhi looked upon as his political *Guru*, read it, he expressed the hope that ere long Gandhi himself would think fit to destroy the book (p. 11). But far from doing so, Gandhi published a reprint of it more than twenty-five years later with the remark that he still upheld the views expressed therein. No doubt some of his concrete suggestions are likely to yield good results, provided they are kept within proper limits. But, as in the case of *Charka*, excessive zeal and undue emphasis on their importance would make some of them useless and sometimes even ridiculous.

The same remark applies to Gandhi's noble efforts for the uplift of the *Harijans*, i.e., the untouchables and the degraded classes in Hindu society. Following the great ideal of *Daridra-Narayan* preached by Swami Vivekananda, Gandhi organized a crusade against this great social iniquity with all his energy. Though the actual success attained by him may not be very great—for the evils are of long standing and of wide extent—there is no doubt that he quickened the social consciousness of the entire Hindu community, gave a concrete shape to the great movement, and securely laid the foundations on which others would be able to build in future. But here, again, his unduly excessive zeal for this side-issue led him to sacrifice the larger interests of the country (p. 475). He also overdid the part of the friend of the poor and the untouchables by travelling in the third class in the railway and occasionally living in the

Bhangi colony in Delhi, causing heavy expenditure to the Government for making his journey and residence comfortable. Sarojini Naidu is said to have once exclaimed: 'if Bapu (Gandhi) had only known what it cost the State to keep him in a state of poverty' ! It would be strange indeed if he had not known it and regarded the amenities which he enjoyed in the third class Railway compartment and in the Bhangi colony as quite normal. We have to remember all these in order to form a proper estimate of Gandhi's personality and, in that light, to judge of his views and activities narrated in this volume.

Next to Gandhi, the most dominant figure in the struggle for India's freedom was undoubtedly Subhas Chandra Bose. His unique personality shone forth when he, alone of all the leading figures in the inner circle of the Congress, kept himself unaffected by the magic charm of Mahatma Gandhi. Hugh Toye, an English biographer of Bose, reckons among the 'undeniable faults' of the latter his assertion "not only that the British were wrong but that Gandhi was wrong, that the Indian struggle had no place for mystics and vague philosophers." Perhaps not a few, and some day many, would regard these very assertions as forming one of Bose's many titles to fame. Few would relish even today Toye's taunting remark that Bose regarded himself "so right that he must escape from poor, enslaved misguided India, in order to save her not only from the British, but from herself." It seems that outraged British sentiments, fuming and fretting over the loss of Indian Empire, have not yet forgiven Bose. Their instinctive recognition of Gandhi as friend and Bose as the worst enemy would one day constitute the greatest tribute to Subhas Bose as the fighter for India's freedom.

The fundamental difference between Gandhi and Subhas Bose is quite obvious. Gandhi's ideal in life was the establishment of *Satyagraha*, and everything else was

secondary ; even the freedom of India had no meaning or value to him in case it involved a sacrifice of this ideal (pp. 602, 613). To Subhas Bose, on the other hand, the freedom of India was the only aim and object in life and no means was too mean for that purpose. Agreement between the two was, therefore, impossible. It is a sad commentary on contemporary politics that most of the Congress leaders *at heart* agreed with Bose in this respect, but sided with Gandhi, even though, as Nehru put it, "they did not agree with his (Gandhi's) philosophy of life or even with many of his ideas, and often did not even understand him" (p. 557). But, as stated above, late in life they revolted against Gandhi and discarded his ideal. Their belated wisdom is a measure of the greatness of Bose, who was never tired of pointing out the right way long before the others would recognize it as such.

The third great figure in the political field during the period under review was Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In order to correctly assess the value of his work, we should not judge him merely from the point of view of the freedom movement in India, as has been done in this volume for obvious reasons. Jinnah, at least in his later life, put up a brave fight. It was, however, a fight not for the freedom of India, except in a very qualified sense, but for the freedom of the Muslims from the tyrannical yoke of the Hindus, as he put it. He won the fight ; the cult of violence decided the issue. To what extent Gandhi's cult of non-violence may claim credit for the freedom of India is a matter of opinion. But there is no doubt that the creation of Pakistan was the triumph of violence—in its naked and most brutal form—and of the leadership of Jinnah. Nobody can reasonably doubt that India would have surely attained independence, sooner or later, even without Gandhi, but it is extremely doubtful whether there would have been a Pakistan without Jinnah. So, if

we are to judge by the result alone, the events of 1946-7 testify to the superiority of violence to non-violence in practical politics, and of Jinnah to the leaders of the Congress. But this affords an illustration of the blunder that is often committed by hasty inference drawn from the immediate result, apparently flowing from a certain course of action, without weighing the force of other circumstances. It ought to serve as a corrective to those who look upon Gandhi as having wrested independence from the British by waving his magic wand of *Satyagraha*. In any case Jinnah stands out as the most successful political leader of the period. Whatever the Hindus might think of Jinnah, he has secured a high place in the history of the Muslim nation, a term at which we can hardly cavil after the foundation of Pakistan. He carried to its logical consummation the work that was begun by Sir Syed Ahmad.

Either by habit or by convention the name of Gandhi alone is in popular view associated with the freedom of India. The truth or justice of this view has been briefly discussed above and in detail in this volume. But incidental reference should be made here to other agencies at work towards the same end. Among these, which are often ignored, I have laid special stress on the revolutionary movements in India and the formation of I.N.A. by Subhas Bose. But it is necessary to remember that the battle for India's freedom was also being fought against Britain, though indirectly, by Hitler in Europe and Japan in Asia. None of these different factors scored direct or complete success, but it is hard to deny that it was the cumulative effect of all these that gained freedom for India.

I have not said much about the Moderate Party after its leaders left the Congress in 1918. The great stalwarts of the Party had mostly passed away, but there still remained some eminent persons who had made valuable contribution to the freedom movement in India.

Surendra Nath Banerji, for example, should always live in history as the father of Indian nationalism, whatever one might think of his views and activities after 1918. But the fact remains that the Moderate leaders did not play any significant role in the movement or struggle for freedom as it shaped itself after 1918. The Moderate leaders, however, contend that their policy of co-operation under the new Reform scheme considerably helped the cause of freedom, and, if sincerely and earnestly followed by the country as a whole, would not have been less fruitful than the policy that was actually pursued.

This raises a controversial issue, namely, whether the achievement of freedom would not have been equally facilitated by following some method other than that pursued by the Congress under the leadership of Gandhi. Such hypothetical questions are always difficult to answer. But it is possible to argue that equal, if not greater, success could have been attained by following the policy of Responsive Co-operation initiated by Tilak and accepted by Gandhi till the end of 1919. Its essence was to accept and work the reforms that were offered, and carry on mass agitation for more and more till the goal was attained. In the circumstances created by the Second World War this procedure would have gained enormous strength and could scarcely have failed in the long run. Whether this process would have involved greater delay nobody can definitely say. But, according to a school of thought, it is very likely that the transfer of power under this process would have been far more smooth and the partition of India, with all its attendant horrors, might, *perhaps*, have been avoided. In any case, they say, it would have saved India from the troubles and evils which necessarily resulted from the sudden transfer of power to the hands of a Party organization without any experience of administration. Such a danger, it may be pointed out, was fully anticipated by

the Congress leaders themselves. Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, had categorically declared that the "Congress as such would automatically cease to exist" after independence.* Gandhi expressed the same view and held that 'the Congress should continue for national welfare from social, moral and economic point of view only, but no member should accept a pay job under the State.'** 'A gradual transfer of power, i.e., transformation of the Executive and the Legislature by systematic grant of more and more power to the elected representatives of the people, was neither theoretically absurd nor an impracticable proposition. But these speculations are at present of little practical value and may be safely left to the verdict of history in future.

It is a great relief to me to have been able to complete the *History of Freedom Movement in India*. Nobody is more conscious than I myself of the many shortcomings in this work which I had to undertake, single-handed, at an advanced age, when my long-cherished project of a co-operative work under the patronage of the Government of India fell through under circumstances, narrated in the Appendix to Vol. I. I can only crave the indulgence of my readers for the many errors of omission and commission in this pioneer work which is only intended to be a basis for a better and more thorough treatment of the subject in future.

I have nothing to add to what I have said in the Prefaces to the first two volumes regarding the scope and nature of this work. So far as the present volume is concerned a word of explanation is necessary in regard to the somewhat disproportionate space allotted to the description of the atrocities committed by the Government during the Civil Disobedience Campaign of 1932. It is always difficult to secure an authentic account of these nefarious deeds, for the people affected are prone to exaggerate, and the Government to minimise the gravity of the crimes perpe-

* *Nehru on Gandhi*, p. 60.

** *Ibid.* Also cf. the 'Last Will and Testament' of Gandhi.

trated in the name of law and order. Fortunately, so far as the atrocities of 1932 are concerned, we have the report of a small Delegation, consisting of three Britishers and one Indian, sent by India League, London. They made a prolonged tour, examined the victims of Government oppression, and submitted a lengthy report, describing the outrages of which they could secure positive evidence. It is difficult to conceive of a more authoritative, independent and impartial body than this Delegation to investigate the allegations against the British rulers in India. As the repressive measures taken by the Government of India against Indian fighters for freedom have been more or less of a uniform pattern, being directed by agencies following the same tradition, the report of this Delegation may be taken as an album of fairly representative pictures depicting the sufferings the Indian patriots had to bear for the sake of their motherland. Curiously enough, though the report of the Delegation was printed, not a single copy, so far as I know, is available in India, though I found one in the Library of the University of Chicago, U.S.A. Evidently, the Government of India took good care to prevent this very damaging report from reaching India. As the Indian readers are not likely to have access to this very important report, I thought it expedient to give copious extracts from it in order to convey some idea of the barbarities practised by the British Government which Bertrand Russell, in his Preface to the printed Report, pronounced to be as abominable as the misdeeds of the Nazis in Germany.

In conclusion, I may draw the attention of my readers to what I have said in the Prefaces to the first two volumes (Vol. I, pp. xiv-xv, xviii-xx ; Vol. II, pp. xvii-xxii) regarding the difficulty of writing on events which are still in the memory of us all. Those observations apply with greater force to the present volume which deals with some leading figures who are still alive or have died during the life-

time of most of my readers. Passions and prejudices die hard and personal opinions, once formed, are not likely to be altered soon. It is, therefore, not unlikely that the views I have expressed may not commend themselves to any, and perhaps a large section of my countrymen would bitterly resent some of them. But I find consolation in the wise saying of one of the greatest Sanskrit poets to the effect, that 'there may be somewhere, at some time, somebody who would agree with my views and appreciate them ; for time is eternal and the world is wide and large'. I may assure my readers that it has been a very painful task to have to comment adversely on the views and actions of some of our great leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who are held in the highest veneration. I shall not be surprised if what I have said about them hurts the feelings of many. My only excuse is that it is impossible to avoid all such comments in writing on a subject such as is treated in this book. I may, however, assure my readers that I have always tried to tell the truth, and in doing so followed no other guide than the light of my own judgment, sincerely formed, with malice to none and goodwill to all, and without any personal or ulterior motive of any kind.

I take this opportunity to express my obligations to my daughter Sumitra Chaudhuri, B A , for preparing the Index, to the Natun Press for the expeditious printing—more than two thousand pages in less than twenty months—, and to the staff of the National Library, Calcutta, for the uniform kindness, courtesy and help I have received from them.

BOOK IV

NON-CO-OPERATION AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

CHAPTER I.

THE YEAR 1919

The year 1919 may be looked upon as an *annus mirabilis* which marked a definite stage in the history of India's struggle for freedom. It was memorable for four outstanding events which shaped India's future relations with Britain. These are :

1. The Rowlatt Bills and their consequence—the reign of terror in the Panjab, culminating in Jallianwalla Bagh massacre and barbarous enforcement of martial law in the Panjab.

2. The emergence of M. K. Gandhi of Satyagraha fame in South Africa as the political leader in India.

3. The passing of the Government of India Act on the basis of the Montford Report.

4. Revival of Pan-Islamism as a force in Indian politics.

Although these factors were inter-connected to a certain extent, it will be convenient to deal with them separately even at the risk of some repetition.

I. ROWLATT BILLS

In pursuance of the policy of reform cum repression or vice versa, followed by Lord Minto and Lord Hardinge, Lord Chelmsford, as mentioned above,¹ appointed a committee to investigate into the revolutionary movement and recommend legislation that may be deemed necessary to suppress it. The Committee was presided over by Mr. Justice Rowlatt of U. K., and consisted of four other members, two of whom were Indians and two, British

officials in India. The Committee prepared a detailed account of the revolutionary movement in India on the basis of the materials supplied by the Government of India, and the legislation recommended by it was based on the draft prepared by the same Government to replace ~~the~~ Defence of India Act which would automatically cease to be operative after the end of the World War. Montagu had warned Justice Rowlatt that the plan already hatched by the Government of India was a plan of "Government by means of internment and police",^{1a} but in vain. After making a detailed survey of the revolutionary movement in different parts of India, which has been described above,² the Committee recommended special legislation which sought to curtail the liberty of the people in a drastic manner.³ Two Bills were prepared on the basis of these recommendations.⁴ The one that was actually passed into law, namely the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, 1919, provided for speedy trial of offences by a Special Court, consisting of three High Court Judges. There was no appeal from the decision of this Court, which could meet *in camera* and take into consideration evidence not admissible under the Indian Evidence Act. The Provincial Government could order any person, *on suspicion*, "to furnish security or to notify his residence, or to reside in a particular area or to abstain from any specified act, or finally to report himself to the police". The Provincial Government was also given powers to search a place and arrest a suspected person without warrant and keep him in confinement, "in such place and under such conditions and restrictions as it may specify." The Bill was strenuously opposed throughout the country by Indians of all shades of political opinion. They argued that apart from serious objections to such legislation in time of peace, when the revolutionary crimes were already on the decline, it was

the height of unwisdom to undertake it at a time when the constitutional reforms were in the offing,—for it was sure to destroy even the slender chance, if any, that these reforms might offer to improve the political situation in India. On the other hand it was urged by the Government that India might be well described as almost in a state of unarmed revolt, and the underground revolutionary movement, spreading over a wide region in India, was far from being rooted out altogether. This view of the Government cannot be brushed aside altogether. Subsequent events have shown that the revolutionary crimes always increased after the withdrawal of coercive legislation, and it can hardly be gainsaid that there was no peace but an undeclared war in India against the British rule. From the point of view of the security of British rule in India—the main consideration which determined the policy of the Government of India—their action cannot be summarily pronounced to be either unjust or unwise. The real point of criticism is that they never realized the true import or significance of the situation from the point of view of nationalist India. But no autocratic Government has ever realized it in time, though wise men pointed out the real nature and solution of the problem. Lord Morley declared with truth that “the best way to get rid of Sinn Fein was to grant self-government to Ireland.” But he never thought of his own remedy while he was responsible for putting down Sinn Feinism in India. The Home (British) Government took nearly a century to realize this truth in respect of Ireland, and not until the situation was well out of hand. One could hardly blame the Government of India for not realizing it in course of a decade.

As could be easily anticipated, numerous public meetings were held to protest against this lawless law. All the non-official Indian members of the Indian

Legislative Council were united in opposing the measure, and four of them resigned by way of protest. Indeed such a unique opposition of Indians to a Government measure was never witnessed since the Partition of Bengal. But the Government of India, like the Bourbons in France, never benefited from past experience and remained adamant. The Bill was passed on 18th March—the officials alone voting in its favour—and placed on the Statute Book on March 21, 1919. The most curious part of the whole episode is that while the new Act practically remained a dead letter—thus falsifying the anticipations and arguments of both its framers and opponents—it brought into lime-light a political leader who was destined to achieve world-wide fame and distinction such as has seldom been the lot of any non-official political leader in any country. This was Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi who has shed lustre on India's struggle for freedom.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF GANDHI AS POLITICAL LEADER OF INDIA

1. Early Career in South Africa

M. K. Gandhi was born on 2 October, 1869, in a well-to-do family at Porbandar, in Kathiawar Peninsula (Gujarat). In 1888 he proceeded to England and qualified himself for the Bar. In 1891 he began to practise in the Courts, but was a complete failure as a lawyer both in Rajkot and Bombay. In Bombay he was insulted by the English Political Agent of the Kathiawar States. "This shock", says Gandhi in his autobiography, "changed the course of my life."⁵ Anxious to escape, he accepted the offer of a firm of Porbandar Muslims to act as their lawyer in South Africa for a year. Gandhi arrived in Natal in May, 1893. Once while going to Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal, he entered a First Class compartment in

the train. He was asked by the Railway officials to go to the Van compartment. As he refused, he was forcibly thrown out with his luggage and had to sit the whole night in the waiting room. Years later, when asked about "the most creative experiences in his life", Gandhi referred to this incident.

There was nothing unusual in the humiliating treatment meted out to Gandhi. For, the two lakhs of Indians who lived in South Africa in 1893 were subjected to all kinds of insults and indignities, and were described in the Statute books as "Semi-barbarous Asiatics". When the South African Government introduced a Bill to deprive the Indians of their right to elect members to the Natal Legislative Assembly, Gandhi organized a campaign against it. Though the Bill was passed, a new life was infused into the Indians under the leadership of Gandhi.

An incident occurred in 1896 which gave a foretaste of the mettle that the new leader was made of. During his stay in India in that year Gandhi had issued a pamphlet describing the humiliations imposed upon the Indians in South Africa, which enraged the Whites in that country. On his return to Natal (December, 1896) Gandhi was informed, even before he and his family left the steamer, that his life was in danger. He was advised to land at dusk when the Port Superintendent would escort them home. Gandhi sent his wife and children in a carriage, but refusing to enter the city like a thief at dusk, walked on foot. As soon as he landed, a crowd gathered round him and pelted him with stones, brickbats and rotten eggs. Then they began to batter and kick him, and even when he fainted, they continued boxing and battering him. The wife of the Police Superintendent, who was passing by, came to his rescue, and saved his life.

In spite of all this Gandhi formed an Ambulance Corps to aid the British during the Boer War and rendered

great service which was highly applauded. He hoped that this voluntary service would appeal to the South Africans' sense of fair play and moderate the hostility of the Whites to coloured Asiatics. But he was soon undeceived. For, instead of decreasing, the tension waxed. Yet Gandhi joined the British army with a platoon of 24 Indian stretcher bearers during the Zulu rebellion of 1906. He volunteered, he said, because "the British empire existed for the welfare of the world", and he had a "genuine sense of loyalty" to it.

But ere long Gandhi's loyalty was shaken by a new Act which required all Indians in Transvaal to get themselves registered with finger prints like criminals, on pain of severe penalties. Gandhi again took the lead in opposing it. After exhausting all peaceful means of redress such as petitions, deputations, interviews and correspondence, he decided to defy the law, by refusing to register, give fingerprints, and receive permits. On September 11, 1906, Gandhi addressed a mass meeting at Johannesburg and called upon the assembled people—about three thousand in number—to resist the insulting ordinance, called by them 'Black Act', and go to jail, or, if need be, die. The people took an oath to resist the law at all costs.

This was the beginning of that movement, technically known as *Satyagraha*, which is similar to Passive Resistance with the difference that it eschewed violence of any kind in thought, words, and deed at any stage.

The scope of *Satyagraha* campaign was extended to fight against two other disabilities newly imposed—one prohibiting the entry of the Indians into Transvaal and another declaring all Indian marriages to be illegal. Women joined *Satyagraha* and a large number, including both Gandhi and his wife, was sent to prison. About 6,000 Indian miners in New Castle went on sympathetic strike, and would not yield even though they were driven from their lodgings

and had to live in the open with their women and children. Gandhi put himself at their head, and on October 28, 1913, marched with more than two thousand men, 127 women, and 57 children to the border of Transvaal to offer *Satyagraha*. Gandhi was arrested and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment. The strikers were also arrested and taken back to New Castle. "The labourers were brave men, and they flatly declined to work on the mines with the result that they were brutally whipped.....(and) kicked.....But the poor labourers patiently put up with all their tribulations." There were strikes and *Satyagrahas* by women in other places in sympathy with New Castle miners. The Government resorted to firing which resulted in a number of casualties. The whole Indian community rose as one man against the tyranny of the Whites.

The grim struggle was being watched with sympathy and admiration in India, and even the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, entered a vigorous protest on behalf of the Indians. Ultimately, the South African Government realized that they could not "put twenty thousand Indians in jail", and arrived at a settlement with Gandhi by removing some of the glaring indignities and iniquities suffered by the Indians in South Africa. The *Satyagraha* campaign, which had commenced in September, 1906, came to an end with the passing of the Indian Relief Act of 1914.⁶

2. Satyagraha

As the new principle and technique of *Satyagraha*, which Gandhi initiated with success in South Africa, formed the dominant element in India's struggle for freedom since 1919, it is necessary to explain briefly its nature and significance. This is by no means an easy task. For, in the first place, *Satyagraha* is a blend of philosophical, ethical and mystic elements which it is not easy to comprehend for those who are uninitiated in the principle and its practice.

Secondly, *Satyagraha*, in its final form, was the result of a gradual evolution, even in the mind of Gandhi, during a period extending over more than thirty years. Gandhi himself has expounded it on different occasions in many different ways in his writings, speeches and actions.

Thirdly, a voluminous literature has grown up on the philosophy of *Satyagraha* treating it from a mystic, psychological or religious point of view, which is not material to our present purpose. I shall therefore confine myself to the general features of *Satyagraha* as a guiding principle or moving force in political actions of masses or individuals.

The aim of *Satyagraha* is the conversion of the opponent to one's own view by self-suffering, and not by violence. How it triumphs over the opponent is thus described : "It involves self-chosen suffering and humiliation for the resisters. If it is effective, it is so by working on the conscience of those against whom it is being used, sapping their confidence in the exclusive rightness of their case, making their physical strength impotent, and weakening their resolution by insinuating a sense of guilt for the sufferings they have a part in causing."⁷

Gandhi originally described his movement in South Africa as 'Passive Resistance'. The word *Satyagraha* was deliberately substituted for it later, both because Gandhi felt ashamed to use an English word and also because he wanted to emphasize that there was an essential difference between his movement and the Passive Resistance. As Gandhi himself put it : "*Satyagraha* differs from Passive Resistance as the North Pole from the South. The latter has been conceived as a weapon of the weak and does not exclude the use of physical force or violence for the purpose of gaining one's end ; whereas the former has been conceived as a weapon of the strongest, and excludes the use of violence in any shape or form."⁸

This is further elucidated by a staunch follower of

Gandhi in the following words : "Passive Resistance is a weapon of the weak. It does not eschew violence as a matter of principle, but only because of the lack of the means of violence or out of sheer expediency. It would use arms if and when they are available, or when there is a reasonable chance of success. Love has no place in it. Satyagraha, on the other hand, is the law of love, the way of love for all."⁹

Non-violence, which forms the very basis of *Satyagraha*, is thus expounded by Gandhi : "When a person claims to be non-violent, he is expected not to be angry with one who has injured him. He will not wish him harm ; he will wish him well ; he will not swear at him ; he will not cause him any physical hurt. He will put up with all the injury to which he is subjected by the wrong-doer. Thus non-violence is complete innocence. Complete non-violence is complete absence of ill-will against all that lives. It therefore embraces even sub-human life, not excluding noxious insects or beasts....

"In contradistinction to passive resistance, *Satyagraha* is the law of love, the way of love for all. It eschews violence absolutely as a matter of principle, at all stages and in all forms. It can never go hand in hand with any kind of violent activity involving injury to person or property. The idea behind it is not to destroy or harass the opponent, but to convert him or win him over by sympathy, patience, and self-suffering. Whilst *Satyagraha* hates all evil and would never compromise with it, it approaches the evil-doer through love. The *Satyagrahi* has infinite trust in human nature and in its inherent goodness."¹⁰

Thus the basic assumption of *Satyagraha* is the essential goodness of human nature which is bound to triumph over temporary aberration if faced with love and self-suffering on the part of his opponent or rather the victim of that temporary aberration. In a more philosophic

phraseology it is the triumph of the soul-force over the brute-force. Gandhi emphasized the fact that the very high ideal of *Satyagraha* could be practised by even the common people for achieving their political ends. Thus he said : "I am not a visionary. I claim to be a practical idealist. The religion of non-violence is not meant merely for the *rishis* and saints. It is meant for the common people as well. Non-violence is the law of our species as violence is the law of the brute".

Gandhi himself has referred to non-co-operation and civil resistance (meaning probably the same thing as Civil Disobedience) as the two offshoots of *Satyagraha*. In addition to these two the *hartal* (temporary strike), purificatory fast, picketing, non-violent raids or marches (as on salt depots in 1930), and fasting, either for a short and fixed period or unto death, are also reckoned by some to be forms of *Satyagraha*. Examples of all of these will occur in course of the narrative of events and need not be described here in detail.

3. *Satyagraha* in India •

Gandhi left South Africa for good and returned to India in January, 1915. He seems to have been almost completely out of touch with the currents of political life in India after the *Swadeshi* movement. His views on it have been quoted above¹¹, but it is somewhat strange that he was unacquainted with the ideology of Arabinda, specially the Passive Resistance. According to his own confession he imbibed the ideas of Passive Resistance from the writings of Tolstoy and Thoreau, but he never refers to Arabinda Ghose who propounded in detail the ideas of passive resistance and non-co-operation at the very moment when he (Gandhi) was carrying on the campaign of *Satyagraha* in South Africa.¹² Even when thousands of Indian youths were carrying on a life and death struggle to get

rid of the British yoke, and the Government of Lord Minto was passing measures of repression one after another, Gandhi felt "a genuine sense of loyalty to the British Government" and accordingly volunteered his services during the Zulu rebellion of 1906. "I bore no grudge against the Zulus, they had harmed no Indians. I had doubts about the rebellion itself". So wrote Gandhi, but yet he offered to form an Indian Ambulance Corps to aid the Natal Government, which had passed the most humiliating laws against the Indian settlers. Gandhi justified his action by saying, "I then believed that the British Empire existed for the welfare of the world. A genuine sense of loyalty prevented me from even wishing ill to the Empire."¹³

While a crusade for *Swaraj* or political emancipation was convulsing India, Gandhi was preoccupied with the social and ethical future of the Indians. His idea of *Swaraj* was very different. In his book *Hind Swaraj*, written in 1908 in Gujrati, he cared little whether India achieved her political goal and became a self-governing colony like Canada, and also decried the attempt to set up in India the parliamentary form of democratic government such as obtained in Great Britain.¹⁴ Indeed the *Hind Swaraj* depicts an ideal of *Swaraj* and civilisation to which it would be difficult for most Indians of this century to subscribe. When Gokhale saw the English translation of this book in 1912 "he thought it so crude and hastily conceived that he prophesied that Gandhi himself would destroy the book after spending a year in India."¹⁵ But his prophecy did not prove true. For even in 1938 Gandhi wrote: "I might change the language here and there, if I had to rewrite the booklet. But after the stormy thirty years through which I have since passed, I have seen nothing to make me alter the views expounded in it."¹⁶

Gandhi's loyalty to the British—a loyalty impervious to the wave of nationalism that was sweeping over India—would have struck dumb even the most moderate of the Moderates in Indian politics. On 9 October, 1908, he wrote to the Governor of Madras: "I should be uninterested in the fact as to who rules (India), the important consideration being how he ruled." At that very moment Indians of all shades of public opinion looked upon self-government as their immediate or ultimate goal, and repeated the dictum of a British Prime Minister, uttered only a few years before, that "good government was never a substitute for self-government." During the First World War, while in England, he was opposed to those Indians who wanted to take advantage of Britain's need to serve the interests of their country. He formed an Ambulance Corps whose members suffered all kinds of insult and humiliation at the hands of the British.

On his arrival in India in January, 1915, Gandhi himself realized that he was a misfit in politics, and accepted Gokhale as his political *guru*. Gokhale was deeply impressed by his wide and liberal humanism (though not by his political ideas) and was keen on admitting him to the 'Servants of India Society'. But the other members of the Society did not like the idea on account of the great difference between their methods and ideals and those of Gandhi, who thereupon set up an *Ashram* at Ahmadabad on the banks of the Sabarmati (1915).

The main object of this *Ashram* was to acquaint India with the method of Satyagraha. The first opportunity came when in 1917 the Viceroy Lord Chelmsford refused permission to Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya to introduce a Bill for the immediate abolition of the Indenture system by which Indian labourers had practically to work as slaves in British plantations. Gandhi took up the challenge and started a campaign for abolition of the

system before 31 July, 1917. Before that date the Government announced that further recruitment would be stopped as a special war measure under the Defence of India Act. No occasion therefore arose to put *Satyagraha* to test.

Gandhi next came into conflict with the Government by taking up the cause of the peasants of Champaran, in Bihar, who were being ruthlessly oppressed by the Indigo-planters. Joined by some local leaders, Gandhi proceeded to make an inquiry on the spot. He was served with a notice to quit the place, but he defied the order. He was tried in the Court on 18 April, 1917, but the case was withdrawn by the Government. Gandhi thereupon proceeded with his inquiry which revealed such staggering facts about the oppression practised by the indigo-planters on the cultivators that the Government abolished the iniquitous system by legislation. This was the first triumph of Gandhi's *Satyagraha* movement in India. It may be pointed out that more than fifty years before, the indigo-cultivators obtained a similar victory in Bengal against the planters.¹⁷

The next scene of Gandhi's activity was Ahmadabad. The mill-hands there had been agitating for a long time for an increase of pay, and Gandhi advised them to go on strike. They agreed to eschew violence and took a pledge not to resume work until their terms were accepted or the mill-owners agreed to refer the matter to arbitration. For two weeks everything went on well, but then the strikers lost their zeal and began 'to totter'. Thereupon Gandhi told the mill-hands assembled in a meeting, that unless they rally and continue the strike till a settlement is reached, or till they leave the mills altogether, he will not touch any food. This fast, the precursor of many that were to follow, had the desired effect, both upon the labourers as well as upon the mill-owners, and a settlement was reached after 21 days' strike.¹⁸

Immediately after the strike was over Gandhi plunged himself heart and soul into a *Satyagraha* campaign at Kheda (or Kaira) District. Under the Land Revenue Rules, the cultivators were entitled to suspension of the revenue assessment if the yield of the crops fell below 25 per cent. The cultivators claimed that this was the case, but the Government officials denied and refused the popular demand for arbitration. When all attempts to settle the matter failed Gandhi advised the cultivators to resort to *Satyagraha*. They took pledge not to pay the revenue and suffer all the consequences, including attachment of movables and forfeiture of lands. Gandhi was joined by a number of public men including Vallabhbhai Patel. In spite of occasional lapses the cultivators stood firm. Their fear of officials passed away ; they stood up against threats of coercion and intimidation by them and even faced with equanimity attachments of their property and notices for forfeiture of land. The Government was ultimately forced to offer terms which were acceptable to the cultivators.¹⁹

4. Agitation against Rowlatt Bills

In spite of his loyalty to the British and a strong dislike to embarrass the Government by pressing the demands for Home Rule during the War, Gandhi made it clear to the Viceroy, as indeed his activities at Kheda and Champaran clearly showed, that he would not tolerate "the tyranny and wrong-doing of the officials." True to his principle Gandhi had no hesitation in deciding to offer *Satyagraha* if the Bills to give effect to the recommendations of the Rowlatt Committee were passed into law. In spite of his earnest pleading with the Viceroy, one of the two Bills was passed on 18 March, 1919. In the meantime Gandhi had called a small conference attended by about twenty persons, including Vallabhbhai Patel and Sarojini Naidu. The *Satyagraha* pledge was drafted and signed by

all present on 24 February, 1919.

The pledge read as follows :-

"Being conscientiously of opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill No. I of 1919 and the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill No. II of 1919 are unjust, subversive of the principles of liberty and justice and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals on which the safety of the community as a whole and the state itself is based, we solemnly affirm that in the event of these bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as a Committee, to be hereafter appointed, may think fit, and we further affirm that in this struggle, we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property."²⁰

A separate body called *Satyagraha Sabha* was established with Gandhi as its President, and its headquarters were fixed at Bombay. Bulletins were issued, public meetings were held and more people signed the *Satyagraha* pledge. Gandhi also proposed that the country should observe a general *hartal*—all the people should suspend business for a day, and observe it as one of fasting and prayer as a fitting preliminary to *Satyagraha* which is a process of self-purification.²¹ The idea was welcomed by Rajagopal-achari and others, and Gandhi drafted a brief appeal. The date of the *hartal* was fixed on 30th March, 1919, but was subsequently changed to 6th April. Gandhi's appeal for *hartal* met with a wonderful response all over India. It began at Delhi on March 30, the date originally fixed, as the notice of change reached too late. It was a unique success, but the Police checked the procession by opening fire which caused many casualties. Similar was the case in other localities such as Lahore and Amritsar and urgent invitations by wire came to Gandhi to visit those localities. Thus the *hartal* of 6th April, 1919,

marked out Gandhi as the all-India leader. The blood of the martyrs soon consecrated him as the uncrowned King of India.

5. The Jallianwalla Bagh and Martial Law in the Panjab

Gandhi's leadership was severely put to the test during the great upheaval that followed his call to observe *hartal* all over India on April 6. Report of successful *hartal* came from all quarters. It is not possible to refer to them all, but a few may be described as typical. Gandhi was himself present in Bombay and the *hartal* in that city was a complete success. In the morning thousands, after a bath in the sea at Chaupatty, marched in a procession to Thakurdvar. The Muslim citizens also joined the procession in large numbers and they took some of the Hindu leaders to a neighbouring mosque where Mrs. Naidu and Gandhi delivered speeches. It was suggested that the people should take the pledges of Swadeshi and Hindu-Muslim unity then and there. Gandhi rejected the proposal on the ground that such pledges should be taken only after "due deliberation, and suggested that those who wanted to take them should assemble on the following morning. His wisdom and insight were proved when only a few persons turned up next day to take the pledges. It indicated a great drawback in the popular movements in India, namely, enthusiasm for exciting work but indifference, if not positive dislike, for sustained and constructive efforts. Another characteristic feature of the Bombay *hartal* was the beginning of Civil Disobedience by the sale of two proscribed books written by Gandhi which sold like hot cakes.

But the *hartal* did not pass off so smoothly in Delhi, where, as mentioned above, it was prematurely held on March 30. There were clashes between the police and the people, the military fired upon the crowd, killing a few

and wounding a large number. This also happened in other localities.

Swami Shraddhananda, 'a man of irreproachable character, and held in the highest esteem all over India, submitted a written statement about the happenings at Delhi which may be summed up as follows :-

'A notice to the following effect was posted and circulated at Delhi : "The 30th of March should be observed as a day of mourning, all business and shops should be closed, and one should spend the day in wishing well for the country, in reforming his own mind and in philanthropic work. Every woman, man, and child should attend the meeting at 5 O'clock." At about 2 O'clock the people who were asking the shops at the Railway station to be closed were threatened by a European Railway official. When he was told that it was no business of his to interfere, he whistled to the police who arrested two men. The people said that if their men were given up they would go away. Then the police began to belabour them with sticks, and soldiers with a machine gun were arriving. As soon as this report was conveyed to me by some gentlemen who had come running from the Railway station, I proceeded there and heard that the machine gun had fired indiscriminately and about a dozen had either been killed or wounded, the bodies being dragged into the Station yard.

'I addressed a public meeting which was attended by about 50,000 people, and asked the huge audience to follow me and disperse quietly to their homes. When we approached the Clock Tower we found the Gurkhas in the middle of the road, in double file, facing both ways. On seeing us they moved to the right foot-board, but as soon as we came near them a rifle was fired into the crowd. There was a great commotion but I pacified the men and went alone to the Goorkhas and asked them why they were .

firing on innocent people. They pointed two rifles at me and said "tom ko ched denge" (we will pierce you). I was clad in my *sanyasi* dress and, standing quietly before them, said, "*main khada hun, goli maro*" (I am standing, fire). At once eight or ten more rifles were aimed at my breast and insolent threats continued to be made. The crowd was about to rush, saying: "Let us die, and not you", when I stopped them by waving my hand and reminding them of their vow. After I had stood there for three minutes with the rifles pointed at my breast, a European officer came and asked the solitary policeman present there whether he had ordered firing. I then left with the people following me.

'The dead bodies and the wounded were removed to the Police Hospital. The English nurses refused to attend them, saying: "They have been well served. They are rebels and we won't attend on them", or words to that effect. It was only after a deputation had waited on the Chief Commissioner that the dead bodies were delivered to their relations and the wounded were taken to the civil hospital and properly dressed'.¹²

Delhi observed also the *hartal* on April 6. More than 10,000 people assembled that day and there were more than eight overflow meetings. Popular excitement ran very high, both at Delhi and Amritsar; so the local leaders invited Gandhi to visit these places as they expected his presence to have a pacifying effect on the people. The Government, however, thought otherwise.

On the night of April 7 Gandhi started for Delhi and Amritsar. Before the train had reached Palwal Station, about forty miles from Delhi, he was served with a written order prohibiting him from entering the boundary of the Panjab as his presence was likely to disturb the peace of the Province. Gandhi was asked to get down, but refused to do so. At Palwal he was taken out by the police and put in a train for Bombay under police escort, on 10 April.

As soon as Gandhi reached Bombay he was set free, but was told that the news of his arrest had roused the people to a pitch of mad frenzy and an outbreak was apprehended every minute at Pydhuni. So Gandhi proceeded there and the huge crowd, mad with joy, formed a procession. There was a body of mounted Police, and brickbats were raining down from above, but nothing untoward happened until the procession was stopped by a body of mounted Police who had arrived there to prevent it from proceeding further towards the Fort area. The crowd had almost broken through the Police cordon, when the Officer-in-charge gave the order to disperse the crowd. At once the mounted party charged upon the densely packed crowd brandishing their lances as they went. The lances just grazed the car of Gandhi, when the lancers swiftly passed by, blindly cutting their way through that seething mass of humanity. Some got trampled under foot, others were badly mauled and crushed.


Disturbances had also broken out at Ahmadabad as the rumour spread that not only Gandhi but Anasuya Ben had also been put under arrest. The mill-hands were infuriated at her rumoured arrest, struck work and committed acts of incendiarism and violence, and a sergeant had been done to death. The officers fired on the crowd several times and placed Ahmadabad under martial law. Gandhi proceeded to Ahmadabad and learnt that an attempt had been made to pull up the rails near the Nadiad railway station, and that a Government officer had been murdered in Viramgam. With the permission of the Government Gandhi held a public meeting on April 13, and tried to bring home to the people the sense of their wrong. He declared a penitential fast of three days for himself, and appealed to the people to go on a similar fast for a day. He also asked those who had committed acts of violence to confess their guilt and the Government to condone their crimes. But there was no response from either side. Peace was, however, restored.

According to Hunter Committee's Report, "two officials were killed, among the rioters 28 are known to have been killed and 123 wounded. It is probable there were other casualties. Telegraph wires were cut at eight places in Ahmadabad and at fourteen places outside. The value of the property destroyed by the rioters at Ahmadabad was approximately nine and a half lakhs of Rupees."

Gandhi did not mince matters. He recounted the misdeeds of the people in a speech at Ahmadabad on 14 April, 1919, in the following words : "I have said times without number that *Satyagraha* admits of no violence, no pillage, no incendiarism, and still in the name of *Satyagraha* we burnt down buildings, forcibly captured weapons, extorted money, stopped trains, cut off telegraph wires, killed innocent people and plundered shops and private houses. If deeds such as these could save me from the prison house or the scaffold, I should not like to be saved."²³

From Ahmadabad Gandhi proceeded to Nadiad. As he saw the actual state of things there and received reports, it suddenly dawned upon him that he had committed a grave error in calling upon the people to launch a campaign of Civil Disobedience. He felt that a *Satyagrahi* must scrupulously obey all laws; for only then does the right accrue to him of the civil disobedience of certain laws in well-defined circumstances. No one had a right to adopt *Satyagraha* before he had thoroughly qualified himself for it, and Gandhi realized that his error lay in his failure to observe this necessary limitation. It was in this connection that Gandhi said that he was guilty of a 'Himalayan miscalculation'.²⁴

As a result of these reflections, reproduced as far as possible in his own words, Gandhi suspended the Civil Disobedience and decided not to re-start it on a mass scale without creating a band of well-tries, pure-hearted volunteers who thoroughly understood the strict conditions of *Satyagraha*, could explain them to the people, and by sleepless vigilance



keep them on the right path. Accordingly, he went to Bombay and raised a corps of *Satyagrahi* volunteers through the *Satyagraha Sabha*. But Gandhi found that people took little interest in the peaceful side of *Satyagraha*. The number of volunteers dwindled and even those who remained did not take a regular training.

There were many who were unhappy over Gandhi's decision to suspend *Satyagraha*. They felt that if all-round peace was regarded as a condition precedent to *Satyagraha*, mass-*Satyagraha* would be an impossibility. Gandhi, however, held the view that those who wanted to lead the people to *Satyagraha* ought to be able to keep them within the limited non-violence expected of them.

In the meantime events were moving fast in the Panjab. In order to properly assess the situation it is necessary to remember the part played by the Lieutenant-Governor Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who had exasperated the whole Province by his cruel recruiting campaigns, his ruthless suppression of the people, and insults heaped upon the educated classes. He interned hundreds of local men with little or no cause. He gagged the vernacular press and prevented the nationalist papers published outside the Panjab from entering the Province. As already mentioned above, he was hated by the people for his arbitrary methods of collecting funds and forcible recruiting of men for the army. One of the devices adopted by him was to force "Lambardars (land-owners) to furnish recruits on the penalty of forfeiting their rights to the land."²⁵ All this caused so much popular resentment that during the special session of the Congress at Bombay (1918) delegates from the Panjab told their fellow-delegates how "they were living over a volcano, which any act of exceptional tyranny might cause to burst out".²⁶

This proved to be a prophetic utterance and the volcano burst out soon after the *hartal* of April 6. Within a week a considerable part of the Panjab was aflame and the authorities

put down the " rebellion " with such measures as no civilized Government in modern times has ever been known to take against its own subjects.

Fortunately for history, a thorough inquiry was made into the whole affair by two Committees, one official (Presided by Lord Hunter), and another appointed by the Congress, within a year of its occurrence. A perusal of these two Reports together with statements of reliable persons made at the time enable one to form a fairly accurate idea of the main trends of events. It is neither possible nor necessary to give a detailed account of even the most important incidents that took place in various localities. It will suffice to give a short account of the incidents at Lahore, Kasur and Gujranwala to serve as typical examples, and make a somewhat detailed reference to the events of Amritsar.

i. Lahore.

The news of Gandhi's arrest created great excitement on April 10. All the shops and business places were immediately closed. About 200 or 300 students, while proceeding towards the Mall, were stopped by the Police near the High Court. They neither moved forward nor turned back. Thereupon Mr. Foyson, the District Magistrate ordered firing, and two volleys were fired. Two or three were killed and a few wounded. In the meanwhile another crowd was collected near the Lahari Gate. Pandit Rambhuj Datta requested the Magistrate to give him some time so that he might induce the men to disperse peacefully. Ten minutes' time was allowed and at the end of this period, people were about to disperse. Mr. Datta, reminded by the Magistrate that the time-limit had passed, asked him to wait for a few minutes as a vast crowd of ten to fifteen thousand would naturally take some time to disperse. Only two minutes were allowed, and after the expiry of this, even while the crowd, sitting on the road, stood up to disperse, fire was opened upon them,

bullets beside buckshots being used. A few died and many were injured.

On Friday, the 11th April, a meeting was held in the Badshahi mosque, and the *hartal* was continued. Next day, the 12th, another meeting was held in the same place. An Inspector of the C. I. D. remarked before the commencement of the meeting : "Is this mosque of God's house or Satan's" ? This provoked the people who beat him. Otherwise the meeting, attended by about 30,000 people, passed off smoothly. But when the meeting was over the people found that the mosque and its approaches were surrounded by the Military and the Police. It is said that a brickbat thrown by the crowd struck the horse of the Officer Commanding. Immediately nine shots were successively fired at Lala Khusiram, a student in the Sastri class and he fell dead. His dead body was taken to the cremation ground in a procession of 50,000. The exact number of the dead could not be ascertained.²⁷

ii. Gujranwala.

The trouble started over the killing of a calf and hanging it on a railway bridge. It was alleged that the Police did it by way of insulting the Hindus. On April 14 a big crowd surrounded a train, stoned it, and burnt two railway bridges including the one mentioned above. The crowd then set fire to the telegraph office, post-office, railway station, Dak Bungalow, the office of the Collector, a railway shed, a church and a school.²⁸

iii. Kasur.

In Kasur the violence of the crowd took a more serious turn. It is alleged that the people got excited by the conduct of the police and were highly provoked. In any case the crowd got entirely out of control on April 12, burnt the main post-office, Munsiff's office and a small

oil shed, did considerable damage to the Railway station signal and telegraph wires, and did other acts of rowdyism. They also attacked a train and beat two European soldiers to death.²⁹

iv. Amritsar

The *hartals* on March 30 and April 6 passed off smoothly, even though the people were highly provoked by the order served upon the two popular leaders, Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew, not to address public meetings. The huge procession of the *Ramnavami* festival also passed off smoothly on the 9th. The Deputy Commissioner said in his evidence: "As a rule they were very civil, every car in the procession stopped in front of me and the band played, God save the King."³⁰ The Congress Committee remarked: "We felt tempted to say that O'Dwyer invited violence from the people so that he could crush them." This seems to be justified by facts. On that very day, 9th April, O'Dwyer's Government issued orders for the deportation of Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew, and they were quietly taken from their homes on the 10th morning. At about midday the news spread in the city. *Hartal* was declared and a not very large crowd of demonstrators marched through the principal streets of the city, towards the Bungalow of the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar to plead for the release of the prisoners. There being a cattle and horse show at Amritsar in connection with the Vaisakhi fair, many people of the agriculturist class from outside the city attended it and they also joined the demonstration. On their way the crowd came to know of the forcible repatriation of Gandhi from the borders of the Panjab by the order of the Government. This created great commotion, but nevertheless the crowd marched peacefully, and did not molest or take any notice of the Europeans whom it met on the way. But the crowd was checked at the Railway level-crossing, called the Hall Gate Bridge, and though the crowd was quite unarmed,

not having even 'sticks, or *lathis*,' firing was resorted to. "Several people were killed and wounded. The crowd then rushed back to the city, infuriated by the sight of their dead and wounded comrades on the ground and the action of the authorities, who had dealt in this manner with a demonstration which set out with peaceful intentions.

"Thereafter followed a series of brutal acts of violence on the part of the coarser elements in the mob, which had got entirely out of hand. Five Europeans were murdered and several buildings, including the telephone exchange, two banks, the Town Hall, and the Indian Christian Church, were attacked and fired, and, in some instances, destroyed. Three of those killed were officials of the National Bank and the Chartered Bank. A lady missionary doctor, Miss Sherwood, was set upon by the mob, struck with sticks and fists, and left unconscious in the street. She was subsequently rescued by some Indians, who took her into a house and cared for her until she was restored to her friends. Later, the crowd again attempted to pass the Hall Gate Bridge, and were fired upon, with twenty to thirty casualties. The telegraph wires were cut and two railway stations outside the city were attacked....

"The sequence of events is important because it shows, as admitted in the official Report, that all the acts of mob violence...followed the unnecessary and unreasonable firing on the crowd at the Hall Gate Bridge, and the killing and wounding of peaceful demonstrators."³¹

This considerably weakens, if not altogether demolishes, the Government theory that the mob violence of 10th April was the designed outcome of a conspiracy to subvert the Government.

Things seemed to have settled down on the 11th. A big funeral procession carrying the dead bodies of the victims of police firing passed off smoothly and no

untoward incident happened in course of the day. But things took a bad turn with the arrival of Brigadier General Dyer on the evening of the same day (11 April). He immediately took command of the troops in the city and behaved as if the city was under Martial Law, though it was not formally declared before 15th April. The official report admits that *de facto* Martial Law prevailed in Lahore since the arrival of Dyer.

Dyer began his regime on the 12th by indiscriminate arrests and the issue of a proclamation prohibiting all meetings and gatherings. But, as the Hunter Committee reports, the proclamation was not read in many parts of the city. This omission, deliberate or accidental, was very unfortunate as it was announced on the 12th evening that a public meeting would be held at Jallianwala Bagh on the 13th at 4-30 P. M. Although Dyer was fully aware of it, he took no step to warn the people about its illegality, or prevent it being held by stationing troops at the entrance of the Bagh. But soon after the meeting had begun, Dyer arrived on the spot with armoured cars and troops. He stationed himself and his troops on a rising ground at the entrance of the Bagh, and, then, without issuing any warning ordered the troops to fire. The troops fired into the dense crowd for ten consecutive minutes till their ammunition was exhausted or nearly so.

The following vivid account given by Valentine Chirol, by no means a friend of India, is based on official evidence: "One cannot possibly realise the frightfulness of it until one has actually looked upon on the Jallianwala Bagh—once a garden, but in modern times a waste space frequently used for fairs and public meetings, about the size perhaps of Trafalgar Square, and closed in almost entirely by walls above which rise the backs of native houses facing into the congested streets of the city. I

entered by the same narrow lane by which General Dyer.....entered with about fifty rifles, I stood on the same rising ground on which he stood, when without a word of warning, he opened fire at about 100 yards' range upon a dense crowd, collected mainly in the lower and more distant part of the enclosure around a platform from which speeches were being delivered. The crowd was estimated by him at 6,000, by others at 10,000 and more, but practically unarmed, and all quite defenceless. The panic-stricken multitude broke at once, but for ten consecutive minutes he kept up a merciless fusillade, in all 1500 rounds, on that seething mass of humanity, caught like rats in a trap, vainly rushing for the few narrow exits or lying flat on the ground to escape the rain of bullets, which he personally directed to the points where the crowd was thickest. The "targets", to use his own word, were good, and then at the end of those ten minutes, having almost exhausted his ammunition, he marched his men off by the way they came. He had killed, according to the official figures, only wrung out of Government months later, 379, and he left about 1200 wounded on the ground, for whom, again to use his own word, he did not consider it his "job" to take the slightest thought."

Sir Valentine comments: "But for General Dyer's own statement before the Hunter Commission, one might have pleaded that, left to his own unbalanced judgement by the precipitate abdication of the civil authority, he simply 'saw red'..... But, on his own showing, he deliberately made up his mind while marching his men to Jallianwala, and would not have flinched from still greater slaughter if the narrowness of the approaches had not compelled him to leave his machine-guns behind. His purpose, he declared, was to strike terror into the whole of the Punjab".³²

We also possess the account of Lala Girdhari Lal, the Deputy Chairman of the Panjab Chamber of Commerce who personally witnessed the whole incident from a house overlooking the Jallianwala Bagh, and was the first to go into the Bagh after the firing had ceased. He says : "I saw hundreds of persons killed on the spot. The worst part of the whole thing was that firing was directed towards the gates through which the people were running out. There were small outlets, 4 or 5 in all, and bullets actually rained over the people at all these gates, and.....many got trampled under the feet of the rushing crowds and thus lost their lives. Blood was pouring in profusion. Even those who lay flat on the ground were shot. No arrangements were made by the authorities to look after the dead or wounded..... I think there must have been over 1,000 dead bodies in the garden then."³³

As will be seen, there is a serious discrepancy between the above two accounts regarding the number of the dead. On this subject the Congress Inquiry Committee observes : "In the matter of the death roll, it is interesting to note that according to the Government's own showing, they did not commence investigating the figure before the 20th August, i. e., four months after the tragedy. Mr. Thompson then announced that not more than 290 had died. Now they have practically accepted the Seva Samiti's figures, viz., 500, which are based on actual tracing and represent the minimum. The exact figure will never be known, but after careful investigation, we consider that Lala Girdhari Lal's computation of 1,000 is by no means an exaggerated calculation."³⁴

The most significant aspect of the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy was the very frank statement of Dyer. He not only admitted all the gruesome facts but almost boasted of his achievement and sought to justify it. "To him it was a 'merciful act' to fire without warning on an inoffensive crowd because it might have made fun of him

if he had refrained from doing so. He admits that he could have dispersed it without firing but that would have been derogatory to his dignity as a defender of law and order. And so, in order to maintain his self-respect, he thought it his duty to 'fire and fire well' till his ammunition was exhausted and 2,000 persons lay dead or wounded. There ended his duty. It was none of his business, he tells us, to look after the dead and wounded. It was no one's business. The defenders of law and order had won a great victory, they had crushed the great rebellion. What more was needed ?"³⁵

But Dyer does not stand alone. The Government of India and a section of the British people—men and women, women more than men,—both in India and Britain, endorsed his action and rewarded him for it. But there was at least one Britisher, C. F. Andrews, who described Dyer's act as "a cold and calculated massacre", and "an unspeakable disgrace, indefensible, unpardonable, inexcusable."^{35a}

The cold-blooded massacre at Jallianwala Bagh, to which it would be difficult to find a parallel in the annals of any civilized Government, took place before Martial Law was declared and the administration was still, at least nominally, in the hands of the Civil authority. Martial Law was proclaimed at Amritsar on the 15th April, 1919, and in five districts of the Panjab between 15th and 24th April. It was withdrawn on 11 June except on railway lands.

The facts elicited by the Hunter Committee from the officials concerned leave no doubt that there was hardly any justification for the introduction of Martial Law to control the situation.

As regards the continuance of the Martial Law even the Majority Report of the Hunter Committee contained the observation : "The wisdom of continuing Martial Law for the whole length of time it remained effective in the

Panjab is more open to objection than the original declaration.”³⁶

The regime of Martial Law was a veritable reign of terror characterized by acts of brutality and deliberate rascality unworthy of any civilized government or of officers claiming to belong to a civilized nation. Fortunately for history, even the facts which are not in dispute are sufficient to sustain this severe indictment.

Dyer, as mentioned above, did not take any step to look after the wounded at Jallianwala Bagh. For, he said, ‘it was not his job, they might go to the hospital if they liked.’ But on that very day (13th April) “he had issued a Curfew Order, that all persons must be indoors after 8 p. m., and would go abroad in the streets at the risk of being shot at sight. Is it surprising that the wounded lay in their agony, that the dead lay putrefying in the hot atmosphere of an Amritsar April night, that the vultures and jackals came to tear the flesh from the bodies of the innocent victims of this dreadful holocaust, while the anxious relatives of innocent victims remained terrified in their houses.... The Curfew Order in Amritsar was maintained for weeks, and was administered with the utmost rigour.”

“Among General Dyer’s inspirations was the cutting off of the water supply and the electric supply of the city.” One of the most astounding inventions of Dyer’s fertile brain was the “crawling order”. “By his orders, for several days, everyone passing through the street in which Miss Sherwood, the lady doctor, was assaulted was ordered to crawl with belly to the ground.”

“Floggings were a common feature of the administration of Martial Law in Amritsar as in other areas. ...A public platform for whippings was erected near the fort, and a number of triangles for floggings were erected in various parts of the city.”

"Finally, here are the figures of the cases dealt with by the Courts at Amritsar. On major charges 298 people were put before the Martial Law Commissions, who tried cases unfettered by the ordinary recognized rules of procedure or laws of evidence. Of these 218 were convicted; 51 were sentenced to death, 46 to transportation for life, 2 to imprisonment for ten years, 79 for seven years, 10 for five years, 13 for three years, and 11 for lesser periods." This does not take account of 50 persons convicted summarily by military officers, and 105 persons convicted under Martial Law by civil magistrates.³⁷

But Amritsar did not stand alone and Dyer had a worthy colleague in Capt. Deveton at Kasur.³⁸

Capt. Doveton confessed that some people were made to touch the ground with their foreheads by way of making them acknowledge authority. He heard of *Sadhus* (ascetics) being whitewashed. Ahmad Khan said that one or two persons were made to get down on all fours and draw lines with their noses. This was done by Doveton's orders. Some persons were lime-washed and made to stand in the sun. As many as 107 persons were kept in a public cage without any overhead covering, specially built for the purpose. These 107 suspects—not yet criminals in the eye of law—were exposed to the burning sun and were obliged to answer calls of nature just where they were. Prostitutes of the town were called to witness flogging. Students had done nothing but were excited. So six were selected at random and whipped. In some cases Doveton gave considerable number of lashes to schoolboys. Men were sentenced to skip twenty times without stopping. Many villages were raided and arrests made between midnight and four in the morning. "Flogging took place in public, and photographic records of these disgusting incidents are in existence, showing that the victims were stripped naked to the knees, and tied to telegraph poles

or triangles."39

A few specimens of the orders under Martial Law may be noted :

1. All shops must be opened by 2 A. M, tomorrow.
2. It shall be unlawful for more than two persons to walk abreast and no male persons shall carry a *lathi*.
3. Any officer may be authorised to enter any building and remove such number of electric lights and fans as may be necessary for the use of the military.

It is a tedious task to narrate at length the whimsical orders passed under Martial Law inflicting severe physical pains and mental anguish upon the people. A few specimens may be given. At Lyallpur "whenever the inhabitants meet any Gazetted European Civil or Military officer, persons riding on animals or on wheeled conveyances will alight, persons carrying open and raised umbrellas shall lower them, and all persons shall salute or *salaam* with the hand. In Lahore, students had to walk about 19 miles a day in the hottest time of the year, and some of them fainted by the wayside. Col. Johnson thought it did them good, it kept them out of mischief."

The order of *dismounting* and *salaaming* (as at Lyallpur) was intended to "bring home to the people that they had new masters". People were whipped and fined for disobeying this order.

Colonel O' Brien, who was responsible for the above order, gave many other evidences of his malignant mentality. "He was responsible for the arrest of number of people, who were kept in gaol for as long as six weeks without being brought to trial. In one case a number of leading citizens were summarily arrested, put in a goods truck, where they were huddled together after being marched several miles in the burning sun, some of them half-clad, and sent by train to Lahore. They were refused permission to answer the calls of nature, and were

kept in the truck in these conditions for about forty-four hours. Hindus and Muslims were chained together. This was regarded by the populace as a jibe at Hindu-Muslim unity. Two hundred persons were convicted by Summary Courts, and received sentences of whipping, or from one month to two years' imprisonment. The Commission convicted 149 people, of whom 22 were sentenced to death, 108 to transportation for life, and others to sentences varying from ten years downwards. Colonel O' Brien's final achievement was to rush a large batch of cases through in about twenty-four hours, when he heard that Martial Law was to terminate the next day. The people concerned were given little opportunity of defending themselves and cases fixed for some days ahead were rushed into the Court post-haste, so anxious was Colonel O' Brien that none should escape his justice by reason of the lapse of Martial Law."⁴⁰

The Panjab was treated by the military as even worse than an enemy territory. The Lieutenant-Governor, himself conceived the idea of sending aeroplanes to throw bombs upon the rioters even when a section of responsible Englishmen believed that the danger from the mob was at an end. Bombs were freely used even where there was no gathering of armed men. At Gujranwala there were promiscuous dropping of bombs and firing of altogether 255 rounds of machine guns, apparently at close quarters. O' Brien admitted that 'the crowd was fired on (from aeroplanes) wherever found'. Lt. Dodkins, R. A. F., machine-gunned twenty peaceful peasants working in the field. He dropped a bomb on another party in front of a house, simply because a man was addressing them. The mentality of these officers, who can only be regarded as degraded specimens of humanity of brutish nature, may be construed from the following report of Carberry's evidence: "Major Carberry, R. A. F., bombed a party of

3 V3

people because he *thought* they were rioters. The crowd was running away and he fired to disperse them. As the crowd dispersed, he fired machine gun into the village itself. He could make no discrimination between the innocent and the guilty. He was at a height of 200 feet and could see perfectly what he was doing. His object was not accomplished by the dropping of bombs alone..... The firing was not intended to do damage alone. It was in the interests of the villagers themselves ! By killing a few, he thought, he would prevent the people from collecting again. This had a moral effect....." After that he went over the city, dropping bombs, and fired at the people who were trying to get away. The official report speaks of 150 rounds. But Carberry says in his evidence that he followed up the bombs with "several hundred rounds of machine-gun fire on the town itself." The official estimate of the casualties by bombing and machine-gunning from aeroplane, is nine killed and sixteen wounded: Horniman observes :

" The public are asked to believe that this promiscuous dropping of bombs and the firing of altogether 255 rounds of a machine-gun, apparently at close quarters, into crowds of people, resulted in the killing of nine and wounding of only about sixteen people ! Can anyone, who remembers the work of the German aeroplanes in England during the war, doubt that the popular assertion of many more casualties is well founded ? The Report is transparently dishonest."41

As regards the student community, the following statistics about punishments to students at Lahore, apart from the indignities, harassments and indiscriminate floggings mentioned above, will convey some idea.

Expulsion—34.

Rustication for one year--18

Detention for one year—47

Forfeiture of scholarship—27

Temporary forfeiture of scholarship—16

Forfeiture of half-fee concession—5

Refused re-admission—12

In conclusion it may be mentioned that Sir Edward Maclagan, who succeeded O' Dwyer, substantially reduced the penalties imposed by various commissions. "Out of 108 death sentences only 23 were maintained..... out of 265 sentences for transportation only 2 were maintained", when they were later revised by the Government. The figures of original punishments give some idea of the administration by martial law courts.⁴² The gruesome tale of atrocities committed in the Panjab were summed up by Sir Sivaswami Aiyer in his presidential speech at the All India Moderate Conference, 1919.

Lala Lajpat Rai, in his Presidential Address at the Indian National Congress in Calcutta held on 4th September, 1920, has also given a vivid account of the outrages that were actually committed in the name of law, and order. A few passages are quoted below.

"Raliyaram and Abdulla have said that they were forced not only to crawl on their bellies but while crawling were kicked by the soldiers with their boots and struck with the butt ends of their rifles. L. Kahan Chand, a blind man, told how even he was made to crawl and was kicked. Six boys were flogged in public, one of them, Sunder Singh, 'became senseless after the fourth stripe, but after some water was poured into his mouth by soldiers, he regained consciousness. Flogging was then resumed. He lost his consciousness for the second time, but the flogging never ceased till he was given 20 stripes.'"

'The invalid wife of Manohar Lal, Bar-at-Law, who was for some time Minto Professor at the University of Calcutta, and their children were dragged from their rooms, forced to take shelter in the servants' quarters

and the kitchen. He was kept under arrest for 28 days and then let off without a charge and without trial.'

"Lala Beli Ram Kapur of Hafizabad was arrested and locked up with 23 others in a room measuring 12 by 25, the same room having to be used by all of them for natural purposes also. They were kept under-trial prisoners up to the 6th June."

"Mr. Bosworth Smith went towards the women. He removed their veils and used abusive language. He called them 'flies, bitches, she-asses' and worse things. He said to them 'your skirts will be examined by the Police constables. When you were sleeping with your husbands why did you allow them to get up and go'. He also spat on them." Even worse treatments to women are referred to by him.⁴³

For eight months the Government of India tried to draw a veil over the horrible atrocities perpetrated in the Panjab. But the news of the terrible events slowly percolated to other parts of India and a wave of horror and indignation swept the country from one end to the other. The great poet Rabindranath relinquished his Knighthood as a measure of protest and wrote a strong but dignified letter to the Viceroy, "giving voice to the protest of the millions of my countrymen surprised into a dumb anguish of terror."

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, with indefatigable energy brought to light the most ugly facts about the reign of terror in the Panjab and framed 92 questions alleging specific instances of brutality for the Imperial Legislative Council. But these were disallowed by the Viceroy, evidently for the very good reason, that the almost incredible picture of monstrous cruelties which they unfolded faithfully reflected the reality. This is proved by the fact that the Government immediately introduced a Bill of Indemnity for protecting the civil and military officials in the Panjab from consequences of their action. The question asked by Pandit Malaviya, however, sent

such a thrill of horror over the whole country, that the Viceroy announced the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry in his opening speech. The non-official members suggested the postponement of the Indemnity Bill in view of the appointment of the Committee of Inquiry—for it would be nothing short of a travesty to absolve from punishment, in advance, those very persons whose conduct was the subject of inquiry. But the Government of India proceeded with the Bill, and it was passed.

A Committee appointed by the All-India Congress Committee appointed a Sub-Committee of nine members 'to conduct an inquiry into the recent occurrences in the Panjab,'

Just before this Sub-Committee came into existence, the Viceroy announced that a Commission of Inquiry would be appointed to investigate the disturbances in the Panjab.

The Commission of Inquiry consisted of Lord Hunter (Chairman), Mr. Justice Rankin, Mr. Rice, Major-General Sir George Barrow, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad and Sultan Ahmad. Pandit Jagat Narain and Mr. Thomas Smith were later added and the Committee began its work on 31 October, 1919.'

Not only in India but even in England fair-minded critics condemned the composition of the Hunter Committee, which contained representatives of the Indian military and civil services, but no nominee of the Indian representative bodies.⁴⁴

In the meantime the Congress Committee had started its investigation. They thought it advantageous to co-operate with the Hunter Committee and accordingly requested them to :

1. Release the leaders, who were undergoing imprisonment, on parole or bail, for the period of inquiry only, in order to make a proper and fair investigation of the Panjab events.

2. Permit the Committee to lead evidence throughout and to cross-examine the witnesses of the other side.

3. Supply a list of official witnesses and their printed statements which will enable their counsel to cross-examine the witnesses properly.

Popular opinion throughout India backed these requests as very proper and reasonable in order to elicit the truth, but the Hunter Committee and the Panjab Government refused to accede to the requests. The Congress Sub-Committee thereupon refused to co-operate with the Hunter Committee.

Thus the Hunter Committee had mainly to rely on the official documents, sanctioning or conniving at the atrocities which formed the subject-matter of investigation.

The Congress Sub-Committee of Inquiry finally consisted of Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, C. R. Das, Fazl-ul-Huq and Abbas Tyabji; M. R. Jayakar replacing Motilal Nehru when the latter was elected President of the Congress. The members of this Committee visited the disturbed areas and took evidence of 1700 persons, the statements of about 600 of whom were incorporated in their Report. These witnesses were duly warned of the consequences of allegations they might make against the Government, but they voluntarily made the statements without being afraid of the oppressions they were likely to suffer at the hands of the Government.

The Congress Sub-Committee submitted a unanimous report on 26 March 1920. The main findings of the Congress Inquiry Committee are summarised below, as far as possible, in their own words :-

'We believe that mob excesses in Amritsar and elsewhere were wrong and deserving of condemnation. Evidence shows that Sir Michael O' Dwyer subjected the Panjab to the gravest provocation under which the people momentarily lost their self-control.

'The theory of rebellion or war or conspiracy to overthrow the Government completely broke down before the

Hunter Committee; there is no proof of any organisation outside the Panjab behind the so-called conspiracy. Martial Law was therefore unjustified, much more so was its prolongation for nearly two months. The measures taken under it were such as to disgrace any Government calling itself civilised. Nearly twelve hundred lives were lost, at least three thousand six hundred men were wounded, and some permanently disabled. The vengeance taken was out of all proportion to the wrong done by the people. The slow torture administered to survivors during the Martial Law period, we have sufficiently described... Jallianwala Bagh massacre was a calculated piece of inhumanity and unparrallel for its ferocity in the history of modern British administration.

'It is impossible to ignore or slur over the inaction, if not active participation, of the Central Government. The Viceroy never examined the peoples' case and ignored the telegrams and letters from individuals and public bodies. He endorsed the action of the Panjab Government without any inquiry. He kept back from the public and the Imperial Government the horrible tales of massacres and other atrocities, even those which have been admitted by official witnesses and must have been known to him.

'O'Dwyer, Dyer, Johnson, O'Brien, Bosworth Smith, Sri Ram Sud and Malik Sahib Khan have been guilty of such illegalities that they deserve to be impeached. But future purity will be sufficiently guaranteed by dismissing them.'

The Report of the Hunter Committee was issued on May 26, 1920.⁴⁵ It was not unanimous, the five European members signing the Majority Report and the three Indian Members, the Minority Report. The two Reports agreed upon the following points :-

(a) The *Satyagraha* movement was mainly responsible

for the outbreak.

(b) The police and the military were justified in firing upon the mob. As regards Jallianwala Bagh, the Majority held that Dyer's conduct was open to criticism in two respects, first, that he fired without warning ; and second, in that he continued firing too long. They thought Dyer committed a grave error of judgment, but could not be blamed for not attending the wounded, for no one was exposed to unnecessary suffering for want of medical attention. The Minority differed on this point and took a graver view of the whole incident, stigmatising Dyer's conduct as inhuman and un-British.

(c) Both commented strongly upon exclusion of lawyers from outside the Panjab, considered the sentences of flogging to be too numerous, and condemned the crawling order and the penalties imposed upon the students.

(d) Both exonerated the Government of India from all blame.

The main differences between the two were on the following points.

(a) The Majority regarded the outbreak as a rebellion. The Minority did not agree that the riots were in the nature of a rebellion or might have rapidly developed into one. The two consequently differed about the necessity or justification of Martial Law. The minority stated that Martial Law came into existence when the crisis was past, at a time when the situation afforded no justification for it, and declared that its imposition for punitive purposes was constitutionally unjustifiable, and that its continuance was wholly unnecessary. They took a more serious view of the orders and punishments under the Martial Law and strongly denounced the actions taken as unjustifiable and calculated to humiliate and to foment racial bitterness.

(b) The Majority held that the outbreak at Amritsar

was anti-Government at every stage, hostility to Government quickly merging into antipathy for Europeans as such. The Minority held that the anti-European sentiments developed subsequent to the military firing of April 10.

(c) While generally agreeing upon the justification of the methods adopted in dealing with riots in other places, the Minority objected to certain specific incidents and regarded as unjustifiable some of the unnecessary firing done at Chuharkhana and Sheikhupura.

(d) The Minority regarded the working of the Courts and methods of arrest highly objectionable while the Majority regarded the trials as lengthy, detailed and careful.

A few Englishmen condemned the action of the Government of India in the strongest terms. Mr. Hyndman wrote: "Our own atrocities stand almost on a level with the outrages committed by Germany in Belgium, France and Poland. Worst of all we bombed unarmed crowds from aeroplanes." This sentiment was echoed by Mrs. Annie Besant and undoubtedly represents the voice of humanity. England had sunk to the level of belligerent Germany before the bar of World opinion. The Government of Britain pronounced only a mild censure on Dyer and removed him from active service, but absolved O' Dwyer and Chelmsford from all guilt. But even this was carried in the House of Commons only by 232 to 131 votes. On the other hand, the House of Lords passed a resolution by 129 votes to 89, deploring the removal of Dyer from the army as unjust and establishing a dangerous precedent. What was worse still, Dyer was acclaimed a hero and public subscriptions were raised to present a purse to him.

In India, the Englishmen regarded Dyer as the saviour of the British Empire. The European Association strongly resented the decision of the House of Commons and "received hundreds of letters through their branches and from European men and women all over India protesting against failure to reinstate General Dyer." They issued an

appeal to support the fund for General Dyer opened by the *Morning Post* in London and organize a memorial of General Dyer. A collection was made by the English ladies in India, who started a Dyer Appreciation fund at Mussooree. Dyer was presented with a sword and a purse of £. 20,000. The Europeans of Lahore entertained Col. Johnson at a farewell dinner and lauded him as the "protector of the poor". He had no difficulty in securing a good commercial appointment in India.⁴⁶ O' Dwyer had telegraphed approval of Dyer's conduct at Jallianwala Bagh as soon as he came to know of it, and Lord Chelmsford did not take any action against him even when the deplorable massacre and outrages came to be fully known. As soon as the Hunter Committee was appointed, the Government of India protected the guilty officials by passing an Act of Indemnity.

The lesson of Jallianwala Bagh was nothing short of this that while some English officers had descended to a level far below that of humanity, the English people, by their active or passive support to this outrage on humanity had lost all moral claim and prestige to rule over India. It thus became the paramount duty of the Indians to avenge at any cost the wrongs and insults inflicted by those who were shorn of all human instincts, and animated by nothing better or higher than a naked brutal force. This lesson was deeply implanted in the heart of every Indian, particularly that of Gandhi, the greatest Indian of the day, and inspired him to launch a campaign against the British which ultimately led to their final expulsion from India.

For the time being, however, Gandhi's action appeared to be mysterious. He suspended the *Satyagraha* movement on April 18 in view of the mob-violence. On July 21, 1919, he issued a statement in which he said that on account of indications of goodwill on the part of the Government and advice from many of his friends, he would not resume

civil disobedience, as it was not his purpose to embarrass the Government. He called on the *Satyagrahis* to work for the constructive programme, viz. use of indigenous goods and unity between Hindus and Muslims.

III. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT

1. The Reform Bill

Although the Montford Report was published on 8 July, 1918, the text of the Reform Bill was not issued till 18 June, 1919. The Bill had a very unfavourable reception in India from all shades of public opinion. In several important respects the scheme of reforms embodied in the Bill fell far short of what was recommended in the Report. It did not leave a vestige of fiscal autonomy with the Provincial Legislatures. The position of the ministers was made much worse, almost intolerable. Secondary and Higher Education as well as Industry—subjects to which all Indians attached the greatest importance—were made Reserved instead of Transferred subjects, as recommended in the original Report. The *Leader* of Allahabad, an organ of the Moderates, characterized the final scheme as sham and observed, “that in the present form and with all its safeguards and limitations, especially with regard to Government of India, the bill was not calculated to cause satisfaction, much less was it likely to arouse enthusiasm.” The *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of Calcutta, an organ of the centre party, remarked “that the people in general were now utterly indifferent about the Bill. The two most essential things were protection of the liberty of subjects and industrial development, but the Bill made no provision for them.”

One of the reasons for this sad state of things was the action of the Government of India, which whittled down the scheme in their final despatch to such an extent that the Indian member of the Viceroy's Council, Sir Sankaran

Nair felt compelled to record a strongly worded minute of dissent. The Indian National Congress sent a deputation to England in a last effort to improve the Bill. But it returned disappointed.

A few liberal-minded Englishmen also decried the Bill. In an article contributed to the *Justice* (London) H. M. Hyndman, after condemning in scathing language the barbarities in the Panjab—India's reward for war-service—, observes : "The Bill remedies no wrong, it stanches not a drop of the ruinous drain, it gives Indians no real power in their own country, it leaves the Central despotism, which is guilty of the crimes recited above, wholly untouched. It is a sham and a fraud, worthy of the men who have botched it up."

Reference should be made in this connection to the great change in the political views of Mrs. Annie Besant, recently the idol of the nationalists in India. In a public lecture under the joint auspices of the Home Rule Leagues, on June 10, 1918, she maintained that nothing short of the Congress-League system would satisfy India. Even as late as August 3, 1918, she said that the Montford Report "established the continuance of the 'machinery of Autocracy' in India, with shreds and patches of local freedom." But in course of a few months her views were radically changed. She had a good following and abundant influence at the Special Congress of Bombay (September, 1918), but she became a back number at the Delhi Congress (December, 1918). She incurred great unpopularity by supporting the Rowlatt Bill, and she sank very low in popular estimation when she wrote on April 18, 1919, that "when the mob begins to pelt them (soldiers) with brick-bats, it is more merciful to order the soldiers to fire a few volleys of buck-shot."⁴⁷ When the scheme of Reforms was being examined by the Joint Committee of the Parliament she not only fell in with the views of the Moderates but even went to the

length of opposing the attempts of the Congress Deputation in England to get the scheme improved by amendments in the House of Commons to the Government proposals.

In 1922 she hailed the reforms of 1919 as ushering freedom in India. Yet, curiously enough, two years later she was instrumental in introducing the 'Commonwealth of India Bill' in the House of Commons through the help of some Labour Members. What is more strange, she expressed a sanguine hope that the Bill would be passed and remove the few limitations that still curtailed the freedom and liberty of India. It is difficult to offer a rational explanation of all these, and no wonder that political India did not take the Bill seriously. As a matter of fact Mrs. Besant passed out of Indian politics after 1920. Even the Home Rule League, founded by her, refused to elect her President and chose Gandhi in her place. In spite of all these it should never be forgotten that Mrs. Besant was a dynamic force in Indian politics at a very critical juncture and rendered yeoman's service for the cause of national regeneration in India, both from political and cultural points of view. India can never forget the energy with which she worked to make the idea of Home Rule popular in a large part of India. She was the first President of the Indian National Congress to show by action that the Presidentship "was not a passing show or a three-day festivity," but its responsibility continued throughout the succeeding year. This is proved by her restless activity for the first five months of 1918.⁴⁸ Her contribution to the growth of Indian nationalism by ardent advocacy of the greatness of ancient Indian culture has already been noted above.

2. The New Constitution⁴⁹

A. Home Government

A few minor changes were made in the Home Government. The salary of the Secretary of State, instead of being

paid out of the revenues of India, was to be provided by the British Government. Some changes were made in the power of the Secretary of State and the composition of his Council.

B. The Government of India.

The Act set up a bicameral legislature, the two houses being called, respectively, the "Legislative Assembly" and the "Council of State." The Council of State consisted of 60 members, of whom 33 were elected and 27 were nominated by the Governor-General. The minimum number of members in the Legislative Assembly was fixed at 140, and it actually consisted of 145 members, of whom 103 were elected and the rest were nominated. Of the nominated members, 25 were officials and the rest non-officials. Of the 103 elected members, 51 were elected by the general constituencies, 32 by communal constituencies (30 by Muslims and 2 by Sikhs), and 20 by special constituencies (7 by landholders, 9 by Europeans and 4 by Indian Commerce).

The life of the Central Legislative Assembly was 3 years, and of the Council of State, 5 years (the periods could be extended by the Governor-General). The first Speaker of the Assembly was to be nominated by the Government, the subsequent Speakers being elected by the members of the Assembly.

The franchise of both the houses was restricted and differed in different Provinces. In the case of the Council of State the voters must have either an annual income of not less than Rs. 10,000, or paid land revenue of Rs. 750. As regards the qualifications of the voters for the Central Assembly, these were either the payment of municipal taxes amounting to not less than Rs.15 per annum, or occupation or ownership of a house of the rental value Rs. 180, or an annual income of not less than Rs. 2,000, or land revenue of Rs. 50 per annum. The total number of voters for the Council of State was about 17,364 and for the Central Legislative Assembly, about 909,874 in 1920.

The Central Legislature was, in theory, given very wide powers to make laws, but they were effectively limited by the discretionary powers vested in the Governor-General. The previous sanction of the Governor-General was required to introduce Bills concerning certain subjects. The Governor-General had also the power to prevent the consideration, at any stage, of a bill or a part of a bill in either chamber of the Central Legislature, if, in his opinion, it "affects the safety or tranquillity of British India, or any part thereof." The Governor-General was empowered to enact laws which he considered essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India, if either chamber refused or failed to pass them. Every Act so passed required the assent of His Majesty. The Governor-General could make and promulgate Ordinances in cases of emergency,—these having the same forces of law as a law passed by the Indian Legislature, but remained in force only for six months. The assent of the Governor-General was essential for the enactment of a law by the Legislature. He had the power to return a Bill for reconsideration, give his assent, or reserve the Bill for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure on the same. The Crown had the power of disallowing any Act made by the Indian Legislature or the Governor-General.

The Budget was voted by the Legislative Assembly. But certain items were not subject to vote or discussion, and any demand refused by the Assembly could be restored by the Governor-General, if he found it necessary for the discharge of his responsibilities. He could also authorize necessary expenditure in case of emergency.

C. Provincial Government

The Act introduced a form of Government which is usually referred to as Dyarchy. As the changes in the Provincial Government were of a far-reaching character, and deliberately designed to train Indians to the working of responsible Government these may be considered in some detail.

The following main principles were laid down in the Act :

1. All the major Provinces such as Bengal, Madras, Bombay, U.P., Panjab, Bihar and Orissa, C.P. and Assam shall be ruled by a Governor. The administrative departments. were divided into two categories,—Reserved and Transferred. The list of Transferred Subjects (given in detail in Schedule II to the Act) includes the following :-

1) Local self-government ; 2) Medical administration, Public Health and Sanitation ; 3) Education (other than European and Anglo-Indian Education, and Central Universities like Benaras Hindu University) ; 4) Agriculture ; 5) Veterinary Department ; 6) Co-operative Societies ; 7) Excise ; 8) Registration ; 9) Religious and Charitable Endowment ; 10) Development of Industries.

The Governor acting with Ministers shall administer the Transferred subjects, while the other departments shall be administered by the Governor in Council as before, though the minimum number of officials in the Executive Council was reduced from two to one.

2. There shall be a Legislative Council in every Governor's Province, which shall include (a) members of the Executive Council, (b) members nominated by the Governor, and (c) members elected in accordance with the Act.

The number of members varied in different provinces, and was specified in the First Schedule. Of the members of each Council not more than twenty per cent. shall be official members and at least seventy per cent. shall be elected members. Each Council shall normally continue for three years.

3. The entire budget shall be presented to the Council for sanction, but if the Council withholds its assent to any demand relating to a Reserved Subject the Governor shall have power to sanction the expenditure. The Governor shall also have power to sanction necessary expenditure, in case of

emergency without the sanction of the Council.

4. The Governor may assent to any Bill passed by the Legislative Council, withhold his assent, return the Bill or reserve it for the consideration of the Governor-General. If the Legislative Council refuse to pass a Bill relating to a Reserved Subject, in a form recommended by the Governor, it shall be deemed to have been passed if the Governor certify that the passage of the Bill is essential for the discharge of his responsibility. All Bills passed by the Legislative Council required the assent of the Governor and Governor-General.

5. The Ministers appointed by the Governor to administer Transferred Subjects shall hold office during his pleasure, provided that no Minister shall hold office for a longer period than six months unless he is or becomes an elected member of the Council.

The Governor shall be guided by the advice of his Ministers in relation to Transferred Subjects, but may, for sufficient cause, act otherwise than in accordance with that advice.

6. Separate constituencies for election to the Legislative Council were provided by the Rules for Muhammadans, Europeans, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, non-Brahmins (in Madras), Sikhs (in the Panjab), Landholders, Commerce and Industry, Planting, Mining, Labour, and University,

It would thus appear that the Legislative Council had no control over the Reserved Subjects and the funds allotted for them, and its power over the Transferred Subjects was more nominal than real, as the Governor could always override its decision.

IV. THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND INDIAN POLITICS

The reaction of the Government of India Act on Indian politics followed more or less the same lines as noted above

in connection with the publication of the Montford Report. The Moderates, though not wholly satisfied, stood for ungrudging and whole-hearted co-operation for working it as successfully as possible within the limited sphere. A strong section was inclined to reject it altogether. But Tilak, who dominated the Nationalist Party and the Congress, stuck to the middle way all along advocated by him. When the King Emperor issued an appeal to the Indian people for co-operation in working the Reforms, Tilak, then on his way to attend the Amritsar Congress, sent a telegram from the railway train assuring "Responsive Co-operation" on behalf of the people of India.

The Moderates held a Conference in Calcutta on 30 December, 1919. They welcomed the Reforms Act as 'a definite and substantial step towards the progressive realisation of Responsible Government, and appealed to all sections of the community, European and Indian, officials and non-officials, wholeheartedly to co-operate for the successful working of the Act.'

Within a few days of the passing of the Act The Indian National Congress held its annual session at Amritsar. C. R. Das moved the following resolution :-

"That this Congress reiterates its declaration of the last year that India is fit for full responsible Government and repudiates all assumptions and assertions to the contrary wherever made.

"That this Congress adheres to the resolutions passed at the Delhi Congress regarding the constitutional reforms and is of opinion that the Reform Act is inadequate, unsatisfactory and disappointing.

"That this Congress further urges that Parliament should take early steps to establish full Responsible Government in India in accordance with the principle of self-determination."

Then followed a battle royal regarding two crucial

points, namely, co-operation with the Government in working out the reforms and offering thanks to Montagu. It was on this occasion that Gandhi for the first time took a leading part in the discussions of the Congress. C. R. Das was in favour of rejecting the reforms, while Gandhi took the opposite view. Tilak was in favour of responsive co-operation. Gandhi's attitude is explained by the following passage in the *Young India* of 31st December, 1919 : "The Reforms Act coupled with the (Royal) proclamation is an earnest intention of the British people to do justice to India and it ought to remove suspicion on that score..... Our duty therefore is not to subject the Reforms to carping criticism but to settle down quietly to work so as to make them a success." Even a die-hard Moderate could hardly improve upon these words to suit his views. The Congress had pronounced adverse judgments on the Reforms both at Bombay and Delhi in 1918, in no uncertain terms, and was prepared to repeat in Amritsar that the Reforms Act was inadequate, unsatisfactory, and, disappointing. The fact that notwithstanding all this Gandhi's view was not only patiently heard, but got a fair degree of support, even under the shadow of the inhuman atrocities perpetrated upon that city only a few months ago, speaks a volume on the great hold that Gandhi had already effected, not only upon the masses but also upon the educated politically-minded classes in India, by his personality and saintly life, and the introduction of the new weapon of *Satyagraha* in Indian politics. In that assembly of veteran nationalist leaders who had distinguished themselves in various fields of life and had a long record of public service in India behind them, Gandhi, a comparatively new figure in the Congress, easily established his position as a leader of the first rank. The contest was a prolonged one and there was an apprehension of another split in the Congress,

But fortunately a compromise was arrived at. It was to the effect that the following addition should be made to the resolution moved by C. R. Das :

“This Congress trusts, that so far as may be possible they will work the reforms so as to secure an early establishment of full Responsible Government and this Congress offers its thanks to the Rt. Hon’ ble Mr. E. S. Montagu for his labours in connection with Reforms.”

C. R. Das, while accepting the compromise, made his attitude quite clear. He was not opposed to co-operation if it helps the early establishment of full Responsible Government; but ‘he was not opposed to obstruction, plain, downright obstruction, when that helps to attain our political goal.’ While commending the additional clause he reminded the members that his original three propositions ‘remain just as they are with the word disappointing’.⁵⁰

Thus ended the memorable discussion on the Reforms in the Congress at Amritsar. On the whole the final outcome was a triumph, neither of C. R. Das nor of Gandhi, but of the ‘Responsive Co operation’ formulated by the great and shrewd statesman B. G. Tilak.

V. THE PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

Reference has been made above⁵¹ to the influence of Pan-Islamic sentiments upon the minds of Indian Muslims and how it reacted on Indian politics by bringing about an *entente* between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League by way of a Muslim protest against the hostile attitude of Britain towards Turkey and other Islamic States.

Shortly after the outbreak of War, when the Allies were loudly proclaiming their sympathy for smaller and weaker nations, Muhammad Ali published an article under the caption “Evacuate Egypt.” In another article, “The

Choice of the Turks," he begged the Allies to win over Turkey by making good the losses which had been inflicted upon her, and was very outspoken about the record of British relations with Turkey. As a result, both the brothers were interned and their papers were suppressed.⁵²

The Pan-Islamic movement gathered force at the end of the First World War. Turkey's entry into that war as an ally of Germany against Britain put the Indian Muslims into an awkward situation. Their natural sympathy with the Sultan of Turkey, as their Caliph or religious head, was in conflict with their loyalty to the British throne as Indian subjects. The British Government fully realized the difficulty of the Indian Muslims, and in order to win their sympathy and support during the war, gave assurances of sympathetic treatment of Turkey at the end of the War. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, publicly declared on January 5, 1918, that the Allies were "not fighting to deprive Turkey of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race.", and this view was endorsed by Woodrow Wilson, the President of the U. S. A., in his message to the Congress on January 8, 1918. These specific assurances and the generous policy and sentiments expressed by President Wilson and other leading statesmen of the Allied countries led the Indian Muslims to believe that whatever happened, the independence of Turkey and her territorial integrity, so far at least as her Asiatic dominions were concerned, would be maintained. But all these hopes were doomed to disappointment by the terms of the Armistice which concluded the War. Thrace was presented to Greece, and the Asiatic portions of the Turkish Empire passed under the control of England and France under the guise of Mandates. While Turkey was thus dispossessed of her

homelands, her ruler, the Sultan, was deprived of all real authority even in the remaining dominions, as he was placed completely under the control of a High Commission appointed by the Allied powers, who really ruled the country in his name.

The Muslims of India regarded the treatment of Turkey as a great betrayal on the part of the British and other Allies, and a storm of indignation broke out among them. They decided to force Britain to change her Turkish policy, and Gandhi held out before them the sovereign remedy of *Satyagraha*. This led to the Khilafat Agitation in 1920.

CHAPTER II.

THE KHILAFAT AGITATION

Early in 1920 the Indian Muslims started a vigorous agitation to bring pressure upon Britain to change her policy towards Turkey. The success of this movement, known as Khilafat movement, was assured by the large measure of sympathy and support which the Muslims received from Gandhi. As the active participation of Gandhi gave an altogether new turn to the movement, it is necessary to explain his view-point which has always remained an enigma to many. Even while Gandhi was in South Africa, he had come to realize that there was no genuine friendship or good feeling between the Hindus and the Muslims. He was deeply aggrieved and strongly felt the need of establishing cordial relations between the two communities. Immediately after his return to India he established contact with the two Ali Brothers, and carried on correspondence with Muhammad Ali who was then in jail. Gandhi felt that the Muslim demand about the Khilafat was just and he was bound to render all possible help to secure the due fulfilment of the pledge that the British Prime Minister had given to the Indian Muslims during the War. In the letter which Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy immediately after the War Conference at Delhi, he particularly stressed the Khilafat question. Henceforth Gandhi missed no opportunity of pressing upon the Government of India the need of a just settlement of the Khilafat question and the release of Ali Brothers. He even went to the length of placing the Khilafat problem on the same level of political importance as the Home Rule for India. In the concluding para of his letter to the Viceroy

referred to above, he wrote as follows {“In the most scrupulous regard for the rights of those (Mohammedan) States and for the Muslim sentiment as to their places of worship, and your just and timely treatment of India’s claim to Home Rule lies the safety of the Empire.” / It need hardly cause any surprise, therefore, that when the All-India Khilafat Conference met at Delhi on November 23, 1919, Gandhi was elected its President. The Conference asked the Mussalmans not to join the public celebrations for victory, and held out threats of boycott and non-co-operation if the British did not solve the problem of Turkey in a manner satisfactory to the Muslims. This decision was reaffirmed by the Muslim League in Calcutta.

The release of Ali Brothers from internment, after four years, on the eve of the session of the Indian National Congress at Amritsar towards the end of December, 1919, gave a great fillip to the Khilafat agitation. Gandhi had a soft corner in his heart for the Ali Brothers who were the most vigorous champions of the Khilafat cause, and they must have taken full advantage of it. The leading Congressmen and Khilafatists, assembled at Amritsar, discussed the whole question, and it was decided to organize the Khilafat work under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi. In other words, the Congress lent the full support of its power, prestige and organization to the cause of the Khilafat.

It was decided in an All-India Khilafat Conference, held at Amritsar immediately after the Congress session, to send a deputation to the Viceroy. This deputation of the Khilafat Conference was fairly representative of Hindus and Muslims and the Address which it presented to the Viceroy on January 19, 1920, was signed by many leading Hindu political leaders, including Gandhi, Swami Shraddhananda, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. This Address pointed out that the Hindus and Muslims “now happily reunited and standing shoulder to shoulder will be

equally aggrieved if the just demands of the Muslims were not accepted". The Viceroy expressed sympathy and added that both he and the Secretary of State were equally convinced that "Muslim feeling in India must be taken into the most serious account in coming to a final decision". He frankly told the deputation: "The contention which you urge in your address that Turkey should preserve in full integrity the sovereignty and dominions which she possessed before the War is one which I fear we cannot reasonably hope will be recognised by the Allied Powers in Conference.She cannot expect any more than any other power which drew the sword in the cause of Germany wholly to escape the consequences of her action".²

The reply was regarded as disappointing, and the Khilafat League arranged to send deputations to England as well as to Hedjaz, Nezd, Syria, Yemen, Palestine and Mesopotamia. The Indian deputation was received by Mr. Fisher on behalf of the Secretary of State, on 2 March, 1920, and met the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, on 17 March, but without much success. The final decisions on Turkey were announced by a communiqué of the Government of India published on 15 May, 1920. Although Turkey retained Constantinople, there was almost a complete dismemberment of the Turkish empire.

Lloyd George's reply to the Khilafat deputation on March 17 deeply stirred the Khilafat sentiment in India, and 19th March was fixed as a day of national mourning—a day of fasting and prayer and *hartal*. In the meantime Gandhi had issued a Manifesto on March 10, embodying his ideas on the future course of action to be pursued by the Khilafatists if their demands were not granted. This Manifesto is historically important as it contains the first definite elaboration of Gandhi's doctrine of Non-violent Non-co-operation which was shortly to play a dominant role in Indian politics. He ruled out the violent method of warfare, open or secret,

"if only because it is impracticable". He then proceeds : "The power that an individual or a nation forswearing violence can generate, is a power that is irresistible...Non-co-operation is, therefore, the only remedy left open to us. It is the clearest remedy, as it is the most effective, when it is free from all violence. It becomes a duty when co-operation means degradation or humiliation, or an injury to one's cherished religious sentiment. England cannot expect a meek submission by us to an unjust usurpation of rights which to *Muslims* means a matter of life and death"³. It is no doubt a lofty sentiment, but it is pertinent to ask whether England's treatment of Turkey, even assuming that she was solely responsible for it, was a greater degradation and humiliation to India than England's treatment of the Indians during a century and a half, or even the recent atrocities in the Panjab. As to regarding the fate of Khilafat as a matter of life and death to the Muslims, events were soon to prove that it was a rhetoric or hyperbole and can hardly be regarded as a serious fact ; for in less than five years the Muslims of Turkey usurped the rights of the Caliph to a far greater degree than the British ever did, and not a leaf stirred in the whole Muslim world outside India. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to believe that the Muslims of India were the only true followers of the Prophet or the most genuine champions of the cause of Islam, it is difficult to understand or explain the weight they attached to the Khilafat question, save on the theory that it was a phase of that Pan-Islamic movement to which the Indian Muslims looked forward as the only guarantee against the influence of a Hindu majority with whom fate had linked them in India. But this aspect of the question certainly could not appeal to Gandhi, and it is therefore not easy to explain why Gandhi should have thought of treating the Khilafat question as more important than the larger issues of Indian politics.

But whatever might have been the impelling motive

of Gandhi he chose this as the occasion for hurling the most effective weapon in his armoury against the British. He therefore sketched in his Manifesto a rough outline of the course of the Non-co-operation movement, in the following words: "We may therefore begin at the top as well as the bottom. Those who are holding offices of honour or emoluments ought to give them up. Those who belong to the menial services under Government should do likewise. Non-co-operation does not apply to service under private individuals. I cannot approve of the threat of ostracism against those who do not adopt the remedy of Non-co-operation. It is a voluntary withdrawal alone that is a test of popular feeling and dissatisfaction. Advice to the soldiers to refuse to serve is premature. It is the last, not the first step. We should be entitled to take that step when the Viceroy, the Secretary of State and the Premier leave us. Moreover, every step withdrawing co-operation has to be taken with the greatest deliberation. We must proceed slowly so as to ensure retention of self-control under the fiercest heat'.⁴

Thus Gandhi was fully prepared to fight the British with his newly forged weapon to the bitterest end over the Khilafat issue. But ere long other issues were joined to the Khilafat, and the Non-co-operation movement, originally intended for undoing the wrongs inflicted upon the Khilafat, merged itself into a general political struggle, far outstripping its original limitations. That story will be told in another chapter.

Gandhi's attitude towards the Khilafat question was criticised even by his friends; he justified himself in the name of the Hindu-Muslim unity, and on grounds of expediency, as would be clear from his following utterance:

"The test of friendship is true assistance in adversity, and whatever we are, Hindus, Parsees, Christians or Jews, if we wish to live as one nation, surely, the interest of any of

us must be the interest of all.....We talk of the Hindu-Mahomedan unity. It would be an empty phrase if the Hindus hold aloof from the Mahomedans when their vital interests are at stake.”⁵

It is an admirable sentiment, and does honour to the heart of a saint like Gandhi. But its practical wisdom may justly be questioned. Gandhi failed to realize that the Pan-Islamic idea which inspired the Khilafat question cut at the very root of Indian nationality. If the real sympathy and “vital interest” of a large section of Indians were bound up with a State and society which lay far outside the boundaries of India and had no political connection with it, they could never form a true unit of the Indian nation. Howsoever opinions might differ on the basic requirements of nationality it is generally agreed that different groups of people cannot constitute a nation unless they have common sympathy, agreement, and interest to such an extent as does not subsist between any of them and any external group. If a hundred million of Muslims are more vitally interested in the fate of Turkey and other Muslim States outside India than they are in the fate of India, they can hardly be regarded as a unit of Indian nation. By his own admission that the Khilafat question was a vital one for Indian Muslims, Gandhi himself admitted in a way that they formed a separate nation ; they were *in* India, but not *of* India.

That ‘expediency’ had also a share in the formulation of Gandhi’s views is fully proved by his oft-quoted statement that such an opportunity of winning over the Muslims and forging the unity of Indian people to fight the British would not come in a hundred years. It is really this feeling that was uppermost in the minds of the Hindu leaders. But they did not realize the true significance of the Khilafat movement and the danger to Indian nationality lurking behind it. *

The view taken above of the real nature of the Khilafat movement and the motives lying behind it may appear

strange to many. It is necessary, therefore, to quote the views of some eminent Muslims in support of it. The historian I.H. Qureshi admits that the claim of the Sultan of Turkey as the supreme religious authority of the Muslim world had no practical significance outside the Ottoman Empire. Then he adds : "But now that the Indian Muslims had lost their own liberty, they had reason to feel a strong emotional attachment to a Caliph whom they could claim as their own sovereign, even though only in a nominal and religious sense. Indeed, before the first World War, prayers for the Turkish Sultan had already come to be included in the Friday *Khutbah* (sermon) in the mosques of India".⁶

But the leader of the Khilafat movement, Muhammad Ali himself, furnishes more valuable testimony. In his unregenerate days, while he was still a nationalist and a broad-minded politician, he openly scoffed at the idea that Indian Muslims should be affected by events in the Muslim world outside India or form a pact with the Hindus as a means of bringing pressure against the British—exactly the two features which marked the Khilafat movement. In a very thoughtful article entitled "The Communal Patriot" which he wrote in his paper , the *Comrade*, he observes :

"People talk sometimes of the need of the Muslims joining hands with the Hindus, because some incidents in contemporary history have not been exactly to their liking... Soft-headed and some self-advertising folk have gone about proclaiming that the Muslims should join the Congress because the Government had revoked the Partition of Bengal, because Persia and Turkey are in trouble. We were simply amused at this irresponsible fatuity. But when a responsible body like the London Branch of the All-India Muslim League talks of closer co-operation between the Hindus and Muslims because the Muslims of Tripoli and Persia have been the victims of European aggressions, we realize for the first time that even sane and level-headed men can run off at a tangent and

confuse the issues. What has the Muslim situation abroad to do with the conditions of the Indian Muslims?... Have the questions that really divide the two communities lost their force and meaning? If not, then the problem remains exactly where it was at any time in recent Indian history. Board of arbitration, peace syndicates and solemn pacts about cows cannot solve it any more than we can by a spell of occult words control the winds and the tides. The communal sentiment and temper must change and interests must grow identical before the Hindus and the Muslims can be welded into a united nationality".⁷ These words are significant in more than one way. It shows that Muhammad Ali was convinced that there were questions that divided the two communities, and so long as they were not solved, a pact such as was made during the Khilafat agitation could not solve the Hindu-Muslim problem. Further, it shows how easily he could change his views deliberately formed on the basis of facts which remained unaltered. For his pact with the Hindu leaders during the Khilafat movement is a direct negation of all that he wrote in his article in the *Comrade*. As a matter of fact there are good grounds to believe that the respect and reverence of the Muslim masses in India for their Caliph, the Sultan of Turkey, were deliberately utilized by their leaders to rally them to the cause of the Pan-Islamic movement, and by forging unity among themselves on this basis, to make the Muslims a great political power in India. As noted above, the Khilafat Conference at Bombay arranged to send delegations of Indian Muslims to all the Muslim countries outside India.

The Pan-Islamic sentiment behind the Khilafat movement was also indicated by the mass migration of Muslims from India to Afghanistan. This planned movement, known as *Hijrat*, started in Sindh and gradually spread to N.W.F.P. It was estimated that in the month of August, 1920, nearly 18,000 people were on their way to Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, the Afghan Government was inspired more by national than by Pan-Islamic sentiment, and forbade the admission of the Indian *Muhajirins* to Afghanistan. Thus the *Hijrat* had to be given up after a great deal of loss and sufferings, including a clash between the emigrants and the military at Kacha Garhi.⁸

The Hindu leaders failed to realize that the Khilafat agitation was really inspired by the Pan-Islamic movement, and the policy of Hindu-Muslim *entente* was merely an ingenious device on the part of the Muslim leaders to secure help against British imperialism, then regarded as the greatest enemy of Islam. There was no reason to suppose, as subsequent events clearly proved, that the Muslim leaders were inspired by a genuine desire to make up their differences with the Hindus in order to form an Indian nation.

The Hindu leaders fell into the trap. Too eager to arrive at a political settlement with the Muslims at any cost, they jumped at what they conceived to be a unique opportunity for achieving that end,—an opportunity which, as Gandhi put it, might not occur in a hundred years' time. Wish being the father of thought, they interpreted the Muslim attitude in their own way, without looking back at the antecedents of the Muslim community in general, and of the Ali Brothers in particular, so far as Pan-Islamism was concerned.

The Ali Brothers "were active members of the Muslim League advocating Muhammadan interests in opposition to the Hindus in the old days of the Bengal Partition agitation. In their public speeches they emphasized the identity of the interests of the Indian Muhammadans with the interests of the Muhammadans elsewhere in Tripoli and Algeria in preference to those of the Hindus."⁹ They openly said that they were Muslims first and Indians afterwards. As a corollary to this, reference may be made to their attitude towards a Muslim invader of India. Wild rumours were afloat at the time that the Amir of Afghanistan was going to invade India

— according to some, at the invitation of the Indian Muslims.^{9a} Whatever might be the value of the report its reaction on Muhammad Ali is most revealing : He said that 'if the Afghans invaded India to wage a holy war, the Indian Muhammadans are not only bound to join them but also to fight the Hindus if they refuse to co-operate with them.'¹⁰

It is a sad commentary on the wisdom of the Congress leaders that they allowed even such statements of the acknowledged leaders of the Khilafat movement to go unchallenged, nay ignored, and Gandhi's 'dear brother' Muhammad Ali was allowed to be a determining factor in Indian politics for a long period. The repeated manifestations of Pan-Islamic and anti-national sentiment, even clear assertions that they were Muslims first and everything else afterwards, both in domestic and foreign policy, left the Hindu leaders unmoved, and did not disturb their dream of founding Indian nationality on the basis of Hindu-Muslim unity.¹¹

But the attitude of Gandhi in this respect was much worse, as he lent the whole weight of his magnetic personality towards making a common cause with the Khilafat movement and carrying the Hindu leaders with him. His statements in justification of his conduct¹² are often of a mystic character. Thus he wrote in the *Young India* on 20 October, 1921 :

"I claim that with us both the Khilafat is the central fact, with Maulana Muhammad Ali because it is his religion, with me because, in laying down my life for the Khilafat, I ensure the safety of the cow, that is my religion, from the Mussalman knife.'¹³

Every Indian, not blinded by devotion to Gandhi, must rub his eyes with wonder at this statement. There were leaders who fully understood that the repercussion of the Khilafat movement on Indian politics would be just the opposite of what Gandhi believed, Thus C. R. Das wrote to Lalā Lajpat Rai : "I am not afraid of

seven crores (of Muslims) in Hindustan, but I think the seven crores of Hindustan plus the armed hosts of Afghanistan, Central Asia, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Turkey will be irresistible.”¹⁴ But though Das fully realized that ‘the Khilafat movement brought this menace into staggering prominence,’ he did not raise his voice against it. It seems, as Jawaharlal Nehru admitted,¹⁵ that Gandhi had the power to cast a spell over those around him and make them acquiesce in his policy without being convinced of its wisdom, and sometimes even though they regarded it as against the best interests of the country. In any case, Gandhi must bear the chief share of the blame for the Hindu support to the Khilafat movement, for it was he who led the way and it was his magnetic influence which drew other Hindu leaders towards it. Howsoever Gandhi might justify himself, there can be no question that the Pan-Islamic movement, based on the extra-territorial allegiance of the Indian Muslims, cut at the very root of the nascent Indian nationalism. Any support, direct or indirect, to the Khilafat movement, not to speak of active participation as its leader, must therefore be regarded as anti-national. The conduct of Gandhi, a great political leader, in assuming the leadership of the Khilafat movement, was certainly very reprehensible, and judged in this context, the epithet ‘Father of the Indian nation,’ given him by his devotees, seems to be singularly inappropriate. How far Gandhi had forsaken the ideal of Indian nationalism may be judged from his observation on the report of Afghan invasion of India mentioned above. While his ‘dear brother’ Muhammad Ali declared that he would join the Afghans and force the Hindus to do the same, Gandhi was prepared to help this ignoble cause of making India a *Dar-ul-Islam* (country of the Muslims) in an indirect manner. He wrote: “I would, in a sense, certainly assist the Amir of Afghanistan if he wage war

against the British Government. That is to say, I would openly tell my countrymen that it would be a crime to help a Government, which had lost the confidence of the nation to remain in power."¹⁶ It would be an insult to the intelligence of man to take notice of the sophistry by which the blind followers or devotees of Gandhi have sought to defend him. An ordinary layman, whose eyes are not blurred by the dazzling mystic halo of Gandhi, can only deduce from these lines that Gandhi was ready to cast aside his patriotism and nationalism, and even sacrifice India, in order to placate the Muslims. It is gratifying to note that there were at least two Indians who had the courage to denounce in public, in the most unequivocal manner, the abject surrender of Gandhi to the Muslims. One was Sir Sankaran Nair,¹⁷ and the other was Dr. Ambedkar.¹⁸ The devotees of Gandhi also indirectly admit that his conduct cannot be approved, nor his action justified, in every case, if judged by normal process of reasoning such as one applies to any other person. Thus Pattabhi Sitaramayya, who was once Gandhi's chosen candidate for the Presidentship of the Congress, and was, later, a Governor in free India, claims that "Gandhi's plans have all along been revealed to him by his own instinct, not evolved by the cold, calculating logic of the mind. His inner voice is his mentor and monitor, his friend, philosopher and guide...He saw things as if by a flash and framed his conduct by impulse. To the righteous man, these two are the supreme guides of life, not reason or intellect."¹⁹ All this may be true. But history, as the term is generally understood, cannot dispense with logic and reasoning and accept, instead, mystic instinct or impulse as the sole criterion of a political leader's conduct and action.

CHAPTER III

THE NON-CO-OPERATION MOVEMENT.

I. INAUGURATION OF THE MOVEMENT BY THE KHILAFATISTS.

Reference has been made above¹ to the issue of a manifesto on March 10, 1920, by Gandhi, recommending Non-co-operation (NCO) as the only course to be pursued by the Khilafatists if their demands were not granted. In the Delhi Khilafat meeting held on 15 March, 1923, a committee consisting of Gandhi, Lajpat Rai, Ajmal Khan, Azad and Shaukat Ali was formed to examine Gandhi's scheme of NCO. Gandhi's ideas were adopted by the Khilafat Conference which met at Madras on April 17, 1920. It laid down the following four stages in the progressive scheme of Non-co-operation; (1) Renunciation of honorary posts, titles and membership of Councils, (2) giving up of posts under Government, (3) giving up of appointments in the police and military forces, (4) refusal to pay taxes.²

On 12th May an urgent meeting of the All-India Khilafat Committee was hastily called at Bombay to deliberate upon the NCO movement. Gandhi attended the meeting and again emphasized that the only course now left open to the Muslims was to adopt NCO. Its success, he said, depended on their firmness and courage. He assured Hindu support but said that the Muslims must take the lead. As for himself, he was willing to sacrifice himself, his wife and children, for the sacred cause. It is said that he was able to persuade Shaukat

Ali and his followers to give non-violent NCO a full and fair trial. As a result of this meeting a Sub-Committee consisting of Messrs. Chotani, Gandhi, Azad, Muhammad Ali. Shaukat Ali, and Ahmad Siddiq Khatre was appointed to organize the NCO movement.

On May 15, 1920, the Government of India published a communique announcing the peace terms offered to Turkey, as has already been mentioned above. Two days later, Gandhi issued a statement declaring that the terms offered were a staggering blow to Indian Muslims and urged them never to lose self-control nor give way to despair. "There is no sacred character about the peace terms," said he, "they are capable of being revised..... I am convinced that the non-co-operation is the only effective remedy both for avoiding violence and healing the wound inflicted on Muhammadans of India."

The publication of the peace terms to be offered to Turkey (May 15, 1920) created a feeling of dismay and gave a rude shock to the Muslims. The Central Khilafat Committee organized a huge public meeting at Bombay on 28 May which adopted Non-co-operation as the only practical line of action. Many notable Muslims accordingly renounced and returned their titles and abjured all co-operation with the Government.

On the same day^{2a} was published the Report of the Hunter Committee together with the decision of the Government of India, which caused a profound and painful impression throughout India. Thus both the communities were stirred to action.

Events now marched at railway speed. and it is not easy to follow their exact course. A meeting of the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) was held at Banaras on 30 May, 1920. It passed a large number of resolutions of which the more important are summarised below :

1. The AICC records its indignant protest against the general policy and attitude of the Secretary of State for India on the Panjab affairs.

2. The AICC records profound disappointment and dissatisfaction in the Hunter Committee Majority's Report, completely dissents from the principal findings and recommendations of the Report, and regards its inquiry as incomplete, one-sided, and unsatisfactory, by reason of shutting out the evidence of the very Panjab leaders whose acts the Committee was called upon to investigate.

"The AICC deplores that the Hunter Committee Majority's report should be tainted with racial bias and a desire to overlook and justify the manifest, proved and grave acts of commission and omission of the Indian and Panjab Governments and many acts of inhumanity perpetrated by the officers during the Martial Law regime, and that the report should thus accentuate the tendency to count Indian life and honour as of little consequence. The AICC unhesitatingly rejects the Majority's conclusion that the Panjab was in a state of open rebellion and accepts the conclusion of the Minority and the Government of India's Indian member to the contrary."

3. A petition be presented to Parliament to take immediate steps to institute proceedings by way of impeachment or otherwise to bring Sir Michael O'Dwyer to justice and to place General Dyer, Col. Johnson, Col. O'Brien and Bosworth Smith before His Majesty's Court of Justice in Great Britain for the cruelties committed in April-May, 1919, in Amritsar, Gujranwala, Kasur and other places in the Panjab. That Rai Saheb Sri Ram Sud and Malik Khan be dismissed and prosecuted.

4. That the Rowlatt Act be repealed.

5. That the Viceroy be recalled.

6. The AICC is emphatically of opinion that the peace terms offered to Turkey constitute a flagrant violence to the

solemn pledges of His Majesty's Government and is in complete disregard of the principle of national self-determination accepted by the Allied Powers and of Muslim religious sentiment in India. The AICC strongly urges that in the interest of peace and contentment in India the Turkish Treaty terms be revised.³

That the above resolutions really reflected the prevailing sentiment in India is proved by the fact that the Moderate leaders, assembled in a meeting of the Council of the National Liberal Federation on June 12, passed resolutions generally endorsing the views of the AICC.

They urged for suitable punishment of all guilty officers, civil or military ; recorded emphatic protest against the high encomium bestowed upon Sir Michael O'Dwyer both by the Government of India and His Majesty's Government, and recommended his removal from office ; regretted that His Majesty's Government have ignored altogether the responsibility of the Viceroy who, instead of examining the situation on the spot and exercising the much-needed control over the Panjab Government, gave it virtually a free hand ; recorded appreciation of the Minority Report (of the Hunter Committee) and urged that His Majesty's Government should make a genuine effort to obtain revision of the peace terms offered to Turkey. At the same time they strongly disapproved of the Non-co-operation movement which, without doing any good to Turkey, is certain to do great harm to the peaceful progress of India.⁴

The All-India Congress Committee which met at Banaras on 30 May, 1920, did not endorse the NCO movement of Gandhi and Khilafat Committee, and passed the following resolution :

"That in view of the general situation in India with reference to Indian public feeling on Turkish peace terms, His Majesty's Government's action with regard to the

Panjab atrocities, and the policy pursued by the Government of India in giving effect to the reform scheme through the proposed draft rules and regulations, a special session of the Congress be convened at Calcutta as early as possible, not later than the 15th September, to consider the adoption of the policy of Non-co-operation or any other suitable course of action”.

It is stated in the official history of the Congress in its account of this A. I. C. C. meeting held at Banaras that “although Lokamanya Tilak passed Banaras at the time, he did not attend the Banaras meeting, for his heart was not wholly in the Khilafat agitation”.⁵ On the other hand, according to Ansari, Tilak supported the Khilafat resolution in the meeting, but refused to attend the Hindu-Muslim Conference held almost immediately afterwards at Allahabad.⁶ The exact nature of this Conference, held on June 2, is also not easy to determine. According to the Congress version it was a meeting of the leaders of all parties summoned by Gandhi which decided upon the policy of Non-co-operation and appointed a committee to draw up the programme.⁷ But this does not appear to be quite correct. In view of its great historic importance the point deserves careful consideration. The account of this meeting and the events following it, as given in the *Indian Annual Register*, may be summed up as follows :

A meeting of the Hindus and Muslims was held at Allahabad under the auspices of the Central Khilafat Committee on June 1 and 2 to consider the serious situation created by the Allied peace terms offered to Turkey. Among the Hindu leaders who attended the meeting were Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Lajpat Rai, Tej Bahadur Sapru, B. C. Pal, Malaviya, Satyamurti, Rajagopalachari, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Chintamani. An informal meeting was held on the morning of June 1, and the main Conference was held at 9 P.M. The Muslim leaders appealed to the Hindus to

co-operate with them and support Non-co-operation. Several Hindu leaders spoke expressing sympathy with the Muslim claim, but differed as to the remedy suggested. Some expressed doubt of the success of Non-co-operation ; others welcomed it on principle, but not at that moment. Mrs. Besant strongly opposed it.

On June 2, the Conference met in the morning when the Muslims from various Provinces* explained how far they were prepared to take up Non-co-operation. The same night, again, a meeting was held when only members took part in the discussion and voted, but delegates and visitors attended. Gandhi, in a solemn speech, said he knew full well that the Muslims realized that Non-co-operation was the only remedy now left to them. He was prepared to co-operate with them and suggested that a committee, consisting of members prepared to remain with him, with full powers, be appointed to work out the scheme and that its decision be binding on all people. This was agreed to and the following resolution was passed by the Central Khilafat Committee : "This meeting reaffirms the movement of Non-co-operation in accordance with the four stages already approved by the Central Khilafat Committee and appoints a sub-committee consisting of the following gentlemen with power to add to their number to give practical effect to the movement without further delay." The gentlemen named were Gandhi and six Muslim leaders. The meeting also resolved that the *Swadeshi* movement should be undertaken in right earnest and appointed a Sub-Committee to work out a scheme.

It is thus quite clear that the decision was made by the Khilafat committee and not by a conference of the leaders of all parties as stated in the official history of the Congress.

In pursuance of the decision arrived at this meeting of the Central Khilafat Committee, a letter signed by about 90 Muslim leaders from various parts of India was sent to the Viceroy which, *inter alia*, stated : "If, unfortunately, Your

Excellency will not adopt our humble suggestion, we shall be obliged as from the first August next, to withdraw co-operation from the Government and to ask our co-religionists and brethren to do likewise." Gandhi also wrote a letter to the Viceroy explaining 'his connection with, and his conduct in, the Khilafat question.' Both these letters were made public in the last week of June.⁸

In the light of later events, the decision of the Khilafatists in the Allahabad meeting must be regarded as a momentous one which profoundly influenced the course of events in Indian history. But if we can trust the memory of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, it would appear that the Muslim members who adopted the resolution of Non-co-operation had really neither courage nor enthusiasm for it, and were merely goaded to this decision by Gandhi's spirited address. Referring to it Nehru writes : "I remember the meeting because it thoroughly disappointed me. Shaukat Ali, of course, was full of enthusiasm ; but almost all the others looked thoroughly unhappy and uncomfortable. They did not have the courage to disagree, and yet they obviously had no intention of doing anything rash. Were these the people to lead a revolutionary movement, I thought, and to challenge the British Empire ? Gandhiji addressed them, and after hearing him they looked even more frightened than before. He spoke well in his best dictatorial vein.....This is going to be a great struggle, he said, with a very powerful adversary.....When war is declared martial law prevails, and in our non-violent struggle there will also have to be dictatorship and martial law on our side if we are to win.....Something to this effect he said, and these military analogies and the unyielding earnestness of the man made the flesh of most of his hearers creep. But Shaukat Ali was there to keep the waverers up to the mark ; and, when the time for voting came, the great majority of them quietly and shamefacedly voted for the proposition—for war !

"As we were coming home from the meeting, I asked

Gandhiji if this was the way to start a great struggle. I had expected enthusiasm, spirited language, and a flashing of eyes ; instead we saw a very tame gathering of timid, middle-aged folk. And yet these people, such was the pressure of mass opinion, voted for the struggle.”⁹

In July 1920, the Non-co-operation Committee, appointed by the Khilafat Committee on June 2, as mentioned above, issued a manifesto outlining the programme of the demonstration to be held on August 1 in the following words :

(1). The Committee advise full *hartal* on the first of August. Mill-hands, however, are requested not to abstain from work, unless they receive permission from their employers, nor should all those abstain who are required for absolutely necessary day-to-day work, viz. hospital men, sanitary men and dock labourers.

(2). The day should be devoted to prayer. All those, who can, should fast for the day.

(3) Meetings should be held all over the country, not excluding the smallest village, at which the following resolution should be adopted, with or without speeches, and forwarded to the Government. (The text of the resolution follows. It requests the Imperial Government to revise the peace terms offered to Turkey).

A note was added to the effect that there should be no defiance of any Government order and “no meetings should be held where there is any written prohibition.”

An appeal was made for the surrender of titles and honorary posts on that day and the Committee sought the co-operation of the Hindus and other non-Muslim communities in making the inauguration of Non-co-operation a complete success.

The Committee issued further directions for the demonstrations on the first of August. ‘There should be no procession and no pressure against anyone refusing to

close shop. Special effort should be made and continued to secure surrender of titles and honorary posts, and parents are requested to withdraw their children from schools recognized by, or under control of Government. Lawyers are requested to suspend practice.....Agitation for securing complete boycott of Councils should be continued unabated. Finally the Committee expects Muslims to lead as well in preserving peace and order as in sacrifice, and we feel sure that our Hindu brethren will not fail to respond and join the Muslims.'¹⁰

The Central Khilafat Committee organized a general all-India *hartal* on 1 August, 1920, under the guidance of Gandhi. Gandhi wrote a letter to the Viceroy and returned all the war medals which were awarded to him by the British for his war services. "I venture to return these medals, in pursuance of the scheme of Non-co-operation inaugurated today in connection with Khilafat movement. Valuable as these honours have been to me", wrote he, "I cannot wear them with an easy conscience so long as my Mussalman countrymen have to labour under wrong done to their religious sentiment."^{10a}

These words, and the whole history sketched above, leave no doubt that the action of Gandhi in launching Non-co-operation on 1 August, 1920, was the direct outcome of the Khilafat movement. A somewhat different interpretation is given of his action on account of his reference to the Panjab incidents in the same letter, in the following words: "The attitude of the Imperial and Your Excellency's Government on the Panjab question has given me additional cause for grave dissatisfaction. ...I therefore respectfully ask Your Excellency to summon a conference of recognised leaders of people and in consultation with them find a way that would placate Mussalmans and do reparation to unhappy Panjab". It is obvious that the Panjab incident was at best a secondary issue ; at a still later date, at the suggestion of

Vijayaraghavachari, endorsed by Motilal Nehru, Gandhi added a third issue, viz. independence of India, as the ground of Non-co-operation movement.¹¹ In view of the whole history of the Khilafat movement sketched above, and the first suggestion of Non-co-operation by Gandhi as far back as November, 1919,^{11a} there seems to be no doubt whatsoever that when he launched the Non-co-operation movement on August 1, 1920, the Khilafat wrongs were the single issue which *determined* his action ; the Panjab atrocities and winning of *Swaraj* were subordinate issues which were gradually tacked on to the main issue of the Khilafat, at a later date, and as an after-thought.^{11b}

It is somewhat singular that both the official history of the Congress as well as the Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee appointed by the Congress in 1922 evade this main point and consequently give a version of the genesis of Non-co-operation movement which is very misleading, to say the least of it. After mentioning the elaboration of Non-co-operation programme by the Madras Khilafat Conference on April 17, 1920, the Report of the Enquiry Committee continues :

“Although at this stage the movement of Non-co-operation was concerned mainly with the Khilafat question, Mahatma Gandhi resolved to refer the question to a Conference of leaders of all parties which met at Allaha-bad on the 2nd of June 1920. At this Conference the policy of Non-co-operation was decided upon and a committee was appointed consisting of Mahatma Gandhi and some of the Muslim leaders to draw up the programme. The Committee published the programme in July and it was in the programme that the boycott of schools and colleges and of law courts first figured.”¹²

The Report then, somewhat abruptly, turns to the Special session of the Congress in Calcutta held in September, 1920.

As noted above,¹³ the course of events in Allahabad is described somewhat differently by others. As a further specimen we may quote the following : "The Hindu-Muslim Conference, which met at Allahabad on June 1, dispersed without coming to any definite conclusions. The Khilafat Committee, meeting on June 9, reaffirmed the principle of Non-co-operation and appointed a Committee to lay down a detailed programme. It was also decided to start the movement under Gandhiji's guidance, after giving a month's notice to the Viceroy. Gandhi addressed an appeal to the Viceroy on June 22.....On July 7, the Non-co-operation Movement Committee gave instructions about the programme consisting of the surrender of honorary titles and posts, boycott of schools and colleges, and of courts and councils, as from the 1st of August." ¹⁴ This account also indicates that it was the Khilafat Committee, and not a Conference of all parties as stated in the Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, that launched the Non-co-operation movement. It also appears that no Hindu leader, other than Gandhi, took an active part in the movement started on August 1. This seems to be quite natural as the whole question was scheduled to be discussed in the Congress session in September, 1920, and it is hardly likely that any prominent Hindu leader would think of definitely participating in it till the Congress decision was known.

It is therefore not a little curious, and perhaps not without significance, that an erroneous view on such an important issue should have been propagated. Thus R. G. Pradhan states : "On 30th June a joint Hindu-Muslim Conference was held at Allahabad regarding the Khilafat question and it was unanimously resolved that Non-co-operation should be resorted to after a month's notice to the Viceroy," ¹⁵

Here, again, the term Hindu-Muslim Conference is misleading, as it is likely to convey the idea of an All-

Parties Conference, as stated in the Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee, whereas it seems to have been really a Conference held under the auspices of the Khilafat Committee, attended by some Hindus.

The attitude of Tilak towards the Non-co-operation movement initiated by Gandhi deserves more than a passing notice, as it is held by many that, but for Tilak's death shortly before the Calcutta session of the Congress in 1920, Gandhi would not have been able to carry his resolution on Non-co-operation. As mentioned above, Tilak always advocated the policy of Responsive Co-operation. After the Amritsar Congress he announced the formation of the Congress Democratic Party and issued a manifesto on behalf of it in April, 1920. The Party proposed "to work the Montagu Reforms Act for all it is worth and for accelerating the grant of full Responsible Government, and for this purpose, it will without hesitation offer co-operation or resort to constitutional opposition, whichever may be expedient and best calculated to give effect to the popular will."¹⁶

There is nothing on record to show that Tilak later changed his views. But a few facts have been brought forward to prove that he was gradually veering round to the principle of Non-co-operation. It is said by Asaf Ali that Gandhi placed a detailed programme of Non-co-operation in a meeting of Hindu and Muslim leaders in Delhi on January 19, 1920. Tilak was present in this meeting but left it before it ended as he had another engagement. But before he left he said : "Whatever may be your decision, you may take it that I agree with it, for I am ready to go much further than your programme."¹⁷

That Tilak's concurrence refers to the Khilafat programme and not to a general Congress policy of Non-co-operation appears not only from the date of the meeting,^{17a} but also from what Ansari speaks of him. Tilak, we are told, support-

ed the Khilafat resolution in the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held at Banaras on May 30,¹⁸ and was urged by Ansari to go to Allahabad where a Hindu-Muslim Conference was to be held in the first week of June. In reply Tilak said that "the Mussulmans could always count on his support in the course of the mild campaign, which they were going to start under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi." Tilak also told Dr. Choitram at Banaras that "he had no objection to his advising Hindus to join the movement, provided Muhammadans are sincerely bent upon non-co-operation with Government." When Gandhi saw Tilak along with Shaukat Ali in Bombay, he (Tilak) said turning to the latter : "About Hindus and Muslims I will sign anything that Gandhi suggests, because I have full faith in him on the question." About Non-co-operation he said to Gandhi : "I like the programme well enough. but I have my doubts as to the country being with us under the self-denying ordinance which Non-co-operation presents to the people. I will do nothing to hinder the progress of the movement. I wish you every success, and if you gain the popular ear you will find in me an enthusiastic supporter".¹⁹ Tilak told Mrs. Besant that "he wished for Responsive Co-operation but he thought that Gandhi wielded power that might serve India, and he would not therefore break with him."²⁰

If we can rely on even the general accuracy of these reported conversations, we may trace the evolution of Non-co-operation movement, bearing in mind Tilak's indifferent attitude towards it. The movement started as a specific mode of protest against the Khilafat wrongs, at the inspiration, and under the guidance, of Gandhi. The organizers of the movement received sympathy and promise of co-operation from some Hindu leaders, including Tilak. But even up to the end of May, 1920, the movement retained its original character. About this time Gandhi conceived the idea of making Indian National Congress participate in this movement, in

order to forge the unity between Hindus and Muslims. The Muslims naturally welcomed the idea with whole heart, because the new-fangled, isolated Khilafat movement would gain enormous accession of strength if an organized all-India institution of established repute like the Congress lends its strength and support to it. As regards the Hindus, a large section was attracted to the idea, partly out of devotion to Gandhi and in deference to his judgement, and partly also because they looked upon it as a master-stroke of policy of organizing a united resistance of Hindus and Muslims against the British Government. The disunion between the Hindus and the Muslims had been the chief obstacle to the political advance of India, and Indian politicians of all shades of opinion strongly held the view that they could never achieve their political goal unless the two communities were united on a common political platform. Here was an opportunity for achieving that unity, which, as Gandhi is reported to have said, would not arise in a hundred years.

There was no doubt that the Muslim community was roused to a passionate hatred against the British, and the intensity of their anti-British feeling was not only demonstrated in mass meetings and conferences, but by a still more practical test, namely the mass exodus to Afghanistan mentioned above. They chose to live in a free Muslim country rather than in British territory in India. These symptoms misled the Hindu political leaders into an exaggerated idea of the importance of the Khilafat movement in India, and the role it was destined to play in the Muslim world. Their poor knowledge about the Muslim countries of Asia led them to place an extravagant value on an alliance between the Congress and the Khilafat Movement. The ludicrously absurd extent to which they were carried by this prospect may be judged from the following observations made by even a leader like Rajagopalachari, who is well known for his political acumen and shrewdness

of a very high degree. In 1921 he wrote :

“The Khilafat has solved the problem of distrust of Asiatic neighbours out of our future. The Indian struggle for the freedom of Islam has brought about a more lasting *entente* and a more binding treaty between the people of India and the people of the Mussalman States around it than all the *ententes* and treaties among the Governments of Europe. No wars of aggression are possible where the common people on the two sides have become grateful friends. The faith of the Mussalman is a better sanction than the seal of the European diplomats and plenipotentiaries. Not only has this great friendship between India and the Mussalman States around it removed for all times the fear of Mussalman aggression from outside, but it has erected round India a solid wall of defence against all aggression from beyond, against all greed from Europe, Russia or elsewhere. The Indian support of the Khilafat has as-if by a magic wand converted what was once the pan-Islamic terror for Europe into a solid wall of friendship and defence for India.” 20a

Gandhi had undoubtedly a genuine sentiment of love and sympathy for the Muslims ; but it may be reasonably concluded that to this was added in his mind a very exaggerated importance of an alliance with the Khilafatists, somewhat on the line of Rajagopalachari's observations. This alone can explain, in a satisfactory manner, the dual role he played in Indian politics which it is not always easy to reconcile. This would be evident from the following *facts* and *dates*.

23 November, 1919—Gandhi supports the idea of Non-co-operation movement by the Muslims.
(p. 56).

31 December, 1919—Gandhi staunchly supports, in the Amritsar Congress, Co-operation of India (including Hindus and Muslims)

with the British Government, against the opposition of eminent Indian leaders, and professes loyalty to the British Government and faith in their goodness (p. 51).

18 January, 1920—Gandhi places a detailed programme of Non-co-operation in a meeting of Hindu and Muslim leaders in Delhi (according to Asaf Ali, p. 78).

January-March, 1920—(i. e. before the fate of Turkey was definitely known and the reports of the Enquiry Committees on the Panjab disturbances were published) Gandhi elaborates the scheme of Non-co-operation movement in the '*Young India*' and issues a manifesto on March 10 (pp. 57-9).

30 May, 1920—The All-India Congress Committee decides to hold a special session of the Congress to *consider* the question of Non-co-operation in view of the Panjab atrocities and dismemberment of Turkey (pp. 70-71).

1-2 June, 1920—The Khilafat Committee decides to start Non-co-operation *under the guidance of Gandhi* (p. 72-3).

1 August, 1920—Gandhi formally inaugurates Non-co-operation movement by returning the three medals which the Government had awarded him for meritorious services, and addressing a letter to the Viceroy in which he declared that the attitude of the Government with regard to Khilafat and the Panjab, as demonstrated by "events that happened

during *past month*," made it impossible for him to continue co-operation with a Government that had acted so unscrupulously and for whom he could retain neither respect nor affection²¹ (p. 75).

4 September, 1920—A Special Session of the Indian National Congress meets to discuss the policy of Non-co-operation.

It is interesting to note that in his letter to the Viceroy, dated August 1, Gandhi seems to convey the impression that he had to resort to Non-co-operation because "events have happened during past month" i. e. in July 1920. Yet it will be quite clear from the chronology of events given above, that Gandhi had been not only thinking about Non-co-operation before the Amritsar Congress, in December, 1919, but also drew up a detailed programme, either almost immediately after it, on January 18, 1920, or in any case during the next three months.

There is another intriguing question that has to be faced. What was the position of Gandhi when the Special session of the Congress met at Calcutta on September 4, 1920? The resolution of Co-operation passed at the Amritsar Congress, at the instance of Gandhi himself, was still in force. Yet Gandhi had been supporting Non-co-operation since November 1919, and had openly declared himself a Non-co-operator on August 1, 1920. One cannot be blamed for holding that he had a split personality like Jekyll and Hyde, a Non-co-operator as a Khilafatist, and a Co-operator as a Congressman. The view is certainly wrong, but then the only other alternative is to suppose that he had already flouted the decision of Amritsar Congress and could only hope that the Congress would approve of his revolt by deciding in favour of Non-co-operation.

Gandhi himself seems to have been fully conscious of

his anomalous position. and had evidently decided to go on with his Non-co-operation programme, with the Congress, if possible, and without it, if necessary. This seems to be the real explanation of his manoeuvre on the eve of the Calcutta Congress, described as follows by one of his intimate friends and devoted admirers: "In Calcutta, while the fate of N. C. O. (Non-co-operation) was hanging in the balance, Gandhi assembled the old Home Rulers, from whom Mrs. Besant virtually seceded, under a common banner and changed the creed of the (All-India Home Rule) League into a form since adopted by the Congress at Nagpur, as also the name of the League into Swaraj Sabha. But this Sabha *never had occasion to function*, as Calcutta accepted the cult of N. C. O., and Nagpur confirmed it."²²

The situation as it actually developed may be briefly described as follows. That part of the Home Rule League, of which Mrs. Besant was the President, rejected her in 1919, and elected Gandhi as her successor. This was evidently due to her reactionary attitude, to which reference has been made above.²³ After the death of Tilak, Gandhi was elected the President of the All-India Home Rule League. He naturally wanted to bring it in a line with the changed political situation in the country, and a sub-committee was appointed early in September, 1920, to revise the constitution of the League. On the recommendations of this sub-committee the following changes were introduced in a general meeting of the All-India Home Rule League held in Bombay on October 3, 1920.

1. The name of the League was altered to "Swarajya Sabha"

2. The object of the Sabha was defined to be "to secure complete Swaraj in India according to the wishes of the Indian people."

3. The interpretation of the word Swaraj shall not be

extended beyond Article 1 of the Congress Constitution.

A strong section headed by M. A. Jinnah and Jamnadas Dwarkadas strongly objected to the changes, and nearly twenty members seceded from the League. Gandhi wrote a long letter trying to meet the objections of the seceders and refuting their arguments (October, 25), but Jinnah's reply thereto shows that Gandhi's efforts were not successful.^{23a} But this was a matter of little practical importance, for henceforth the All-India Home Rule League or Swarajya Sabha lost its separate identity and unconsciously merged itself into the Indian National Congress.

II. ADOPTION OF THE NON-CO-OPERATION MOVEMENT BY THE CONGRESS

The Special session of the Congress was held in Calcutta on September 4, 1920, under the shadow of a grave national calamity, for the great national leader Tilak had passed away on August 1, 1920. It was presided over by Lala Lajpat Rai who, after a long forced internment in U.S.A., was at last permitted by the Government of India to return to his native land. The Congress met in a tense atmosphere. The whole country looked upon it with animated suspense. A new weapon, which had been forged by Gandhi and had hitherto been tried on a small scale with varying success, was now going to be hurled by India upon the mighty British Empire. The resolution moved by Gandhi read as follows :

"In view of the fact that on the Khilafat question both the Indian and Imperial Governments have signally failed in their duty towards Mussalmans of India, and the Prime Minister has deliberately broken his pledged word given to them, and that it is the duty of every non-Moslem Indian in every legitimate manner to assist his Mussalman brother in his attempt to remove the religious calamity that has overtaken him ;

"And in view of the fact that, in the matter of the events of the April of 1919, both the said Governments have grossly neglected or failed to protect the innocent people of the Punjab and punish officers guilty of unsoldierly and barbarous behaviour towards them, and have exonerated Sir Michael O'Dwyer who proved himself, directly or indirectly,^{23b} responsible for most of the official crimes, and callous to the sufferings of the people placed under his administration, and that the debate in the House of Commons and specially in the^{23c} House of Lords betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India, and showed virtual support of the^{23d} systematic terrorism and frightfulness adopted in the Punjab, and that the latest Viceregal pronouncement is proof of entire absence of repentance in the matters of the Khilafat and the Punjab ;

"This Congress is of opinion that there can be no contentment in India without redress of the two aforementioned wrongs and that the only effectual means to vindicate national honour and to prevent repetition of similar wrongs in future is the establishment of Swarajya. This Congress is further of opinion that there is no course left open for the people of India but to approve of and adopt the policy of progressive non-violent Non-co-operation inaugurated by Mr.^{23e} Gandhi until the said wrongs are righted and Swarajya is established ;

"And inasmuch as a beginning should be made by the classes who have hitherto moulded and represented public opinion, and inasmuch as Government consolidates its power through titles and honours bestowed on the people, through schools controlled by it, its law courts, and its legislative councils, and inasmuch as it is desirable in the prosecution of the movement to take the minimum risk and to call for the least sacrifice, compatible with the attainment of the desired object, this Congress earnestly advises—

(a) surrender of titles and honorary offices and resignation from nominated seats in Local Bodies ;

(b) refusal to attend Government Levees, Durbars, and other official and semi-official functions held by Government officials, or in their honour ;

(c) gradual withdrawal of children from schools and colleges owned, aided or controlled by Government, and in place of such schools and colleges, establishment of National schools and colleges in the various provinces ;

(d) gradual boycott of British courts by lawyers and litigants, and establishment of private arbitration courts by their aid, for the settlement of private disputes ;

(e) refusal on the part of the military, clerical and labouring classes to offer themselves as recruits for service in Mesopotamia ;

(f) withdrawal by candidates of their candidature for election to the Reformed Councils, and refusal on the part of the voters to vote for any candidate who may, despite the Congress advice, offer himself for election ;

(g) boycott of foreign goods ;

“And inasmuch as Non-co-operation has been conceived as a measure of discipline and self-sacrifice without which no nation can make real progress, and inasmuch as an opportunity should be given in the very first stage of Non-co-operation to every man, woman and child for such discipline and self-sacrifice, this Congress advises adoption of Swadeshi in piece-goods on a vast scale, and inasmuch as the existing mills of India with indigenous capital and control do not manufacture sufficient yarn and sufficient cloth for the requirements of the Nation, and are not likely to do so for a long time to come, this Congress advises immediate stimulation of further manufacture on a large scale by means of reviving hand-spinning in every home and hand-weaving on the part of the millions of weavers who have abandoned their ancient and honourable calling for want of encouragement”.

But though sponsored by Gandhi and backed by the Ali Brothers and nearly the whole Muslim bloc, the resolu-

tion was strongly opposed by a large section. The Subjects Committee debated it for three days. The substantive motion was the one drafted by the Reception Committee, and Gandhi introduced his motion by way of an amendment. There were about thirty amendments but the rest were lost and Gandhi's amendment was carried by a majority of seven votes only. In the open session of the Congress, on September 8, a resolution was moved for adjournment of the Congress till the winter session so that further time may be given to the country to consider the whole question. The mover pointed out that the discussion in the Subjects Committee left no doubt that there was a considerable body of opinion against the Non-co-operation resolution of Gandhi, and a precipitate decision might split the Congress. But the adjournment motion was lost. The resolution was opposed by C. R. Das, B. C. Pal, Annie Besant, Malaviya, Jinnah and others. Among the eminent Hindu leaders only Pandit Motilal Nehru supported Gandhi. After a prolonged debate the motion was carried by 1886 against 884 votes.²⁴ It was a great personal triumph for Gandhi—for he had already burnt his boats behind him, and it may be said, staked his whole political career on the favourable decision of the Congress. For his position would have been unenviable if the Congress threw out his resolution. This must have been a compelling consideration to many who supported Gandhi's resolution on Non-co-operation.^{24a}

There has been much speculation about the fate of the resolution, if the Congress could have the benefit of the presence and advice of Tilak. All that can be urged with a tolerable degree of certainty is that the death of Tilak undoubtedly facilitated the assumption of unquestioning leadership by Gandhi.^{24b}

As this ushers in a new era in India's struggle for freedom and marks a turning point in the history of the Indian National Congress, it is necessary to pause and

discuss the motives that prompted Gandhi to a radical change of his views. It has been held by a biographer of Gandhi that "this change, from love to rejection of the British Empire, grew out of the Jallianwalla blood bath"²⁵. According to Surendra Nath Banerji, "the Rowlatt Act was the parent of Non-co-operation movement."²⁶ Such views have been repeated by others. But they ignore the very important fact that the Rowlatt Act was passed and Jallianwala massacre took place before the Amritsar Congress where Gandhi opposed even a milder form of Non-co-operation. One might indeed be puzzled to think out what happened during the following six months that brought about such a radical change in Gandhi's inborn sense of loyalty to the British Empire and his die-hard spirit of co-operation with the Government, which neither the Rowlatt Act nor the tragic incidents of the Panjab in 1919 could extinguish or even modify to any degree.

Gandhi's own explanation for his sudden change of front is given in the following passage in the speech with which he moved the resolution on Non-co-operation in the Calcutta Congress : "The Mussulmans of India cannot remain as honourable men, and followers of the faith of their Prophet, if they do not vindicate its honour at any cost. The Punjab has been cruelly and barbarously treated..... And it is in order to remove these two wrongs.....that I have ventured to place before this country a scheme of Non-co-operation....." He did not, however, make it clear, why, in respect of the wrongs done to the Khilafat, the Musalmans of India should regard themselves on a special footing, as compared with their co-religionists in other countries. If the Muslims of Arabia and Persia, the homeland of Islam, did not feel perturbed, and even welcomed the terms offered to Turkey, why should the Musalmans of India, who derived their faith from those two countries, cease to be honourable men or followers of the

faith of their Prophet (who belonged to Arabia), if they did not vindicate the honour of the Khilafat ? But what is still more important, the Turks and their Caliph, themselves, did not want any domination over Arabia, demanded by the Indian Muslims ; for the Turkish deputation in January-February, 1919, after the Armistice, only pressed for political and economic independence in the area of predominantly Turkish population. What is the explanation for the Indian Muslims out-Heroding Herod himself, and the justification of the Hindus for supporting them even by taking an extreme and hazardous step ?

As regards the Panjab Gandhi rightly observed : "Inasmuch as a single Panjabi was made to crawl on his belly, the whole of India crawled that day on her belly, and it is that humiliation which you and I, if we claim to be worthy sons and daughters of India, must be pledged to remove." These are noble sentiments, but one wonders how, with all the crawlings and hundred other indignities of the people of the Panjab fresh in his memory, Gandhi could put his whole weight on loyal co-operation with the British in the Amritsar Congress, and fight against those who proposed to vindicate the wrongs of the Panjab by a programme of Non-co-operation, which he now proposed.

The same personal explanation, with slight variations, is found in Gandhi's letter to the Viceroy on August 1, 1920, and more particularly in the statement which he had made before Justice Broomfield during his trial in March, 1922. The relevant passage runs as follows :—

"The first shock came in the shape of Rowlatt Act..... Then followed the Punjab horrors.....I discovered, too, that the plighted word of the Prime Minister to the Mussulmans of India regarding the integrity of Turkey and the holy places of Islam was not likely to be fulfilled. But in spite of the foreboding and the grave

warnings of friends, at the Amritsar Congress in 1919, I fought for co-operation and working the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, hoping the Prime Minister would redeem his promise to the Indian Mussulmans, that the Panjab wound would be healed, and that the Reforms, inadequate and unsatisfactory though they were, marked a new era of hope in the life of India. But all that hope was shattered. The Khilafat promise was not to be redeemed. The Punjab crime was whitewashed, and most culprits were not only unpunished but remained in service, and some continued to draw pensions from the Indian revenue, and in some cases were even rewarded. I saw, too, that not only did the reforms not mark a change of heart, but they were only a method of further draining India of her wealth and of prolonging her servitude."

In view of the saintly character of Gandhi, and particularly his solicitude for truth, no one has a right to disbelieve the above statement. But history is no respecter of persons, and is bound to judge the conduct of a public man by certain rational standards. A person who is not blinded by unquestioning faith in, and devotion to, Gandhi, and is in a position to take an unprejudiced and detached view, may, while appreciating the sentiments of Gandhi, find it difficult to admit the soundness of his views and the wisdom of his judgment. As regards the Khilafat question, it was the height of political unwisdom to make it a chief plank or problem in the struggle for freedom waged by India against the British. India might certainly have expressed her sympathy with Turkey and others; the Musalman citizens of India might feel perturbed by the curtailing of the power of the Khilafat over their holy places; but, as pointed out above, the Muslims outside India did not share their views and, in any case, it was not for India to make it

the first issue in her political struggle against the British. But Gandhi's action might appear to many to be still more objectionable. By joining with a separate Musalman organization acting independently of the Congress, and in deciding upon Non-co-operation solely on this issue, while the Congress at his instance had decided at Amritsar to co-operate with the Government, he put a premium upon the extra-territorial nationality of the Indian Muslims. In other words, he upheld the right of the Muslims in India to look upon Turkey or Khilafat as more important than their own country, India. This cut at the very root of Indian nationality. As John Stuart Mill has very correctly observed, different groups of men inhabiting a country may be said to constitute a nationality only when they are united by common sympathies which do not exist between any constituent group and outsiders. If the Muslims of India felt themselves in duty bound to take an extreme step against the Government for undoing the wrongs done to the Khilafat which they did not consider necessary to adopt for redressing the wrongs of the Panjab or attaining self-government for India, they could hardly be regarded as a constituent group of the Indian nation.

It is sad to find that even such shrewd statesmen as Rajagopalachari did not realize this aspect in their over-zealous enthusiasm for the Indian support of the Khilafat.²⁷ There were, however, many eminent Indians who disapproved of the conduct of Gandhi.

But, apart from this theoretical objection, will it be seriously contended that a man with even a moderate knowledge of European politics could have failed to see in September, 1920, or even in December, 1919, what was in store for Turkey? If Gandhi had honestly believed that the threat or agitation of Indian Musalmans in September, 1920, would induce the British Government

to re-open the question which had already been settled in consonance with the general policy adopted by the victorious Allies towards the resettlement of Europe, and force the latter to adopt a radically new policy, one cannot entertain a very high opinion of his knowledge of European history, or of his political acumen, to say the least of it.

Similarly, the ominous silence of the Government of India about the tragic happenings in the Panjab for a period of about eight months, and the composition of the inquiry committee which they were reluctantly forced to appoint, should not have left any hope that the Panjab wounds would be healed, even on the assumption that the grievous wounds could be healed by any action of the Government of India. There should not have been any reasonable doubt in the mind of any one in December, 1919, that the inhuman atrocities in the Panjab were done with full knowledge and connivance, if not encouragement, of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Province, and the action was tacitly, if not directly, approved by the Government of India and condoned by the Home Government. The attitude displayed by the Government of India during the six months that followed the Amritsar Congress was therefore neither unexpected nor so strikingly grave in character as might justify Gandhi's complete somersault in respect of his feelings of loyalty towards the British. But the most mysterious is the last sentence in the statement of Gandhi in the Court, quoted above, which adds a third ground for his action, not included in his letter to the Viceroy. His favourable attitude towards the Reforms is explicitly indicated by his articles in the *Young India*, and the part he played in the Amritsar Congress²⁸. How, one wonders, did Gandhi realize, even before the Reforms were actually put into operation, that they were only a method of "further draining India of her wealth and of prolonging her servitude"? The draining of the wealth of India, so pathetically described by Dadabhai Naoroji and Digby, and her

abject servitude for one hundred and sixty years could not materially impair Gandhi's attachment to the British rule, and left Gandhi sufficiently loyal to extend his hand of co-operation up to the end of 1919 ; what new knowledge, gained in course of six or seven months following it, outweighed the experience of 160 years, it is not easy to determine. Besides, as indicated above, Gandhi seems to have decided upon Non-co-operation before the events, he complained of, actually took place. On the whole it would have been difficult to accept the explanation, at least as whole truth, if it were offered by a lesser man than Gandhi. A more rational explanation of the change of Gandhi's mind seems to be that he could sense the great change in the temperament of the people, and either realized his own mistake or wished to be in a line with his own countrymen. One could also explain his attitude towards the Khilafat problem as a matter of expediency, for Gandhi himself is reported to have said that it provided "such an opportunity of uniting Hindus and Muhammadans as would not arise in a hundred years".²⁹ But none of these fits in with the known character of Gandhi. He never hesitated to admit his own errors, and never allowed himself to be moved by mere popular feelings or expediency, unless he was convinced that the course was right.

We are, therefore, bound to accept the explanation offered by Gandhi himself, though it is sure provoke the criticism that the nobility of his character was not matched by his political acumen. In this connection one may remember what Gandhi once wrote : "My aim is not to be consistent with my previous statement on a given question, but to be consistent with the truth as it may present itself to me at a given moment. The result is that I have grown from truth to truth".³⁰ This may be a lofty utterance from the point of view of personal ethics, but may often be dangerous in a political leader. For, if he does not choose to disclose the grounds for his change of views

and invite public discussion on the matter, the only alternative for the people is to accept, without demur, whatever the leader says and follow blindly his directions, or to reject his leadership. The latter course was almost impossible in the case of Gandhi, who had established his position among the masses more by his ascetic ideals and saintly character than by political wisdom or a cut and dried political programme. The fact that Gandhi carried his pro-British resolution in 1919 in spite of the opposition of prominent Indian leaders like Tilak, C. R. Das and Jinnah, and again, without more ado, carried the opposite resolution eight months later in 1920, again in the teeth of opposition by C.R.Das and other leaders, proves beyond doubt that he had already attained the position of spiritual *guru* in politics, whose word was law. This was further demonstrated by the Nagpur Congress of 1920 where leaders like C. R. Das 'who came to scoff, remained to pray'.^{30a} The Calcutta resolution was the first, but not the last, of Gandhi's political somersaults, which puzzled his contemporaries, irritated many, and alienated a few, but were nevertheless accepted in principle and carried into practice by the overwhelming majority of the people.^{30b}

Before leaving this topic it is necessary to draw attention to the third para of the Non-co-operation resolution moved by Gandhi and accepted by the Congress. It conveys the definite idea that *Swaraj* was demanded only to redress Panjab and Khilafat wrongs, and thereby vindicate national honour and prevent their repetition in future. This side-tracks the main issue of the fight for freedom, and unnecessarily emphasizes only two side-issues. The inclusion of Khilafat wrongs as a ground for demanding *Swaraj* would perhaps appear to many as nothing short of grotesque. Even the Panjab wrongs, grievous though they were, should not have been put forward as the basis of demand for *Swaraj*. By adopting this

para, political India went back upon what had hitherto been regarded as the fundamental issue, so tersely put by Tilak : "Swaraj is my birth-right and I shall have it."

Gandhi's occasional utterance in this respect perhaps deserves even stronger condemnation. When, after about a year, the Non-co-operation movement failed to redress the grievances of the Muslims and they grew impatient, Gandhi wrote :

"In their impatient anger, the Musalmans ask for more energetic and more prompt action by the Congress and Khilafat organisations. To the Musalmans, Swaraj means, *as it must mean*, India's ability to deal effectively with the Khilafat question. The Musalmans, therefore, decline to wait if the attainment of Swaraj means indefinite delay... "It is impossible not to sympathise with this attitude. ...*I would gladly ask for postponement of Swaraj activity if thereby we could advance the interest of the Khilafat.....*

"But in my humble opinion, attainment of Swaraj is the quickest method of righting the Khilafat wrong..."^{30c}

Thus according to Gandhi's own confession, the freedom of India was valued chiefly as a means to the restoration of the authority of the Turkish Sultan, and he was even prepared to give up the struggle for India's freedom, if anybody could suggest a quicker remedy for achieving the same end. Comment is superfluous upon such a statement made by one whom the country hailed as "Father of the Nation", meaning obviously Indian and not Muslim nation.

III. THE NAGPUR CONGRESS—DECEMBER, 1920

The mystic element in Indian politics which was noted in the sudden change of front by Gandhi in the first part of 1920, persisted throughout the year. This is amply evident from the proceedings of the Annual session of the Congress held at Nagpur in December, 1920, under the Presidentship of Vijayaraghavachariar. The resolution on Non-co-operation passed in the Special session of the Congress at Calcutta had to be ratified in the regular

session. There was unprecedented enthusiasm and more than 14,000 attended the Congress.^{30d}

It was generally expected that there would be a fresh trial of strength between Gandhi and the opponents of Non-co-operation. But, curiously enough, no such thing took place, and the resolution was ratified with only a few dissentient voices. This was mainly due to another inexplicable and sudden political somersault,—this time on the part of C. R. Das. Subhas Chandra Bose, who shortly afterwards became the most confidential lieutenant of Das, gives the following version of the whole affair :

“ Mr. Das and his followers mustered strong at Nagpur hoping to cross swords with Mr. Gandhi once again. But through the latter's tactful handling of the situation an understanding was arrived at between him and Mr. Das. The boycott of the legislatures, to which Mr. Das was chiefly opposed, was no longer a live issue as the elections had already taken place. It was therefore possible to persuade Mr. Das to come to an agreement. When this was done, the non-co-operation resolution was ratified with practical unanimity, though Pandit Malaviya, Mrs. Besant, Mr. Jinnah and Mr. B. C. Pal remained irreconcilable.”³¹

The explanation is vague and unconvincing. Das did not indicate in the Calcutta session that his opposition was limited to the boycott of legislature. Even if it were so, the holding of one election could not be a decisive factor, as there was to be another election after three years. Besides, Bose's own statement that Das started for Nagpur with a strong contingent to fight against Gandhi takes away the force of his argument, for even before Das started for Nagpur, the election was over and the boycott of legislature 'had ceased to be a living issue'. Here, again, one might ask, what happened during his stay at Nagpur—perhaps during less than twenty-four hours—which

induced Das to give up the fight and join wholeheartedly with Gandhi ? The incident further shows the beginning of dictatorial regime (or *guruvaad*) in Indian politics. Das was no less a dictator in the restricted sphere of Bengal than Gandhi in the rest of India. It seems that the rank and file of Congress politicians had gladly and willingly surrendered their political judgment and conscience to the safekeeping of a few individuals. There were a few honourable exceptions, including those mentioned above by Bose. Among these Mrs. Besant veered round to the Moderate camp. Jinnah gave pointed expression to his disapproval,—and this is worth noting as it marks the beginning of his estrangement from the Congress politics dominated by Gandhi. Jinnah was the only one who strongly fought against the Non-co-operation resolution at Nagpur, and when Gandhi asked for his co-operation, he replied as follows :

“ I thank you for your kind suggestion offering me to take my share in the new life that has opened up before the country. If by “new life” you mean your methods and your programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them, for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster.....Your methods have already caused split and division in the public life of the country, not only amongst Hindus and Muslims, but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims, and even between fathers and sons ; people generally are desperate all over the country and your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and illiterate.”³²

Another political leader, who raised his voice of protest and whose forebodings proved almost prophetic, was G.S. Khaparde, a co-worker of Tilak, who published a short memorandum on December 10, 1920, pointing out how the Non-co-operation resolution, passed in Calcutta session, was calcu-

lated to "divert the energies of the Congress into directions of attaining soul force and moral excellence, and lose sight of the political aspect of affairs." "The N.C.O.", it continued, "as preached now, may develop powers of endurance, but cannot breed the energy and resourcefulness and practical wisdom necessary for a political struggle. The three boycotts, at present recommended, are futile and have not at all a distinct political aspect, and the tendency of the whole, as evidenced in the proceedings for alteration of the creed of the All-India Home Rule League, now renamed Swaraj Sabha, would appear to be towards a return to autocracy and personal rule, which is objectionable and against the spirit of the age, though entrusted to a highly developed and moral individual."³³

Three members of the British Labour Party—Colonel Wedgwood, Mr. Ben Spoor, and Mr. Holford Knight,—attended the Congress session. Wedgwood, who was permitted to attend the Subjects Committee with his two colleagues and was also permitted to take part therein, gravely warned the Congress against N.C.O. "You will make it difficult for your friends in England to take up your cause", said he. "You are going into the wilderness. You must pursue a constructive programme". He was immediately met with the blunt reply: "We have no friends outside India; let there be no mistake about that. Our salvation lies in our own hands. We must make or mar our future. We are going into the wilderness, we know, because the way to the 'land flowing with milk and honey', the land of Canaan, from the land of our bondage, lies only through a wilderness. And we trust to the leadership of a Moses or an Aaron to lead us from untruth to truth, from darkness to light, from death to life". There is no doubt that this speech reflected the sentiment, not only of the people in general, but also of a vast majority of the politicians of the Nationalist school who attended the Congress. C.R.Das, who came prepared to oppose

N.C.O., himself moved and Lala Lajpat Rai seconded the resolution about N.C.O. It was long and comprehensive, and virtually reaffirmed the one passed in Calcutta, covering the whole field, from the renunciation of titles at one end to the refusal to pay taxes to the other. It laid emphasis on non-violence as an integral part of the N.C.O. movement and requested those elected to the Council to resign their seats. By a separate resolution the country was asked to refrain from taking any part in functions or festivities in honour of H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught.

A number of other decisions adopted at the Nagpur session makes it a landmark in the history of the Congress.

In the Amritsar session of the Congress in 1919, Gandhi was authorized to prepare the draft of a new constitution for the Congress. On the basis of this draft certain important changes were made in the constitution. The goal of the Congress was defined in the existing constitution as "self-government within the British Empire". This kept out of the Congress a radical section whose political ideal was complete independence. To accommodate this section the goal of the Congress was declared to be 'Swaraj'. It literally means self-rule, and neither long usage nor any generally accepted convention had given any definite connotation to it. It was evidently kept deliberately vague so that each individual member might satisfy his conscience by putting any interpretation upon the word he likes. Gandhi defined 'Swaraj' to mean "self-government within the empire, if possible, and outside, if necessary."

The Congress was reorganized on the basis of a gradation of committees, beginning from village, the smallest unit, through gradually increasing areas like sub-division, district, and province, to the All-India Congress Committee of about 350 members. This Committee was to elect a Working Committee of 15 members which would be the supreme Executive of the Congress for the whole country. The

provinces, for the purpose of the above organization, were re-arranged on a linguistic basis ; Madras, for example, being divided into Andhra and Tamil-nadu. The Subjects Committee was henceforth to be composed of the members of the AICC alone and was to meet 2 or 3 days before the open session of the Congress.

Another important change was the substitution of the words "all peaceful and legitimate means" for the existing "constitutional means", which defined the method to be followed by the Congress in achieving the goal. This was evidently a compromise between the Moderate section represented by Malaviya and Jinnah and the Radical section who demanded absolute independence to be achieved by all possible means. Gandhi's influence induced the extreme section to accept the compromise.

IV. THE NAGPUR PROGRAMME

I. Constructive Work

The movement launched by Gandhi, on which the Nagpur Congress put its imprimatur with almost rare unanimity, had two aspects which may be called positive and negative, or constructive and destructive. The former included the promotion of *Swadeshi*, particularly the revival of hand spinning and weaving, removal of untouchability among the Hindus, promotion of Hindu-Muslim unity, prohibition of the use of alcoholic drinks, and the collection of a crore of Rupees for the memorial of Tilak (in the shape of a *Swarajya* fund). The spinning and weaving—two lost arts of India, of which the first was almost a forgotten one—were no doubt originally intended as a means of economic uplift of the masses, but to this was later added a symbolic—one might almost say, political and ethical—significance which gave it a sacrosanct character. Gandhi even went so far as to declare that the *Charka* (spinning wheel) was the key to India's freedom,—as soon as India would be able to weave its own

cloth, 'Swaraj' would be realized. Some of the eminent nationalist leaders like B. C. Pal regarded this as going too far and refused to see in the spindle the veritable secret of, or way to, India's political freedom.

The destructive side is usually referred to as the triple boycott,—namely, boycott of legislature, courts, and educational institutions, both schools and colleges maintained or aided by the Government. The ideas of Passive Resistance and Civil Disobedience, though not explicitly included in the programme, seem to have been tacitly permitted, though under strict limitations, whenever necessary to carry out the above programme. The minor items of boycott included surrender of titles, honours, etc. as formulated in the resolution, quoted above, of the Congress in its special Session at Calcutta. Some constructive work was directly necessitated by the destructive programme, such as setting up arbitration boards where cases might be decided out of courts, and national schools and colleges where students leaving old schools and colleges might continue their education. By a reverse process, the boycott of foreign goods, particularly foreign cloth, formed an important item by way of promoting *Swadeshi*.

Immediately after the Nagpur session Gandhi made an extensive and prolonged tour of the country in order to popularize the N. C. O. movement. It seems that at first the constructive side was more emphasized than the destructive. The All-India Congress Committee, meeting at Bezwada on March 31, 1921, passed resolutions "calling upon all workers to concentrate their attention chiefly on (1) collecting a crore of Rupees for the Tilak Memorial Swaraj Fund; (2) enlisting a crore of members; and (3) introducing 20 lakhs of *Charkas* (spinning wheels) in Indian households; all this before the 30th June 1921". The first item was successfully carried out, the fund being over-subscribed by 15 lakhs of Rupees. The membership reached more than

fifty lakhs and the number of *Charkas* almost reached the target. Gandhi was at first against the boycott of foreign goods, as it was, in his opinion, a form of violence, but he changed his views in a few months and laid great emphasis on it. In its meeting at Bombay on July 28, 1921, the All-India Congress Committee sent detailed instructions to all Congress organizations in order to attain "complete boycott of foreign cloth by the 30th September next," and asked them to concentrate their attention upon manufacture of *Khaddar* by stimulating hand-spinning and hand-weaving. It also approved the picketing of liquor shops which had already begun, but deplored the excesses committed by the mob at Aligarh and Malegaon.

The weaving and popularizing of *Khaddar* made some progress, but the production was slow and far behind the target aimed at. As to the consumption of liquor, it underwent a marked decline due to vigorous picketing of liquor shops, and there was a substantial fall in the revenue of the Government, but "after the removal of the pickets, the pendulum swung back and the evil asserted itself again in full force."³⁴

The All-India Congress Committee at Bombay, while passing the resolution on the boycott of foreign cloth, also advised all Congress organizations "to collect foreign cloth for destruction or use outside India at their option." This provoked a heated discussion and several amendments were moved against the burning of cloth or its being sent out to Smyrna for the use of the Turkish forces. Patel, supported by Kelkar, opposed the destruction of foreign cloth which he thought was valued roughly at hundred crores and which he described as national wealth, especially at a time when millions were either ill-clad or naked. Gandhi vigorously supported the burning of cloth by the consumers, though not by the cloth-dealers. Immediately after the session of the AICC, the city of

Bombay displayed great enthusiasm in this item. Numerous meetings were held urging the boycott of foreign cloth, and arrangement was made for a great spectacular demonstration of burning it. The following is the contemporary account of a scene :

" On July 31 there was a gathering of some two to three thousand people to witness the great holocaust. The pile of foreign cloth collected was ranged in an enormous circle about a mile in diameter and some three feet high. All sorts of foreign clothing from rich brocades and silk *saris* to torn hats, coats, neckties and collars, were thrown into the pile. All the prominent provincial leaders who had gone to Bombay to attend the AICC meeting were present, and also a few hundreds of ladies. Gandhi came in the evening and applied a lighted match to the pile. At once the fire leaped up and went round the circle in a few minutes, and in about a couple of hours the huge pile worth some crores of Rupees was burnt to ashes."³⁵

Similar bonfires, though not on such a grand scale, were made in other towns, and this became almost a regular feature of the programme of cloth boycott. Eminent men, including poet Rabindranath, made vigorous protest against this "insensate waste" of cloth when millions were going half-naked. Gandhi gave a spirited reply in his paper, the *Young India*. "Critics", said he, "have overwhelmed me with their rebuke regarding the burning of foreign cloth. After having considered every argument advanced against it, I cannot help saying that destruction is the best method of dealing with foreign cloth."

But in spite of spectacular demonstration of the burning of foreign cloth, the boycott of foreign cloth did not show satisfactory progress, as was admitted by the Working Committee at its Bombay meeting on 5

October, 1921. As regards other items of constructive programme it is difficult to recognize any substantial progress either in the removal of untouchability and other class distinctions among the Hindus, or in the promotion of Hindu-Muslim unity. The deplorable communal riots in Malabar and at Multan, to which reference will be made later, rather show a worsening of the situation, even though the Congressmen, as usual, attributed all incidents to mischief-makers. The elaborate review of this point in the Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee is almost pathetic in its simplicity of faith in the inherent Hindu-Muslim fraternity, and crude, almost incredible tendency to ignore hard facts.

2. Boycott

The destructive side of the Non-co-operation movement was also pursued with zeal. The two most exciting items in this connection were the boycott of legislature and educational institutions. Serious attempts were made at the time of the election in November, 1920, to persuade persons, particularly Congressmen, not to stand for election, and the voters to abstain from registering their votes. These activities were, of course, shortlived and came to an end as soon as the elections were over. Far more protracted, and at first far more active and successful, was the country-wide agitation for the boycott of schools and colleges. Eminent leaders appealed to the students to leave their institution, and the response was, in some parts, most enthusiastic.

i. Volunteer Organization

But there is no doubt that much of the success in regard to this item was due to picketing by students themselves. Picketing was also an essential feature in stopping the sale of liquors and foreign goods. This work was mainly done by the National Volunteers—a body thoroughly reorganized for carrying out the programme of Non-co-operation.

Long before the commencement of this movement there were Congress Volunteer Associations in almost all parts of India whose main activities, besides helping the arrangements for the annual sessions of the Congress, were confined to social and philanthropic service, such as helping the pilgrims on special occasions when there was a great rush, maintaining order in religious fairs, relief work in times of epidemic, famine or floods, etc. The Khilafat agitation led to the growth of a body of volunteers who were from the very beginning, of a more militant character, and in many places wore uniforms and practised drills and route marches. These two bodies were now combined, though not actually fused into a single organization under one command, and came to be known as National Volunteers. It was mainly with the help of these volunteers that the Congress carried on not only the picketing which was essential for preventing the sale of liquors and foreign goods, but also the enforcement of other items, both constructive and destructive, through social and economic pressure as far as possible. Though pledged to non-violence their activities were described by Government as subversive of order and discipline. "Attempts to usurp functions of police, intimidation and use of violence to enforce *hartals* and social and commercial boycott, or under guise of *swadeshi* or temperance movements in order to impair authority of Government and terrorise political opponents, have been prominent features of their recent activities". This view of Government was not certainly without foundation, though the evils and shortcomings were considerably magnified by them.

ii. *Boycott of Councils*

The object of boycotting the Councils was to bring about a complete deadlock in administration. Gandhi hoped that there would be a wholesale abstention of voters from voting. To the argument that the whole country will not respond to this and

the Moderates will steal into the Councils, he replied : "Will a single Moderate leader care to enter any Council if more than half his electorate disapproved of his offering himself as a candidate at all ?³⁶ I hold that it would be unconstitutional for him to do so." From this point of view the movement for boycotting the Councils was a complete failure. All the Congress candidates had withdrawn from the contest in obedience to the mandate of the Calcutta Congress, and all the seats were filled up by non-Congressmen. Just out of fun, or out of spite, the Congressmen put a cobbler as a candidate from a seat in Bengal and he was duly returned. But though the Congress was undeniably strong and could easily command majority of votes in almost all Hindu constituencies, it was not strong enough to prevent at least a quarter of the total number of voters from casting their votes and thereby render the election void or ineffectual, as they hoped. The Congress, however, succeeded in proving to the world that the Legislative Councils elected under the new constitution had no claim to represent the people of India. This was frankly admitted even by high British officials. Thus on November 22, 1924, in the course of a farewell speech, Sir Frank Sly, the Governor of C.P., observed : "At the first election many of the electors, under the influence of the Non-co-operation movement, abstained from voting, and members were returned to the Legislative Council who could not claim to be really representative of public opinion, and some of whom were unfit to exercise the responsibilities of their position".³⁷

iii. Boycott of Law-Courts

The boycott of legal profession was heralded by the magnificent self-sacrifice of Pandit Motilal Nehru and C.R. Das, both leaders of the Bar and enjoying a princely income. They gave up their practice, and their example was followed by a large number of

lawyers. Here, again, the boycott was more spectacular than effective, for the number of boycotting lawyers, though perhaps exceeding a thousand to start with, but gradually dwindling as time passed, were not large enough in proportion to their total strength, and hence could not make any impression upon, far less cripple, the work of the British law-courts. The attempt to dissuade the people from resorting to British courts and settle their litigation by boards of arbitration set up by the Congress or village *panchayats*, though partially successful in a few localities, did not achieve any important result.

iv. Boycott of Schools and Colleges

The programme of boycotting schools and colleges at first created great enthusiasm. It was foreshadowed by the All-India College Students' Conference held at Nagpur on December 25, 1920, under the Chairmanship of Lala Lajpat Rai. In his Presidential address he denounced the view that "students ought not to have to do anything with politics." He thought that "while students ought to be free to study politics, have opinions on political questions and express them at times, whenever there is need, through their organization, they ought to steer clear of politics. Otherwise this organization might be turned into a political organization, and the division among political parties will be carried into the students' camp". As regards the item of the boycott of schools and colleges in the Non-co-operation programme he gave the following advice : "Leave at once the Law Colleges. Do not leave Medical, Engineering, and Technical Schools. As regards Arts Colleges, consider the situation well and if you really feel the call of duty, leave the Arts Colleges, but under no delusion that some one is going to make provision in National Schools established by the leaders of the National Congress."³⁸

The Conference met again on December 26, 1920,

with Mr. Pickthal, Editor of the *Bombay Chronicle*, in the chair. There was a heated debate on the boycott of Government-aided schools and colleges. A resolution was passed to the effect that 'the Conference whole-heartedly supports the immediate and unconditional boycott of Government and Government-aided colleges, and advises the college students of India to respond to it.' By another resolution national leaders were requested to establish National Colleges, including provision for technical education. A programme of work was laid down for the student Non-co-operators. The students of India were requested by another resolution to use only ~~their~~ vernacular in their correspondence, daily talk and provincial deliberations.

The Students' Conference, and the almost unanimous adoption of the Non-co-operation resolution by the Congress, at Nagpur, had great repercussion upon students all over the country. The greatest upheaval took place in Calcutta on January 12, 1921, as a large number of students left their colleges, marched through the streets in procession, and gathered in a meeting addressed by Congress leaders like C. R. Das and B. C. Pal. In course of the next week, many more students came out and processions and mammoth meetings became the order of the day. The teachers, however, with rare exceptions, did not join the students' strike. The example of Calcutta was followed by many Mofussil colleges. The boycotting students adopted a novel method of picketing in order to prevent others from entering the colleges. A number of them lay flat, side by side, on the pavements of the doorways, blocking the entrance. The students, willing to attend, had either to tread upon the bodies of their fellow-students or abstain from attendance. It is easy to understand why many chose the latter alternative. The initial success of the boycott was mainly due to this practice, whose non-violent character may justly be questioned. But,

as noted above, the boycott of colleges, thus artificially maintained, did not, in the long run, prove very effective. This result was also partly due to the attitude of Gandhi. Hitherto the students merely boycotted the existing colleges in order to join National institutions which were slowly springing up in different parts of India. Gandhi, however, made it clear that he wanted the students to give up their education and join in the fight against bureaucracy by devoting their whole time and energy to the national movement. He cited the analogy of belligerent countries in Europe during the World War where the colleges were closed down and the students drawn to war-work. In this national crisis, said Gandhi, students were to think not of education but of *Swaraj*. This appeal, however, found little response.

There was a great commotion among the students of the D. A. V. College at Lahore, and Lala Lajpat Rai requested its authorities to convert it into a national institution. The Managing Committee, however, refused to do so. On January 25, the students of the college held a meeting at Gujranwala which was addressed by Rambhuj Dutt Choudhuri and Lajpat Rai. The former appealed to the students to give up their studies at once and join the national movement to win *Swaraj*. Lajpat Rai asked the students to leave the D. A. V. College so that it might be converted into a true national college. "But", he added, "remember one thing, don't be a bluffer. Think and consult your conscience. Do not leave the college unless you are absolutely determined to follow your conscience. But once you take the step, do not recede."

The meeting was followed by the Panjab Students' Conference at Gujranwala on January 30, with Dr. Kitchew as President. It passed a resolution urging upon all students above the age of 16 "to make immediate and effective response to the call of the nation by unconditional withdrawal from all arts, sciences, and professional institutions connected

with the Government."

In the meanwhile the students of other colleges went on strike on January 27, and passed similar resolutions in their meetings. Most of the colleges had to be closed down for the time being. But by the end of February, the movement for strike practically died down both in Calcutta and Lahore.

There were commotions in varying degrees, but no strong movement of students in other parts of India. On the whole, the movement for the boycott of schools and colleges proved a failure. Though quite a large number of students gave up their studies, the movement never gained sufficient strength, and failed to create any lasting impression or produce any serious effect on the existing institutions. Many of the students who came out rejoined their old institutions ; some resumed their studies in newly started national schools and colleges ; only a small band remained steadfast to their resolve, at least for many years to come.

But the boycott of courts and educational institutions produced most significant and far-reaching consequences in another direction. Men like Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das, along with others, now devoted their whole time and energy to the service of the country. So did most of the students who gave up their studies. For the first time in the history of modern India there was a select band of whole-time workers, both leaders and rank and file, all over the country, who made the freedom of India their only goal in life and consecrated themselves to its achievement. There were many who took to the service of the country as a whole-time job rather than a pastime of leisure time ; and their example had a profound influence over others ; all this changed the entire outlook of the country, and gave a new zeal and spirit to India's struggle for freedom. The ideal of Bankim Chandra's *Anandamath*, and the idea with which Gokhale started the 'Servants of India Society' at last came to fruition.

v. Miscellaneous

The Boycott of titles and honours as well as of Government offices was a hopeless failure. The number of persons who renounced honours and titles was very small compared to the total number. But it is an undeniable fact that these titles and honours henceforth ceased to be distinctions in the estimation of the people at large, and generally came to be regarded as badges of slavery. Many holders of titles, though unable to renounce them for fear of incurring the displeasure of Government, really felt uncomfortable, and gradually the display of the so-called honours and their recognition as such were confined to Government functions.

As regards the resignation of Government jobs, the response was insignificant and negligible. But there were a few remarkable instances. Subhas Candra Bose, the future Netaji, who passed the I. C. S. in 1920, resigned his post in May, 1921. P. C. Ghosh, who later became the Chief Minister of Bengal, also resigned a lucrative appointment. There were a few other cases, too.

More spectacular success attended the movement for boycotting the visits of H. R. H. the Duke of Connaught and the Prince of Wales as will be related later.

3. The Policy of the Government

It is very significant that the Government at first did not take any serious notice of the activities of the Non-co-operators, except in cases of picketing and burning of foreign cloths, which led to disturbances, either real, or artificially created by *agents-provateurs* of the Government. The disturbances were followed by the usual *lathi* charge, brutal assault and imprisonment.

The gradual evolution of the policy of the Government of India towards the Non-co-operation movement has been admirably summed up in the long telegraph which the Viceroy sent to the Secretary of State for

India on February 9, 1922, thus covering the entire period during which the movement was in force. As early as April, 1920, instructions were issued by Lord Chelmsford's Government that there should be prompt prosecution of all persons tampering with the loyalty of the troops or the Police, and a scheme for instituting counter-propaganda was formulated in July of the same year. In September instructions were issued to Local Governments to take action vigorously to prosecute for all incitements to violence, and their attention was drawn in October to the dangerous potentialities which lay in the Volunteer movement. Lastly, in November 1920, a resolution was issued by the Government of India defining their general attitude towards the Non-co-operation campaign. It was explained that, although the entire movement was unconstitutional, they had refrained from instituting criminal proceedings against such of its promoters as had advocated simultaneously with non-co-operation abstention from violence, and they had given instructions to Local Governments that action should be taken against those persons only, who, in order to further the movement, had advanced beyond the limits which its organisers had originally set up, and had openly incited the public to violence by speech or writing, or endeavoured to tamper with the loyalty of the army or the Police. The following considerations had influenced Government in adopting this policy :-

1. Reluctance to interfere with the freedom of the Press and liberty of speech at a time when India was on the threshold of a great advance towards self-government.

2. The knowledge that those against whom prosecution might be directed (some of whom were actuated by honest, if misguided motives) would be likely to find in it the opportunity of posing as martyrs, and that they

8V3

might swell the number of adherents to their cause by evoking false sympathy.

3. The belief that Non-co-operation would be rejected by the country as a visionary and a chimerical scheme.....

In the above communication reference is made to a system of counter-propaganda by the Government. It took two forms. The Government subsidised some papers and issued leaflets with a view to emphasizing the evils of the Non-co-operation movement and defending the policy of the Government. It is hardly necessary to point out that this was a mere waste of money, paid to certain favoured individuals for their loyalty, and had absolutely no effect on the class of people whom the Government had in view. The second form of the propaganda was to convince the people of the great powers conceded to them by the Reforms of 1919. We may quote from the telegraph referred to above : "Government at the same time took every opportunity during the first session of the reformed legislature of convincing Indian opinion that the reforms were real and great, and that they had conferred on the representatives of the people wide powers, and that there was a readiness to inquire into the cause of discontent, or any specific grievances. It was, for example, agreed to refer to non-official Committees of the Legislature certain Acts which conferred extraordinary powers on the Executive, as well as the Acts regulating the conduct of the Press ; the greatest consideration was shown in framing the Budget to the opinion of the Legislature."

4. Gandhi and the Ali Brothers.

During the early part of 1921 Gandhi and the Ali Brothers succeeded in bringing about such a unity of aims and activities between the Hindus and Muslims as was never witnessed before or since. The Muslims, as

a general rule, plunged into the movement with a greater zeal and enthusiasm, and consequently suffered, in the hands of the Government, a great deal more than the Hindus. It was indeed complained by the Muslims that while they formed only a small minority of the population, they had to bear the greater share of the brunt on their shoulders. This was true to a large extent. The reason lies in the fact that the appeal to the Muslims was mainly religious in character, while the Hindus were inspired by national sentiments alone. The Non-co-operation movement proved once more that religion had a stronger hold on the minds of the people than the country, and this was certainly true of the Muslims. Though not fully realized at the time by Congressmen, it demonstrated quite clearly that the edifice of the Hindu-Muslim unity was founded on an artificial basis, and not designed on a clear-cut national plan. But as times passed, this aspect gradually forced itself on the public mind. The Pan-Islamic spirit behind the Khilafat agitation, which has been discussed in detail in this and the preceding chapter, gradually revealed itself in the speeches of the Muslim leaders, who further showed but scant respect to the spirit of non-violence. As noted above, even Muhammad Ali, Gandhi's disciple in non-violence, spoke openly that he was a Muslim first and everything else afterwards, and did not leave any doubt about the scope and meaning of this pregnant phrase when he said that if the Amir of Afghanistan were to invade India for the liberation (?) of the country, it would be the duty of all Muslims to assist him actively.³⁹ As a matter of fact, the speeches of Muslim leaders mainly laid stress on the religious character of the war waged against the English by the Muslims of India in combination with their brethren in faith beyond the north-western frontier of India, i. e. the wild tribes and the people of Afghanistan, whose past domination in India was a

bitter and painful memory to every Hindu. The Hindus were rudely shocked, particularly as even Gandhi lent indirect support to the utterances of his 'dear brother' Muhammad Ali.⁴⁰ But, as noted above,⁴¹ such was the magic spell of Gandhi over the Hindus, that in spite of protests and murmuring from certain sections, they were not affected in any way by the Pan-Islamic spirit of the Khilafatists, or even by the shocking atrocities perpetrated by the Muslims upon the Hindus on a large scale in Malabar, to which detailed reference will be made later. The lure of the coveted goal of Hindu-Muslim unity stifled, to a large extent, the natural resentment of the Hindus against the undue toleration of Muslim opinion and demands by Gandhi.

Gandhi's faith in the nationalism of the Ali Brothers and their non-violent spirit can only be described as pathetic in character. Instead of honourably extricating himself from his entanglements with them, he descended to activities which were deemed by many at the time to be unworthy of the great leader of the Non-co-operation movement. This feeling is not perhaps fully justified by facts, but as it created a great stir at the moment and there is a good deal of misunderstanding even now on the subject, a brief reference may be made to the incident.

Shortly after Lord Reading assumed charge of his office as Viceroy, he had several interviews with Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, who suggested the idea that the Viceroy should see Gandhi. Lord Reading told him, "if Mr. Gandhi applied to me for an interview I would readily grant it and I should be glad to hear his views". Gandhi came to Simla at the request of Malaviya and C.F. Andrews, and applied for interview which was readily granted by the Viceroy. There were altogether six interviews between May 13 and 18, 1921, and some of them were very prolonged. This gave rise to various rumours and prophecies, none of

which proved true. There is still a veil of secrecy over the talks between the Viceroy and Gandhi, and all that was given out was that there was a general talk about the political situation. Only in one respect the interviews led to an important consequence. The Viceroy told Gandhi that some responsible Non-co-operators had made speeches inciting to violence, and as Gandhi denied it, the Viceroy read to Gandhi certain passages from the speeches of Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali. Gandhi thereupon admitted the charge of the Viceroy and told him that he would advise the Ali Brothers to express publicly their regrets for the unintentional incitement to violence contained in the passages. It was at this stage, *and not before*, that the Viceroy told Gandhi that the Government proposed to institute criminal proceedings against the Ali Brothers for these passages, and if Gandhi showed him the draft of the statement he would recommend to them to issue, and if this statement prove satisfactory, he would prevent the prosecution. The draft was in due course shown by Gandhi to the Viceroy, and some alterations were made at the latter's suggestion. Gandhi left Simla and some days afterwards telegraphed to His Excellency that the Ali Brothers had signed the statement, with an immaterial alteration and sent it to the press for publication. This apology of the Ali brothers, after denial of any intention to incite to violence, ran as follows :

"We therefore sincerely feel sorry and express our regret for the unnecessary heat of some of the passages in these speeches, and we give our public assurance and promise to all who may require it that so long as we are associated with the movement of non-co-operation, we shall not directly or indirectly advocate violence at present or in the future, nor create an atmosphere of preparedness for violence. Indeed, we hold it contrary to the spirit of non-co-operation to which we have pledged our word."

Next day, May 30, the Government issued a communique about it and Lord Reading referred to the whole subject in a speech at the Simla Chelmsford Club dinner. The official circle was very jubilant and the Government report referred with great glee to the fact that "the head and forefront of the campaign for non-cooperation with a 'Satanic Government' actually presented himself to the Viceroy". Feelings ran very high among the Non-co-operators, and a split threatened the Gandhi camp over this matter. It was very galling to their pride that Gandhi should secure pardon for the Ali Brothers by inducing them to give an apology while the rank and file were courting arrest for less violent language. It was also irritating to many that Gandhi should have sought interview with the Viceroy, while carrying on a life and death struggle with the British Government for *Swaraj within a year*, and that again, not for discussing the problem of *Swaraj* or any other fundamental problem, but only a side-issue of a very minor nature and of a personal character. Gandhi defended his action in a long statement. Two important facts are often ignored in judging of Gandhi's action. In the first place, it is clear from the Viceroy's statement that Gandhi was unaware of the Government's decision to prosecute the Ali Brothers when he suggested about public apology. Secondly, Gandhi did discuss with the Viceroy the general political issues, and the episode of Ali Brothers was merely a side-issue. Besides, as Gandhi pointed out, he did not make any bargain, but thought it to be proper for the Ali Brothers to express regret for violence, irrespective of the question whether there was any prosecution or not.⁴²

Gandhi might have other motives, too. The apology tendered by the Ali Brothers was calculated to remove, or at least diminish, the growing discontent and sullen resentment of the Hindus about the aims and methods

of the Khilafatists and their leaders, and to convince them that the Khilafatists by abjuring violence showed that they did not cherish any Pan-Islamic sentiment.

There is no doubt, however, that the episode of tendering apology considerably lowered the prestige of both Gandhi and the Ali Brothers, and consequently weakened Non-co-operation movement. The Ali Brothers fully realized this and tried to wriggle out of the position. In his Presidential speech at the Gujarat Provincial Khilafat Conference, held at Broach on June 2, Muhammad Ali denied that he ever had made a violent speech or ever dreamt of bargaining with the Government. He also made it clear that while their present policy coincided with the Mahatma's their creed was not identical, and should Non-co-operation fail to achieve the end, he would exert his right to take up arms against the enemies of Islam. Again, at the Khilafat Conference at Karachi, held on July 8-11, Muhammad Ali referred to the apology in his Presidential address. He said, addressing the audience, "I want you to understand that the apology is meant for you. We can never apologise to the Government." Again he observed that the apology "was meant for Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya who entertained fears of an Afghan invasion. It was meant to set at rest the fears of the Pandit. But, as it would seem, it has unfortunately not succeeded." Referring to the public criticism and the Government attitude, he said: "In the eyes of our enemies we are politically extinct to all intents and purposes. We have been represented by the Sircar that having apologized none is prepared to listen to us". He then proved by citing concrete illustrations that his popularity was as great as ever.⁴³

Whatever we may think of these pronouncements, the Khilafat Conference at Karachi rehabilitated the Ali

Brothers in their old popularity and prestige. Some time before it a *futwa* was published in the name of five hundred Ulemas (learned Muslim divines) to the effect that all service under a non-Muslim Government was forbidden by Islamic law, and service in the police and the army was stigmatised as a specially heinous sin. In accordance with this view the Karachi Conference passed the following resolution: "This meeting clearly proclaims that it is in every way religiously unlawful for a Mussulman at the present moment to continue in the British army or to induce others to join the army, and it is the duty of all the Mussulmans in general, and the Ulemas in particular, to see that these religious commandments are brought home to every Mussulman in the army."

Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali and four other Muslim leaders were arrested in September and tried on the charge of passing the above resolution and circulating the Ulemas' *futwa*, since proscribed, among the Muslim troops.

All the accused were convicted on November 1, and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment. As soon as the sentence was passed the Ali Brothers were wildly cheered by a vast crowd that had collected near the court and once more they became popular heroes. But even before the trial was over, public meetings were held all over the country where the Karachi resolution was reiterated and the extracts from the *futwa*, regarding service in the army, were distributed broadcast.⁴⁴

Huge meetings were held at Delhi and Lakhnau on September 29 and 30, and in the latter place ten thousand people are said to have sprung to their feet and repeated the whole resolution word for word. Similar meetings were held at Kanpur, Agra, Nagpur, and many other places. Gandhi himself took up the challenge and along with 46 other top-ranking N.C.O.

leaders issued a manifesto on 4 October. They declared it to be "contrary to the national dignity for any Indian to serve as a civilian, and more specially as a soldier under a system of Government which has brought about India's economic, moral and political degradation" and that "it is the duty of every Indian soldier and civilian to sever his connection with the Government and find some other means of livelihood". Next day, 5th October, the Congress Working Committee, meeting in Bombay, passed a long resolution expressing the same sentiment.⁴⁵

5. The Militant Attitude of N.C.O.

It is somewhat surprising that the Government ignored this open defiance. But it was fully aware of the growing strength of the N.C.O. movement, as would be evident from the following remarks in the official report : "The activities of the non-co-operation party redoubled. The number of Khilafat and non-co-operation meetings rose to unprecedented heights, and a steady stream of inflammatory oratory was poured forth. Hostility to Government increased, encouraging the tendency towards general lawlessness. The volunteer movement became more formidable : intimidation was freely practised and the police were molested in the exercise of their duty. The design of erecting an administration parallel to that of Government, which should be ready on the slightest warning to take over the whole regulation of the country, was freely bruited."⁴⁶

How far the allegations of the Government were correct, it is difficult to say, But there is no doubt that the tempo of the Non-co-operation movement rose much higher at this time. "When the Working Committee met at Patna on the 16th August, 1921, the letter of request for permission to start Civil Disobedience of Orders under section 144 from the District of Hardoi in U. P.

was adjourned to the next meeting of the Committee.”⁴⁷ At its next meeting, held in Calcutta in September (6th, 7th, 8th and 11th), it negatived the idea of Civil Disobedience in any District and Province, and only authorized Civil Disobedience by individuals who might be prevented in the prosecution of the *Swadeshi* propaganda. But the Working Committee and the AICC that met at Delhi after the arrest of Ali Brothers, on November 5, 1921, took a much bolder step. They authorized every Province on its own responsibility to undertake Civil Disobedience, including non-payment of taxes, in the manner considered most suitable by the respective Provincial Congress Committees, subject to the following conditions : “Every individual civil resister must have fulfilled the part of the NCO programme applicable to him, should know spinning, must have discarded foreign cloth, taken to Khaddar, must be a believer in Hindu-Muslim unity, believe in non-violence as absolutely essential..... In regard to mass civil disobedience a district or tahsil should be treated as a unit and therein a majority of the population must have adopted full *Swadeshi* and must be clothed out of cloth hand-spun and hand-woven in that area.....No one should expect support out of public funds.”⁴⁸

This did not lead to any mass Civil Disobedience, nor was it probably intended. But it shows a striking advance on the road to Civil Disobedience which was destined henceforth to form the chief item in the non-violent campaign against the Government for the attainment of *Swaraj*. The Non-co-operation movement was only the first stage. The Delhi Resolution may be said to have heralded the beginning of the second.

There is no doubt that the arrest of the Ali Brothers rejuvenated the Non-co-operation movement. Another important factor which contributed to it was the support

which the members of the old revolutionary party in Bengal accorded to it. As this fact is not generally known, the account, as given by Subhas Chandra Bose, may be quoted at some length :

“While opposition to the Mahatma’s policy of non-co-operation came from the intellectuals, opposition to his cult of non-violence came from another quarter, namely, the Revolutionary Party. During the Great War, thousands of revolutionaries had been imprisoned and most of them were subsequently released as a result of the amnesty declared in 1919. Many of them did not approve of the doctrine of non-retaliation which they apprehended would demoralise the people and weaken their power of resistance. There was a possibility that the ex-revolutionaries as a class would go against the Congress owing to ideological differences. As a matter of fact, a section of them had already started propaganda in Bengal against the Non-co-operation movement. Strangely enough, funds had been provided by the British mercantile community under the name of the Citizens’ Protection League. The money was distributed through the medium of an Indian advocate who did not disclose the source of the funds. Deshabandhu C. R. Das was anxious to disarm the hostility of the ex-revolutionaries and, if possible, to win their active support for the Congress campaign. He therefore arranged a Conference in September between them and the Mahatma, at which he also was present. The ex-revolutionaries had a heart-to-heart talk with the Mahatma, and he and the Deshabandhu tried to convince them that non-violent non-co-operation, instead of weakening or demoralising the people, would strengthen their power of effective resistance. The upshot of the Conference was that all those present promised to give a full chance to the Congress to strive for Swaraj and promised to do nothing to hamper its work, while many of them agreed

to join the Congress organisation as loyal and active members."⁴⁹

Bose adds that this Conference took place behind closed doors in September, 1921, when the Mahatma and other members of the Congress Working Committee were staying in Calcutta as guests of C.R.Das. As Bose speaks of the Conference from his own personal knowledge, there is no reason to disbelieve his account which is corroborated by the statements of several ex-revolutionaries and their practical conduct mentioned in Chapter VII.

6. Boycott of the Prince of Wales.

Though the arrest of Ali Brothers and the subsequent episode caused a great sensation, generally speaking, the Non-co-operation Movement did not, so far, arouse any great excitement, or lead to any such open conflict between the Government and the people as many anticipated. The youthful Subhas Bose, who had thrown himself whole-heartedly into the movement immediately after his return to India in July, 1921, records in his autobiography that the youths of Bengal rather felt damped in spirit at the tameness of the 'whole show and were 'spoiling for a fight', but no opportunity presented itself. The visit of the Prince of Wales to India in November, 1921, however, offered such an opportunity.

It was originally proposed that His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales would formally inaugurate the new legislatures in India, both Central and Local, constituted under the Reforms Scheme of 1919. But as he had not yet completely recovered from labours of his Dominion tour, His Royal Highness, the Duke of Connaught, was appointed by His Majesty to discharge the task. But it was announced at the September session of the Legislative Assembly that the Prince will visit India in November. The Indian public generally interpreted such royal

visit as an attempt to exploit the traditional sentiments of India, and the view was generally held that the visit was deliberately planned as a counterpoise to the Non-co-operation movement with a view to conciliating a large section of the people and rallying it to the support of the Government. To allay such suspicion the Viceroy went out of his way to make the following observations: "The Prince of Wales will come to India on this occasion as the son of the King-Emperor and as the Heir to the Throne, not as the representative of any Government or to promote the interests of any political party". On another occasion Lord Reading emphatically repudiated the allegations that the Prince was coming to serve some political end and assured the Indian people: "Neither I nor my Government have ever had the faintest intention of using His Royal Highness' visit for political purposes."

The Congress was not satisfied with these assurances and strongly condemned the exploitation of the Royal family for political ends. Its view is thus summed up in the Enquiry Committee's Report: "Every child in the country knew that the visit of H. R. H. was originally intended to give a start to the working of the new Reforms which the country had refused to accept...After this it was but natural to apprehend that the Prince would be called upon, in the course of his visit, to give his Royal Blessing to these very highly controversial reforms, an apprehension which subsequent events fully justified". Urged by such considerations the All-India Congress Committee meeting at Bombay on July 28, 1921, decided to boycott the visit of the Prince of Wales. It passed a resolution to the effect, "that it is the duty of everyone to refrain from participating in or assisting any welcome to His Royal Highness or any functions organized officially or otherwise in connection

with his visit". To this was added the following : "While the AICC considers it its painful duty to tender the above advice to the people, it desires to place on record its opinion that India bears no sort of ill-feeling against the person of His Royal Highness, and that this advice is tendered because the Committee regards the proposed visit as a political move and calculated to give strength and support to a system of Government.....that is designed to keep India as long as possible from her birthright of Swaraj". The Congress party publicly declared that by this step they meant no insult to the Prince, and Gandhi elaborated the idea in an article entitled "Honour the Prince" in his journal *Young India* of October 27, 1921.

According to the official report Lord Reading's explanation regarding the visit of the Prince was unnecessary so far as the larger portion of the Indian people were concerned, as considerable enthusiasm prevailed among them. This, like most of the detailed statements about the 'successful' (?) tour of the Prince, as given in the official report, is inaccurate and misleading. It is worthy of note that even the leading politicians of the Moderate Party opposed the idea of the visit of the Prince. The veteran leader, Srinivasa Sastri, told the Liberal Conference at Bombay that "he did not think there was anyone there who desired it most enthusiastically. He certainly did not. He counselled against the visit as long as he could."

The boycott of the Prince of Wales' visit followed the same pattern as that of the Duke of Connaught. Some Municipalities like those of Bombay and Calcutta presented Addresses but the Lahore Municipal Committee refused to do so. There were usual receptions with pomp and grandeur in one part of every city he visited, while, there was *hartal* in the other parts. A very disgraceful scene

was enacted in Calcutta owing to the indiscretion of some overzealous loyalists. The Sheriff of Calcutta summoned a public meeting on 4 August to discuss the question of according a public reception to the Prince. It was announced that the meeting would be held at the Dalhousie Institute under the Chairmanship of the Governor. The Non-co-operators took up the challenge and mustered strong at the Dalhousie Institute. Long before the appointed time the hall was full. In view of this situation the venue of the Sheriff's meeting was shifted without any public notice to the Town Hall. As the Sheriff did not turn up at the Dalhousie Institute where the meeting was announced to be held, C. R. Das was voted to the Chair and a resolution was passed to the effect that "no reception should be accorded to the Prince of Wales on the occasion of his visit here".

In the meanwhile the Sheriff held the meeting at the Town Hall whose approaches were guarded by European and Indian Police armed with *lathis*, and a detachment of the Gurkha military police was stationed on the portico. In spite of this police cordon shutting out the people from the meeting, nearly thousand persons collected outside the building to witness the '*purdah* party' as they called it, and disturbed the work of the meeting by a regular fusillade of cat-calls, howling, shouting and jeering. In the midst of all these the '*purdah*' meeting adopted a resolution to accord a hearty welcome to the Prince, and a committee was appointed with the Governor as Chairman to organize the reception. Such was the genesis of the 'cordial public reception' which was given to the Prince in Calcutta.

The Prince of Wales landed in Bombay on November 17, at about 10 A. M. He was welcomed by the Viceroy, officials, and a large number of Ruling Chiefs, leading businessmen and landed aristocrats. After he read the

King's message, he was presented with the Municipal Address. After this function was over the Prince drove in state to the Government House, and the Royal procession was lustily cheered by a crowd of sightseers, mainly composed of Europeans, Eurasians, Parsis, and the wealthy residents of Bombay.

In accordance with the resolution of the Working Committee of the Congress to observe *hartal* on that day all over India, a huge public meeting was held at the opposite end of the town. During the morning the tramcars were running and the mills were working. Within a few hours, however, all this stopped, and swelling crowds rushed into the streets. They declared *hartal* and joined the boycott meeting at the beach which was addressed by Gandhi, and a huge bonfire was made of a pile of foreign cloth. The mill-hands came out and began hooliganism of all kinds. Other people joined them, and a swelling mob was molesting the peaceful passengers in the tramcars and held up the tram traffic. Their special wrath fell upon those who had joined or gone to witness the royal procession. The mob forcibly removed their foreign caps and head-dresses, pelted Europeans, and burnt tramcars, a motor and several liquor shops. Some Parsi women were roughly handled and had their *saris* torn from them. In some quarters every passer-by with a foreign cap was molested, and even beaten, if he refused to give up the cap.

The orgy of the mob is thus described by Gandhi himself: "The crowd did not consist of hooligans or only of boys. It was not an unintelligent crowd. They were not all mill-hands. It was essentially a mixed crowd, unprepared and unwilling to listen to anybody. For the moment it had lost its head, and it was not a crowd but several crowds numbering in all less than twenty thousand. It was bent upon mischief and destruction."

Soon there was police firing and the Anglo-Indian and Parsi quarters took revenge upon those wearing *khaddar*. Many congress volunteers were seriously injured. The following is a contemporary description: "For full five days the riot went on. There were Parsi mob in the Parsi quarter, Moslem mob in the Moslem quarter, Christian and Anglo-Indian mob in their own quarter, and, to crown all, the monster mob of mill-hands in the mill quarter of the town.....The Parsis, infuriated at the treatment of their women and children, came out in the streets armed with guns, *lathis* and bamboos, and belaboured whoever came in their way—not excepting their own kinsmen who happened to have *khaddar* and Gandhi cap on. Europeans and the Jews also took the law into their own hands ..and mercilessly injured Hindu and Muslim passers-by. As a result there was another mob-rising which was quickly quelled by military and police fire. Several grog-shops were burnt, a Parsi temple was set fire to, and immense damage was done to shops. Eminent Indian leaders, who had gone out to pacify the fighting mobs, were badly molested by the Parsis and Anglo-Indians. The casualties were heavy. According to official report 53 persons were killed and about 400 were wounded". But, as Gandhi pointed out, "of the 53 persons who lost their lives, over 45 were Non-co-operators or their sympathisers—the hooligans ; and of the 400 wounded, to be absolutely on the safe side, over 350 were also derived from the same class".⁵⁰

Gandhi was deeply mortified at the incidents of Bombay. He violently denounced the rioters and vowed to abstain from food till the violence stopped. He remarked: "With non-violence on our lips we have terrorised those who happened to differ from us. The *swaraj* that I have witnessed during the last two days has stunk in my nostrils." As a result of this ugly riot

Gandhi suspended the Civil Disobedience Movement which was to be launched at Bardoli on 23 November.

Generally speaking, the *hartal* was successfully observed all over India on November 17, and passed off quietly everywhere except at Bombay. Calcutta witnessed a strange scene. It looked like a deserted city. Here is a contemporary account: "All Indian shops, bazars, markets, including the great business quarters were closed. There was no tram or any sort of vehicular traffic in the streets...All mills were closed. The European business offices had to stop work owing to the absence of the Indian staff. The Courts, including the High Court and Government offices, had similarly to close down. The Railway stations and their goods-sheds were desertedThe municipal-hands, the sweepers, scavengers, gas-lighters all struck work. In the European quarters European residents themselves lighted some of the lamps, and it was an interesting sight to see the sahibs running with the ladders on their backs. Not a single case of riot, street-brawl, or even ordinary crime was reported. The volunteers with folded hands requested everybody not to make any disturbance".⁵¹

The extraordinary success of the peaceful *hartal* so much unnerved the English community that the Bengal Chamber of Commerce addressed a letter to the Government of Bengal the very next day, drawing their attention to the seriousness of the situation. As this letter gives a graphic picture of a political *hartal*—which was to be a very common feature in India in near future—and its reaction upon the British, a somewhat long extract from it is quoted below:

"In order to understand", they said, "how successful the movement was, its leading features must be surveyed. In the first place, the means of locomotion were paralysed. No tram-cars "tiqca gharries" or rickshaws were allowed

to run, and practically no taxi-cabs. Office gharries could not be utilised. Private motor-cars were interfered with, and many drivers dragged from their seats even in the European quarters of the city. Industrial labour went on strike for the day... The Municipal Services collapsed. The streets were unswept and the dustbins remained unemptied. The shopkeepers were afraid to open their shops; attempts were made to prevent children going to schools; and even the police courts were closed. At night, the gas lamps were dim and streets were desertedThe success of their (that is, of the volunteers') exertions must, of necessity, encourage the leaders of the movement to redouble their efforts. What is possible for one day is possible for more than one. Indeed, there seems no reason to doubt that this is merely a trial of strength, preparatory to the proclamation and organisation of a complete HARTAL to be observed for the week during which His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales will be in Calcutta.....The position of the movement is that the people are rapidly losing, if they have not already lost, all confidence in the Government established by law in the city. They are being systematically taught that the Government has passed away, and that another Government has been set up in its place; and this doctrine they are accepting and acting upon."⁵²

The two English *dailies* in Calcutta, the *Statesman* and the *Englishman*, also wrote in the same strain. They remarked that the Congress volunteers had taken possession of the city of Calcutta and the Government had abdicated; and demanded immediate and drastic action against the Volunteers.

7: Repressive Measures of the Government

The loud outcry of the Englishmen had the desired effect. The Government issued a notification within

twenty-four hours, declaring the Congress and Khilafat volunteer organization as unlawful. A week later proclamations were issued suppressing all public assemblies and processions for three months in Calcutta and some important towns. Lord Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal, threatened to take more drastic steps if these measures proved inadequate, and many other Provincial Governments followed suit.

The fact is that the complete *hartal* that greeted the arrival of the Prince of Wales in India radically changed the policy of the Government of India. This is clearly explained in the Telegraph of the Viceroy referred to above :

“A new and dangerous situation confronted Government after the events of the 17th November. An increasing disregard for lawful authority and the growth of a dangerous spirit of lawlessness had been engendered by the outbreaks of the last few months, and it had become evident that a systematic campaign of violence, intimidation and obstruction had been embarked on by many of the Volunteer Associations, to combat which it had proved ineffective to proceed under the ordinary criminal law. In many places these associations were at first recruited from educated classes, but as the campaign became more violent, they began to draw adherents from unemployed labourers, mill-hands and city rabble, many of whom were paid for their service. Government decided in these circumstances that measures of more comprehensive and drastic character should be resorted to, and information was sent to the Local Governments that sanction would be given to the application of the Seditious Meetings Act in any district where it was considered necessary to adopt that course. Instructions were also given to them that vigorous use should be made of the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Part II,

for combating the Volunteer Association's illegal activities, and that troops should be employed more freely, both in order to reinforce the police and to hearten and encourage all law-abiding citizens, and the measures to be taken in the event of civil disobedience being inaugurated were laid down. Provincial Governments were assured of the full support of the Government of India in checking disorder, while the formation of armed Police battalions and the extensive enrolment of special constables was suggested. In particular, they were informed that they should not hesitate to prosecute any offenders against the ordinary law, however prominent their position, whose arrest and prosecution was in their opinion required for the maintenance of authority.....Action was promptly taken by practically all local Governments in Northern India, in accordance with these instructions. The Seditious Meetings Act was introduced in most of the seriously affected districts in the Punjab, Bihar, Bengal, Assam, and Burma. In some provinces the various Associations had been declared as unlawful, under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, a few days before the receipt of our instructions. and certain other Provinces have now issued similar proclamations. A large number of persons have also been arrested and convicted under that Act and other enactments for preservation of law and order. At the same time prosecutions were more freely instituted against newspapers, leaders and speakers who had incited to violence."

It is thus obvious that the Government of India was determined to suppress, by force, the movement to boycott the Prince of Wales. Thus was kindled the flame which lay in embers nearly throughout the year. At last, after eleven months of inactivity, comparatively speaking, the Government declared open war against the Non-co-operators, and the whole of India watched with

a thrill the results of the first encounter between the armed might of the powerful British Government and the Non-violent Non-co-operation or Passive Resistance.

Calcutta proved to be the most sensational theatre of war, and an account of it is given by young Subhas Bose, who took an active part in organizing the boycott. Referring to the notifications issued by the Government of Bengal declaring volunteer organization etc. illegal, he writes : "We had been spoiling for a fight in Calcutta and the official notification therefore was thrice welcome to us. The general opinion was in favour of an immediate reply to the official challenge."⁵³ But the leader, C. R. Das, did not like to take any precipitate action. After ascertaining the views of different district organizations, a meeting of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee was called and held *in camera* towards the end of November, 1921. The Committee unanimously decided to start civil disobedience and vested all its powers in Das, thus making him a Dictator both in law as well as in fact. He decided to begin by sending out batches of five volunteers who would proceed quietly to sell *Khadi* cloth. Das issued a stirring appeal for volunteers who would thus defy the official ban and take all the consequences. As the response at the outset was not quite satisfactory, Das decided to send his only son, Chiraranjan, and his wife Basanti Devi as volunteers, in order to set an example to others. As soon as the son was arrested, the number of volunteers who offered their services was increased. But still, against the unanimous remonstrances of all his followers, Das sent his wife the next day with a batch of volunteers including two other ladies. As soon as the news spread that Mrs. Das was taken to prison, with the other ladies, there was wild excitement in Calcutta and men and women began to pour in as volunteers. • In the meanwhile Mrs. Das had been

taken to the Police Station ; but as she was stepping in- to the prison van, Police Constables "came up to her and vowed that they were going to resign their jobs the same day." There was also a sensation at a dinner party in the Government House, Calcutta. Mr. S. N. Mallik, a leading member of the Liberal Party, one of the invited guests, left the party as a protest as soon as he heard the news of the arrest of Mrs. Das. The excitement grew so tense all over the city of Calcutta that at midnight the Government ordered the release of Mrs. Das and her associates and gave out that they had been arrested through mistake.

But it was too late; the shrewd device of Das was crowned with complete success. From the next day thousands began to enlist as volunteers. The number of volunteers increased rapidly beyond all expectation or calculation, and everyone of them was eager to court arrest. Within a few days the two big prisons in Calcutta were filled with political prisoners. Camp-prisons were then opened, but they too were filled in no time. The British jail had lost its terror and imprisonment became a badge of distinction. As this was the most marked characteristic of the N. C. O. movement and became a permanent feature of the national struggle in future, some actual details may be given in the words of Subhas Bose.

"As more people were arrested the prison-admini- stration became more unmanageable. Orders were given for the release of a large number of political prisoners, but no one would leave the prison, and moreover, it was impossible to identify them. Sometimes they would be taken to the prison office on the pretext of being transferred to some other prison or of being interviewed by their relatives and there they would be set free. When this trick was discovered, no prisoner would leave

his cell when called by a prison-official. Prisoners were thereupon taken forcibly to the prison-gate and set at liberty. Outside prison, tactics were changed. Arrests were stopped and orders were given that sticks and batons should be used freely by the police in dealing with crowd and demonstrators. In some cases demonstrators were removed in police-vans to out-of-the-way places thirty miles from the city and there asked to walk back home. A liberal use was also made of the hose in order to give the demonstrators free cold baths in winter."⁵⁴

The Prince of Wales was due to arrive in Calcutta on 24 December. Lord Ronaldshay was not insensible to the gravity of the local situation, and did not like to throw the whole city into a violent turmoil during the Prince's visit. That is probably the reason why he did not take to more violent measures at the time, and even opened negotiations with Das. He proposed to withdraw the repressive measures if he called off the boycott of the Prince. Das pointed out that the boycott was proclaimed by the Congress and could only be lifted by that body. On December 10, Das followed the old tactics for stimulating the agitation. He himself went out as a volunteer and was arrested. This was followed by the arrest of all the prominent leaders of Khilafat and Congress organizations who were in Calcutta. The Government now showed its mailed fist. To overawe the people the British soldiers were posted in different quarters of the city.

This repressive policy was not confined to Calcutta, but was followed with relentless vigour in other Provinces where trouble was brewing or apprehended. Leaders like Motilal Nehru and Lajpat Rai were arrested and put in prison. The scene of Bengal was repeated. People came out in open defiance of Govern-

ment orders and courted arrest. A wave of unprecedented enthusiasm swept over the country and within a month twenty-five thousand people were put in prison.

8. Reaction against Government Policy

There is no doubt that the Government were hustled into this repressive campaign, partly by the pressure brought to bear upon them by the non-official European opinion, and partly, perhaps mainly, by the unprecedented situation with which they were faced. No Government could possibly tolerate an open defiance of its authority by an organized movement spreading over the whole country. The disrespect shown to the Prince of Wales was also a grave cause of offence, as it made the Government of India look small in the eyes of the Home Government and the world at large. The riot at Bombay was also a grave warning to those who were responsible for maintaining law and order in the country. The Government could be hardly blamed if they regarded the Non-co-operation movement, as it emerged in November 1921, as an incipient revolt on the part of a large section of the people. On the face of it, therefore, the Government had every right to consider itself justified in taking the extraordinary measures which, in their view, were forced upon them. But what the Government failed to realize was the national character of the revolt, and that the real remedy was not the suppression of the disorders which were merely outward symbols, but to eradicate the root cause by generous concessions to the demands for freedom. This is a lesson which the history of every age and every country has taught, but which no Government has ever taken to heart. Another great lesson which was ignored by the Government of India, like all others, is that repression, however necessary or justified, merely helps the cause

of the revolution ; the blood of the martyr has always proved the seeds of the church. There is therefore nothing to be surprised at the fact that the campaign of repression launched by the Government in place of the cautious policy they had hitherto pursued produced an effect very much the opposite of what was expected. It did not crush the spirit of revolt, but served to widen still more the breach between them and the people. Even the Moderates who had hitherto been their staunch supporters wavered in their loyalty and showed a sullen spirit of resentment and revulsion. The Official Report attaches special significance to this phenomenon, and gives an admirable analysis of the various factors that were working upon their minds. But, as usual, the Government refused to learn the obvious lessons and shape their policy accordingly. But this analysis is important enough to be quoted at some length in order to give a real picture of the effect of the action of the Government upon the people at large, including the loyal element : "But amongst the first effects of the action taken by Government against the volunteers was the arrest of a considerable number of high-minded and much respected persons who were believed by many Indians to be animated by motives of disinterested patriotism. The prosecution and conviction both of these people and of a number of immature and misguided students led to a disappointing revulsion on the part of moderate sentiment. Further, the Seditious Meetings Act falls within the category of those enactments which Indian opinion stigmatises as 'repressive' ; and its application, even in the circumstances already related, gave rise to uneasiness. There became manifest a noticeable inclination to represent the new policy as an interference, for political purposes, with the rights of freedom of speech and of freedom of association ;

and on this ground a disposition was shown to make common cause with the extremists in attacking Government.....In part, also, it seems to have been due to sympathy for high-minded, if mistaken people, who were the earliest victims of the majesty of the law ; and in part, to a general belief that the powers now employed by the Executive were being misused in an oppressive manner by subordinates.”⁵⁵

The Government version indicates, but does not adequately describe, the righteous indignation felt by the Moderates and loyal sections of the people who had hitherto supported the Government. It is therefore necessary to refer to a few facts illustrating their feelings :

1. On December 10, 1921, Mr. Raza Ali, a member of the Council of State, sent a long telegram to the Viceroy, emphatically protesting against the Government's new policy. “Indiscriminate arrests and incarceration of men like Matilal Nehru, Lajpat Rai, Mrs. Das, and others, he pointed out, are helping to prove the claim of the Non-co-operators “that the only place for an honest Indian is gaol.” · “Courageous men who have not hesitated to part company with Mr. Gandhi cannot be expected to acquiesce in a reign of terror being established by the Government.....One can understand Government's efforts to put down intimidation and actual or apprehended violence, but recent events indicate the Government's desire to strike at the Congress and the peaceful part of its propaganda. The new policy, it is my duty to state, will be met with opposition by united India. How can any self-respecting Indian stay at home when our ladies are being put under lock and key in the name of law and order ?

2. On December 15, the Lucknow Liberal League wired to the Viceroy a series of resolutions beginning with the following : “The Lucknow Liberal League views with great alarm the new policy of the Government in pursuance

of which volunteers and similar organisations of the Congress and Khilafat have been declared unlawful and strongly disapproves of the wholesale and indiscriminate arrests and imprisonment that are taking place in the name of law and order."

3. On December 18, the President of the Madras Liberal League, Sir Sivaswami Aiyar, wired to the Viceroy to the same effect.

4. The National Liberal League, the party to which the Ministers belonged, sent a memorial to the Viceroy complaining of the manner in which the Military and the Police behaved in the streets of Calcutta which caused wide-spread discontent among the citizens, many of whom badly suffered in their hands. Strong objection was also taken to the way in which the law was administered by the Magistracy and the Police and of the atrocious beating of undertrial prisoners.

5. The Indian Association of Calcutta, the central organization of the Bengal Moderates, also made two strong protests to the Viceroy to which reference will be made later.

The session of the Bengal Legislative Council on December 19, 1921, gave an opportunity to both the Government and the Moderate and loyal elements to express their views on the current political situation. The Governor, who personally addressed the Council, made an open offer that the Government would "stay their hand" if the boycott of the Prince were withdrawn. Mr. S. N. Mallik, a prominent Moderate leader, who had been a member of the Council of the Secretary of State, moved the adjournment of the House to consider the grave political situation, and made a vigorous protest against the repressive policy of the Government. The following extracts from his speech would give some idea of his vehement denunciation :

"The whole province is in a state of terrorism..... crude weapons of coercion have been put into use for the purpose of commanding the love and affection of the people.....The methods of putting into execution these repressive measures have taken away the breath even from the most peaceful and law-abiding of citizens... Repression has taken such a cruel shape that I have every reason to believe that the Indian element in the Government has not been consulted by the bureaucraey in such a vital matter, thus violating the spirit of the new Reforms. Our disapproval here cannot but take the shape of the utmost possible condemnation. Unprovoked assaults, unjustifiable insults, indiscriminate arrests are the outstanding features of this period of oppression. Still more objectionable have been the trials *in camera* and in jail and the harsh sentences ...persons even after their arrest have been subjected to unnecessary harshness and cowardly assault. These things have.....laid Government open to the charge of vindictiveness in their doings.

"On the top of these, the wantonly mischievous activities of the Military and the intolerable aggressiveness of the Police have put the severest strain upon the loyalty of the most devoted Moderate and have made him look aghast. Whatever Government communique may say, I have the evidence of my own eyes which I cannot disbelieve. I have seen the Military charging, insulting and assaulting innocent passers-by in the streets with an exuberance of animalism—characteristic of their profession—intensified by the hauteur of a supposed racial and a certain physical superiority. Even respectable persons, regarding whom there could be possibly no honest mistake, were not saved from humiliation and assault at the hands of the Police and the Military."

9. Efforts for Peaceful Settlement

The disaffection of the Moderates must have created a deep impression upon Lord Reading. The position was brought home to him in a more personal way. He arrived at Calcutta about a week before the date of the Prince's arrival in the city, and must have been mortified to learn that the banquet which the Calcutta Bar had arranged in his honour as ex-Lord Chief Justice of England was cancelled on account of the arrest of C.R.Das. The day of the Prince's visit was drawing near and there were clear signs as to the sort of welcome he would receive in Calcutta. The whole outlook was gloomy indeed. The Non-co-operation movement was attaining greater and greater dimensions, and there were various other disturbing factors such as the Akali movement and the Moplah rebellion. Perhaps all these made him eager, or at least willing, to arrive, if possible, at a settlement with the Congress. Unfortunately, a veil of secrecy still surrounds the negotiations that were carried on for this purpose during that fateful week. According to the official Report, "it was urged by many of the leaders of Moderate opinion that a Round Table Conference should be held at which Government should be represented and all shades of public opinion, in order that some solution might be found of the situation through the means of some act of constructive statesmanship, and a deputation waited on the Viceroy for this purpose in Calcutta on December, 21." The Viceroy insisted upon "discontinuance of the unlawful activities of the Non-co-operation party as a fundamental condition which should precede the discussion of any question of a conference". The Telegraph of the Viceroy, from which the above is taken, leaves the topic at that, but the official Report adds a few more details,

We are told that when the suggestion was first made about the Round Table Conference on December 21, by a Deputation headed by Pandit Malaviya, Lord Reading made it quite plain that nothing could be done until the Non-co-operation party discontinued open breaches of the law and the practice of intimidation; but he did not discourage efforts which were so plainly well-intentioned. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and the other would-be peace-makers then found that it was Mr. Gandhi who was adamant. He demanded, as a preliminary to any conference, the withdrawal of the recent prescription of the Volunteer organizations and the release of all persons,—including the Ali Brothers, recently convicted for what he described as non-violent activities. Accordingly, the Deputation which met the Viceroy on 21 December could not offer anything on behalf of the Non-co-operators which the Government could accept. But the Government version does not perhaps contain the whole truth. There are good grounds to believe that Lord Reading made a serious attempt to come to an understanding with C. R. Das. There is no doubt that negotiations for a settlement were carried on with Das by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, but whether the latter acted as an emissary of the Government or took the initiative himself, is not quite clear. The following account given by Subhas Bose seems to be fairly authentic, as he was himself in prison along with C. R. Das at the time. Bose writes that Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, who had kept away from the 1921 movement, “came to interview Deshabandhu Das in the Presidency jail with a message from the Viceroy”, thus clearly implying that it was the Viceroy who took the initiative. The rest may be stated in Bose’s own words :

“The offer that he (Malaviya) brought was that if the Congress agreed to call off the civil disobedi-

ence movement immediately, so that the Prince's visit would not be boycotted by the public, the Government would simultaneously withdraw the notification declaring Congress volunteers illegal and release all those who had been incarcerated thereunder. They would further summon a Round Table Conference of the Government and the Congress to settle the future constitution of India.

"The leader (Das) had a long discussion with Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, the outstanding Moslem leader of Calcutta, and with Pandit Malaviya. Some other points had to be decided, including the question of the release of the Ali brothers and their associates, who had been sentenced to two years' hard labour at Karachi in September. On this point the official reply was that since they had not been sentenced in connection with the civil disobedience movement, the Congress should not press for their release as a part of the terms of settlement. But the Viceroy was prepared to give an assurance that they would actually be released in due course. When Deshabandhu Das broached the subject to us and asked for our opinion, the younger section, including myself, vehemently opposed the idea of an armistice on those terms. Thereupon he entered into an elaborate discussion with us and advanced the following arguments in support of his contention that a compromise should be made at once. Rightly or wrongly, he said, the Mahatma had promised *Swaraj* within one year. That year was drawing to a close. Barely a fortnight was left and within this short period something had to be achieved in order to save the face of the Congress and fulfil the Mahatma's promise regarding *Swaraj*. The offer of the Viceroy had come to him as a godsend. If a settlement was made before December 31st and all the political prisoners were released, it would

appear to the popular imagination as a great triumph for the Congress. The Round Table Conference might or might not be a success, but if it failed, and the Government refused to concede the popular demands—the Congress could resume the fight at any time, and when it did so, it would command greater prestige and public confidence.

“The above logic was irrefutable and I felt convinced. Under the joint signatures of Deshabandhu Das and Maulana Azad a telegram was sent to Mahatma Gandhi recommending his acceptance of the proposed terms of settlement. A reply came to the effect that he insisted on the release of the Ali Brothers and their associates as a part of the terms of settlement and also on an announcement regarding the date and composition of the Round Table Conference. Unfortunately, the Viceroy was not in a mood for any further parleying and wanted an immediate decision. All that the Deshabandhu could do in the circumstances was to send for his friends who were then outside prison and urge upon them that they should use all possible means to get the Mahatma to agree. These friends did so and many telegrams passed between Calcutta and Sabarmati. Ultimately the Mahatma did come round, but by then it was too late. The Government of India, tired of waiting, had changed their mind. The Deshabandhu was beside himself with anger and disgust. The chance of a lifetime, he said, had been lost. The feeling among the political prisoners, as also among the Congress rank and file, was that the Mahatma had committed a serious blunder. Only a minority, who had blind faith in him, refused to pass any judgement.”⁵⁶

The circumstantial character of the whole narrative leaves no doubt of its substantial authenticity. The reasoning of C. R. Das would also appear very strong indeed. It is not, however, quite so clear whether the whole

10V3

thing had been put so logically or in such a lucid form before Gandhi. All his trusted lieutenants and advisers, who might have influenced his decision, were clapped in prison. So a terrible responsibility was thrust upon Gandhi's shoulders, and he was comparatively new in politics. His insistence on the release of Ali Brothers and their associates, after the assurance given by the Viceroy, was ungenerous and tactless, and can only be accounted for by his undue and over-zealous solicitude for keeping the Muslims well in hand. As regards the date and composition of the Round Table Conference Gandhi's insistence cannot altogether be brushed aside as impolitic, at least as a step in the negotiating stage, but this should not have created an insurmountable difficulty. Unfortunately, the telegraphic correspondence between Das and Gandhi is not available and it is not possible to form a final judgment on the conduct of the latter. But there is no doubt that it was a great blunder to close the door of the negotiation on this score, and Gandhi should have left a great deal of latitude to Das, subject to his own general views. He does not seem to have done this until at a very late stage, and, if this is true, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Gandhi was guilty of a grave error of judgment.

Before concluding this section it is necessary to refer to the so-called changed attitude of the Moderates towards the campaign of repression launched by the Government. Their early reaction has been mentioned above. According to the official report, the uncompromising attitude of Gandhi to the project of a Round Table Conference and the conciliatory speech of the Viceroy to the deputation that waited on him for this purpose on December 21 "exercised a steadying effect on Moderate opinion",⁵⁷ and they supported and endorsed the Government policy. This is not, however, a fair inference from

the resolutions passed at the annual meeting of the All-India Liberal Federation at Allahabad. This is evident from the following which forms a part of the Resolution No. 7 :

“But it views with great concern the inauguration of a policy of indiscriminate arrest and extensive application of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, and is strongly of opinion that such a policy defeats its own object by alienating popular sympathy and aggravating general unrest. It also draws pointed attention to the fact that some local Governments and local authorities have acted with an excess of zeal and want of discretion in the matter of arrests, and with harshness and severity in regard to sentences, of which the Federation strongly disapproves, and the Federation therefore strongly urges on the Government an immediate reconsideration of its policy in order to ease the present situation.”

It is true that the Federation, which met two days after the Ahmadabad Congress, strongly condemned the proposed campaign of Civil Disobedience and earnestly appealed to the country not to follow a course which was fraught with peril and bound to lead to a deplorable set-back in the progress of the country. But this view was held by the Liberals from the very beginning and does not indicate any new change of policy in favour of the Government.

V. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

1. Ahmadabad Congress

Shortly after the failure of the negotiations, the annual session of the Congress was held in December, 1921, at Ahmadabad. As nearly 40,000 Congress workers were in jail, the session was attended by only 4,726 delegates as against 14,583 at Nagpur, a year ago. C. R. Das, the President-elect of the session, was in jail, and

so Hakim Ajmal Khan presided. Das had already written a portion of his Presidential Address, and this was printed and distributed at the meeting. In his undelivered Address Das showed the 'hollowness of the Reforms Scheme which does not secure to the subject even the elementary rights which are possessed by every citizen under any civilised government.' He expounded the meaning and philosophy of Non-co-operation, and, challenging the view that it was a doctrine of negation, declared : "We break in order to build, we destroy in order to construct; we reject in order to accept." Referring to the disturbances in Bombay, he said : "Bloodshed and disorder have been associated with every great movement, that has taken place, the spread of Christianity for instance..... the fact that disturbances have taken place is no argument against the essential truth of our movement. We must meet the situation with courage and devise means to prevent the recurrence of those disturbances ; but I cannot and will not advise you to stay your hand from the Non-co-operation movement."

The main resolution adopted by the Congress was a fairly long one and consisted of several parts. It contained a review of the work of the past year and an enunciation of programme for the next. It claimed that by reason of the adoption of Non-violent Non-co-operation, the country has made great advance in fearlessness, self-sacrifice, and self-respect, that the movement "has greatly damaged the prestige of the Government," and that "the country is rapidly progressing towards *Swaraj*." After urging therefore to continue the movement with greater vigour in such a manner as each province may determine, it 'appeals to all the students of the age of 18 and over, to become members of the Volunteer Organisations by signing the required pledge (which is reproduced) and to offer themselves for arrest.' It also

'advised all Congress workers and others...to organise individual civil disobedience and mass civil disobedience when the mass of people have been sufficiently trained in the methods of non-violence and otherwise, in terms of the resolution thereon of the AICC at Delhi ; in order to concentrate attention upon it all other Congress activities should be suspended to the extent it is necessary for this purpose.'

In view of the wholesale arrest of Congress leaders and workers the resolution provided for a possible contingency by appointing "Mahatma Gandhi as the sole Executive authority of the Congress...with the power to appoint a successor in emergency."

This resolution and the proceedings of the Congress leave no doubt that, far from being cowed down by the repressive measures of the Government, it was still on the war path and decided to carry on the struggle with unabated zeal and greater daring, resorting to mass civil disobedience, if necessary. An interesting interlude was provided by the resolution moved by Maulana Hasrat Mohani that complete independence should be adopted as the goal of the Congress. His impassioned eloquence profoundly moved the audience and it seemed as if the resolution would be carried. But Gandhi stood firmly against it and it was rejected.

2. Reactionary Attitude of the Viceroy

The rejection of Hasrat Mohani's resolution and the resolution passed by the Congress deploring the riots at Bombay on November 17 and the following days, led the Government of India to believe that Gandhi's views have changed for the better. They telegraphed to the Secretary of State : "The resolutions of the Congress gave evidence of this, since they not only rejected the proposals which the extreme wing of

the Khilafat Party had advanced for abandoning the policy of non-violence, but, whilst the organization of civil disobedience when fulfilment of the Delhi conditions had taken place was urged in them, omitted any reference to the non-payment of taxes, and were worded in such a way as to suggest that for the present civil disobedience would be restricted to defiance of the Seditious Meetings Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act directed against unlawful associations." It was perhaps this feeling which prompted the Viceroy to reject the peaceful gestures of Gandhi.

Undeterred by the failure of his negotiations with C.R. Das mentioned above, Pandit Malaviya and others continued their efforts for a Round Table Conference, as they were particularly anxious to avoid the mass civil disobedience which the Ahmadabad Congress had decided upon. Pandit Malaviya and a few others issued a letter, in response to which about 300 eminent Indians, representing all shades of political opinion outside the Congress fold, met in political conference at Bombay on 14th January, 1922, in order to formulate terms upon which it would be possible to hold a Round Table Conference with Government. Although the Subjects-Committee of the Ahmadabad Congress rejected the proposal of such a conference, Gandhi not only attended the Bombay Conference, but induced the Working Committee to accept its recommendations by which the Congress agreed to suspend *hartal*, picketing and civil disobedience in case the Government agreed to withdraw the notifications under the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Seditious Meetings Act, release the persons convicted thereunder, and to submit to an arbitration committee the cases of other persons convicted under the ordinary law of the land. As the Viceroy told the deputation that waited upon him on December 21, 1921, that the discontinuance of the unlawful activi-

ties of the Non-co-operation party must be a fundamental condition precedent to the holding of a Round Table Conference, the political leaders assembled at the Conference at Bombay as well as Gandhi had every reason to believe that the decision of the Working Committee to accept the recommendations of the Bombay Conference had removed the difficulties in the way of a Round Table Conference. The Viceroy, however, thought otherwise, and rejected the idea of a Round Table Conference on the ground that "there was no suggestion that any of the illegal activities of the non-co-operators other than *hartals*, picketing and civil disobedience should cease." On January 26, the Private Secretary to the Viceroy wrote in reply to the letter of the Conference that "His Excellency was unable to discover in them (the proposals of the Conference) the basis for a profitable discussion in a Round Table Conference, and no useful purpose would be served by entering into any detailed examination of their terms." No unprejudiced man would deny the force of the contention of Gandhi that the terms agreed to by the Congress Working Committee "were quite in keeping" with the requirements of the Viceroy, as enunciated by him in his earlier speeches. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the earlier conciliatory attitude of the Viceroy was prompted by a desire to make the Congress withdraw its boycott of the Prince's visit, and that as the Congress had already done its worst, there was no further need to placate it. Besides, as already mentioned above, the Government were encouraged by the resolutions of the Ahmadabad Congress to believe that Gandhi had decided not to carry matters too far.

3. Gandhi's Declaration of Non-violent War

This belief was, however, rudely shaken by a letter which Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy on first February, 1922, communicating the decision of Bardoli, a small

tahsil in the Surat District in the Bombay Presidency, having a population of about 87,000, to embark on mass Civil Disobedience. In this historic letter Gandhi briefly traced the history of the movement,—how it was intended to launch the campaign at an earlier date but was suspended on account of the riots in Bombay on the occasion of the Prince's visit, how it was renewed on account of the repression of a virulent type resorted to by the Government since that event, and the summary rejection of the proposal to hold a Round Table Conference in order to arrive at a settlement. As specific instances of repression Gandhi referred to "the looting of property, assaults on innocent people, brutal treatment of the prisoners in jails, including flogging," suppression of "the freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of Press." "This lawless repression in a way unparalleled in the history of this unfortunate country," said Gandhi, "has made immediate adoption of mass Civil Disobedience an imperative duty." Gandhi made a final appeal to the Viceroy to revise his policy, set free all the prisoners convicted for non-violent activities, to free the Press from all administrative control and declare in clear terms the policy of absolute non-interference with all non-violent activities undertaken for "the redress of the Khilafat or the Panjab wrongs or *Swaraj*." The concluding part of the letter reads as follows :

" If you can see your way to make the necessary declaration within seven days.....I shall be prepared to advise postponement of Civil Disobedience of an aggressive character...If the Government make the requested declaration, I shall regard it as an honest desire on its part to give effect to public opinion and shall, therefore, have no hesitation in advising the country to be engaged in further moulding the public opinion without violent restraint from either side, and trust to its working to secure the fulfilment of

its unalterable demands. Aggressive Civil Disobedience in that case will be taken up only when the Government departs from its policy of strictest neutrality or refuses to yield to the clearly expressed opinion of the vast majority of the people of India.”⁵⁸

Gandhi's letter was an ultimatum to the Viceroy, a procedure which has no precedent in the annals of India's struggle for freedom. It was a bold step which a man like Gandhi alone could think of, and he must have weighed very carefully all the pros and cons of Bardoli's "final and irrevocable choice," for which he was "chiefly responsible." The Government of India took up the challenge and their view is clearly reflected in the long telegraph sent to the Secretary of State on February 9. They did not 'minimise in any way the great anxiety caused by the situation,' but were "prepared for disorder of a more formidable nature than has in the past occurred," as they were "satisfied that the army and the great majority of the Police are staunch, there is no disaffection on the part of the majority of the population, and there are now more promising economic conditions with a bumper harvest in prospect." In reply to Gandhi's letter the Government of India issued on February 6 a Press Communique which may be virtually regarded as the Declaration of War. It began by pointing out "a series of misstatements in the Manifesto issued by Mr. Gandhi on the 4th February justifying his determination to resort to Mass Civil Disobedience", and ended with the following :

"The alternatives that now confront the people of India are such as sophistry can no longer obscure or disguise. The issue is no longer between this or that programme of political advance, but between lawlessness and maintenance of civilised Government. Mass Civil Disobedience is fraught with such dangers to the State that it must be met with sternness and severity. The Government entertain no doubt that in any measures which they have to take for its suppression they

can count on the support and assistance of all law-abiding and loyal citizens of His Majesty."

The last sentence was, of course, meant only for public consumption at Home, like the observation in the telegraph to the Secretary of State that "there is no disaffection on the part of the majority of the population." These were 'white lies' in which all belligerents freely indulge, and no one need take them seriously. The Government never counted on the support and assistance of the loyal citizens in India, for they knew very well that the number of such men, outside the rank of their own employees, would be very small, almost insignificant. The utmost they could hope for was the negative help in the shape of neutral inactivity of the people, but their chief reliance was on the army and the Police so pointedly referred to in the telegraph from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State.

Gandhi issued a long rejoinder to the Government Communique of 6 February. He exposed the falsity of the Government denial of lawless repression by citing a number of instances, which have been referred to in Section IV-7 of this Chapter. He also challenged the accuracy of many other statements and assumptions in the Government Communique. Of course, no one expected any change in the attitude of the Government as a result of all this correspondence, and Bardoli in Bombay and Guntur in Madras Presidency were making strenuous preparations to launch the no-tax campaign. Similar preparations were made in Chittagong, some parts of Assam, Bihar, Panjab, and C. P., as well as in many districts of Southern India. The Government also set in full motion their machinery of repression; but it merely stiffened the spirit of the volunteers, thousands of whom suffered all kinds of oppression and went to prison with a smiling face.

The attention of the whole of India was centred on Bardoli. Gandhi himself went there to lead the campaign in person. On January 30, he addressed a big Conference of local people emphasizing all the preliminary requisites of the coming struggle. He went through every one of the conditions of the mass Civil Disobedience laid down by the Congress, and took the sense of the meeting on every one of the conditions. The Conference, attended by 4,000 *khaddar*-clad representatives, and 500 women adopted a resolution to begin a mass Civil Disobedience under the guidance of Gandhi and Vallabhbhai Patel. Gandhi was deeply impressed by the solemnity of the occasion and wrote a long account of the Conference in his paper *Young India*. He commenced by saying : "Bardoli has come to a momentous decision. It has made its final and irrevocable choice" ; and concluded with the famous lines of Cardinal Newman :

"Lead kindly Light , amid the encircling gloom,
Lead thou me on ;
The night is dark, and I am far from home,
Lead Thou me on."

Next day the Working Committee of the All-India Congress Committee met at Surat and congratulated the people of Bardoli. It, however, advised all other parts of India to co-operate with the people of Bardoli *taluk* by refraining from mass or individual civil disobedience of an aggressive character, except with the express consent of Mahatma Gandhi, previously obtained.

4. Retreat of Gandhi and the Collapse of N.C.O.

No words can adequately describe the intense animation and grave suspense with which India was looking forward to the impending struggle, swayed both by the hope of victory and fear of incalculable misery as the inevitable consequence of defeat. But no Indian could

foresee that the great battle for freedom begun with such trumpet and fanfare, would be irretrievably lost even before it was begun. He could not imagine in his wildest speculations that the bold advance of the veteran general, the idol of the people, would be immediately followed by a precipitate retreat, one being as glorious as the other was humiliating. But the incredible did happen; and true to the oriental spirit, Gandhi's devoted followers, unwilling or unable to judge in a rational manner, attributed the humiliating retreat to the Divine Will. As the Congress Enquiry Committee put it, "The country was all agog to witness the final triumph of soul force over physical might. But the gods had willed it otherwise."

The Divine Will was evidently manifested through a horrible crime perpetrated on 5 February, by an excited mob at a small village called Chauri Chaura, near Gorakhpur, far away in U. P. The details of the tragic incident will be related later;^{58a} it will suffice to state here that the Police opened fire on a procession, but when their ammunition was exhausted, and they shut themselves up inside a building, the excited mob set fire to it, and as the members of the Police force were thus forced to come out, they were all, twenty-two in number, hacked to death, and their bodies were thrown into the flame. There was another mob-outbreak at Bareilly, but it was easily suppressed. These incidents created a feeling of disgust, and about fifty prominent leaders of the U. P. at once issued a manifesto condemning the conduct of the volunteers. Pandit Malaviya urged Gandhi to call an emergent meeting of the Working Committee. Gandhi came to Bombay on 9 February to see Pandit Malaviya, Jayakar, Natarajan, Jinnah and other politicians who had been endeavouring to bring about a Round Table Conference. They strongly urged Gandhi to suspend Civil Disobedience, and Gandhi agreed to do so. Pandit Malaviya and others were invited

to come to Bardoli. The Working Committee of the Congress met at Bardoli and discussed the political situation for two days (11 and 12 February). The Committee resolved that mass Civil Disobedience contemplated at Bardoli and elsewhere be suspended.....and this suspension be continued till the atmosphere is so non-violent as to ensure the non-repetition of atrocities like those of Chauri Chaura, or hooliganism such as took place at Bombay and Madras, respectively, on 17 November 1921, and 13 January, 1922. All activities "specially designed to court arrest and imprisonment" and "all volunteer processions, public meetings merely for the purpose of defiance of the notifications regarding such meetings," were stopped till further instructions, and a new programme of constructive work was laid down. This decision was confirmed by the All-India Congress Committee at Delhi, on 24 and 25, February.

It would be hardly any exaggeration to say that the news of the suspension of the Civil Disobedience movement fell upon India as a bolt from the blue. Writing long after the event, a foreigner, Louis Fischer, correctly diagnosed the whole situation in a few words : "At a word from Gandhi India would have risen in revolt. That word was not said; instead all the enthusiastic and sacrificing efforts were wasted or thrown away at the altar of the doctrine of non-violence." Before proceeding to note the general reaction and the consequences of the suspension, it is necessary to make a few general observations. It would be an insult to the intelligence of Gandhi if it be supposed for a moment that he could not envisage the possibility of an outbreak of violence in some parts of India in course of the excited campaign, particularly in view of the grave warnings conveyed by the recent riots in Bombay and Madras mentioned a few lines above. As a matter of fact, Gandhi restricted the area to Bardoli for that very

reason, and the site was selected to enable him to personally supervise the experiment by a tried set of people. To abandon the movement, so carefully planned and seriously undertaken, because something quite unconnected with it had happened nearly a thousand miles away, is an act which cannot be defended on any rational consideration, such as should normally determine the affairs of men. It is interesting to note that C. R. Das, in his undelivered Presidential Speech (Ahmadabad Session) quoted above, contemplated such a situation and gave it as his definite view that isolated disturbance was no argument against the Non-co-operation movement. Reference may also be made in this connection to Gandhi's own view in 1919 regarding a situation exactly similar to this. Lajpat Rai quotes the following passage from a letter of Gandhi to one who advised him to give up the idea of Civil Disobedience completely :

"How can I abandon the idea of resuming Civil Resistance, because in April people in some parts of Hindustan, owing to special causes, resorted to violence? Must I cease to do right because some people are likely at the same time to do wrong?.....All action is controlled by a complexity of circumstances, some of which are under the doer's control and the others beyond his control. He can therefore restrain himself only till he has obtained the maximum of control over the surrounding circumstances, and then trust to the almighty to see him through. And that is exactly what I have done in suspending."59

The suspension of Non-co-operation was all the more regrettable as no one, least of all Gandhi himself, could fail to anticipate the disastrous effect of such frustration on the public, buoyed up to the highest enthusiasm by the prospect of a real test of the non-violent fight against the mighty Government. It is reason-

able to conclude that this frustration was the main cause of the ensuing political inertia of the masses, and as always happens, their pent-up energy found an outlet in the Hindu-Muslim riots. On the whole, it is difficult to acquit Gandhi of a serious blunder which retarded the progress of the national movement to a very considerable extent. If he could not foresee the possibility of violence in any part of this vast sub-continent during the campaign, he must have been a very poor judge of human character indeed. Either he should not have begun Civil Disobedience unless he was assured that above 300 millions of Indians have all been inspired by his precept and example,—though he would have to wait till doomsday —, or having begun it without that assurance, he should not have been deflected from his course by a single incident of violence, however bad as that might be.

We may now describe the reaction of Gandhi's action on his fellow-workers. Subhas Bose represented the view of a large section when he observed as follows :

“The Dictator's decree was obeyed at the time but there was a regular revolt in the Congress Camp. No one could understand why Mahatma should have used the isolated incident at Chauri-Chaura for strangling the movement all over the country. Popular resentment was all the greater because the Mahatma had not cared to consult representatives from the different provinces and because the situation in the country as a whole was exceedingly favourable for the success of the civil disobedience campaign. To sound the order of retreat just when public enthusiasm was reaching the boiling-point was nothing short of a national calamity. The principal lieutenants of the Mahatma, Deshabandhu Das, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai, who were all in prison, shared the popular resentment. I was with the Deshabandhu at the time and I could see that he was

beside himself with anger and sorrow at the way Mahatma Gandhi was repeatedly bungling. He was just beginning to forget the December blunder when the Bardoli retreat came as a staggering blow. Lala Lajpat Rai was experiencing the same feeling and it is reported that in sheer disgust he addressed a seventy-page letter to the Mahatma from prison.”⁶⁰

Jawaharlal Nehru’s outburst was more dignified and to the point :

“We were angry when we learned of this stoppage of our struggle at a time when we seemed to be consolidating our position and advancing on all fronts.,..... The sudden suspension of our movement after the Chauri Chaura incident was resented, I think, by almost all the Congress leaders—other than Gandhiji, of course. My father (who was in jail at the time) was much upset by it.^{60a} The young people were even more agitated. Our mounting hopes tumbled to the ground and this mental reaction was to be expected. What troubled us even more were the reasons given for this suspension and the consequences that seemed to flow from them. Chauri Chaura may have been and was a deplorable occurrence and wholly opposed to the spirit of the non-violent movement, but were a remote village and a mob of excited peasants in an out-of-the-way place going to put an end, for some time at least, to our national struggle for freedom ? If this was the inevitable consequence of a sporadic act of violence, then surely there was something lacking in the philosophy and technique of a non-violent struggle. For it seemed to us to be impossible to guarantee against the occurrence of some such untoward incident. Must we train the three hundred odd millions of India in the theory and practice of non-violent action before we could go forward ? And, even so, how many of us could say that under extreme

provocation from the police we would be able to remain perfectly peaceful? But even if we succeeded, what of the numerous *agents provocateurs*, stool-pigeons, and the like who crept into our movement and indulged in violence themselves or induced others to do so? If this was the sole condition of its function, then the non-violent method of resistance would always fail.”⁶¹

Although the Working Committee accepted the advice of Gandhi without demur, the All-India Congress Committee, which met at Delhi a few days later to consider the question, proved less pliable. There was a strong opposition, and many considered Gandhi's action not only a great blunder but a severe blow to the national movement. Even when the heat of the excitement subsided, opinions were sharply divided about the wisdom of the decision, as the Enquiry Committee reported in 1922. On the whole, quite a large section of the people felt what has been so aptly expressed by an impartial foreign observer, Romain Rolland, in the following words: “It is dangerous to assemble all the forces of a nation, and to hold the nation, panting, before a prescribed movement, to lift one's arm to give the final command, and then, at the last moment, let one's arm drop, and thrice call a halt just as the formidable machinery has been set in motion. One risks ruining the brakes and paralyzing the impetus.”⁶²

The general feeling of repulsion against Gandhi's leadership was realized by the Government and fully exploited by them. The Government had long been contemplating the arrest of Gandhi, but stayed their hands for fear that his arrest would be attended with bloody outbreak in numerous places. But this fear being removed by the growing unpopularity of Gandhi, Lord Reading decided upon his arrest, and this was carried into effect by the Government of Bombay on 10 March.

The official chronicler, Rushbrook Williams, who records this view, observes : "That the arrest, being well timed, passed off peacefully, should not mislead the reader into thinking that it could have been effected with equal absence of popular excitement at an earlier period. It came when Mr. Gandhi's political reputation was at its nadir, when the enthusiasm of his followers had reached the lowest ebb ; when the public mind of India was engrossed with other issues."⁶³

Gandhi was tried at Ahmadabad on March 18, 1922. He pleaded guilty to the charge but made a statement, referred to above,⁶⁴ explaining why he, a staunch loyalist and co-operator with the British Government, had turned into an uncompromising opponent and non-co-operator. The Sessions Judge, Mr. Broomfield, sentenced him to six years' simple imprisonment.

The first phase of Non-co-operation movement ended with Gandhi's cry of halt, and any chance of its revival at an early date was removed by his confinement behind the walls of prison. For, the whole movement centred round one person, and his disappearance gave a death-blow to it at least for the time being. It is not indeed a sign of healthy public life in any country that a great movement should rest upon the exertions and guidance of one man alone. But in the case of Non-co-operation movement, it was even worse still, for it depended wholly upon the personal whims and predilections of Gandhi which did not always appeal to his followers as based upon a clear process of reasoning intelligible to them. Nevertheless, he was obeyed without question, and retained the implicit confidence of millions, such as has never fallen to the lot of any other political leader before or after him. The secret of it lies in the combination of a saint and a political leader in his person. Gandhi, by his loin cloth and high ideals of an ascetic life of renun-

ciation, succeeded in canalising the traditional reverence and unquestioning faith in a spiritual *guru* in India to the service of politics. Whether Gandhi was the most saintly politician or the most political saint, will ever remain a matter of opinion. But the combination of the dual capacity in him introduced a new element in Indian politics—the idea of a political *guru*—which worked wonders during his life and which he left as a legacy to this country.

In the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee at Delhi Gandhi had tried hard to maintain that the resolution of suspension did not in any way nullify the resolution on Non-co-operation passed in the Nagpur session of the Congress. But neither his eloquence nor his prestige could conceal the fact that Non-co-operation was dead. This was fully admitted by the Congress Enquiry Committee, which observed: "There can be no doubt that the principle and policy laid down at Ahmadabad were completely reversed to the great disappointment of an expectant public", and the Congress "failed to create sufficient enthusiasm to carry on the constructive programme with the earnestness it deserved". The last is a very significant admission, and should be borne in mind in making a proper study of the Non-co-operation movement, both in 1922 and thereafter. It means that the enthusiasm which sustained the movement was really kept up by its fighting programme, and the constructive programme, such as weaving and spinning, removal of untouchability etc., which was not likely to involve any collision with the Government, really fell flat upon the masses who looked upon them as merely of secondary importance, to be tolerated for the sake of Gandhiji, if not as an unnecessary hindrance to the real fight.

The Congress Enquiry Committee had also the

candour to admit that "no man other than the Mahatma could lift the wet blanket thrown upon most of the workers by the Bardoli and Delhi resolutions, or effectively divert the course of Congress activities into the channels marked out by these resolutions." They believed that if Gandhi could "make one of his lightning tours through the country", the whole aspect of things would have been changed. This may be seriously doubted in view of the callous indifference with which Gandhi's imprisonment was looked upon by the public. As has been remarked, not a leaf stirred in this vast country on that occasion. The Congress Enquiry Committee and the orthodox followers of Gandhi have taken pains to explain this indifference as merely 'the homage of reverence which the people paid to Gandhiji by observing that exemplary self-restraint and perfect non-violence which were so dear to his heart'. One is constrained to observe that these were no less dear to his heart in 1919, when the mere rumour of his arrest created serious troubles in the Panjab and Bombay; in 1922, only a few months before, when Chauri Chaura incident took place; or in 1942, when Gandhi was again arrested and put into prison. We must, therefore, look for some other reasons to explain the all-pervading calm after Gandhi's incarceration in 1922. That these included popular resentment at his action and the consequent waning of his popularity will probably be disputed by none, except the blind followers of Gandhi.

The Congress Enquiry Committee rightly observed that it would be "unprofitable to inquire what would have happened if Mahatma Gandhi had not been arrested and sent to prison." What actually happened admits of no doubt. The first phase of the Non-co-operation movement had ended and there was no chance of its revival, so long at least as Gandhi was in prison.

VI. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE DURING N.C.O.

The Non-co-operation movement brought into prominent relief the brute force of the British rule in India. This was neither unknown nor unexpected after the recent happenings in the Panjab. But, strangely enough, the movement made also an exhibition, side by side, of some of the best as well as the worst instincts of the Indian people.

1. The Oppression by the Government.

Reference has already been made above to the repressive measures adopted by the Government in connection with the visit of the Prince of Wales. We may now make a rapid review of the general policy pursued by the Government throughout the campaign, and the measures adopted by them to put it down. (On March 24, 1921, a full-dress debate was held in the Legislative Assembly on Non-co-operation, in course of which Sir William Vincent outlined the policy of the Government. He declared that the object of the Non-co-operation was to paralyze the Government, and for this purpose "there is no source of discontent which they have not used," such as fomenting strikes of labourers, setting tenants against *zamindars*, etc. The Government was therefore justified in taking repressive measures to put down the movement.

These measures consisted of terrorist activities and strict enforcement of the repressive laws already on the Statute Book, such as Section 144, preventing assembly of more than five persons, Seditious Meetings Act, etc. Directions were issued for an extensive use of these powers, and the District Officers were permitted to enforce the total prohibition of inflammatory meetings. But the Government also took resort to terrorism in various forms. The Non-co-operators were humiliated in various ways, brutal assaults were made on picketers, and 'mild' (?)

lathi charge, i. e. merciless beating with iron-shod heavy bamboo sticks, became the order of the day. The Police, in the name or in the guise of house-searches, with or without warrants, acted like gangsters, breaking, looting, assaulting the inmates of the house, including the *zenana*, and putting them to all kinds of indignities. More excusable were the activities of the Government by way of counter-propaganda against the Non-co-operators. In U. P. the Government issued a Communique stating that the N. C. O. movement was revolutionary and anarchical, and that it was the duty of all servants of the Crown to counteract it. The existing prohibitions to Government officers in regard to participation in political movements were withdrawn, and they were encouraged to declare themselves openly and actively against the N. C. O. movement. The Collectors were instructed to attend and address meetings of Reform Leagues and Liberal Leagues designed to oppose the Non-co-operation movement.

But sometimes the counter-propaganda assumed a ludicrous form. Thus in Bihar the anti-drink campaign of the Non-co-operators was fought by a counter-propaganda which emphasized the "value of wine both as food and as a medicine." It was also added in the Government Manifesto that "many great men were wine-drinkers, such as Moses, Alexander, Julius Caesar, Napoleon, Shakespeare, Watt, Gladstone, Tennyson, Bismarck."

As noted above, the Government repression became more severe in consequence of the boycott of the visit of the Prince of Wales. The campaign of repression was most severe in Calcutta. More than three thousand volunteers were arrested during the ten days preceding the Prince's visit. Even respectable and inoffensive men like Principal Heramba Chandra Maitra suffered indignities in the hands of the custodians of law and order.

A unique feature of repression was added in the shape of Anglo-Indian Civil Guards, who, together with the Gurkha troops and Police, formed the veritable trio of oppression. A specimen of their brutality was witnessed in Entally, a suburb of Calcutta, on December 25, 1921. After a drunken brawl the Civil Guards assaulted the Muslims of the locality. They were soon reinforced by other Civil Guards and several European Sergeants, "who madly roamed about the streets, revolver in hand, ready to shoot whoever interfered with their mad career. One man was killed outright and some twenty wounded. The same night the police raided a mosque." 'They entered with shoes on, and are alleged to have desecrated it.'⁶⁵

In Bihar the European officer of the Police Station, Sonapur, snatched away from the Congress volunteers who were preaching *hartal*, flags, badges and even *khadi* clothes which they had on them, and tore everything to pieces. Immediately after, he raided the Congress office and ordered the constables to beat and plunder (*maro aur looto* were the actual words used). The constables carried the order to the letter by assaulting the volunteers, breaking open boxes and almirahs, and even carrying away Rs. 120 in cash. Religious books like the *Ramayana* and the *Gita* were burnt.^{65a}

Such instances of Government oppression can be multiplied to almost any extent. But it is unnecessary to refer to them in detail, particularly as it is not always possible to ascertain the exact truth. In their Communique dated February 6, the Government asserted: "There is thus no shadow of justification for the charge that their policy has been one of indiscriminate and lawless repression." Gandhi, who formally made this charge in his letter to the Viceroy, dated 4th February, 1922, gave the following reply to the above statement of the Government:

"Instead of an ample expression of regret and

apology for the barbarous deeds that have been committed by officials in the name of law and order, I regret to find in the Government reply a categorical denial of any 'lawless repression'. In this connection I urge the public and Government carefully to consider the following facts whose substance is beyond challenge :-

(1). The official shooting at Entally in Calcutta and the callous treatment even of a corpse.

(2). The admitted brutality of the Civil Guards.

(3). The forcible dispersal of a meeting at Dacca, and the dragging of innocent men by their legs although they had given no offence whatsoever.

(4). Similar treatment of volunteers in Aligarh.

(5). The conclusive (in my opinion) findings of the Committee presided over by Gokul Chand Narang about the brutal and uncalled for assaults upon volunteers and the public in Lahore.

(6). Wicked and inhuman treatment of volunteers and the public at Jullunder.

(7). The shooting of a boy at Dehra Dun and the cruelly forcible dispersal of a public meeting at that place.

(8). The looting admitted by the Bihar Government of villages by an officer and his Company without any permission whatsoever from anyone, but, as stated by non-co-operators, at the invitation of a Planter, and the assaults upon volunteers and burning of *khaddar* and papers belonging to the Congress at Sonapur.

(9). Midnight searches and arrests in Congress and Khilafat offices.

"I have merely given a sample of the many 'infallible proofs' of official lawlessness and barbarism. I have mentioned not even a tithe of what is happening all over the country, and I wish to state without fear of successful contradiction that the scale on which this

lawlessness has gone on in so many Provinces of India puts into shade the inhumanities that were practised in the Punjab, if we except the crawling order and the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh.....but as if this warfare against innocence was not enough, the reins are being tightened in the jails..."⁶⁶

Those who know the scrupulous regard for truth which characterised Gandhi throughout his life, would not hesitate for a moment to accept his statement in preference to the Government version. There were many allegations of inhuman cruelties behind the bars of prison, but for obvious reasons no details were available. But narratives of many prisoners who came out of jail at a later period leave no doubt of the cruel treatment of the helpless victims who incurred the wrath of the authorities for not following the humiliating practices meant for and enforced upon ordinary criminals of low classes.

An impartial testimony to the lawless and repressive activities of the Government is afforded by the vigorous denunciation of their measures by the Moderates, who cannot be accused of having any partiality for the Non-co-operators. Reference has been made above⁶⁷ to the general condemnation of the Government repression by various individuals and organizations of the Moderate Party. Some specific allegations were made by the Indian Association of Calcutta, the central organization of the Bengal Moderates, dominated by veterans like Surendra Nath Banerji who was then a Minister of the Governor of Bengal. They addressed two letters to the Viceroy. In one of these they observed :

"The Indian Association have always supported and will support Government in all attempts to put down lawlessness and intimidation, but when Government in the name of preserving peace and order allow their own officers to exceed the bounds of law and to

create a general state of terrorism, they feel bound to enter their emphatic protest”.

In another letter they specially invited the attention of the Viceroy to the following :-

1. The wide-spread impression, confirmed by newspaper reports of trials, that persons are being arrested and convicted simply for selling or wearing *khaddar*, crying *Bande Mataram* or *Gandhi Maharaj ki jai*, or for asking people to close their shops on the 24th December.

2. Assaults and rude behaviour by the military, the Police and the Anglo-Indian Civil Guards on unoffending persons.

3. Indiscriminate arrests.

4. Arrests of ladies.

5. Maltreatment of arrested persons.

6. Reported forcible seizure and removal of “*Khaddar*” from shops and other places.

7. Trial of persons *in camera* and in jail; information in some cases not being given even to Counsel desirous of appearing for, or watching proceedings on behalf of, accused persons.

8. Severity of the sentences passed on persons accused of political offences or offences of a technical or trivial character.

9. The detention of persons in custody without any charge being formulated against them.

10. The stationing of military pickets in various parts of the city (in some cases with machine guns).

The letter concludes with a reference to the great excitement caused by the assault on Principal Heramba Chandra Maitra.^{67a}

Reference may be made to some grave instances of oppression.

A. Two cases of unprovoked assault authenticated by non-official Committees who made a careful inquiry

into them.

i. Chittagong Gurkha Outrage.

On October 20, 1921, Sri J. M. Sen Gupta, the Congress leader of Chittagong, along with 17 others, were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three months. This created great commotion, and a large crowd gathered outside the jail precincts and spread all along the road towards the Railway Station where, it was reported, the prisoners would be taken that very evening. The people formed a procession, with torchlights, bands, *sankirtan* parties and display of firework. The procession peacefully followed the prisoners' carriage up to the approaches of the Station, though it was alleged that there was picketing and burning of foreign clothes on the road by some street boys. When the head of the Procession reached within fifty yards of the main entrance to the Station, a large number of people had already proceeded by short cuts to the Railway compound which was also full of peoples who had already gathered there since early hours of the evening. There was no disturbance of any kind, but suddenly a band of Gurkhas began to "assault the people right and left indiscriminately, mainly with the butt end of the rifle." As the people fled on all sides, the Gurkhas chased them all along and struck them all the way. The Gurkhas also attacked several carriages and struck severe blows upon their occupants, including a Zamindar who was also an Honorary Magistrate. One Gurkha party also fell upon the Processionists and struck them. Altogether more than 100 persons were wounded, some of them very severely.⁶⁸

ii. Matiari Firing.

On July 21, 1921, a disturbance took place at the village Matiari, in Hyderabad District (Sindh), in connection with the meeting of the Aman Sabha, in course

of which the Police fired upon the crowd and inflicted one fatal and twelve other casualties. According to Official Report the disturbances were due to the attempt of the Khilafatists to wreck the Sabha and molesting those who participated therein. According to non-official inquiry the Khilafatists did try to persuade the people not to attend the Sabha, but did not molest anybody for doing so. But even the Official Committee unanimously held "that there was no justification for the police firing. No warning was given to the crowd before the order to fire was given and, though after the first shots the crowd had dispersed, firing was unnecessarily continued." No attempt was made to render medical aid to the injured either by Mukhtiarkar (First Class Magistrate) or by the Police Sub-Inspector. The Official Committee also held that responsible Police officials like the District Superintendent were guilty of making false statements and many of the allegations against the Khilafatists "had been shamelessly fabricated by the Matari Police." "The Government of Bombay dismissed Mukhtiarkar and censured the conduct of the Police Sub-Inspector."⁶⁹

There is no reason to disbelieve these specific events or to doubt the general accuracy of the accounts of these Committees. Special importance attaches to the allegations of oppression and ill-treatment recorded in the Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee which was composed of Pandit Motilal Nehru, C. Rajagopalachari, M. A. A. Ansari, V. J. Patel and S. Kasturiranga Iyengar as members, and Hakim Ajmal Khan as Chairman. The illegal and repressive acts of the Government have been summarised by them as follows :

B. Wholesale arrests of the leaders and workers of the Congress.

Many districts particularly in the Panjab, U. P., Bengal and Assam were from time to time practically denuded

of the more active of their Congress and Khilafat workers by wholesale and indiscriminate arrests and prosecutions. A few examples may be quoted as specimens to show how the authorities acted in the name of law :

(i) Fifty-five members of the U. P. Provincial Congress Committee were discussing a resolution on volunteering at an emergent meeting at Allahabad. The Police entered, seized the draft resolution, asked every individual present whether he approved of it, and on his replying in the affirmative, sent him to the Police van downstairs. Those who did not move quickly enough had some gentle pressure applied to them from behind, and the progress of at least one was accelerated by a mild assault. They made no defence in the Court and were sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment each, which was simple or rigorous according to the personal whim of the Magistrate. The Government, as advised by a special judge appointed by it, had to admit that the convictions were illegal, but the men were still kept in prison. One of them died in jail, and as he was a strong young man, a public inquiry was demanded, but was not allowed.

(ii) C R Das was arrested on 23 December, on the eve of his departure to Ahmadabad to attend the session of the Congress of which he was the President-elect. The case was adjourned from time to time till 12th February, as it was necessary for the Government to prove his signature on the appeal, for issuing which he was prosecuted. At last the handwriting expert of the Government swore that the handwriting was that of Das, who was accordingly convicted and sentenced to six months' imprisonment after being detained for nearly two months as undertrial prisoner.

(iii) Lala Lajpat Rai was convicted under the Seditious Meetings Act and sent to jail, when the Law

Officer of the Government, who was not consulted before, gave his opinion that the conviction was illegal. Lalaji was released, but as soon as he stepped out of the prison gate, he was arrested and sentenced for another offence to two years' imprisonment.

(iv). Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was sentenced to 18 months' rigorous imprisonment for two offences :
 1. Declaring his intention to picket foreign shops in a public speech; 2. Presiding at a committee meeting which decided to send letters to certain cloth merchants calling upon them to pay the fines imposed by the cloth merchants' own association under their own rules. This was construed as an abetment of extortion.

C. Lawlessness outside the Courts

Appalling lawlessness prevailed outside the Courts. It may be broadly stated that causing injury to the person, property or reputation of a Non-co-operator not only ceased to be an offence, but came to be regarded as an act of loyalty to the Government of a specially meritorious character. Specific references may be made to a few typical varieties of oppression :

"Taking the country as a whole, a general summary of the various kinds of anti-Non-co-operation activities may be given in a few short sentences. Gandhi caps and *Khaddar* dress were anathema to the officials generally throughout India, and marked out the wearer for all kinds of insults and humiliations, as also for false prosecution. Assaults on volunteers, stripping them of their clothing, and ducking them in village tanks in winter months were some of the 'innocent' practical jokes designed by the Police for their own amusement. Confiscation of licenses for arms, forfeiture of *jagirs*, *watans* and *inams*, withholding of water-supply for irrigation, and refusing *takavi* advances were some of the milder punishments

for those who were not charged with specific offences. Destruction of Congress and Khilafat offices and records and of national educational institutions, burning of houses and crops and looting property were resorted to in the case of the more obstinate recalcitrants. Several cases of forcible removal of jewellery from the persons of women and of indecent assaults and outrages committed on them, as well as the burning and trampling under foot of religious books and other sacred objects, have also been brought to our notice. The estate of an extra-loyal Zamindar in Utkal (Orissa) has gained a wide notoriety in that Province for cases of shooting, assaults on women and a novel method of humiliating and insulting high-caste people by sprinkling liquor on them and compelling them to carry night-soil on their shoulders."

2. The Excesses Committed by the People

The Enquiry Committee claimed that the people bore all these with admirable patience and self-restraint. That this was not due to cowardice or want of strength was, according to the Committee, demonstrated by the fact that it was the martial races of the Panjab and U. P. who, while smarting under brutal treatment, maintained the most wonderful self-restraint. This may be generally correct, but there is no denying the fact that excesses were also committed by overzealous Non-co-operators, and sometimes it fully resembled the atrocities of the Police. The Committee admitted some sporadic cases of outbursts of violence, but refused to believe that the Non-co-operators were to be held responsible for the few sad incidents that occurred. While one may readily admit that these cases were few and far between, it is difficult to exonerate the Non-co-operation movement from all blame in this respect, whatever we might think of the actual perpetrators of the crimes. Reference has been made to the tragic

occurrences in Chauri Chaura and the brutal nature of the crime will be described later. A few other instances alleged by the Government may be mentioned below :

A. Picketing

'Peaceful' picketing was one of the methods usually resorted to by the Non-co-operators to prevent the purchase of foreign goods and liquor, and attendance at schools, colleges and University classes and examinations. But like the 'mild' *lathi* charge of the Police, picketing was often far from 'peaceful'. Non-co-operators usually stretched themselves on the ground before the gates of educational institutions so that no one could get in without trampling upon their bodies. Sometimes young boys were specially employed for the same purpose.

B. Intimidation

Intimidation was used to force shop-keepers to close shops and make the drivers of carriages cease to ply on the occasion of the *hartals*. There is hardly any doubt that the charge was not altogether unfounded.

C. Agrarian Riots in U. P.

Early in 1921, there were great agrarian troubles in the districts of Rae Bareilly and Fyzabad in U. P. Troubles were due to the refusal of the tenants to pay some of the illegal and oppressive cesses which were imposed by the landlords, and often realized with the help of the Police and the Magistrate, who, in addition to their natural sympathy with the landlords scented in the opposition of the tenants the influence of the Non-co-operation movement. A great riot raged in many villages from January 2 to 7. A scuffle between the peasants and the Police at Fursatganj on January 5 led to a gathering, two days later, of about 10,000 people before the jail at Munshiganj.

Though dispersed by Police fire, the mob looted the *bazār*, and some property of the landlords. On January 23, a serious riot took place at Rachrawan in which several Constables were killed. In course of another peasant rising on the 29th at Gosaigunj, about 1,000 men lay flat on the railway line on hearing that their leader was being carried away in the incoming train. The train had to stop for three hours until the police cleared the line by buckshot fire. To relieve the situation, the N.C.O. leaders organized a Kishan (peasant) League under the guidance of Pandit Motilal Nehru and Purushottamdas Tandon, and the troubles gradually subsided.

The Government believed that these agrarian troubles were created, or at least exploited, by the Non-co-operators in various parts of U. P. and Bihar. It was alleged that the mob, armed with *lathis* and sticks, shouted *Mahatma Gandhiki Jai*, *Shaukat Ali Muhammad Aliki Jai*, etc., and attacked petty as well as substantial *Zamindars*, and *Talukdars*. The leaders of the mobs moved about the country collecting cesses. "Short of taking life they resorted to every form of intimidation, including the defiling of wells, the destruction of crops, and the burning of houses." The ryots were promised *Swaraj* if they would refuse payment of rent to the *Zamindars*.⁷⁰

D. Malegaon

A serious mob-outbreak at Malegaon in the Nasik District (Bombay) caused considerable loss of lives and property. The population, predominantly Muslim, was largely affected by the Khilafat agitation. The conviction of several Momins in April 1921, for carrying arms at a mass meeting in contravention of an order by the District Magistrate, created great commotion, and a Police constable was roughly handled. Thereupon the City Sub-Inspector with a few official and a dozen armed constables proceeded to

the town. Being attacked by the mob, his men fired some rounds of small shots, but as the mob did not disperse, they took refuge in a Hindu temple. The mob brought fuel and kerosene and set fire to the temple, which was burnt along with several neighbouring houses. The Sub-Inspector, while trying to escape in the guise of a woman, was caught, beaten to death, and thrown into the fire. One or two constables were also killed and burnt, while the other officials escaped, though badly injured. The mob cut the telegraph wires and stopped the mail tongas from running. The unarmed Police on town duty were driven out of the town. Some were beaten and some were killed. It was alleged that the mob burnt the Hindu temple, because the Sub-Inspector had taken refuge there and the inmates of the temple refused to surrender him.

Next day the mob plundered the houses of some Muslim leaders who had counselled moderation regarding the Khilafat agitation. They then forced the Mamlatdar to release the convicted Momins from the jail, and for the next three days they burnt houses and committed other outrages. Peace was not restored till the arrival of the troops from Ahmadnagar on April 29, 1921.⁷¹

E. Giridih

There was a violent outbreak at Giridih (Santal Parganas, Bihar) on April 25. It arose out of the refusal of a person to accept the decision of the Non-co-operation *Panchayat* (arbitration tribunal, replacing the regular courts) of Bishnupur. The offender was socially boycotted, and when his daughter went to the village well to draw water, a Khilafat volunteer is alleged to have assaulted her and broken her pitcher. The volunteer was prosecuted, and when the trial was going on, about ten thousand people surrounded the court building. They stoned the

Police, inflicting severe injuries, and damaging the jail building. In the afternoon a mob of about 5,000 appeared in front of the *thana*, pelted the Sub-Inspector with stones and brickbats, and wrecked and looted his quarters. Armed Police and the Gurkhas arrived the next day and order was restored.⁷²

F. Aligarh

There was a riot at Aligarh on July 5, 1921. The official version is as follows :

On July 5, 1921, when a political agitator, Malkhan Singh, was being tried by the Magistrate, a crowd endeavoured to rush the court. They were driven by the Police with the help of batons, and were also unsuccessful in their attempt to attack Police buildings. Later on a mob attacked and burned certain buildings in the Police quarters, including the Treasury. The armed guard fired on them. One constable was killed and three dangerously wounded. A number of rioters were wounded. No attack was made on the houses of Europeans.⁷³

G. Picketing of liquor shops

This often led to violent acts such as snatching away of liquor bottles and assaulting the purchaser, burning of liquor shops etc. More serious charges were brought against the volunteers by Mr. Hammond, the officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar and Orissa. He cited the three following cases : (1) A Muslim vendor in Ranchi died, and the Khilafat party tried to obstruct his funeral rites. After he was buried, his corpse was exhumed, thrown upon the public road and the face beaten in with a brick. (2) Gopi Kahar of Chatra was beaten and, with his face blackened, paraded through the town because his wife sold food to those who visited liquor shops. (3) A woman of Kateya, near Siwan, named Musammât Paremia Koerin, was, for similar offence, stripped naked

and driven through the country by a howling mob. When a Police officer went to hold an inquiry he was attacked by a mob.

Similar incidents were also reported from other places. At Dharwar in Bombay, while volunteers were picketing liquor shops, the mob tried to murder a Sub-Inspector of Police and to set fire to certain buildings.

H. Chauri Chaura

The most deplorable outbreak occurred at Chauri Chaura, a Police-Station, 15 miles from Gorakhpur in U. P. As a result of vigorous picketing there was hardly any customer of foreign cloth or liquor in the local bazar. On February 1, a zealous police officer was alleged to have beaten some volunteers engaged in peaceful picketing. In consequence of this, all the volunteers of the neighbouring villages, numbering about 500, accompanied by a large crowd, went to the *thana* and asked for an explanation of the conduct of the police officer. Some neutrals pacified them and the whole party moved on. After they had proceeded to some distance there was a hue and cry in the rear. It was alleged that the Police roughly handled some of the stragglers in the rear. In any case, the mob returned and began to throw brickbats. The armed Police fired on the mob. How long the firing lasted is not known, but dead bodies of only two rioters were later found near the *thana*. It is not unlikely, however, that some wounded persons were removed by the mob. After some time the firing ceased, presumably because the Police had exhausted their ammunitions. As soon as the crowd realized this, they rushed towards the *thana* building, shouting: "through Gandhiji's kindness even the bullets have turned to water". On their approach the policemen went inside and bolted the door. The mob then set fire to the building. Some

perished and those who were driven out by the heat and smoke were thrown back into the fire after being besmirched with kerosene.

It should be pointed out that the allegations against the Non-co-operators, including those mentioned above, were not inquired into by any reliable committee and rest solely upon official statements whose accuracy may justly be challenged in the light of many serious charges brought by officials which later proved to be without any foundation or highly exaggerated. In the case of Chauri Chaura, however, we possess a statement signed by the President of the District Congress Committee and others who were not likely to err against the popular side. In view of the horrible nature of the crime and the role it played in the suspension of the Non-co-operation movement,^{73a} part of this authentic statement is quoted below :

"The scene presented a most horrible and gruesome appearance. Two buildings were still burning. The roofs of almost all the buildings had been burnt down. Some boxes and trunks belonging evidently to the members of the police force were found lying open without their contents. Twenty-two corpses, more or less burnt and disfigured, were lying there, seven having been almost completely burnt.....Besides these burnt corpses, there were two corpses, apparently of men of the mob, which were not burnt, one of them clothed in khadder which had a gunshot wound.....There was a very large number of brickbats and *kanker*, evidently used in attacking the police, found in the compound. On our return to the Railway station at 2 P. M., we found three wounded men two of whom were police chowkidars and one a *bannia* of the *bazaar*. The last had a gunshot wound in the thigh and the chowkidars had brickbat wounds on their heads and bodies. It is said that all the police

force stationed there, including the armed guard which had been sent there a day before, as some trouble was apprehended, has been murdered except two who were out on duty elsewhere, and one constable who managed to escape''74

It is likely that the provocations by the Police were much graver than the Government version admitted, but still there cannot be any excuse for the demoniac brutality displayed by the people. Further, although many bad characters must have taken part, probably the main part, in enacting the tragedy, it is impossible to believe that the Non-co-operators were not at all involved in the series of events leading to the gruesome tragedy. Chauri Chaura definitely proves two things. First, it is idle to expect that in the excitement caused by Non-co-operation movement it would always retain its character of *ahimsa* or non-violence; and secondly, there is no limit to the excesses of a mob once they are roused to a frenzy of passion.

Apart from these specific instances, the Government brought general charges against the National Volunteers for inciting the masses to violence and disorder. There is no doubt that it was through the Volunteer organizations that the message of *Swaraj* by Non-co-operation was spread among the masses, and this constituted the chief characteristic, and the principal success, of the whole movement. It is idle to expect that the masses, or even the Volunteers who guided them, would always remain faithful to the cult of non-violence. It is, therefore, not unreasonable that the Government viewed it as pregnant with possibilities of serious disorders. According to the official Report, "the members of the Volunteer organizations spread themselves over the countryside, inspiring rustics, only a shade more credulous than themselves, with contempt for constituted authority." The Government, therefore, held

the Non-co-operation movement directly or indirectly responsible for all the disturbances in the country during 1921, including industrial and railway strikes, and attributed them more specifically to Volunteer organizations and the doctrine preached by Gandhi and Ali Brothers during their joint country-wide tours. This is undoubtedly an exaggerated statement, but there is no denying the fact, that the Non-co-operation movement made the people politically self-conscious and infused them with an enthusiasm for redressing the wrongs which they had so long patiently borne, either in silence or with mild ineffective protest of a passive character. The agrarian riots in U. P. or the Akali movement, to which reference will be made later, and many other riots and disorders—though not all—cannot be directly traced to the Non-co-operation movement, but may be regarded as a consequence of the new spirit engendered by that movement. In spite of obvious exaggeration it is not possible to deny that there was a great deal of truth in the following allegation of the Government :

“In Bihar, there was a strike, complicated by non-co-operation activities, in the East Indian Railway Collieries, leading to a riot at Giridih. Another strike, also accompanied by disorder, broke out on the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway. At Nagpur, in the Central Provinces, the intimidation practised by “National Volunteers” against persons resorting to liquor shops, led to serious disturbances. In Assam, inflammatory appeals to ignorant tea-garden labourers, began to produce their inevitable effects in riot and disorder. In the Madras and Bombay Presidencies mobs of hooligans, with the name of Gandhi upon their lips, practised subtle terrorism and intimidation of a sort with which the authorities found it most difficult to cope, while Khilafat preachers roused the frenzy of poor and ignorant

Muslims with the cry of "Religion in danger". Everywhere through these masses of combustible elements, moved the emissaries of non-co-operation, preaching, it is true, non-violence, but coupling with this admonition fervent exhortations as to the necessity of "passively" defying the authority of the State, and inflammatory appeals for the rectification of the Panjab and Khilafat grievances, and the acquisition of immediate Swaraj. Everywhere they invoked the magic of Gandhi's name thereby strengthening, whether consciously or unconsciously, the belief of the credulous masses in his miraculous powers. Thousands of ignorant and humble persons, whether dwellers in the city or countryside, were fired with enthusiasm for the great "Mahatma" whose kingdom, when it came, would bring them prosperity, affluence, and a respite from labour. Little wonder that while eagerly drinking in the tales of the Government's iniquity and oppression, they set small store by admonitions against the use of violence."⁷⁵

The charge contained in the last sentence, and that of a general 'non-violent' coercion, were also brought against the followers of Gandhi by eminent political leaders. The following extract from a speech of Mrs. Besant during Non-co-operation movement reflected the opinion of a large body of men. "Under the Gandhi Raj there is no free speech, no open meeting except for Non-co-operators. Social and religious boycott, threats of personal violence, spitting, insults in the streets, are the methods of oppression. Mob support is obtained by wild promises, such as the immediate coming of Swaraj, when there will be no rents, no taxes, by giving to Gandhi high religious names, such as Mahatma and Avatara, assigning to him supernatural powers and the like."⁷⁶

The historian has not sufficient data to enable him to pass a final judgement on the allegations of either

the brutality of penal measures adopted by the officials or the violent character of the non-violent Non-co-operation movement. There seems to be no doubt, however, that there is a great deal of truth in the charges and counter-charges by the Congress and the Government. The Non-co-operation movement was both directly and indirectly responsible for much violence, and sometimes even serious crimes, and the Government measures were often unnecessarily cruel and harsh, deliberately designed to terrorize the people. To argue that they were necessary to maintain law and order, is but a tacit admission that the Government was based on force, pure and simple, and not on the willing allegiance, far less loyalty, of the people at large, as the Government of India claimed in season and out of season. On the other hand, there is no denying the fact that few, if any at all except Gandhi himself, were inspired by the true spirit of *Satyagraha* or non-violence, as expounded by him and accepted by his followers in theory.^{76a} Most of the people, including leaders, had really no sincere faith in this cult ; they looked upon it as a useful political expedient, but did not accept it as a creed.

VII. THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF N.C.O.

Before concluding this Chapter, it is incumbent upon the historian to inquire, how far the Non-co-operation movement was a success or failure. It has been argued that it must be pronounced to be a failure, because it failed to achieve *Swaraj* within a year as was promised to the people by Gandhi, and no conspicuous success attended the efforts to carry out the different items of Non-co-operation as laid down in the resolution of the Calcutta Congress in 1920 and endorsed by the Nagpur session. Fortunately for the historian, there is not much

dispute about the main facts assumed in the above argument. All the facts in connection with the movement were reviewed by a responsible committee consisting of eminent persons, though naturally they all belonged to the Congress Party. But the general impartiality of this committee, so far as the ascertaining of facts is concerned, must be recognized by all. This is admitted even by an eminent veteran of the Moderate Party, though not without an unchivalrous fling. He observes: "The Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee was quite instructive. It was certainly a one-sided document, as it was bound to be in the nature of things. But there was in it enough to enable uncommitted men to draw non-partisan conclusions." 77 The conclusions which he has drawn as a non-partisan—a claim which many would be disposed to challenge—do not materially differ from what has been stated above regarding each item, and it is only fair to add that the Committee itself admitted the failure, in a manner which a 'partisan' Committee has seldom done or is likely to do in future. Whatever may be the difference between an impartial critic and the Committee, one may venture to assert, that it would be one of degree and not of kind, and that also not of a very substantial character.

But even admitting all this, it is difficult to concede that the Non-co-operation movement was a failure. There is a great deal of truth in the claim made by C. R. Das in the following passage in his Presidential address at the Gaya session of the Congress held in December, 1922.

"It is assumed that a movement must either succeed or fail, whereas the truth is that human movements—I am speaking of genuine movements—neither altogether succeed nor altogether fail. Every genuine movement proceeds from an ideal and the ideal is always higher than the achievement... Was the Non-co-operation Movement in India

a success ? Yes, a mighty success when we think of the desire for *Swaraj* which it has succeeded in awakening throughout the length and breadth of this vast country. It is a great success when we think of the practical result of such awakening, in the money which the nation contributed, in the enrolment of the members of the Indian National Congress and in the boycott of foreign cloth. I go further and say that the practical achievement also consists of the loss of prestige suffered by Educational Institutions and the Courts of Law and the Reformed Councils throughout the country.....Yet it must be admitted that from another point of view, when we assess the measure of our success in the spirit of Arithmetic, we are face to face with "the petty done" and the "undone vast". ...I say to our critics : I admit we have failed in many directions, but will you also not admit our success where we have succeeded ?"

A similar claim is put forward in the following passage of the Report of the Congress Enquiry Committee :

"Witnesses from all parts of the country speaking from direct local knowledge have testified to the outstanding features of the crisis through which the country is passing. These are : (1) the general awakening of the masses to their political rights and privileges, (2) the total loss of faith in the present system of Government, (3) the belief that it is only through its own efforts that India can hope to be free, (4) the faith in the Congress as the only organisation which can properly direct national effort to gain freedom, and (5) the utter failure of repression to cow down the people. Our own personal observation in the course of our tour round the whole country fully corroborates the evidence on these points. We have found the general population

permeated with the indomitable spirit of a great national awakening unprecedented in the history of the human race for its wide sweep and rapid growth. The great bulk of the people showed complete lack of confidence in the Government and were found to be firm believers in non-co-operation and all that it stands for. Repression, where it had done its worst, had no doubt left behind it a trail of sorrow and suffering, but failed to crush the spirit of the people."

Although stated with some amount of pardonable exaggeration, the claims made by the Congressmen, as illustrated in the above passage, cannot be lightly brushed aside. Even the Government was forced to admit that in spite of its impracticable nature, the Non-co-operation movement was engineered and sustained by nationalist aspirations. In the statement submitted to the Parliament, the Government of India made the following observations regarding the general results of the Non-co-operation movement :

"But when we turn to consider the campaign as a whole, it would be idle to assert that it was infructuous. Whether the results obtained are desirable or undesirable will be demonstrated beyond all possibility of doubt by the passage of time. But that these results are real is no longer open to question. Mr. Gandhi's intensive movement during the years 1921 and 1922 has diffused far and wide, among classes previously oblivious to political considerations, a strong negative patriotism born of race hatred of the foreigner. The less prosperous classes both in the town and the countryside have become aroused to certain aspects—even though these be mischievous, exaggerated and false—of the existing political situation. On the whole, this must be pronounced, up to the present, the most formidable achievement of the non-co-operation movement. That it

has certain potentialities for good will be maintained by many ; that it will immensely increase the dangers and difficulties of the next few years can be denied by few.”⁷⁸

Making necessary allowance for a foreign Government's view about what constitutes true patriotism, and what is mischievous, on the part of the Indians, the above lines may justly be regarded as an indirect admission of the great success of the Non-co-operation movement.

The most outstanding feature of the Non-co-operation movement was the willingness and ability of the people in general to endure, to a remarkable degree, hardships and punishments inflicted by the Government. This is the reason why, though the Non-co-operation movement collapsed, the memory of its greatness survived, and was destined to inspire the nation to launch a more arduous campaign at no distant date. For, the movement served as a baptism of fire which initiated the people to a new faith and new hope, and inspired them with a new confidence in their power to fight for freedom. Any one who reviews the whole course of events during the movement must be struck with two undeniable facts. First, that the Congress movement had, *for the first time*, become a really mass movement, in the sense that national awakening had not only penetrated to the people at large, but also made them active participants in the struggle for freedom. The second, which is no less important, but generally ignored by friends and foes alike, is that the Indian National Congress was, almost overnight, turned into a genuine revolutionary organization. It was no longer a deliberative assembly, but an organized fighting party, pledged to revolution. Its weapons were different, but its aims, objects and animating spirit closely resembled those of the militant nationalism of the early years of the century, represented by the so-called terrorist party. But there were two significant differences. It did not work in secret, and

it was widely accepted almost all over India as the only party which could achieve the independence of the country. Henceforth the national energy was directed to a revolutionary programme,—non-violent, if possible, violent, if need be.

VIII. OFFSHOOTS OF NON-CO-OPERATION MOVEMENT.

A. Moplah Rebellion

The Moplahs are a band of fanatic Muslims, poor and ignorant, about a million in number. They are descended from the Arabs who had probably settled in the Malabar coast,⁷⁹ about the eighth or ninth century A. D. and married mostly Indian wives. They lived in Malabar along with about two million Hindus, and had acquired an unenviable reputation for crimes perpetrated under the impulse of religious frenzy. They were responsible for no fewer than thirty-five outbreaks, of a minor nature, during the British rule. But their most terrible outbreak, mainly due to the Khilafat agitation, took place in August, 1921, and is described in the official report as follows :

“During the early months of 1921, excitement spread speedily from mosque to mosque, from village to village. The violent speeches of the Ali Brothers, the early approach of Swaraj as foretold in the non-co-operating press, the July resolutions of the Khilafat Conference—all these combined to fire the train. Throughout July and August innumerable Khilafat meetings were held, in which the resolutions of the Karachi Conference were fervently endorsed. Knives, swords, and spears were secretly manufactured, bands of desperados collected, and preparations were made to proclaim the coming of the kingdom of Islam. On August 20, when the District Magistrate of Calicut, with the help of troops and police, attempted to arrest certain leaders who were in possession of

arms at Tirurangadi, a severe encounter took place, which was the signal for immediate rebellion throughout the whole locality. Roads were blocked, telegraph lines cut, and the railway destroyed in a number of places. The District Magistrate returned to Calicut to prevent the spread of trouble northwards, and the machinery of Government was temporarily reduced to a number of isolated offices and police stations which were attacked by the rebels in detail. Such Europeans as did not succeed in escaping—and they were fortunately few—were murdered with bestial savagery. As soon as the administration had been paralysed, the Moplahs declared that Swaraj was established. A certain Ali Musaliar was proclaimed Raja, Khilafat flags were flown, and Ernad and Walluvanad were declared Khilafat kingdoms. The main brunt of Moplah ferocity was borne, not by Government, but the luckless Hindus who constituted the majority of the population.....Massacres, forcible conversions, desecration of temples, foul outrages upon women, pillage, arson and destruction—in short, all the accompaniments of brutal and unrestrained barbarism,—were perpetrated freely until such time as troops could be hurried to the task of restoring order throughout a difficult and extensive tract of country.

“As the rebellion had spread over a wide area, the troops available in the Malabar District were unable to cope with the situation, and strong reinforcements had to be sent; and by the middle of October these amounted to four battalions, one pack battery, a section of armoured cars, and other necessary ancillary services. As the rebels took to the hills, it was some time before they could be caught in appreciable numbers. By the end of the year 1921 the situation was well in hand, and the back of the rebellion was broken. An idea of the fierceness of some of the fighting may be gained from the night

attack at Pandikad, on which occasion a company of Gurkhas was rushed at dawn by a horde of fanatics who inflicted some 60 casualties on the Gurkhas and were only beaten off after losing some 250 killed. Throughout the campaign casualties among the Government troops totalled 43 killed and 126 wounded; while the Moplahs lost over 3,000 in killed alone. A great tragedy marked the end of the rebellion. On November 19, 1921, a batch of seventy Moplah prisoners was being conveyed by train, but through the neglect of the guards there was no arrangement for ventilation in the closed coach in which they were put, and all of them died by asphyxiation.”⁸⁰

The Muslim leaders put the number of Moplah martyrs (?) as 10,000 and they also referred to the desecration of mosques and other outrages perpetrated by British troops while suppressing the revolt. They as well Gandhi and his blind followers ignored the terrible outrages upon a large number of Hindus, but these described above in the Government version, have been corroborated by independent testimony. It will suffice to refer to a few documents out of a mass of materials collected on the subject.

1. A statement signed by the Secretary and the Treasurer of the Kerala Provincial Congress Committee, Secretary, Calicut District Congress Committee, Secretary, Ernad Khilafat Committee, and K. V. Gopala Menon refers to the following misdeeds of the Moplahs: “Their wanton and unprovoked attack on the Hindus; the all but wholesale looting of their houses in Ernad and parts of Valluvanad, Ponnani, and Calicut taluqs; the forcible conversion of Hindus in a few places in the beginning of the rebellion, and the wholesale conversion of those who stuck to their homes in later stages; the brutal murder of inoffensive Hindus, men, women, and children, in cold

blood, without the slightest reason except that they are "kaffirs" or belong to the same race as the policemen, who insulted their Tangals or entered their mosques ; the desecration and burning of Hindu temples ; the outrage on Hindu women and their forcible conversion and marriage by Moplahs".

The signatories add : "These and similar atrocities (were) proved beyond the shadow of a doubt by the statements recorded by us from the actual sufferers who have survived".⁸¹

2. The memorial of the women of Malabar to Lady Reading contains the following : "It is possible that your Ladyship is not fully appraised of all the horrors and atrocities perpetrated by the fiendish rebels ; of the many wells and tanks filled up with the mutilated, but often only half dead, bodies of our nearest and dearest ones who refused to abandon the faith of our fathers ; of pregnant women cut to pieces and left on the roadsides and in the jungles, with the unborn babe protruding from the mangled corpse ; of our innocent and helpless children torn from our arms and done to death before our eyes and of our husbands and fathers tortured, flayed and burnt alive ; of our hapless sisters forcibly carried away from the midst of kith and kin and subjected to every shame and outrage which the vile and brutal imagination of these inhuman hell-hounds could conceive of ; of thousands of our homesteads reduced to cinder-mounds out of sheer savagery and a wanton spirit of destruction ; of our places of worship desecrated and destroyed and of the images of deity shamefully insulted by putting the entrails of slaughtered cows where flower garlands used to lie, or else smashed to pieces... We remember how driven out of our native hamlets we wandered, starving and naked, in the jungles and forests...." ⁸²

(This is only a short extract from a long harrowing tale of misery).

3. Proceedings of the Conference at Calicut presided over by the Zamorin. "Resolution VI. That the Conference views with indignation and sorrow the attempts made in various quarters by interested parties to ignore or minimise the crimes committed by the rebels such as

- a. Brutally dishonouring women ;
- b. Flaying people alive ;
- c. Wholesale slaughter of men, women, and children ;
- d. Burning alive entire families ;
- e. Forcibly converting people in thousands and slaying those who refused to get converted ;
- f. Throwing half-dead people into wells and leaving the victims for hours to struggle for escape till finally released from their sufferings by death.

(Two other items refer to looting and desecration of temples as described in the above memorial of the ladies).⁸³

4. Typical instances of horrible outrages on women were described in detail in the *New India* edited by Mrs. Annie Besant and the *Times of India*.⁸⁴ A sense of decency forbids us to reproduce them. Reference may be made to the brutal treatment of a respectable Nai'r lady at Melator and the way a large number of Hindu girls were outraged. Inquisitive readers would find these and other incidents in the Appendix of Sankaran Nair's book *Gandhi and Anarchy*. Sankaran Nair has referred to only "three narratives out of literally hundreds that might be selected from the English and vernacular papers."

5. Sankaran Nair points out that 'in addition to those mentioned in these articles two other forms of torture were credibly reported as having been resorted to in the case of men, namely, skinning alive, and making them dig their own graves before their slaughter.⁸⁵

The Congress leaders at first disbelieved the stories. Gandhi himself spoke of the "brave God-fearing Moplahs" who were "fighting for what they consider as religion, and in a manner which they consider as religious." Little wonder that Khilafat leaders passed resolutions of congratulations to the Moplahs on the brave fight they were conducting for the sake of religion. But when hundreds of Hindu refugees arriving at Calicut confirmed the most terrible stories of barbarous and fanatical cruelty, a wave of horror passed over those Hindus who were not blinded by Gandhi's new-fangled ideas of Hindu-Muslim unity at any cost. Local members of the Congress and Khilafat asked for, and obtained, permission to enter the disturbed area in order to pacify the Moplahs, but they speedily returned with frank admission that they could effect nothing. When truth could not be suppressed any longer, and came out with all its naked hideousness, Gandhi tried to conciliate Hindu opinion by various explanations, denials, and censure of the authorities which were crystallized in the following resolution passed by the Congress at Ahmadabad :

"The Congress expresses its firm conviction that the Moplah disturbance was not due to the Non-co-operation or the Khilafat Movement,^{85a} specially as the Non-co-operators and the Khilafat preachers were denied access to the affected parts by the District authorities for six months before the disturbance, but is due to causes wholly unconnected with the two movements, and that the outbreak would not have occurred had the message of non-violence been allowed to reach them. Nevertheless this Congress deplores the acts done by certain Moplahs by way of forcible conversions and destructions of life and property and is of opinion that the prolongation of the disturbance in Malabar could have been prevented by the Government of Madras accepting the proffered assistance of Moulana Yakub Hassan and

other Non-co-operators and allowing Mahatma Gandhi to proceed to Malabar, and is further of opinion that the treatment of Moplah prisoners as evidenced by the asphyxiation incident was an act of inhumanity unheard of in modern times and unworthy of a Government that calls itself civilised."

This resolution is unworthy of a great national organization, which launched the Non-co-operation movement as a protest against the Panjab atrocities. Its deliberate attempt to minimize the enormity of the crimes perpetrated by a band of fanatic Muslims upon thousands of helpless Hindus betrays a mentality which is comparable to that of the Government of India in the case of the Panjab atrocities in 1919, and must be strongly condemned by any impartial critic. It is interesting to compare the words—almost apologetic in tone—condemning the Moplahs with those which are used against the Government for the faults—severe though they are—of some officials. It is nothing short of ridiculous to maintain that the Moplahs would not have been guilty of inhuman cruelties towards their Hindu brothers only if the message of non-violence had been allowed to reach them. It is quite clear that they had heard of the Non-co-operation slogans and Khilafat cries, but we are to presume that the 'non-violence' part of it was carefully withheld from them. It is tacitly assumed that these fanatic Moplahs were more amenable to the cult of non-violence than hundreds of people—men of Chauri Chaura for example—who had broken into violence even though the message of non-violence was preached to them. Is it for this reason, one might ask, that while the excesses of the mob at Chauri Chaura induced Gandhi to suspend Civil Disobedience, the hundred times more heinous crimes of the Moplahs were not allowed to disturb his equanimity—they did not raise even a ripple on the placid

water of the Hindu-Muslim unity and Non-co-operation movement. The fact seems to be that Gandhi and his blind Hindu followers were prepared to go to any length in order to nurse the tender plant of Hindu-Muslim unity which had been grown by him, and had willy-nilly to be preserved at any cost during the campaign against the Government, as success was otherwise impossible. It is not necessary to imagine that Gandhi or his devoted Hindu followers were callous to the incredible sufferings that the Moplahs had inflicted upon the Hindus, but they perhaps thought that they had to swallow the bitter pill for the sake of the greater good of the country as a whole.

There is no doubt that it was a great tactical blunder on the part of the Government not to allow Gandhi to visit the land of the Moplahs. It might possibly have some good effect, and in any case could not have worsened the situation. But the refusal of such permission, six months before the outbreak, can hardly be regarded as a conducive factor, far less the cause of it. It will also be generally admitted that though the Moplah rebellion may or may not be the direct outcome of the Non-co-operation movement—available materials are, however, sufficient for presuming that it was—it is impossible to dissociate it altogether from the spirit of defiance engendered by the Khilafat movement at the very moment.

Mrs. Besant has definitely connected the Moplah rebellion with the Non-co-operation and Khilafat movements, and many other eminent men have expressed similar opinion. Even Muslim leaders indirectly supported this view. Thus Hasrat Mohani, in his Presidential speech at the annual session of the Muslim League, held at Ahmadabad on December 30, made the following observations about the atrocities of the Moplahs :

"The Moplahs justify their action on the ground that at such a critical juncture, when they are engaged in a war against the English, their neighbours (Hindus) not only do not help them or observe neutrality, but aid and assist the English in every way. They can, no doubt, contend that while they are fighting a defensive war for the sake of their religion and have left their houses, property and belongings and taken refuge in hills and jungles, it is unfair to characterise as plunder their commandeering of money, provisions and other necessities for their troops from the English or their supporters,"

In characterizing the Moplah action as a religious war against the British, Hasrat Mohani definitely regards it as a political movement which cannot be dissociated from the Khilafat agitation.

His justification of the atrocities of the Moplahs is not only puerile in the extreme, but directly contrary to facts. He ignores the patent fact that in the majority of cases, the almost wholesale looting of Hindu houses in portions of Ernad, Valluvanad and Ponnani *talucs* was perpetrated on the 21st, 22nd and 23rd of August before the military had arrived in the affected area, i. e. long before the Moplahs had betaken themselves to hills and jungles. It would be interesting to know whether Hasrat Mohani regarded the forcible mass conversion and inhuman outrages on Hindu women by the Moplahs also as dictated by military necessity?

The levity with which the Muslim and Congress leaders treated the Moplah outrage is nothing short of scandalous. The Moplah outrages far exceeded in enormity those perpetrated during the Martial Law in the Panjab. If the action of the British Cabinet and the Viceroy in condoning or ignoring those outrages was considered by Gandhi as *raison d'etre* of the N.C.O. campaign, what are we to think of the remissness of Gandhi and his followers in respect of instituting a proper inquiry and

taking proper steps to punish the delinquents in Malabar ? By their attitude towards the Moplah outrages Gandhi and the Congress forfeited their moral right to criticize the action of the British authorities in respect of the outrages in the Panjab. Gandhi's ejaculations about the "God-fearing Moplahs" and the congratulations showered on them by the Congress and Muslim leaders, remind one of O' Dwyer's telegraphic approval of Dyer's action. The saddest part of the whole episode is that the two great virtues which elevated Gandhi above every other politician, viz., an unflinching regard for truth and a high sense of morality and justice, he sacrificed at the altar of the Hindu-Muslim unity, which was, at the best, a pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp, and at the worst, a political expediency.

In view of the callous attitude of the Hindu leaders, the condoning of the conduct of the Moplahs by the Muslim leaders can scarcely be a matter of surprise. Reference has been made above to the views of Hasrat Mohani—the great 'national' champion of Indian independence and 'the intrepid Muslim patriot', as Muhammad Ali called him in his Presidential Address at the annual session of the Khilafat Conference at Ahmadabad. In the session of the Conference at Cocanada held in 1923, when all the woeful tales of barbarous outrages committed by the Moplahs were widely known all over the country, the other great national leader, Shaukat Ali, President of the session, moved a resolution for the provision of Moplah orphans and families. "Thousands of Moplahs", he said, "had been martyred (sic), but they owed a duty, both on religious and humanitarian grounds, to these brave Moplahs". While conceding that some Hindus had suffered at the hands of the Moplahs, he said the whole chapter was a closed book to them ; but they had a duty to the brave Moplahs. He announced that he and his brother

would each provide for the maintenance of one Moplah orphan. Member after member rose to narrate the sufferings that the Moplahs had endured in the hands of the Government, but there was no reference to the inhuman barbarities committed by them upon the Hindus. The Khilafat Conference adopted the resolution moved by Shaukat Ali, and funds were collected for the maintenance of the Moplah orphans. One looks in vain for a similar action on the part of Gandhi and the Congress leaders to help the victims of the Moplah outrage.

The Jamiat-ul-Ulema Conference, held at Cocanada on December 28, 1923, proceeded further still. It passed a resolution condemning the atrocities committed on the Moplahs and decided to raise a fitting memorial to perpetuate the memory of the Moplah martyrs ! 86

B. Satyagraha for Reforms in Religious Institutions.

The two notable incidents under this head were the *Satyagraha* movement at the temple of Tarakesvara in Bengal, and the Akali movement in the Panjab ending in the Nankana tragedy. Both the movements originated in an effort to remove the glaring abuses in the management of old religious institutions, with rich endowments, and received their inspiration from the political movement launched by Gandhi.

The *de facto* proprietor of the temple at Tarakesvara was the *Mohant* or the resident abbott. Though supposed to lead the life of an ascetic and religious teacher, persons holding the post were known to be of vicious character and lax morality. Serious allegations were made against Satis Giri who was the *Mohant* in 1924. C. R. Das, the leader of the Swarajya Party, first attempted to negotiate a settlement with him, but it proved unsuccessful. So Das launched a *Satyagraha* movement in 1924 for taking peaceful possession of the temple. But as soon as the volunteers

began to move towards the temple, the Police appeared on the scene. "The usual Satyagraha scenes were re-enacted at Tarakeswar—peaceful volunteers moving up from one side and the Police attacking them mercilessly on the other and occasionally making arrests." The movement became very popular all over Bengal and the *Satyagraha* campaign went on for several months. Ultimately the *Mohant* was forced to come to a compromise with Das and an agreement was drawn up whereby the temple and the major portion of the property attached to it was to be placed under the administration of a public committee. It involved the creation of a Trust approved by the High Court. But at this stage a third party raised some objections, and while the matter was under consideration Das suddenly died, and the *Mohant* nullified the agreement. Thus the whole thing ended in a lamentable failure.⁸⁷

Far greater interest attaches to the Sikh movement on the same line which commenced at an earlier date and undoubtedly inspired the movement against the *Mohant* of Tarakesvara. The Sikh League, inaugurated in 1919 with the avowed object of safeguarding the political and religious interests of the Sikh people, turned its attention to the mismanagement of the Golden temple at Amritsar. Under the influence of the prevailing spirit of Non-co-operation, resolutions were passed at a Sikh Conference in 1920, demanding control by the Sikhs themselves of their religious and educational institutions without interference of any kind from the Government. As a result of their efforts the Sikhs secured full control over the Golden Temple and the Khalsa College. Encouraged by this success a Committee, called the 'Gurudwara Prabandhak' or the Reformed Sikh Committee was formed in November, 1920, to undertake the management of all Sikh Gurudwaras and other religious institutions. The Sikh shrines, many

of which enjoyed considerable revenues, were hitherto under the *Mohants*, or resident abbots. These were generally of licentious character, and were accused of malversation and abuses of every kind. As a result of the agitation some shrines voluntarily surrendered their control to the reforming party, and a few were occupied by force, leading to fracas. The reformers now planned to take possession of the Nankana Gurudwara, the wealthiest of the Sikh shrines, with an income of several lakhs of Rupees. They proposed to hold a grand *Diwan* or session of the Khalsa at Nankana Sahib to inquire into the administration of the shrine.

The body of Puritan Sikhs, known as the Akalis, formed the vanguard of the reforming party. They used to form *jathas* or companies which travelled from shrine to shrine in their work of reformation. On February 23, an Akali *jatha* appeared at Nankana Sahib, but was refused admission inside. A second company of 150 appeared and quietly entered the temple. The doors of the temple were shut after they had entered, but when the doors were opened again, there was no trace of the *jatha*.

The chief *Mohant* of Nankana, Narain Das, had engaged a body of five hundred hooligans and Pathans, and as soon as the *jatha* had entered, the doors were closed and the Akalis were attacked with rifles, revolvers, and other missiles. All the Akalis were killed and their dead bodies were burnt with wood and kerosene oil. Evidently their bodies were cut to pieces, for traces of different parts of the bodies, chopped off into bits, were found in the burnt heaps.

This grim tragedy stirred the whole country and eventually the management of the shrine was made over to the Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee. After a protracted trial, the *Mohant* and seven others were sentenced to death.

C. The Assam Coolie Exodus and the Chandpur outrage.

Early in May, 1921, there was a stampede of labourers from tea plantations in Assam. The lot of these coolies has always been very miserable, as mentioned above,⁸⁸ and owing to a slump in tea trade there were great reductions and wholesale dismissals in some gardens managed by Europeans. There was also probably the indirect influence of the Non-co-operation movement which generated a belief in the minds of the coolies that Gandhi was a divine incarnation and *charka* was the remedy of all the evils they were suffering from. In any case, about 12,000 men and women left the garden and walked towards their distant homes with the cry of *Gandhi Maharaj ki jai* on their lips. A large number of them reached Chandpur and was halted there as they had to cross the mighty river Padma in order to proceed to their destination. At first Mr. Sinha, the Sub-Divisional Officer (S. D. O.), spent some money to facilitate their transportation, but this was stopped by the Bengal Government, presumably under the influence of the tea-planters. Mr. Macpherson, a representative of the European Tea Association of Assam, came to Chandpur and, with the help of the S. D. O., tried to induce the coolies to return to the gardens. This alarmed the coolies who rushed towards a steamer lying by at the *ghat*. The S. D. O. ordered the gangway between the steamer and the receiving flat to be removed and several coolies were reported to have fallen into the river. The coolies were then driven to the Railway station. In course of the melee the S. D. O. is alleged to have been struck by some coolies. Thereupon the Divisional Commissioner, Mr. K. C. De, who was at Chandpur, wired for a batch of armed Gurkhas from Narayangunj. Next night, at about 10-30 P. M., when the coolies were peacefully resting at the Railway shed, they were asked to remove

themselves immediately, but some of them refused or delayed. Thereupon the Gurkhas fell upon these coolies—men, women and children—and by kicks, and beating with sticks and butt-ends of their guns forced them to leave the Railway station and take refuge in an open ground even though it was raining. Mr. C. F. Andrews, who visited the place next day, has given a heart-rending account of the persecuted and oppressed refugees—poor, feeble, and emaciated women, with their babies, dragging wearily along by the hand their little children, who were quite unable to move quickly, while all the time the Gurkha soldiers kept beating them with the butt-ends of their rifles in order to force them to move faster. For the next few days there was a complete *hartal* in the town and the local leaders fed and looked after nearly 4,000 stranded coolies. From this time the Non-co-operation leaders were at work. There was a Railway strike followed by a Steamer strike organized by C. R. Das and J. M. Sen Gupta. The strike began on May 24 and lasted till the middle of September. For more than three months the whole land and water traffic route to Chittagong Division was in complete deadlock. Even C. R. Das had to risk the crossing of the Padma river by a country boat when he went to Chandpur to organize the strike. Sir Henry Wheeler, a member of the Executive Council, inquired into the matter and submitted a long report, justifying the action of the officials.⁸⁹

A non-official Inquiry Committee was appointed by the Tippera Congress Committee with J. M. Sen Gupta as Chairman. The report of the Committee fully endorses the story of brutal assault as given above. Wheeler held that the injuries were inflicted on a small number of coolies and these were of very minor nature, and not at all serious. He also denied that the bayonets were used. According to the non-official Committee the

evidence of the station staff who were present at the time of the occurrence prove that "injuries were inflicted with *lathis*, butt-ends of guns and bayonets", the number of injured coolies was very large, and many of them received very serious injuries. According to the non-official Committee the assault was serious and a premeditated one. Mr. K. C. De, the Commissioner, admitted that the assault was begun almost immediately after the Gurkhas had arrived, and there was hardly any interval between the moment when the coolies were asked to clear and the moment when the beating actually began.⁹⁰

D. The Nagpur Flag Satyagraha

On 1 May, 1923, the police authorities at Nagpur objected to a procession carrying the National Flag, and promulgated section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code to prohibit it. The volunteers disobeyed the order and were arrested and sentenced. The Movement received the blessings of both the Working Committee and the A.I.C.C. It soon developed into an All-India Movement and volunteers poured in from different parts of India. It was guided and inspired by the two Patel Brothers—Vitthalbhai and Vallabhbhai—, and Seth Jamnalal Bajaj was also arrested in connection with it. The Government demanded that the processionists should apply for permission, but the Congress claimed the right to proceed along any public road without let or hindrance. A big procession was taken out on the 18th March and it was intended to be a trial of strength between the Government and the volunteers. But, curiously enough, the procession was allowed to pass. The Government gave out that the Congress had asked for permission, but the Congress contended that it never did so.⁹¹

E. Bardoli No-Tax Satyagraha (1928).

In order to complete the picture we may mention

here a remarkable case of *Satyagraha*, though it took place somewhat later, in 1928. Reference has been made above to Gandhi's decision to launch a mass Civil Disobedience movement in the *tahsil* or *taluk* of Bardoli in 1922, and his sudden abandonment of the project in view of the tragic happenings at Chauri Chaura. In 1928 Bardoli launched the no-tax campaign which constitutes a landmark in the history of *Satyagraha* movement in India. It arose out of the periodical revision of assessment of the land revenue in Bombay after every thirty years. As a result of this revision the revenue of two neighbouring *taluks* of Bardoli and Chorasi was raised by 30 per cent. and later, as a result of protest, reduced to 22 per cent. But the peasants regarded even this increase as too high and demanded an open inquiry which was refused. After much deliberation the peasants proposed to withhold payment of revenue in case the Government stuck to its decision. Gandhi studied the situation and blessed the struggle, which was carried on under the leadership of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.

Patel organized the *taluk* by setting up about twenty camps in convenient centres placed in charge of 250 volunteers. On February 12, 1928, a representative conference resolved that the revision settlement was arbitrary, unjust, and oppressive, and called upon all landholders to refuse payment of revenue until the Government accepted it at the old rate or appointed an impartial tribunal to settle the whole question of revision by investigation and inquiry on the spot.

Men, women and children attended the meetings called by the Sardar, and took pledge to remain non-violent, to suffer to the utmost, and cheerfully lose everything they possessed. A new spirit pervaded the whole *taluk* which was almost converted into a military

camp, where fighting, sacrifice, and defiance were on the lips of everyone.

"The Government tried its best to compel payment. It tried flattery, bribery, threats, fines, imprisonment, forfeiture, and *lathi*, charges. It attempted to divide the communities. Property on a large scale was attached and sold for a song to outsiders, as no local buyer came forward. They attached about 1400 acres of land and sold it by auction. Pathans were employed to threaten people and create an atmosphere of fear. But all this only infused more solidarity in the *taluk*. A strong social boycott was imposed on all Government representatives and against those who bought the attached property. But physical necessities were never denied even to the opponents.

"The whole of India sympathised with the struggle, and looked with admiration on the heroes of Bardoli. Women, no less than men, took part in the struggle. Several members of the Legislature resigned as a protest against the repressive policy of the Government. The matter was also discussed in the Parliament. The peasants stood firm and non-violent. After five and a half months' struggle, the Government yielded and the Governor appointed a Committee of Inquiry. All property that had been attached was restored, and village officers who had resigned were reinstated. The Committee found that the complaints of the peasants were substantially true and instead of 22 per cent. they recommended only 6 per cent. increment."⁹²

IX. NON-CO-OPERATION AFTER GANDHI'S ARREST

1. Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee

The general situation, as it developed after the arrest of Gandhi, was reviewed by the All-India Congress Committee at Lakhnau on June 7-9, 1921. The Committee noted that in spite of the suspension of all aggressive

activities by the Congress Committees, repression in a severe form was resorted to by the Government in several parts of the country, and that in consequence of this there was a widespread feeling that the country should be advised to resort to some form of Civil Disobedience to compel the Government to abandon their present policy and to concede the triple demand of the Congress. The Committee postponed the consideration of this question till the next meeting to be held in Calcutta on August 15, and requested the President to nominate a few gentlemen to tour round the country in the meantime and report on the situation to the next meeting. This is the genesis of the "Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee" to whose Report frequent references have been made above. The Committee, as finally constituted, consisted of Pandit Motilal Mehru, C. Rajagopalachari, M. A. Ansari, V. J. Patel and Kasturiranga Aiyangar. Hakim Ajmal Khan, the Acting President of the Congress, was the ex-officio Chairman of the Committee.

The Committee made an extensive tour almost all over India in order to study the political situation. They issued a questionnaire and received written replies from 459 witnesses, of whom 366 were also orally examined. The Report of the Committee was submitted in October, 1922.

The Committee made a general review of the success and failure of the Non-co-operation movement, item by item, and their findings have been referred to in the preceding sections. As noted above, the Committee found a lack of faith in, and enthusiasm for, the constructive programme of the Congress on the part of a large number of workers. At the same time the Committee held that the country was 'not prepared at present to embark upon general Mass Civil Disobedience.' They, however, recommended that the Provincial Committees be

authorized to sanction limited Mass Civil Disobedience as contemplated by the All-India Congress Committee in its meeting at Delhi on November 5, 1921.^{92a} But it is clear from the whole Report, that although this was the specific question which led to the appointment of the Committee, it had ceased to be of any practical importance, and the most engrossing topic which agitated the Congress leaders was the question of entry into the Legislative Councils.

2. The Council Entry

It appears that as soon as the militant phase of the Non-co-operation movement was suddenly brought to an end in February, 1922, and the first outburst of rage, resentment and protest at the unexpected action of Gandhi had passed away, the leaders set their heads together to devise the programme of work for the future. They knew full well that the country had no great enthusiasm for the constructive programme chalked out as a substitute, and the arrest of Gandhi left no hope for the revival of the fighting programme in its old form. Some of them therefore hit upon the idea of carrying on the fight inside the legislatures set up by the Government of India Act, 1919. Of course it would mean going back upon the Congress resolution carried after a keenly contested fight in the Calcutta session of September, 1920, and almost unanimously passed in the Nagpur Session at the end of the year. The Congressmen therefore at first felt some hesitation in giving public expression to this view, as it would tacitly imply a confession of defeat in respect of an important item of the programme. But gradually, the idea developed and assumed a new form which might, in the opinion of some, be made to fit in with the basic idea of Non-co-operation. Still the majority were in a hesitant mood, and it is significant that this all-

important question was not specifically referred to the Enquiry Committee, though it looms large in their Report and may be said to be its chief topic for discussion.

There is no doubt that the idea was agitating the Congress leaders long before the Enquiry Committee was appointed at the beginning of June in 1922. Subhas Chandra Bose tells us that the idea struck C. R. Das shortly after the Bardoli resolution, even when he was in the Alipore Central Jail, and he elaborated to his co-workers, then in prison along with him, his plan of non-co-operation within the legislatures. The idea was opposed by many and "discussions regarding this new plan were carried on vigorously from day to day in the Alipore Central Jail." "As these discussions went on for some weeks, two parties crystallized among the political prisoners in the Alipore Jail and they proved to be the nuclei of the future 'Swaraj' and 'No-change' parties." Perhaps the first hint of this new policy was given to the public in the Address of Srimati Basanti Das, wife of C. R. Das, in her Presidential Address at the Bengal Provincial Conference held at Chittagong in May, 1922. "She stated that the Congress might have to consider a change in tactics and suggested, among other things, that the policy of non-co-operation within the legislature was worth considering." As Subhas Bose pointed out, "it was not difficult to guess who had inspired her speech, and taking it as a feeler sent out by her husband, a storm of controversy was at once let loose all over the country."⁹³

The Enquiry Committee examined a large number of witnesses, and an overwhelming majority were against any change in the Congress programme of boycott of Councils. It is evident, however, that many of them did not grasp the full significance of the new idea of

wrecking the Reforms from within, as it was gradually developed. But although a very strong majority deprecated the idea of Council entry, the members of the Committee were equally divided. Three of them, M. A. Ansari, C. Rajagopalachari, and S. Kasturiranga Aiyangar were against, while the other three, Ajmal Khan, Motilal Nehru, and V. J. Patel, were in favour of it. Each group put its views separately in the form of minutes, and the elaborate arguments and counter-arguments cover nearly fifty printed pages, comprising about two-fifths of the whole Report. The main arguments, advanced by each may be summarised as follows. Those who were against Council-entry urged :

1. The proposal involves a distinct violation of the principle of Non-co-operation and a clear departure from the policy of the Congress.

2. It will mean an admission of the failure of Non-co-operation, for even the particular form of Non-co-operation in the Councils, which the other group proposes, was discussed and rejected by the Congress in the Special session held at Calcutta.

3. That the country is definitely against the view, is proved by the evidence given before the Committee, for the Council-entry, as proposed by the other group, is supported only by a negligible number of Congressmen. Although there is a strong section in favour of entering the Councils, they are against total obstruction, but would rather follow a policy of responsive co-operation.

4. A campaign of entry into Councils would mean a diversion of the public attention and energy from the constructive programme and would have the certain effect of relegating it to the cold shade of neglect.

5. It is absolutely impossible to secure a majority in the Councils sufficient to create deadlocks in the manner contemplated.

6. As a large number of Non-co-operators, including the most eminent leaders, are disqualified from membership of the Council by reason of sentences of imprisonment for over six months passed against them, it will be inconsistent with self-respect and dignity for other Non-co-operators to think of entering into the Councils. Babu Rajendra Prasad voiced the public opinion, when he said : "It would be cowardice to go and I use the word for want of a stronger term."

7. As Mahatma Gandhi pointed out in 1920, in the Calcutta session of the Congress, it was not a good and honest policy to enter into an institution in order to wreck it. Besides, indiscriminate obstruction will be a manifest violation of the oath of allegiance which every member has to take before accepting a seat in the Council.

8. Mahatma Gandhi was opposed to Council Entry on grounds which still hold good.

9. The chances are remote for obtaining such a majority at the elections as is one of the essential conditions of the success of the scheme.

10. Even if there be such a majority the Government will not be brought to its knees through the Councils deadlock, for Government have many weapons like veto.

The arguments put forward by the groups favouring Council-entry may be summed up as follows :

1. Political tactics are never immutable. They must change with the change of conditions. As Mahatma Gandhi had expressed it, when he defended himself for suspending Non-co-operation, "consistency is a desirable quality, but it becomes a 'hobgoblin', when it refuses to see facts." Gandhi's whole political career illustrates this. He adopted *Satyagraha* in March 1919, abandoned it after the disturbances in April, at the Amritsar Congress pleaded for co-operation ; —"from one pole to the other, all in the brief space of eight months." After another

three months he began a march back from co-operation. Six months later, Non-co-operation became the accepted creed of the Congress ; after a year's working it was extended by the All-India Congress Committee to include Civil Disobedience. Though, as Mahatma Gandhi himself declared, the two movements were radically different in character, the change was effected without any authorisation by the Congress. The Ahmadabad Congress put its seal of approval on this change and laid down that "Civil Disobedience is the only civilised and effective substitute for armed rebellion." The country was asked to suspend all other activities and concentrate on Civil Disobedience. Then at Bardoli, the Working Committee, under the advice of Mahatma Gandhi, asked the country to suspend all aggressive activities and concentrate on the constructive programme. In view of these sweeping changes, suited to the altered circumstances, one need not attach much importance to arguments Nos. 1, 2, and 8.

2. We have failed to bring about such a complete boycott of the Councils as was contemplated by Mahatma Gandhi. The Nationalists being out of the way, it was a walk-over for the Moderates, and they took full advantage of the opportunity to fill the Councils. Mahatmaji hoped that the Moderates would resign as an overwhelming majority abstained from the polls. But in spite of a resolution to this effect in the Nagpur Congress and numerous meetings, and even special Conferences, the Moderates clung to their seats. The keeping of the Council chamber empty, which was the real object in view, was not only not achieved, but was virtually defeated by the entry of the very persons who ought not to have been there. We made the co-operation of others easy. To repeat it will be suicidal. For assuming that the Council cannot do any good, it cannot be denied that it can and is doing immense harm.

3. As to the item 7 above, the objections do not apply to merely contesting the elections and effectually preventing the co-operators from coming in. This question may be considered apart from the policy to be adopted after election. If we do not contest, we shall be out again for three years, in course of which many repressive measures affecting the daily life of the people will be enacted with the help of the so-called representatives of the people. Under these circumstances, it is a question for consideration how far the hold of the Congress over the masses can remain unaffected.

4. The policy of abstention seems to have lost its charm and it is not at all unlikely that a greater percentage of voters will poll at the ensuing elections, thus rendering nugatory the success of the Non-co-operation in 1920.

5. The oath of allegiance to the sovereign of England is not incompatible with Congress creed, so long as we do not definitely lay down "independence" as the goal of the Congress. A Non-co-operator, who secures his election to the Council with a distinct mandate from his constituency to obstruct the proceedings at every step, does not act improperly if he enters the Council with the avowed object of paralyzing it after giving an undertaking in the form, "I will faithfully discharge the duty upon which I am about to enter." For he can faithfully discharge the duty only by acting strictly in accordance with the mandate.

6. The proposed entry into Councils involves a change in the programme and should therefore obtain the sanction of the Congress. But it is not inconsistent with the principles of Non-co-operation. As a matter of fact it was not included in the original programme of Non-co-operation, and was not considered as an essential feature of it at the beginning.

7. The argument No. 6 would be valid if we intended

to co-operate with the Government ; rather it furnishes the strongest reason for our recommendation. We have silently watched the incarceration of our leaders and thousands of workers. An opportunity now presents itself to vindicate our national self-respect. We can carry the fight into the camp of the Government and tell them plainly that so long as our men are in jail, and other wrongs are not redressed, we refuse to co-operate with you. This would be the only dignified reply to terrorism and repression of the Government.

8. As regards objections Nos. 5 and 9, the evidence adduced before us strongly supports the belief that we shall be in a very substantial majority in all the Provinces if the Congress and Khilafat declare in favour of entering into the Councils.

9. The objection No. 10 ignores the elementary fact that there can be no greater paralysis of the system than Government by veto.

10. We are not only not making any progress in respect of constructive programme, but we are actually going backwards. But even if the constructive programme be pushed in right earnest, a substantial success, such as would win 'Swaraj', would take a long time to come, and in the meantime 'the nation will have gone completely under.' Realizing this, the Ahmadabad Congress advised a resort to Civil Disobedience. That has failed ; nor is the country now prepared to embark upon general Mass Civil Disobedience. There is thus a stalemate. We must therefore have something else as nearly approaching Civil Disobedience as possible. While there is a general desire for that 'something' among those who are against entering into the Councils, no definite and workable suggestion has been made by any of them.

The publication of the Report of the Enquiry Committee in October, 1922, was followed by an acri-

monious discussion all over the country between the orthodox section of the Congress and those who favoured the entry into Councils. C. R. Das put his whole weight on the side of the latter and, with Pandit Motilal Nehru, became the recognized leaders of the new movement. The whole question was discussed at length in the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee, held in Calcutta on November 20-24, 1922. "At the end of five days' analysis, criticism, invective and diatribe, the Committee resolved that the country was not prepared for Mass Disobedience", but it authorised P. C. C's to sanction limited Civil Disobedience. The harder question of Council-entry was held over for decision at the next session of the Congress.⁹⁴

The annual session of the Congress was held in Gaya in a tense atmosphere (December 26, 1922). C. R. Das, in his Presidential Address, made a vigorous plea for Council-entry. "These Councils must," he said, "be either mended or ended. Hitherto we have been boycotting the Councils from outside. We have succeeded in doing much—the prestige of the Councils is diminished, and the country knows that the people who adorn those chambers are not the true representatives of the people. But though we have succeeded in doing much, these Councils are still there. It should be the duty of the Congress to boycott the Councils more effectively from within. Reformed Councils are really a mask which the Bureaucracy has put on. I conceive it to be our clear duty to tear this mask from off their face. The very idea of boycott implies, to my mind, something more than mere withdrawal. The boycott of foreign goods means that such steps must be taken that there may be no foreign goods in our markets. The boycott of the Reformed Councils, to my mind, means that such steps must be taken that these Councils may not be there to impede the progress

of *Swaraj*. The only successful boycott of these Councils is either to mend them in a manner suitable to the attainment of *Swaraj* or to end them completely. That is the way in which I advise the nation to boycott the Councils." Das then elaborated his views, answering the arguments against Council-entry. These more or less followed the line of discussion in the Report of the Enquiry Committee mentioned above. He emphasized the twofold aspects of the Non-co-operation movement. One was destructive and the other constructive, complementing each other and always going hand in hand ;— such as the boycott of schools and colleges on the one hand and establishment of national schools and colleges on the other ; the boycott of foreign goods and the spinning wheel and the looms on the other. "Judged by this principle," asked he, "what is wrong about the desire either to convert the Councils into institutions which may lead us to *Swaraj*, or to destroy them altogether ? The same twofold aspects of creation and destruction are to be found in the boycott of Councils in the way I want them to be boycotted."

The question was hotly debated both in the Subjects Committee and in the open session of the Congress. Rajagopalachari moved the resolution against Council-entry to which there were several amendments in the Subjects Committee. There were two different sections among the supporters of the Council-entry. Both agreed to contest the election, but while one held that the elected members should refuse to take the seats, the other wished to leave the question open to be decided by the next Congress. The first view was sponsored by Srinivasa Aiyangar, and the second by Motilal Nehru. After all the motions were moved, Madan Mohan Malaviya made a brilliant address lasting for an hour. He considered that the best way of proceeding forward was to enter

the Councils solidly and using that weapon to break the citadel of Bureaucracy.

Srinivasa Aiyangar's motion of contesting elections but not entering Councils was first put to vote but was lost, 107 voting for, and 139 against it. Rajagopalachari's motion that all voters shall abstain from standing as candidates for the Council and from voting for any such candidate was pressed to a division. It was carried by 203 votes against 87. In the open session of the Congress the resolution of Aiyangar was defeated by 1740 votes against 894 votes and Rajagopalachari's motion was carried by a large majority.

To complete the no-change programme, the Congress passed resolutions maintaining the boycott of Government and Government-aided and affiliated educational institutions, as well as the boycott of law-courts by lawyers and litigants. More important still was the following resolution : "The Congress calls upon all Congress-workers to complete the preparations for offering Civil Disobedience by strengthening and expanding the national organisations and to take immediate steps for the collection of at least Rs 25 lakhs for the Tilak Swarajya Fund and the enrolment of at least 50,000 volunteers satisfying the condition of Ahmadabad pledge by a date to be fixed by the All-India Congress Committee at Gaya"

The success of the orthodox or no-changer party seemed to be complete and there was a great jubilation in the Congress camp. But it was shortlived. For it was soon apparent that the Swarajya party would not take the defeat lying down but was determined to continue the fight.

3. Split in the Congress

The Congress concluded its session at Gaya on December 31, 1922, and the All-India Congress Committee met

next day, January 1, 1923. Before the business commenced, C. R. Das announced his resignation of the office of Congress President, and made a statement in explanation or justification of his action. The proceedings of the Congress, said he, convinced him "that there are at least two schools of thought with fundamental differences. I cannot accept and cannot associate myself with most of the resolutions passed in the last session of the Congress... I must therefore work with those who believe in my programme." He therefore considered it to be his duty to resign the Presidentship. But, he added, "I am not leaving the Congress in the conviction that I shall be able to convert the minority into majority at no distant date."

Shortly after this the pro-Councillors issued a manifesto forming and constituting themselves into a party within the Congress, called the Congress Khilafat Swaraj Party. It accepted the creed of the Congress, namely the attainment of *Swaraj* by all legitimate and peaceful means, and also the principle of non-violent Non-co-operation. C. R. Das was elected the leader, and Motilal Nehru, with three others, as Secretaries. The manifesto announcing the formation of the party was assented to by more than 100 persons including, among others, Hakim Ajmal Khan, V. J. Patel, N. C. Kelkar, Satyamurti and Jayakar.

The open defection of so many eminent leaders, including two stalwarts like Das and Nehru, marred the jubilation of the orthodox party over their triumph, for all reasonable men could foresee a split in the Congress camp. It was not long before this fear was realized. What was worse, the fight degenerated into an ignoble squabble. The gulf between the two parties, already wide enough, was further widened by intemperate and irresponsible utterances of the press. "Mutual recrimination

became the order of the day and motives concocted in editorial conclaves were gratuitously fathered upon the leaders." The bitterness engendered by the party quarrels filtered down to all sections of the people. The result was that very little was done to carry into effect the constructive programme adopted by the Congress. The orthodox party only agreed in opposing the Council-entry, but were sharply divided in their opinions. Some of them aimed at mass civil disobedience through constructive programme, while others preferred the *khaddar* and national education programme for its own sake. "It was soon found that party quarrels were much better employment for the leaders than an active effort to carry out the Congress resolutions."

In spite of the party squabbles, the leaders of the Swaraj Party showed great activity in organizing their newly formed party. They conducted a vigorous propaganda all over the country,—Nehru in Upper India, Patel in Bombay, and Das in Bengal, C. P. and South India. After this preliminary propagandas all over India they summoned a conference at Allahabad in March, 1923, and drew up the constitution of the Party and the plan of its campaign. The conference was followed by another series of propaganda tours by the leaders. Das stormed the citadel of orthodoxy in Madras, and his success there, while aggravating the bitterness between the two sections of the Congress, had its repercussions in other parts of the country. The success of the Swaraj Party spurred the orthodox party into activity, but they were seriously handicapped by the series of communal riots to which reference will be made later. .

Early in February, 1923, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad made an attempt to bring about a compromise between the two sections of the Congress, and, after repeated failures, succeeded in making them agree to a truce till

April 30. The Council propaganda was to be suspended on both sides during the period, and both parties would be at liberty to work out the remaining items of their respective programmes. The compromise did not satisfy the extremists on either side, and at the end of the period each party accused the other of violating the terms of the compromise.

There was no doubt, however, that due to the propaganda of the Swarajists or other causes, the no-changers were gradually losing their hold over the country. Although the Working Committee consisted entirely of no-changers, the All-India Congress Committee passed a resolution in Bombay, in May 1923, that no propaganda be carried on amongst voters relating to the boycott of Councils. This raked up the bitter controversy of the earlier part of the year, and six prominent members of the Working Committee, including Rajendra Prasad and Rajagopalachari, tendered resignation. The new members of the Working Committee, who took their place, did not belong definitely to either of the two parties. They represented a fairly large body of non-partisan congressmen who were seriously perturbed by the rivalry between the two warring sections within the Congress and tried to remove it by some sort of compromise. This party was able to assert itself at the meeting of the AICC at Nagpur. The AICC decided to suspend the operation of the Congress resolution boycotting the Councils and hold a Special session of the Congress to discuss the issue.

4. Rise of the Swaraj Party within the Congress.

The Special session of the Congress was held at Delhi on September 15, 1923. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who presided, advocated the policy of the Council-entry. But the real hero of the meeting was Muhammad Ali, who, after his two years in jail, was released on

August 29, 1923. He was the most popular leader next to Gandhi, and all the parties looked towards him for support. An orthodox Non-co-operator though he was, he realized the growing strength of the Swaraj Party led by Das and Nehru, and felt that the only statesmanlike policy was to permit the Swarajists to follow their own course to wreck the Councils without any hindrance from the Congress. It was a great diplomatic manoeuvre on his part to announce in the Congress that he had received a wireless message from Yeravda (the great prison where Gandhi was confined) in favour of lifting the ban on Council-entry. This had undoubtedly a great effect upon the audience, though it would perhaps be too much to assert that it alone decided the issue. Both the groups had mustered strong in the Congress meeting and indications were not wanting that the chances were in favour of the Swarajists. In any case a compromise resolution was adopted without any difficulty. It was worded as follows :

“While reaffirming its adherence to the principle of Non-co-operation this Congress declares that such Congressmen as have no religious or other conscientious objections against entering the legislatures are at liberty to stand as candidates and to exercise the right of voting at the forthcoming elections, and this Congress therefore suspends all propaganda against entering Councils. The Congress at the same time calls upon all Congressmen to double their efforts to carry out the constructive programme of their great leader, Mahatma Gandhi, and by united endeavour to achieve *Swaraj* at the earliest possible moment.”

It may be added, by way of anticipating events, that this resolution was reaffirmed at the regular annual session of the Congress held at Cocanada in December, 1923, though by that time the elections were over. The reversal of the Gaya resolution at Delhi reflects

great credit upon the leadership of Das and Motilal Nehru and great tribute must be paid to the energy and tenacity with which they carried on what appeared to many at the time to be a hopeless campaign. The action of Das, Nehru and their followers offers a striking contrast to that of the Moderates who seceded from the Congress on less vital issues and on less justifiable grounds.

Mahammad Ali's reference to the wireless message from Mahatma Gandhi roused a great deal of controversy, particularly after Srinivasa Sastri had announced that he had it from Gandhi himself that no such message was sent. Muhammad Ali, being accused of playing a hoax upon the no-changers and even of having deceived them, made a long statement to justify himself. It seems that Muhammad Ali told Devadas Gandhi, the son of the Mahatma, that the great leader being in prison and unable to address the nation in favour of his views, for this reason, if for no other, there should not be any change in the Council-entry programme. Devadas reported this to the Mahatma when he interviewed him later in jail. The Mahatma said that he was still in favour of continuing the triple boycott, but added that if, in the changed circumstances of the country, Muhammad Ali was himself convinced that a change of any sort was necessary, he was to follow his own convictions and must not permit any loyalty to him (Gandhi) to weigh with his decision.

After Devadas reported this to Muhammad Ali, the latter was confirmed in his interpretation of Mahatmaji's message by an article contributed by Mahadev Desai in the *Young India*. Muhammad Ali added: "Subsequently when I moved in the Subjects Committee the resolution for the removal of the ban on Council-entry, I repeated almost word for word what I heard from Devadasji."⁹⁵

Even making due allowance for all the facts and

circumstances, Muhammad Ali's explanation does not appear to be quite satisfactory. In particular it is difficult to follow him when he says: "I certainly do not know of anyone who voted for my motion or abstained from voting against it because he understood that Mahatma Gandhi had sent a message asking the people to do so." What other consequence could possibly follow from his words, it is not easy to imagine.

After the ban on Council-entry was lifted by the Delhi Congress the real importance of the Non-co-operation movement centred round the Swaraj Party whose history will be discussed in the next Chapter. In the meanwhile we may trace the activities of the other section of the Congress who was against Council-entry and pinned its faith in the constructive programme. The activity of this section revived with the release of Gandhi early in 1924. Gandhi presided over the Belgaum Congress in 1924, and brought about a final reconciliation between his followers and the Swarajists. But he laid emphasis on the boycott of foreign goods, specially cloths traffic, based, as it was, on the ruins of India's millions. As an 'ancillary' to this he stressed the necessity of promoting hand-spinning and hand-weaving. He had no animus, he said, against the Swarajists and was ready to cling to them as a child clings to the mother. There was a frank and complete understanding between the two. The Swarajists agreed to his constructive programme and he agreed to their work in the Councils.

But Gandhi kept himself severely aloof from any active political work. He devoted his whole energy to the constructive programme. In addition to spinning, Gandhi directed his main attention to the uplift of Harijans (untouchables) and promotion of Hindu-Muslim unity. His sincere efforts and personal example removed the thousand-year-old inertia of the Hindu society, and

a genuine movement to improve the condition of the lower classes and abolish untouchability stirred the whole country. No other single man had ever done so much to wash off this black stain from the Hindu Community, and the movement made remarkable progress.

In one respect, however, the constructive programme completely broke down. This was the Hindu-Muslim Unity which, along with the spinning and removal of untouchability, formed the three main planks of the constructive programme. The old feud between the two communities appeared again with renewed vigour, after the brief interlude of Non-co-operation-cum-Khilafat movement. Indeed the suspension of Non-co-operation movement almost immediately broke open the dam which had stopped the flow of communal passions, and they now swept in torrents the whole country for the next quarter of a century. This will be described in another Chapter.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL EVENTS (1921—1928)

1. REFORMS AT WORK

The new constitution was brought into operation in January-February, 1921. The Duke of Connaught, a son of Queen Victoria, was sent from Britain to inaugurate the Reforms. In accordance with the Congress resolution at Nagpur, his visit was boycotted by the people and placards were posted on the roadside carrying such words as "Boycott Connaught", "Remember Jallianwala," etc. On 9 February, while inaugurating the two imperial legislatures the Duke made a passionate appeal in the following words : "I have felt around me bitterness and estrangement between those who have been and should be friends. The shadow of Amritsar has lengthened over the fair face of India.....No one can deplore those events more intensely than I do myself.....I appeal to you all, British and Indians, to bury along with the dead past the mistakes and misunderstandings of the past, to forgive where you have to forgive, and to join hands and to work together to realise the hopes that arise from today." Such an appeal was bound to fail and had not the least effect on the Indians.

The new Reforms could not be wrecked by the Non-co-operation movement, for the Moderates who were elected did not resign their seats on account of the smallness of the number of voters, as Gandhi hoped.¹ The Non-co-operators were, however, right in their assessment of the real value of the Reforms. For it did not

take the Moderates long to realize that neither the popular Ministry nor the Legislature with elected majority could exercise any effective authority in the administration of the country. Even after less than a year's experience, the new organization of the Moderates, the Liberal Party, in their annual conference described the Reforms as unsatisfactory and asked for full autonomy in the Provinces and popular control over the Central Government in all subjects except defence, foreign affairs, relations with Indian States, and ecclesiastical affair, at the end of two years. They also reiterated the view that India would not be satisfied unless adequate punishments were meted out to the Panjab delinquents. In these and other matters, such as the redress of Muslim grievances, condemnation of the repressive policy of the Government, etc., there was hardly any perceptible difference between the Moderates and the Non-co-operators.

Hemmed in between a hostile public and unsympathetic and unresponsive Government, the Liberal leaders would have found it hard enough to execute the task entrusted to them, namely to sow the seed of Responsible Government on Indian soil and nurse the tender plant, when grown, into maturity. But their task was made harder by the undisguised hostility of the Bureaucracy in India and the die-hard elements in England.

Mr. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of Britain, revealed the real British policy in his famous speech in the Parliament on 2 August, 1922. He made it quite clear that "Britain will in no circumstances relinquish her responsibility to India," and that 'the British Civil Service must remain as the steel frame on which the whole structure of British administration in India must rest for ever.'

This gave a clear indication of the kind of Responsible Government which the British had in view for India.

Lloyd George's speech created almost a consternation in the ranks of the Moderates and strengthened the influence of the Non-co-operators. A resolution was moved in the Indian Legislative Assembly requesting the British Government to repudiate the statement of Lloyd George. The fact that in spite of the strong opposition by the Government such a resolution was passed in an amended form by 48 votes to 34, is an indication of the change effected by the Reforms. But the fact that it had not the least effect upon the British policy shows their hollowness.

Even apart from the utterance of Lloyd George, the Moderate leaders had already been disillusioned about the character of the Reforms by realizing the unpalatable truth that the I. C. S. still reigned supreme, and even the ministers had little or no control over them. One of the ministers very tersely explained their position in the following words: "Ministers occupy a position of responsibility without the power of freedom of action. The Act and the Rules made thereunder give power to the Secretaries and the Heads of Departments to take cases direct to the Governor who may overrule the Minister on the representation of the Head of the Department or the Secretary." The Section 52(3) of the Government of India Act lays down that "in relation to Transferred Subjects, the Governor shall be guided by the advice of his ministers unless he sees sufficient cause to dissent from their opinion." This clearly implies a consultation with the whole body of ministers and the Joint Parliamentary Committee emphasized the corporate responsibility of the ministers. But under the Rules which were prepared by the I. C. S., and not by the British Parliament, the Governor could violate the section 52(3) both in letter and spirit. He could, and as a general rule, did, consult the ministers individually. The ministers complained bitterly

how they were overruled by the Governor even on petty matters. The ministers were completely under the control of the Governor, and as one of them put it, "it came to this that while the minister was responsible to the Legislative Council for his administration, it was the Governor who had the final decision on almost all questions, though he was very little in touch with the Council."²

It is thus quite clear that contrary to what was intended and expected, the Reforms gave the Governor more autocratic powers than before, and the ministers could only exercise as little or as much authority as the Governor allowed them at his discretion. But it was soon apparent that even apart from the illegitimate interference by the Governor, the ministers had no reason to feel that they were responsible to the people, through their representatives in the Council. As a substantial number of members in the Legislative Council were either officials or nominated by the Government or returned by special constituencies under the influence of the Government, the ministers could get a majority of votes in the Council even though a clear majority of the elected members was against them. It has been calculated, for instance, that in Madras if ministers could secure the votes of only 23 out of 86 members elected from General Constituencies (Hindu, Muslim and Christian), they would secure a majority of votes in the Legislative Council, if the Government wanted to retain them in power. Thus the ministers were really responsible, not to the people, but to the Government, through the Council which could maintain them in power even against the popular will. A glaring instance was furnished by a vote of Censure moved against the ministers in the Madras Council in 1927. The motion was defeated and the ministers continued, but the Division list showed that a clear majority of elected members voted against the ministry. As far back as 1923 it was admitted

by the Government that whips were issued to the officials and the supporters of the Government to vote for the Government and thus save the ministers. No wonder, therefore, that even the ministers themselves did not always recognize their responsibility to the Council. The Raja of Panagal gave out the bare truth when, opposing the vote of Censure in November, 1923, he said that 'he was responsible only to the Governor'. However amazing and incredible such a statement might appear, particularly when it comes from the Chief Minister of a Province, it serves to show that the so-called Parliamentary responsibility of ministers was nothing but a sham, at least in actual practice, as the effective authority rested not with the ministers but with the Governor whose actions could not be criticized by the Council.

Even the ministers, in their evidence before an official committee to inquire into the working of the Reforms, admitted that the system of Dyarchy had failed. There were, however, two redeeming features of the new constitution. In the first place, many of the ministers, even though severely handicapped, did their work with great ability and thus demonstrated, if such demonstrations were at all necessary, that the Indians were fully capable of carrying on the work of administration efficiently and with a full sense of responsibility.

Secondly, full use was made of the Legislatures by the elected members to elicit facts of public importance, and give forceful expression to public views and grievances. Although most of the important proposals could not be carried on account of the opposition of the official bloc, and even if carried, were vetoed by the Governor and Governor-General, it would be idle to deny that some grievances of the people were redressed. Reference may be made to the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923 which restored the democratic character of the

Calcutta Corporation after nearly a quarter of century ; the abolition of the special privileges enjoyed by the Europeans in criminal law against which the Indians carried on violent but unsuccessful agitations in 1849 and 1883 ;³ modification of the repressive laws including the harsh press laws ; adoption of a scheme for imparting military training to Indian youths leading to the establishment of a military college at Dehra Dun ; laws for the amelioration of the lot of Industrial workers, and Indian labourers in the British Dominions and Crown Colonies ; and some measures, though inadequate, for improving trade and industry.

It is also significant that the political demands of the nationalists were now made from the floor of the Legislative Assembly Hall.

It is thus quite clear that contrary to expectations, and perhaps, also, the intention, of the framers of the Government of India Act of 1919, the Legislative Assembly exercised a great deal of effective influence on the Government of India and proved by far the most successful feature of the Reforms of 1919. Strange though it may appear, this was partly, if not mainly, due to the Non-co operation movement, which exercised a great deal of indirect pressure both on the Government and on the Liberal Party which co-operated with it. In order to take off the edge of the criticism that Reforms were a mere sham, the Government deliberately yielded on important demands, such as the revision of the repressive laws. As mentioned above,⁴ the Government admitted to have adopted this policy as a measure of counter-propaganda against the Non-co-operation movement. The Liberal Party also had to stiffen their back and raise their demands, partly to rehabilitate themselves in the good opinion of their fellowmen, and partly to take the wind out of the sails of the Non-co-operators. But for the spectre

of the Non-co-operators swaying the whole country into a solid opposition bloc, the Government would not have gone out of its way to rally the Moderates and placate the people, extending the limits of concession as far as possible.

II. THE SWARAJYA PARTY

The victory of the Swarajists at Delhi in September, 1923,⁵ came not a moment too soon. The elections were due to be held in November and they had barely two months' time to make preparations. They issued a manifesto from Allahabad on October 14, 1923, explaining the policy and programme of the Party. They made it clear at the very outset that the Swarajya Party was an integral part of the Congress and always kept in view the essential principles of Non-violent Non-co-operation as they understood them. The Party, on entering the Legislative Assembly, would demand the right of framing their own constitution, and if this be refused, and they constitute a majority, they would resort to a policy of "uniform, continuous, and consistent obstruction with a view to make Government through the Assembly and Councils impossible." The manifesto made it quite clear that for achieving their purpose they would try to secure the co-operation of the Nationalist members of the Legislatures who "without agreeing with the principles of non-co-operation, are in sympathy with the Party programme so far as it relates to Councils." The Party would also readily accept the invitation of other parties to join with them "for the purpose of defeating the Government on any non-official measure opposed by the Government or on an official measure opposed by the inviting party or members."⁶

The election broke the spell of inertia that had seized the country as a consequence of the suspension of the Civil Disobedience movement in 1922. The whole country

rang with the exultant battle-cry of the Swarajists, and their success at the elections must be regarded as phenomenal in view of the very short period of time they had for preparation. The Swarajists practically routed the Moderate or Liberal Party. Even veteran leaders of this party like Surendra Nath Banerji in Bengal, Sheshagiri Iyer in Madras, and Paranjpye in Bombay were thoroughly beaten at the polls. The defeat of S. R. Das (Calcutta), Mr. Chintamani (U. P.), Hriday Nath Kunjru and others completed the debacle of the Moderates who henceforth ceased to count as an effective factor in Indian politics. The utter disorganization of the Party was clearly reflected in the poor attendance at the session of the National Liberal Federation held at Poona on December 26. The President of the session, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, ascribed the debacle of the Party at the recent election to lack of organization and failure to educate public opinion. But the plain truth seems to be that they had forfeited the confidence of the educated classes and had no influence upon the masses.

The success of the Swarajya Party varied in different Provinces. It had captured the majority of seats in C. P., but very few members of the Party were elected to the Legislative Councils of Madras and the Panjab. In Bengal the Swarajists formed the single largest party, though they did not command an absolute majority of votes. In Bombay, U. P., and Assam, the Swarajists were fairly strong ; no member of the Swarajya Party was set up for election to the Legislative Council in Bihar and Orissa, but the Nationalists were returned in large number.

In the Central Legislative Assembly, the total number of officials and non-officials nominated by the Government was, respectively, 25 and 14, forming practically a solid bloc of 39 votes under the control of the Government. Of the 105 members elected by the people, the Swarajists

numbered 48 and there was a group, under the leadership of Jinnah, consisting of 24 members, who called themselves Independent.

They held the key position as without their help neither the Swarajya Party nor the Government could hope to gain a majority. The Swarajists therefore, at the very outset, carried on negotiations with the Independents which led to the formation of the coalition that went by the name of the Nationalist Party. The coalition was based on the programme of presenting the national demand to the Government and to pursue a policy of obstruction and refusal of supplies in the event of the Government not making a satisfactory response thereto. This joint party programme was laid down definitely as follows :

"If the Government do not make a satisfactory response to the resolution demanding reforms within a reasonable time, the Party (Joint Party) will then be bound to a policy of obstruction and will put the policy into operation at the earliest period when the demands for grants are made by the Government, by refusing supplies, provided the party decide by a majority of three-fourths, at a meeting specially to be convened for the purpose, that the response, if any, made by Government is not satisfactory."

This policy worked remarkably well and the Joint Party achieved remarkable success. But the Independents soon changed their mind and were not prepared to join the Swarajists, to the full extent, in the policy of obstruction. The result was that though on some important occasions the Swarajists, with the help of the Independents, inflicted defeat upon the Government, they were defeated on many occasions when the Independents remained neutral, or some of them voted with the Government against the Swarajists.

When the fourth session of the Assembly opened

in Delhi in January, 1925, a revised rule was introduced by the Independents to the following effect: "In the event of the Party desiring to resort to a policy of obstruction including refusal of supplies or rejection of Finance Bills, no such decision shall be taken in the Nationalist Party unless both the Swaraj and Independent Parties have separately met in the first instance and decided at their respective meetings to make it a party question. If either group does not desire to resort to a policy of obstruction or of refusing supplies, the Nationalist Party shall not make it a Party question. In that event either group will be free to act as it may determine."

This practically meant a definite end of the coalition and made it impossible for the Swarajists to follow effectively their policy of obstruction. This was undoubtedly the main cause of their final decision to walk out of the Assembly, as directed by the Congress at the end of 1925.

It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly ; but a few facts may be noted to indicate the new spirit that animated the elected members.

On 8 February, 1924, Pandit Motilal Nehru, the leader of the Swarajya Party in the Assembly, moved by way of amendment to a motion already pending before the House that

"This Assembly recommends to the Governor-General in Council to take steps to have the Government of India Act revised with a view to establish full Responsible Government in India and for the said purpose (a) to summon at an early date a representative Round Table Conference to recommend with due regard to the protection of the rights and interests of important minorities, the scheme of a constitution for India, and (b) after dissolving the Central Legislature, to place the said scheme

before a newly elected Indian Legislature for its approval and submit the same to the British Parliament to be embodied in a statute."

The matter was discussed for full three days, namely 8th, 13th and 18th February, and Nehru's amendment was carried by 76 to 48 votes. This was the first great victory—an almost historical one—of the Nationalists or Swarajya Party-cum-Independents. This was shortly followed by other triumphs. When the Budget debate on the voting of demands was held on March 10, Nehru moved for the total omission of the grant under Customs. It was carried by 63 to 56 votes. Similarly the Assembly refused the demands under the heads Income-tax, Salt and Opium.

Next day Mr. Jinnah, the leader of the Independent Party, made it clear that they refused grants only to record their protest against, and condemnation of, the Government for refusing to grant reforms. But they had nothing to do with the wrecking programme of the Swarajists, and so, after having established the principle, they would discuss the other grants in the ordinary way. Nevertheless, the Finance Bill was thrown out by 60 votes against 57. Of course, the grants and Bills were certified by the Governor-General.

In the September session of the Legislative Assembly the Independent members were organised into a regular party of 28 members under the leadership of Jinnah. So the position of the Nationalist party formed by an alliance between the Swarajists and Independents became more secure and stable. The most important subject that came up for discussion before the Assembly was the consideration of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India, generally known as the Lee Commission from the name of the Chairman, Lord Lee. —

On September 10, 1924, the Home Member moved

a resolution to give effect to the chief recommendations of the Commission. The more important among these were the following :

1. That while the existing system of appointment and control of the All-India Services should, in present conditions, be maintained in Reserved fields, the Services operating in Transferred fields should, so far as future recruits are concerned, be appointed and controlled by Local Governments.

2. The recruitment of Indians for the Services in Reserved fields should be increased as recommended (direct recruitment of 40 Europeans and 40 Indians out of every hundred, the remaining being promoted from the Provincial Service so that there will be a half and half composition in 15 years).

3. The Constitution of a Public Service Commission.

4. That pay, passage, concessions and pensions be granted to the officers on the scale recommended (increase of basic pay in the Indian Police Service and the Indian Service of Engineers, privilege granted to European officers to remit his total overseas pay at two shillings to the Rupee, grant of four return passages to the European officers and their wives and one passage for each child, increased pension for the members of the I. C. S. serving as Member of Council or Governor).

Motilal Nehru moved a long amendment to the Government resolution of which the principal points were the following :

1. That the recommendations of the Lee Commission be not accepted.

2. That all further recruitment in England for the Civil Services in India be stopped.

3. That the powers of appointment and control of the Services now vested in the Secretary of State be transferred to the Government of India and the Local

Governments, shcn powers to be exercised under laws to be passed by the Indian and Local Legislatures.

4. That a Public Service Commission be established in India and the constitution and functions of that Commission be determined on the recommendation of a Committee elected by this Assembly.

5. That instead of accepting the recommendation number 4 of the Home Member's resolution, a Committee elected by this House should go into the entire question so far as the present incumbents are concerned.

There was a heated discussion in course of which Mr. Rangachariar pointed out that there was a revision of pay on the ground of high prices in 1919-20, when the prices had already reached the highwater-mark. and there was a total increase of over a crore in emoluments. Now that prices had fallen, they were asked to sanction a further increase costing another crore and a quarter. Col. Crawford remarked that the House was representative to some extent of the intelligentsia of India but it did not represent the voice of the people of India who desired to retain the European element in the Services. If the Pandit's amendment were carried, the House would show that it was not a civilised body. More than one speaker pointed out that the Services should be in the real sense Services, as they were in other countries, but must not be masters.

After two days' debate the amendment of Pandit Motilal Nehru was put to vote and carried by 68 votes against 46, on 12 September.

On 16 September Dr. Gour's Bill to repeal Part II of the Criminal Amendment Act of 1908 was passed by 71 votes against 31.

Although the Labour Government in Britain rejected the demand of the Swarajya Party for revision of Constitution, it was evidently at their instance that a Committee was appointed

in February, 1924, to inquire into the working of the Reforms. The Committee could not come to any agreement and there were two Reports. The Majority, consisting of five members, recommended only a few minor adjustments. The Minority Report, signed by four members, held that Dyarchy had failed and should be replaced by a Unitary and Responsible Provincial Government.

The Committee had verbal and written evidence from past and present Ministers and Executive Councillors from all the Provinces. With the exception of three disgruntled Ministers of Bengal who were driven out by the Swarajists in 1924, they all expressed the view, supported by reasons, that the experiment of Dyarchy has already taught all that it can be used to teach, that it is impossible to work it satisfactorily, that it is condemned, not only by themselves, who have tried to work it, and by all politicians of all Indian parties, but by an increasingly pronounced popular feeling, due to its failure to fulfil popular expectations.⁷

The Labour Government which was responsible for appointing the Committee fell before the Report of the Committee was submitted, and a Conservative Government took its place. It is significant to note in this connection that the Labour Party, at its Conference in Liverpool, in September, 1925, declared "its agreement with the conclusions of the Minority Report of the Indian Reforms Inquiry Committee," and that Lord Olivier, writing in December, 1925, associated himself entirely with the resolution passed by the Conference of the Labour Party at Liverpool.⁸

The Majority Report was condemned by all political parties and the Legislative Councils of Madras, Bombay, C.P. and the Panjab.

On September 7, 1925, the Report was discussed by the Legislative Assembly. After Sir Alexander Muddiman

moved for the acceptance of the Majority Report, Motilal Nehru moved a long amendment. After reiterating the demand contained in the resolution of February 18, 1924, it recommended some fundamental changes in the present constitutional machinery and administration of India. The more important of these were as follows :

1. The principle of responsibility to the Legislature shall be introduced in the Central Government subject to some reservation of powers to the Governor-General.

2. Unitary and autonomous Governments shall be established in the Provinces.

3. The Central and Provincial Legislatures shall consist only of members elected on a wide franchise.

4. The Indian army shall be nationalised within a reasonably short and definite period of time.

Finally, the Amendment recommended the appointment of a Convention, Round Table Conference, or other suitable agency to frame a detailed scheme on the above principles. After a full-dress debate for two whole days, the Amendment was carried on 9 September.

The Government of Bengal as well as the Government of India also suffered many defeats in connection with the notorious Bengal Ordinance issued in October, 1924, and the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Bill of 1925 which replaced it. Patel's Bill to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure was passed on 19 March, 1925.

The coalition of the Swarajists and the Independents which inflicted so many defeats on the Government in the Legislative Assembly broke down in the Budget Session of 1925, as mentioned above.

On 25 February, 1925, Nehru moved the rejection of the demand for the grant re expenses of the Railway Board, on the old principle that there should be redress of grievances before supply. Jinnah, the leader

of the Independent Party, announced that his party discussed the question and thought that the refusal of supplies was not a proper course.

On March 14 Motilal Nehru moved the omission of the whole demand for the Executive Council. It was, he said, a motion of censure on the Government of India, and the Swarajya Party would vote for it on the principle of the refusal of supplies before redress of grievances. After a prolonged discussion the motion was carried by 65 to 48 votes.⁹ But other demands were granted though the Swarajists opposed each of them. Pandit Motilal also opposed the Finance Bill and there was a passage at arms between him and Jinnah, who opposed the Swarajist "purpose of wrecking the present constitution." The Bill was passed.

Nevertheless, the Swarajya party scored a few more victories with the help of the Independent members.

On 26 January, 1926, the Assembly discussed the question of the release of political prisoners and the treatment accorded to them in jails. The main resolution was moved by Muhammad Shafi, but T.C. Goswami, a Swarajist member from Bengal, moved the following amendment :

"That this Assembly recommends to the Governor-General in Council—

(a) forthwith to secure the immediate release of all political prisoners detained without trial ;

(b) to take steps to remove all difficulties in the way of the return to India of Indian exiles in foreign countries who may be or may have been suspected of being concerned in any revolutionary or other activities regarded by the Government as prejudicial to the interests of India ; and

(c) to bring to trial under the ordinary law of the land such persons against whom the Government think

that they have sufficient evidence to go to court.”

The Government opposed the amendment but it was carried by 53 against 45 votes.

On February 26, the Assembly passed a motion for the adjournment of the House to discuss the situation created by the hunger-strike among the Regulation and Ordinance prisoners in Mandalay jail, by 57 votes against 40.

This was the last victory of the Swarajya party in the Assembly. For, the Congress in its Kanpur session, held in December, 1925, had decided to boycott the legislature. So, after the Budget was introduced on 1 March, 1926, Pandit Motilal got up and announced that his party was under a mandate to walk out in view of the Government attitude over the Reform issue. He referred to the resolutions of the Kanpur Congress in December, 1925, and the All-India Congress Committee at Delhi on March 6 and 7, to which reference will be made later.^{9a} He gave a short history of the demands for constitutional reforms made by the Assembly and the refusal of the Government to make even any conciliatory gesture. The Government passed repressive laws in the teeth of opposition of the Assembly by powers of certificate and there was also the Lee loot. “The co-operation we offered”, said Motilal, “has been contemptuously rejected, and it is time for us to think of other ways to achieve our object”. In conclusion he said: “There is no more use of us here. We go out into the country to seek the suffrage of the electorates once more. We do not give up the fight.....We feel that we have no further use for these sham institutions, and the least we can do to vindicate the honour and self-respect of the nation is to get out of them and go back to the country for work in the country. We will try to devise those sanctions which alone can

compel any Government to grant the demands of the nation. We hope and trust that the nation will give a suitable reply to the truculent rejection of our demands, and will send us again, in larger numbers with a stronger mandate, and God willing, with the mission of fulfilling its aspirations and enforcing its commands".

After Motilal's speech was over, he and all the Swarajist members walked out of the House in a body. It must be said that the concluding part of Motilal's speech, quoted above, is not only vague but somewhat self-contradictory. If there was no further use of these sham institutions, one might ask, then why again seek for election to them? Nor is it easy to understand what is meant by a stronger mandate, or "those sanctions" which will compel Government to grant the demands of the Swarajya party. It is not, perhaps, an unreasonable conjecture that Motilal deliberately chose these vague expressions as the future course of action was not finally decided.

It was soon apparent that the interest, importance, enthusiasm, and excitement walked out of the Assembly along with the Swarajist members. Mr. Jinnah moved for the omission of the demand for the Executive Council in order that the House might record its unequivocal vote of censure on the Government policy with regard to the Reforms. Both he and Rangachariar denounced the Government for their policy in regard to Reforms and the refusal to accept the hand of co-operation which the Swarajists had extended to them. But Jinnah's motion was defeated by 47 to 31 votes in spite of his pathetic appeal to the nominated and non-official European members.

In spite of the unfortunate end of the Swarajya Party's activity in the Assembly there cannot be two opinions on the signal service they had rendered to the country.

For the first time the Legislative Assembly wore the appearance of a truly national Assembly, where national grievances were fully voiced, national aims and aspirations expressed without any reservation, and real character of the British rule through sham legislatures ruthlessly exposed. The British autocracy and Indian bureaucracy, in their naked form as agencies of tyranny and repression, stood exposed to the whole world. This, by itself, was no mean achievement, even though the Party could not continue this useful function during the whole life of the Assembly owing to the secession of the Independents. The stewardship of Pandit Motilal Nehru was fully vindicated, and the aims and aspirations of the Swarajya Party were fulfilled to a very large degree.

So far as the Provincial Governments are concerned the Swarajya Party had an absolute majority of votes in the C. P. Council. The Swarajists there, however, refused to accept the Ministry and forced the Ministers, appointed by the Governor, to resign by the wholesale rejection of the Budget. In Bengal the Swarajists had not an absolute majority in the Council, but formed the largest single Party. The Governor, Lord Lytton, asked C. R. Das, the leader of the Swarajya Party, to form the Ministry ; but he declined and the Ministers were selected from among the non-Swarajist elected members of the Council. On 24 January, 1924, J. M. Sen Gupta moved the resolution that "all political prisoners of and belonging to Bengal, detained under Bengal Regulation III of 1818, be forthwith released." After a heated debate the resolution was passed by 76 to 45 votes. A similar resolution for releasing other political prisoners and another for repealing all repressive laws were also passed. The Swarajya Party, helped by some Independent members, both Hindu and Muslim, inflicted many defeats upon the Government, both in respect of demands for Grants, including Ministers'

salary, and unofficial resolution for extending the scope of Reforms. The Government, however, managed to win over some of the opposing members and thus thwarted the Swarajya Party. But the Ministers' salary being refused twice, they had to resign and the Governor assumed charge of the Transferred Departments.

No spectacular successes attended the efforts of the Swarajya Party in any Province, other than C. P. and Bengal. Still they occasionally scored some significant victories against the Government.

In accordance with the directions of the Kanpur Congress in December, 1925, the Swarajist members walked out of the Councils.

Almost immediately after the Swarajya Party joined the Legislature, Gandhi was released from prison on 4 February, 1924, on grounds of illness. He made no secret of the fact that he looked upon the Council-entry as incompatible with Non-co-operation. Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das saw him, but he was not convinced by their arguments. He issued a statement on 22 May, 1924, refusing to help the Swarajists, but in view of the Congress resolution in favour of the Council-entry advised the no-changers to keep themselves absolutely neutral and prove their own faith by prosecuting the constructive programme. Das and Nehru issued a counter-statement saying that they did not consider Council-entry as inconsistent with Non-co-operation, but even if it were so, they would sacrifice even Non-co-operation to serve the real interests of the country."¹⁰

But Gandhi was soon on the war path. He issued a statement to the effect that those who did not strictly follow the Congress resolution on boycott and Non-co-operation —i.e., members of legislature, practising lawyers, persons using foreign or mill-made cloth, teachers of Government schools, etc.— shall not be members of any Executive

Body of the Congress like A.I.C.C. and any local Executive Committee, though they might become ordinary members of the Congress. "The most natural thing for the Swarajists, therefore, is to work the constructive programme through their own organizations."

This very frank statement threw the country into a vortex of heated controversy which was brought to a head by the publication, on 19 June, 1924, of the four resolutions which Gandhi proposed to move in the next meeting of the A.I.C.C. in order to give effect to his idea of the reconstitution of the Congress organization.

The A.I.C.C. met at Ahmadabad on June 27, and after an unsuccessful effort to arrive at a compromise, Gandhi moved his first resolution to the effect that "all members, of various representative Congress organisations shall regularly spin for at least half an hour and send a specified quantity of yarn each month". There was a penal clause to the effect that any member failing to do so shall be deemed to have vacated his office.

As soon as Gandhi moved his resolution Nehru raised a point of order and argued that the resolution was against the Congress constitution. A heated debate took place and the President, instead of giving a ruling on the point of order raised, left it to the house to decide by vote. As 68 voted for Motilal and 82 against him, the discussion on Gandhi's resolution was taken up after the House re-assembled next day. Gandhi, in course of his speech while moving the motion, made the following significant observation, presumably with reference to Nehru's point of order. "If we feel", said he, "that we cannot possibly bring about Swarajya without trampling under foot the very constitution, it becomes our sacred duty to override and set aside that constitution. This is a time when we are justified in committing this breach in the constitution."

Pandit Motilal opposed Gandhi in a vigorous speech. "The Charka programme", he said, "was not going to bring them any the nearer toward Swaraj". He asked the supporters of Gandhi to tell him how much they worked his 'Constructive Programme' during his imprisonment. He asked them to put their hands on their hearts and 'tell us honestly' if they believed in the Charka programme during the Mahatma's absence. Continuing in the same strain, Motilal said : "We believe in the Constructive Programme, but we do not believe that by itself and without any other activity it will, or can, lead to Swaraj within a reasonable period of time.....The Indian National Congress belongs as much to us as to the opposite party. We will not allow, if we can help it, the constitution to be changed according to the caprice of a narrow majority whenever it may think necessary to crush the minority. The demand that the Swarajists should go out of the Executive is, under the circumstances, an unreasonable demand, and it is only due to our self-respect that we must resist it."

In conclusion Motilal said : "We declare that the resolution under discussion is an unconstitutional contrivance, and we go away today only to return with a majority whose duty it will be to refuse its sanction to such unconstitutional attempts." With these words Motilal Nehru, C. R. Das and their supporters, including Srinivas Iyengar, left the Hall in a body as a protest against the resolution of Gandhi.

The discussion continued, some opposing and some supporting the motion. An amendment to delete the penal clause was defeated and the main resolution was then put to vote. It was carried by 67 votes against 37.

The fact that even among the non-Swarajists there were 37 members who were opposed to him, had a great repercussion on the mind of Gandhi. Its immediate effect

was the deletion of the penal clause of the resolution. Gandhi himself proposed that "in view of the fact that the penalty clause of the resolution was carried only by 67 against 37 votes, and in view of the fact that the said clause would have been defeated if the votes of those who had withdrawn from the meeting were given against it, this Committee considers it proper and advisable to remove the penalty clause from the resolution, and to reaffirm the said resolution with the introductory clause."

This conciliatory gesture paved the way for an amicable settlement, and when the A.I.C.C. met next day, the third resolution of Gandhi was moved in a modified form. The original motion accepted by the Working Committee ran as follows : "In the opinion of the All-India Congress Committee it is desirable that Congress electors do not elect to the Congress organisations, practising lawyers, those who deal in or wear mill-spun cloth, parents and guardians sending their minor children to educational institutions under Government control, holders of Government titles, and members of legislative bodies, and the A.I.C.C. therefore requests such persons who are now members of the various Congress elective organisations to resign their places."

The compromise resolution which was actually moved ran thus :

"The All-India Congress Committee draws the attention of the Congress voters to the fact that the five boycotts, namely, of all mill-spun cloth, Government law courts, educational institutions, titles and legislative bodies, except in so far as they may have been affected by the Coganada resolution, are still part of the Congress programme and, therefore, considers it desirable that those Congress voters who believe in the Congress programme do not elect to the various Congress organizations those who do not believe in carrying out, in their own person, the said

five boycotts, except where affected by the said Cocanada resolution, and the A.I.C.C. therefore requests such persons who are now members of the Congress elective organisations to resign their places.”¹¹

In spite of the efforts of a class of no-changers to delete the reference to the Cocanada Congress resolution, the compromise resolution was passed

The difference between the two resolutions shows that Gandhi had practically given up the fight against the Council-entry, so far at least as it had any bearing on the Congress organization.

There was a strenuous fight over two other resolutions moved by Gandhi, one condemning the action of Gopinath Saha who had murdered a European, and another proposing that the resolution No. 3, already passed, should not apply to litigants before a Court. In the first case C. R. Das moved, by way of amendment, the resolution passed by the Bengal Provincial Conference at Sirajgunje on 1 June, 1924, which was denounced by the Englishmen in India and even in the House of Commons. It ran as follows : “This Committee, while denouncing and dissociating itself from violence and adhering to the principle of non-violence, appreciates Gopi Nath Saha’s ideal of self-sacrifice, misguided though it is, in respect of the country’s best interest, and expresses respect for his self-sacrifice.” The amendment was lost by only eight votes,—78 votes against 70.¹² As regards the second, the motion was ruled out of order by the President, at the instance of Dr. Choitram

The proceedings of the A.I.C.C. meeting moved Gandhi to the depth of his heart and proved a great shock to him. He was grieved, he said, “to see his own immediate followers so shaky and so hypocritical”. He observed that ‘when Dr. Choitram rose to a point of order it was like a thrusting of dagger in his heart’.

According to a contemporary account, "with these words the great leader collapsed, and after recovering consciousness spoke of retiring from the Congress."

Gandhi wrote two articles in the *Young India* under the captions "The A.I.C.C." and "Defeated and Humbled". He summed up the lessons of the A.I.C.C. meeting as follows :

"I had a bare majority always for the four Resolutions but it must be regarded by me as a minority. The House was fairly evenly divided. Copinath Saha Resolution clinched the issue. The speeches, the result and the scenes I witnessed afterwards—all was a perfect eye-opener. I undoubtedly regard the voting as a triumph for Mr. Das although he was apparently defeated by eight votes. That he could find 70 supporters out of 148 who voted had a deep significance for me. It lighted the darkness, though very dimly as yet."

But the articles also broadly hinted that Gandhi would not give up the fight against the Swarajists and "must strive for a majority in the next Congress"

But suddenly Gandhi's ideas underwent a radical change. He felt an imperative need of closing the ranks not only within the Congress but also outside it among all other political parties. He evidently realised the serious consequences of the divisions in the country, among non-changers and Swarajists, among Hindus and Muslims, and between the Congress and the other political parties. "Our non-co-operation," said he, "has taken the form of non-co-operation in practice with one another instead of with the Government." In a speech at the Excelsior Club, Bombay, on 31 August, 1924, he said : "There was no reason why we could not find a common denominator of action. There must be some things on which we could all unite and for the prosecution of which we could all meet under the same roof."

Gandhi began his work by arriving at a settlement with the Swarajists. This was hastened and facilitated by the terrible campaign of repression in Bengal inaugurated by the New Ordinance of October. After three days' discussion in Calcutta an agreement was reached between Gandhi on one side and Das and Nehru on the other. Its chief provisions were as follows :

1. The Congress should suspend the programme of Non-co-operation except in so far as it relates to the refusal to use or wear cloth made out of India.

2. Different classes of work of the Congress may be done by different sections within the Congress.

3. Spinning and weaving, removal of untouchability and promotion of Hindu-Muslim unity should be carried on by all sections within the Congress, and the work in connection with the Central and Provincial Legislatures should be carried on by the Swarajya Party on behalf of the Congress and as an integral part of the Congress organisation, and for such work the Swarajya party should make its own rules and raise and administer its own funds.¹³

The change in Gandhi's attitude was shortly followed by that of C.R.Das. On 25 March, 1925, he issued a statement condemning all acts of violence for political purposes, without reserve, and in words which even Gandhi could hardly improve upon.

This manifesto was acclaimed as a new gesture not only by the Anglo-Indian Press, but even by the Government. In course of the debate on the Bengal Ordinance in the House of Lords on March 31, the Secretary of State, Lord Birkenhead, referred to it in appreciative terms and observed : "I invite Mr. Das—and I have not used in the course of this debate a harsh word about him—to take a further step. I ask him to go forward and co-operate with the Government in repressing the violence which he deprecates." On April 3,

Das issued a statement regarding Lord Birkenhead's remarks. He was not only willing but anxious, said he, to devote the rest of his life to eradicate violence, but his efforts were bound to be ineffective unless a favourable atmosphere was created by the Government, by removing those deep-rooted causes of political and economic discontent of which the revolutionary and violent activities are mere symptoms. The moment the revolutionaries feel "that at any rate the foundation of our freedom is laid by the Government, I venture to assert that the revolutionary movement will be a thing of the past. I suggest in all humility that there should be a distinct and authoritative declaration by the Government at the earliest opportunity."

On April 6 it was stated by the Under-Secretary in the House of Commons that "if, as he (Lord Birkenhead) hopes, Mr. Das now makes constructive proposals which obtain the support of the Government of Bengal and the Government of India, His Majesty's Government, so far as they are concerned, will give such proposals their sympathetic consideration."

On May 2, Das outlined his policy in his Presidential speech at the Bengal Provincial Conference held at Faridpur. He defended the ideal of Dominion Status as against independence. He also offered co-operation with Government on the following terms :

"In the first place, the Government should divest itself of its wide discretionary powers of constraint, and follow it up by proclaiming a general amnesty of all political prisoners. In the next place the Government should guarantee to us the fullest recognition of our right to the establishment of Swarāj within the Commonwealth in the near future, and that in the meantime, till Swaraj comes, a sure and sufficient foundation of such Swaraj should be laid at once."

It is evident that Das extended the hand of fellowship to the Government even by sacrificing some of the cherished principles of his party. As a matter of fact, the speech of Das created great discontent among a section of his followers and it was openly talked about that it was the result of a secret negotiation between Das and the Government. Even Gandhi had to publicly defend Das against all such accusations, and was at pains to point out that "if they scratched Mr. Das, he knew they would find the same man desiring deliverance for his country." Gandhi observed : "After they had made the choice of their leader, like Sita they should fall into the fire with him and all would be well."

It is very likely that some activities were going on behind the scene. Fortunately Subhas Bose, who was in the confidence of Das, has thrown some light on the whole episode. He definitely states that Lord Lytton, the Governor of Bengal, opened negotiations with Das, and "these negotiations went on for some months" on the basis of Dominion Status. In view of the great importance of the matter we may quote a long extract from the account of Subhas Bose.

According to Bose Das attended the Bengal Provincial Conference at Faridpur in order to demonstrate to the Government that he would be able to rally the Congressmen round him. So, in his Presidential speech, Das "discussed the question of Dominion Status v. Independence as the goal of the Congress, and declared that he stood for the former. Moreover, he spoke in condemnation of terrorism. The speech as a whole appeared to be an appeal to the Government and to the more extreme elements among the Indians to adopt a compromising attitude so that the ground could be prepared for a settlement. It was, however, not welcomed by the youthful section of the audience and there was a possibility that he would be defeated when the matter was put to the

vote. Nevertheless, so great was his personal influence at the time and so transparent his sincerity of purpose that he carried the day. The deliberations of the Faridpur Conference were on the whole satisfactory to the authorities with whom the Deshabandhu was engaged in negotiating.

"Soon after this, Lord Reading left India for London, as the Conservative Cabinet and the Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, wanted to consult him. By that time it was in the air that negotiations had been going on between Deshabandhu Das and the Government, though hardly anyone knew any details. It was announced that after consulting Lord Reading, Lord Birkenhead would make an important pronouncement about India. Everyone in India awaited his speech with the greatest interest and eagerness."¹⁴

Then there was a bolt from the blue. In June Deshabandhu Das, who was having a rest in the hill-station of Darjeeling, fell seriously ill. After a brief attack he suddenly died on 16 June, 1925.

According to Subhas Bose the death of Das induced the British Government to change its mind; the official pronouncement, carefully prepared by Birkenhead on behalf of the Cabinet, and announced to be made on 7 July, 1925, was suppressed. and a non-committal speech was made instead on that day. The Government of London, relieved for the time being by the death of their chief adversary, refused to grant concession in a hurry and once more fell back on the policy of 'watch, wait and see.'¹⁵

The death of C. R. Das and the speech of Birkenhead brought about further reconciliation between Gandhi and the Swarajists. This was indicated by the following resolution of the A.I.C.C. :

"That the Congress now take up and carry on all

such political work as may be necessary in the interest of the country, and for this purpose do employ the whole of the machinery and funds of the Congress... provided that the work in the Legislatures shall be carried on by the Swarajya Party under the constitution framed by the party and the rules made thereunder, subject to such modifications made by the Congress as may be found necessary from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the said policy." There was, however, one important departure. A separate autonomous organization was set up under the name of All-India Spinners' Association for the development of hand-spinning and *khaddar*. It was a permanent organization under a Council of its own with a constitution laid down by the A.I.C.C. ; and funds and assets of the Congress, which were earmarked for this body, were specifically excluded in the above resolution from those available for political purposes. In other words, the position of the Swarajya Party *vis à vis* the Congress was now reversed ; the party and its politics now became the main concern of the Congress, and the constructive programme was relegated to a separate non-political organization within the Congress. This was further emphasized by changing the franchise of the Congress membership, the annual subscription of four annas being restored as an alternative qualification to spinning, in modification of the decision of the Belgaum Congress.

But ere long there was a split in the Swarajya party, as a prominent section of it was in favour of adopting the policy of Responsive Co-operation—the old policy of Tilak.

In the annual session of the Congress, held at Kanpur on 25 December, 1925, Sarojini Naidu presiding, Pandit Motilal Nehru moved a resolution outlining the future political programme of the Congress which now meant, of course, also of the Swarajya Party. It sought

to confirm the decision of the A.I.C.C. at Patna, and reiterated the faith in Civil Disobedience as the only effective weapon ; but in view of the fact that the country is not now ready for it a comprehensive programme of work both inside and outside the Legislatures was laid down. The directions to the Swarajya party were as follows :

'The party shall wait till the end of February for a decision of the Government on the demands for constitutional reforms set forth in the resolution passed by the Assembly on February 18, 1924. If no satisfactory reply be received by that date, the Swarajist members of the legislatures shall walk out, though provision was made for attendance on special occasions.'

Malaviya moved an amendment to the resolution which sought to omit the clause relating to Civil Disobedience and lay down the following programme. "That the work in the Legislatures shall be so carried on as to utilize them to the best possible advantage for early establishment of full responsible government, co-operation being resorted to when it may be necessary to advancement of the same cause."

Jayakar, who seconded this amendment, dramatically announced at the very outset that he, Kelkar and Moonje had resigned their seats in the Legislatures as they could not subscribe to the policy of the Swarajya Party. He said that either they must come out of the Councils altogether, or, being in, "take the last juice out of it by occupying every place of power, initiative and responsibility and would give no quarter to the Bureaucracy."

The amendment was, however, lost and Nehru's resolution was passed by a large majority.

The All-India Congress Committee met at Delhi on March 6 and 7, 1926. As no satisfactory response was made by the Government to the demands for constitutional reforms the Swarajist members in the Assembly

were directed to leave their seats on March 8, after moving for the rejection of the first demand for grant. The A.I.C.C. then laid down the programme and principles for the next general election, more or less on the same lines as before.¹⁶

In the meantime the revolt of the Responsive wing of the Swarajist party was complete. The resignation of Jayakar, Kelkar, and Moonje was followed by an open declaration of the Swarajist members of the Bombay Council against the programme of the Party, and the Berar members resigned from the Swarajya party as a whole. The Responsive Co-operators held a Conference at Akola on February 14 and 15, under the chairmanship of Jayakar, formed a new party named "The Responsive Co-operation Party", drew up a manifesto, and adopted a resolution expressing disagreement from the policy laid down at the Kanpur Congress as it was ineffective either to obstruct the machinery of the Government or to advance the interests of the people.¹⁷

The revolt of Jayakar and his followers against the Swarajya Party soon merged itself into a general rally of all political parties outside the Congress round "Responsive Co-operation." Malaviya, who unsuccessfully opposed the walk-out resolution at the Kanpur Congress in December 1925, resigned from the Independent party on 22 February, 1926, in order to bring together all Nationalists under a new party with the programme of Responsive Co-operation, and expounded his views in public meetings held at Delhi on 25 March, and at Lahore on the next day. About the same time, more than one hundred persons belonging to all political organizations, except the Swarajya Party, issued a manifesto on 24 March, 1926, inviting all to attend a Conference in Bombay on 3 April in order to inaugurate a new organization to be called the Indian Nationalist Party which will follow the method of Responsive Co-operation.

The Conference was attended by about 125 members representing Liberals, Independents, Responsive Co-operationists, Nationalists and Conventionists. It brought into existence a new party called 'Indian National Party.' It adopted Dominion Status as its goal, excluded mass civil disobedience and general non-payment of taxes from its programme, and laid down Responsive Co-operation as its method of work in the Legislature.¹⁸

On 23 June, 1926, a meeting was held in Calcutta to organize a party within the Congress which would work the Responsive Co-operation programme. The meeting was presided over by B. Chakravarti and addressed by Malaviya. A conference of the party was held on 28 August.¹⁹

By the end of July, 1926, the most influential section of the members of the Legislative Council in C. P. seceded from the Congress and a statement was issued under the signature of Raghavendra Rao, Leader of the Swarajya Party in the C. P. Legislative Council, that unless and until Congressmen are returned in a majority in at least two of the major Provinces, C. P. alone should not be harnessed to a programme of obstruction.

Lajpat Rai tendered resignation from the Swarajya party on 24 August, 1926. Malaviya made a last effort to unite the different sections of the Congress and called a Conference for the purpose at Delhi on 11 September, 1926. Motilal's party wanted both Responsivists and Independent Congressmen to accept the Congress pledge and thereby enable the forthcoming elections to be run by one united party leaving the question of policy and programme to be adopted in the Legislatures for decision by the next Congress in Assam in December. The Responsivists and Independent Congressmen did not agree to this; they formed a coalition party known as the Independent Congress Party, formed of those members who did not agree with the Congress policy and programme within the Legislature.

It was decided to form a central board which would define a common policy and run candidates for election to the Legislatures. The Party issued a manifesto on 28 September, 1926, laying down the policy and programme on the basis of Responsive Co-operation.

For the Swarajya party the hour was dark indeed, and the position was rendered worse by the communal dissensions to which reference will be made later. The election of 1926 was held under the shadow of grave communal disturbances and their political reaction went definitely against the Congress. A strong section of the Muslims made a propaganda against Non-co-operation, and a section of the Hindus felt that if the Hindus non-co-operated while the Muslims co-operated with the Government, the Hindus would be placed at a great disadvantage. The inordinate length to which leaders like C. R. Das and Lajpat Rai were prepared to go to propitiate the Muslims, as evidenced by their proposed pacts, to be mentioned later, gave rise to a general feeling that the Hindu interests were not safe in Congress hands.

The Congress, i. e. the Swarajya party, suffered heavy losses in the election of 1926. In the Legislative Assembly they gained notable successes only in Bengal and Madras. Most of the members, returned in Bihar and Orissa on the Congress ticket, were really Responsivists. In C. P. and U. P. the Swarajists got only one member each, and in Bombay, two.

The results of elections to the Provincial Councils were equally or still more disastrous to the Swarajists. In U.P, their number went down from 31 to 19, and in C.P. from 44 to 15. The Panjab had only two Swarajist members, and Bombay, eleven.

The election results had evidently some effect on the Congress. In the Gauhati session the walk-out policy of Kanpur was given up and the old policy was resumed,

It was, however, definitely laid down that "the Congressmen shall refuse to accept Ministership or other offices in the gift of the Government and oppose the formation of a Ministry by other parties until a satisfactory response is made by the Government to the National Demand." The result of the election showed that while among the Hindus the loyalty to the Congress generally triumphed over communal interests, the Muslims had, generally speaking, returned reactionary elements dominated by communal considerations, and not nationalists, as they had done in 1923. The strength of the Congress Hindu bloc was, however, weakened by the success of the Responsivist Party. Thus the United Swarajya Party in the Legislatures of 1923 gave place to three distinct groups, namely, the Swarajists, Responsivists and Communal Muslims. Its effect was clearly perceptible in Central Provinces and Bengal where Swarajya Party in 1924 had scored its greatest triumphs by forcing the Ministers to resign. Thanks to the Responsivist Party in C. P., and the Muslim members in Bengal, the Ministries in both these Provinces were kept on the saddle by 1926 election. In some Provincial legislatures like those of Bihar and Madras, the number of Congress members in 1926 showed an increase over those of 1923, but nowhere could they gain sufficient strength to inflict defeat upon the Government. As a political power, the Swarajya Party proved to be a spent force.

In the Budget session of the Legislative Assembly for 1927, Mr. Jayakar renewed the old campaign by moving rejection of the demand for grant under the head—Expenses of the Governor-General's Executive Council. But though the motion was carried, it failed to receive solid support from the Muslim members. It was clearly evident from the debates that the nationalist ideas had been sacrificed to communal interests, The Muslim

members veered round more and more to the communal electorate and even held the view that Swaraj without communal representation and adequate safeguarding of Muslim interests was not worth having. On the other hand, even progressive nationalist Hindus firmly refused to have Swaraj at the cost of conceding excessive and unreasonable concessions to communal demands which cut at the very root of nationalism. This fundamental difference broke down the common national front which Non-co-operation movement had brought into being. The Indian politics lost life and vigour and once more flowed into the narrow groove of communal channels.

The British Government correctly gauged the situation and no longer felt any need to placate public opinion.

III. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE CONGRESS.

1. Different Political Parties.

Reference has been made above to the complete rout of the Moderate or National Liberal Party at the election held at the end of the year 1923. The number of delegates at the two annual sessions of the National Liberal Federation showed that the Party as such had little following in the country. But the Party counted among its members a very large number of eminent political leaders who still exercised great influence on the political movement of the country. These included, among others, Srinivasa Sastri, Annie Besant, Tej Bahadur Saprú, Khaparde, Dr. Gour and B.C. Pal.

There were two Hindu organizations which, but for their communal character, might have been regarded as branches of the Congress and the National Liberal Party. These were, respectively, the Hindu Mahasabha and the All-India non-Brahmin Federation. The non-Brahmins

formed the Ministry in Madras and successfully carried on the administration. Their political views coincided more or less with those of the Moderates or Liberals. The Hindu Mahasabha started as an organization for social reforms but gradually drifted into politics in order to safeguard the interests of the Hindus as against Muslims, and combat the tendency of the Hindu leaders to appease the Muslims by surrendering the legitimate right of the Hindus.^{19a} They held very strong views against the communal electorate and weightage given to the Muslims. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the great representative of the Hindu community, and the ablest spokesman of the Mahasabha, referred to its activity in another direction which irritated the Muslims and gave rise to great misgivings even in the mind of the Hindu leaders. "For centuries", said Malaviya, "Muhammadans had been converting Hindus, and the majority of the Muslims of India were converts. Numerous Christian missions were also carrying on a campaign of proselytisation. Therefore the question of having a Hindu Mission for proselytisation had become a very pressing necessity in the situation created in this country by the activities of Muslim and Christian Missions."

The All-India Khilafat Committee became *functus officio* after the Turkish Government of Kemal Pasha deposed the Sultan, abolished the institution of the Caliphate, and declared Turkey a secular State in March, 1924. So the All-India Muslim League again entered the political field.^{19b}

The beginning of the Communist Party may also be traced to this period. Although the influence of Communist idea made itself felt in India shortly after the Russian Revolution in 1918 and attempts were made to organize a Communist Party in India by M. N. Roy and others since 1921, no conspicuous success attended their efforts till the Communist Party of Great Britain took up the matter and sent

some agents to India in 1926.

Philip Spratt was the most successful among these foreign agents. When he arrived in India in December, 1926, there were hardly a dozen members of the Communist Party, though it had been formally started about a year and a half before. But Spratt worked with great vigour. The following lines fairly sum up his activity.

“During those early days Spratt’s hand was everywhere. He planted the seeds of revolt in the Punjab. It was Spratt’s untiring energy that brought into being a Workers’ and Peasants’ Party in the United Provinces, which held its inaugural conference at Meerut in October 1928. Within a month, branches had been formed in Delhi, Meerut, Gorakhpur, Jhansi and Allahabad. Spratt worked in 1927 mainly with the Bombay group, in 1928 with the Bengal Party. He played a large part in uniting the Punjab groups into one Party, and in the formation of those in the United Provinces, into another.”

The activity of the Communists was, however, cut short by the wholesale arrest of their leaders on 20 March, 1929. The following findings of the Court fairly sum up the history and activities of the Communists in India :

“It has been definitely proved that (1) the Communist International was founded in 1919, with its headquarters at Moscow, as the supreme head of all Communist organisations throughout the world ; (2) its chief aim is to establish Workers’ Republics in every country ; (3) for this purpose it has as its fixed policy the exciting of violent revolution in all countries ; (4) in particular it has turned its attention to India and determined to cause a revolution which has for its immediate object the overthrow of the sovereignty of the King Emperor in British India ; (5) with this object it has formed a conspiracy with persons and bodies in Europe and India

and elsewhere to excite the Indian workers and peasants to revolution ; (6) these persons and bodies, who may be called conspirators, have laid down a general plan of campaign under the direction of the Communist International ; (7) this plan includes the formation of such bodies as a Communist Party of India and Workers' and Peasants' Parties ; (8) the immediate work of these parties is to gain control of the working classes by organising them in Unions, teaching them the principles of Communism, inciting them to strikes in order to educate them and teach them solidarity, and in every way to use every possible method of propaganda and instruction ; (9) the workers are thus to be taught mass organization with a view to the declaration of a general strike followed by revolution ; (10) the peasants are to be organised in a similar manner so as to form an effective reserve force for the proletarian masses and to effect an agrarian revolution ; (11) in pursuance of these aims a Communist Party of India and four Workers' and Peasants' Parties, in Bombay, Bengal, the Punjab and the United Provinces, were formed ; (12) these bodies were given financial aid from Moscow and their policy was dictated from Moscow, directly and via England and the Continent, through communications conducted in a secret and conspiratorial manner ; (13) in addition to this, several persons, such as Allison, Spratt and Bradley were sent out to India for the express purpose of organising the work and fomenting revolution ; (14) in pursuance of these directions and with the financial help thus obtained, these bodies have organised unions, conducted demonstrations, edited papers, instituted youth movements, initiated and conducted strikes, and used all possible methods of propaganda ; (15) in these activities all the accused, with the exception of Dharamvir Singh, are shown to have taken part with full knowledge and

approval of their aims and objects and directly or indirectly in league with the conspirators outside India."

There is a general consensus of opinion that these findings make a fair approximation to truth. Even Communist leaders did not dissent from them except on one point. Spratt dissented from the last finding, no. 15. "According to him, almost half the accused were nationalists or trade unionists who were largely ignorant of the real nature of the conspiracy and of its underhand methods. When those were revealed during the trial, they were taken aback. The demoralisation and quarrels among the prisoners during the later stages of the trial could partly be attributed to this factor."²⁰

After a protracted trial 27 accused persons were found guilty and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment on 16 January, 1933. The High Court considerably reduced the sentences, and by 1935 all the accused were set free.

2. The Commonwealth of India Bill.

The most important political activity, outside the Congress, was the Conference of the elected members of the Central and Provincial legislatures in February, 1923, at Delhi, which drew up the outline of a constitution for India on the basis of Dominion Status. A second Conference in February, 1924, approved of it and merged itself into a Convention which met in April, 1924. It consisted of members and ex-members of the Legislatures, Central and Provincial (231), the members of the Council of the National Home Rule League (19), the elected representatives of the political sections of the 1921 clubs in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta (3), the co-opted representatives of the Indian Women's Association (2), and the late Law Member of the Governor-General's Council,—256 in all. The Convention drafted the Commonwealth of India Bill. A Deputation, consisting of Mrs. Besant and Sastri, left for U. K. on 26 April, 1924,

and another on 10 May, to press the Home Rule campaign there, on behalf of the National Convention. The members of the Deputation and several other eminent Indians who were already in London, carrying on propaganda on behalf of India, submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of State.

The Deputation addressed several meetings and there were select gatherings, private dinner to the Secretary of State by a fully representative gathering of Indians, and various other functions. Speeches were made by Sastri, Besant, Lajpat Rai and others. The Prime Minister saw Lajpat Rai, Harkishen Lal, and Besant, and had long talks with them. There was a crowded meeting at the Queen's Hall presided over by Mr. Robert Smillie, M.P., Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party. He believed, he said, "that at last the majority of British people believed in India's right of self-government. He knew that the majority of the rank and file of the supporters in the House of the Government desired to confer that right upon India and he believed that the majority of the Cabinet agreed with them." Another successful demonstration was held in Birmingham on 27 June, and there were many other meetings in which Indian leaders spoke. At a meeting at the Caxton Hall, attended mostly by Indian students, Mrs. Besant, the speaker, was questioned about the right of herself and Sastri to represent any considerable section of the Indian people. The interrogators advocated armed force as the only effective method of turning the British out of India, notwithstanding Besant's protest.²¹

On her return from England, early in September, 1924, Mrs. Besant made an attempt to establish unity among different political parties in India. Gandhi had also realized the need of such unity and had already made up his differences with the Swarajists and restored the unity of the Congress. He also elaborated his

ideas in a long article in the *Young India* on 11 September. To give a definite shape to this idea Muhammad Ali, as President of the Congress, invited representatives of all parties to meet the A.I.C.C. at Bombay on November 21 and 22. There was a good response to this invitation and nearly four hundred delegates representing different shades of public opinion met at the Muzaffarabad Hall, Bombay. It was a great tactical move on the part of Muhammad Ali to resign his claim to preside and propose instead that Sir D.M. Petit should take the chair. In his opening speech Gandhi said that they had gathered together not to emphasize points of difference but to understand and find out points of agreement. One of these was some action in connection with the extraordinary Bengal Ordinance. He thought there should be no difficulty in coming to a unanimous decision on the repression that was going on in Bengal. He therefore proposed that the Conference should appoint a representative Committee to draft a resolution for its discussion. Mrs. Besant spoke at great length justifying the Bengal Ordinance, but Gandhi's resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority.

The draft of the resolution prepared by the Committee ran as follows : "A. While firmly of opinion that anarchical organisations can never secure Swaraj to the people of India, and while disapproving and condemning most emphatically such organisations, if any, this Conference, representing all classes and communities in India and every variety of public opinion, views with the strongest disapproval and condemns the action of the Governor-General in promulgating the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance of 1924, as such an extraordinary measure, being a direct invasion upon individual liberty, should not have been enacted without the sanction of the Legislature, and as it easily lends itself at the

hands of the Executive to grave abuses resulting in implicating innocent persons and in interfering with constitutional political activity, as past experience of similar measures has repeatedly demonstrated. B. This Conference urges the immediate withdrawal of the Ordinance and the trial, if necessary and in accordance with ordinary law, of the persons detained under it. C. This Conference further urges that Regulation III of 1818 which gives the Government powers of arresting and confining persons suspected of public crimes without warrant, without trial and without statement of reasons for such arrest and confinement, should be forthwith withdrawn. D. The Conference records its conviction that the present political situation in India is due to denial of just rights long overdue to the people and that the speedy establishment of Swaraj is the only effective remedy therefor."

The resolution was moved by Chintamani, an eminent leader of the Moderate Party, and for some time a Minister in U.P. It was a unique occasion, since the split of 1918, when once more India placed her political demands from a common platform. The first two parts—A and B—of the resolution being put to vote were carried by an overwhelming majority, there being only four dissentients, namely, Mrs. Besant, Lady Emily Lutyens, Jamnadas Dwarakadas, and Ratansi Dharamsey Morarji. The other two parts—C and D—were carried unanimously.

Gandhi then moved for the appointment of a Committee, consisting of a number of representative leaders named by him, to consider the best way of reuniting all political parties in the Indian National Congress, to prepare a scheme of Swaraj including the solution of Hindu-Moslem and like questions in their political aspects, and to report not later than 31 March, 1925,—the Conference to meet not later than 30th April. It was

unanimously carried.

The Committee met at Delhi on January 23, 1925. Gandhi, who presided, explained at the outset that the objects of the Conference were to explore the avenues of communal and political unity and to formulate a scheme of *Swaraj*. He suggested the appointment of a sub-committee to formulate the lines of agreement. This was objected to by a large section but was agreed to after a long discussion. A fully representative Sub-Committee, consisting of forty members, was appointed :

(a) to make such recommendations as would enable all parties to join the Congress ;

(b) to frame a scheme for the representation of all communities, races, and sub-divisions on the legislative and other elective bodies under *Swaraj*, and recommend the best method of securing the just and proper representation of the communities in the services with due regard to efficiency ; and

(c) to frame a scheme of *Swaraj* that will meet the present needs of the country.

This Sub-Committee divided itself into two groups, one to deal with the Hindu-Muslim union and the other to outline a scheme of *Swaraj*.

The group dealing with the scheme of *Swaraj*, presided over by Mrs. Besant, took the Draft Bill prepared by the National Convention in December, 1924 (The Commonwealth of India Bill),²² as its basis and submitted a report on 23 February, laying down certain general principles. The other group held a few meetings but could not arrive at any agreement on the main question of the revision of the 'Lucknow Pact'²³ and the method of representation on legislative and other bodies. It was therefore adjourned *sine die*. The consideration of the *Swaraj* scheme was therefore dropped, for no such scheme could be considered without a basis of communal agreement.

The efforts of the All-Parties Conference having failed, Mrs. Besant felt herself free to push the Commonwealth of India Bill sponsored by her. She incorporated in the Bill certain features suggested in the Report of the Swaraj Group of the Sub-Committee, and the Bill reached its final form during the three days' sitting of the National Convention at Kanpur on April 11-13, 1925. In May, 1925, it was sent to Major D. Graham Pole, the Hony. Secretary of the British Committee on Indian Affairs in England. He laid it before the leading members of the Labour Party and it was backed by them, read a first time in the House of Commons, and ordered to be printed. It then went before the Executive Committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party that examines every Bill before it is taken up by the Labour Government or Opposition, as the case may be. It was closely examined, clause by clause, and finally passed unanimously as embodying the resolutions passed by the Labour Party from time to time respecting India. It thus passed into the hands of the future Labour Government, and was put on the list of Bills balloted for as an official measure.²⁴ A brief memorandum explaining the imperative need of passing the Commonwealth of India Bill, signed by over forty Indian leaders of various political parties, was issued on 29 June, 1925. It contains a scathing condemnation of the British rule and the attitude of the British Government by the most moderate among eminent Indian leaders.

After making an extensive tour and propaganda work throughout India, Mrs. Besant proceeded to England on 3rd July to influence the members of Parliament, some of whom had already supported her Bill.

On Mrs. Besant's return from England two Commonwealth of India Bill Conferences were held, one in Karachi on February 14, and another at Bombay on May 7, 1926. Both the Conferences supported the Bill and Mrs. Besant

proceeded, shortly after, to America, to place India's case before its public and thereby counteract the anti-Indian propaganda of Lord Sydenham and his group.

IV. HINDU-MUSLIM RELATION.

The Hindu-Muslim unity brought about by Gandhi in 1920-21 was artificial in character and did not produce any real change of heart. It was based on the common hostility and hatred entertained, for quite different reasons, by the Indian Nationalists and the Khilafatists towards the British, and was sustained by the militant programme of Non-co-operation and Civil Disobedience. The suspension of the Civil Disobedience and Non-co-operation programme chilled the enthusiasm of the Khilafatists, and as Gandhi was shortly after removed to prison there was no one to keep up the show. Then the Khilafatist movement itself was blown out of existence by the action of Kemal Pasha, who had liberated Turkey but showed no concern for the holy places of Islam, and finally abolished the Caliphate. Thus the ground was cut from under the feet of the Khilafatists and the movement died a natural death. The need for a common front against the British having thus disappeared, the Muslim politics again resumed its communal character. The revival of the old Muslim outlook was signalized by the renewed activity of the Muslim League in 1924 and a series of communal riots after 1923.

1. The All-India Muslim League

The activities of the League had been suspended for four years, and the 15th adjourned meeting was held at Lahore on 24 May, 1924. Mr. Jinnah, who presided, in reviewing the political activity of the preceding four years in India, pointed out that though the Non-co-operation movement was a failure, and much harm was done, a great deal of good had also come out of it. "There is", he said, "an open movement for the achieve-

ment of *Swaraj* for India. There is a fearless and persistent demand that steps must be taken for the immediate establishment of Dominion Responsible Government in India. The ordinary man in the street has found his political consciousness and realised that self-respect and honour of the country demand that the government of the country should not be in the hands of any one else except the people of the country".

As the speedy attainment of *Swaraj* was one of the declared objects of the League, it proceeded to lay down some basic and fundamental principles in any constitution for India acceptable to the Muslims. The main points stressed were the following :

1. There shall be a Federal Constitution for India with full autonomy for the Provinces, the functions of the Central Government being confined to matters of general and common concern.

2. The mode of representation in the Legislatures and all other elected bodies shall guarantee adequate and effective representation to minorities in every Province, subject, however, to the essential proviso that no majority shall be reduced to a minority or even to an equality. The representation shall continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present.

3. No Bill or resolution shall be passed in any elected body if it is opposed by three-fourths of the members of any community which feels itself affected by it.

4. The Reforms of 1919 are inadequate and unsatisfactory, and immediate steps should be taken to establish full Responsible Government.

The League deprecated communal dissensions and, in order to establish inter-communal amity, recommended the establishment of conciliatory boards with a central board in each Province. The Chairman of the Reception

Committee gave an economic interpretation of the communal discord by saying that as the "majority of the Muslims is poor and the majority of the Hindus is in better circumstances, the poor Muslim is ready to rob the rich Hindus at the slightest provocation".

Almost as soon as the Non-co-operation movement died down there was a recurrence of the old feuds between the Hindus and the Muslims. The Muslim support to that movement was dictated by the policy of deriving advantages by co-operating with the Hindus against the British. That purpose having no longer any incentive the Muslims followed the traditional policy of seeking to derive advantages by supporting the British against the Hindus. It is very significant that when, in 1923, there was a general feeling among the Muslims against further co-operation with the Hindus, Muhammad Ali, in his Presidential Address at the annual session of the Congress at Cocanada in December, 1923, tried to combat it, not by appealing to the national feeling of the Muslims and their patriotism to India, but by pointing out the comparative advantages of co-operation with the Hindus and the British Government for attaining Pan-Islamic objectives. He appealed to the "Muslims who are being asked today to discard the policy of non-co-operation with England to confront facts before they reverse a decision to which their sad experiences of co-operation with England had driven them." After explaining why the Muslims' loyalty to the British Government is incompatible with their loyalty to Islam, he continued: "And if we may not co-operate with Great Britain, is it expedient, to put it on the lowest plane, to cease to co-operate with our non-Muslim brethren? What is it that has happened since that staunch Hindu, Mahatma Gandhi, went to gaol for advocating the cause of Islam that we must cease to

18V3

co-operate with his co-religionists ?”²⁵

But in spite of the earnest appeal of Muhammad Ali there was no possibility of reviving the communal co-operation of 1920-1 which was but a passing phase in Indian politics. The revival of the old communal feelings resulted in discords over petty issues such as music before mosque, cutting down the branches of pipal tree, held sacred by the Hindus, which obstructed the very long pole carried in the Muslim Tajiya procession, killing of cows in public places during Id ceremony, and things of this sort. Referring to this lamentable state of things Muhammad Ali said in his Presidential Address in December, 1923 : “I know that Hindu-Muslim relations today are not precisely those that they were two years ago. But is it possible for any honest and truly patriotic Indian to say that either community is wholly blameless, and that the guilt is entirely one community’s ?.. .. Most regrettable events have unfortunately occurred in Malabar, at Multan, at Agra, at Shaharanpur and elsewhere, and I am prepared to support the creation of a National Tribunal to judge the respective guilt of the two communities.”²⁶ This was an eminently wise suggestion, but though it was mooted at a conference held at Delhi, the idea was not carried into effect. Early in 1923 there were serious communal clashes in Multan and Amritsar. Later in the year the Muslims started a definite communal movement called *Tanzeem* and *Tabligh* in order to organize the Muslims as a virile community. As a counterpart to this the *Sangathan* movement sprang up among the Hindus for promoting physical culture and removing social abuses. Swami Shraddhananda vigorously carried on the *Suddhi* (purification) movement, initiated by Dayananda Swami more than half a century before, with a view to bringing back within the Hindu fold those who had renounced Hindu faith and were converted into Islam. In particular

he tried to reconvert the Malkana Rajputs who were originally Hindu, but had embraced Islam, and were now willing to come back to their ancestral faith. The *Sangathan* and *Suddhi* movements were denounced by the Muslims and caused a serious rift between the two communities.

The Muslims even suspected that the object of the removal of untouchability, emphasized by the Hindus under the guidance of Gandhi, was not the removal of a great social evil by absorption of the suppressed classes into Hindu society, but merely to use them as auxiliaries on the Hindu side in future affrays between the Hindus and Muslims. The promotion of physical culture among the Hindus was also suspected on the same ground. As regards the *Suddhi* movement there were allegations of coercion, intimidation and undue pressure by *Zamindars* and money-lenders and by a numerical majority of neighbours in the surrounding area. In view of such allegations by the Muslims, and the denial and counter-allegations by the Hindus the Congress decided to appoint a Committee of Inquiry, but nothing came out of it. Muhammad Ali's observation on the sudden manifestation of zeal by the Muslims and Hindus for conversion and reconversion to their faith is worth quoting : "My own belief is that both sides are working with an eye much more on the next decennial census than on heaven itself, and I frankly confess it is on such occasions that I sigh for the days when our forefathers settled things by cutting heads rather than counting them."²⁷

The Hindus naturally resented the attitude of the Muslims toward the *Suddhi* movement and felt themselves perfectly justified in converting or reconverting others to their own faith,—a right which the Muslims had fully exercised all along without any restraint, and which alone accounted for their number in India. They also could not find any justification for the Muslim interpretation of

the *Sangathan* movement. But there is no doubt that the whole Muslim community was highly excited.

In the Jamait-ul-Ulema Conference held at Cocanada on December 29, 1923, the President referred to the sponsors of the *Suddhi* movement as "the worst enemies of India," and expressed the opinion that "the *Sangathan* movement would prove detrimental to the cause of Indian advance." The Conference also "condemned those activities which are likely to weaken the basis of (Hindu-Muslim) unity and considered their promoters as enemies of the nation."²⁸

Serious communal riots vitiated the political atmosphere of India from 1923 onwards. The ostensible and immediate causes of these riots have been mentioned above, but they were really due to the revival of mutual suspicion and distrust which have generally characterized the relation between these two communities except during rare intervals. The deep-rooted causes, political, social and religious, which kept the Hindus and Muslims as two distinct units in India although they lived together, side by side, in this country for more than seven hundred years, have been analysed in the first volume. The fundamental consideration that kept them apart in the political evolution of the twentieth century was the disparity between the two communities in point of number and educational progress. A community which formed only one-fourth of the total population was bound to occupy a subordinate position in any democratic constitution. Whatever might have been their past position and status *vis à vis* the Hindus, under modern condition there was every chance that it would be reversed under any form of Government in Free India. And for the present the educational backwardness of the Muslims deprived them of their due and legitimate share of high and responsible posts in the Government of their country. Democratic form of Government and efficiency as the sole test in making public appointments—too high as ideals to be openly

repudiated by any sensible man in the twentieth century—stood as an insurmountable wall between the Muslims, proud of their past history and achievements, and their natural ambition to play an important role in the present or future Government of the country. This feeling of inferiority complex haunted the minds of even thoughtful and patriotic Muslims in India, and made them look wistfully to the Islamic world outside India and emphasize their membership of the Islamic Brotherhood.

It is a remarkable fact that the Hindu leaders never gave any serious consideration to these two elementary and fundamental facts in their effort to build up a common nationality on the basis of Hindu-Muslim fraternity. It will be seen, as the history of the next two decades unfolds itself, that even eminent Hindu leaders like Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, whose pro-Muslim activities were strongly resented by the Hindus, never attempted to grasp the real problems but tried to evade or ignore, if not deny, them altogether,—the first under cover of high-sounding moral, spiritual, and ethical philosophy, too abstruse to be understood by anyone but the very elect, and the second under fervid emotional appeals to abstract national ideas and sentiments. This is all the more surprising when one finds that even nationalist Muslims like Muhammad Ali, and Muslim idealist like Iqbal, gave very clear expression to Muslim feelings and ideals, their doubts, suspicion and root causes of discontent and difficulties, in their public speeches and writings. Even in his Presidential Address to the Congress of 1924, after serious communal riots had continued for 15 years, Gandhi said: "I share Maulana Shaukat Ali's robust optimism that the present tension is a mere temporary distemper." Nehru's view, up to the very last, was even more short-sighted, as will be related later. We may now briefly refer to some of the riots between the Hindus and Muslims in 1923-4.

One of the worst communal riots broke out in Calcutta in May, 1923. It arose out of an Arya-Samajist procession playing music while passing before a mosque. The Arya-Samajists contended that they were merely following a regular practice which was never objected to before, while the Muslims asserted that the music disturbed their religious prayer. So, fighting commenced and continued for several days in course of which there were many casualties on both sides. There were a series of riots on July 15, 1924, on the occasion of the Bakrid. The most serious one took place at Delhi, in spite of the fact that Muhammad Ali, Ajmal Khan and other eminent Muslim leaders had, only a week before, earnestly appealed to the Muslims to keep peace on the Bakrid day.

Generally communal riots were confined to the British territory, and the Indian States were free from them. A serious riot in 1924 in Gulburga, in the Nizam's territory, formed an exception. The Muhammadan mobs attacked all the Hindu temples in the city, numbering about fifteen, and broke the idols. They also raided the Sharan Vishveshwar Temple and attempted to set fire to the Temple car. The Police were eventually obliged to fire, with the result that three Muhammadans, including the Police Superintendent Mr. Azizullah, were killed and about a dozen persons injured. Next morning the streets were again in the hands of Muhammadan mobs and considerable damage was done to Hindu houses and shops. On the arrival of Police reinforcements, order was restored. On the 14th August the Muslim mob fury was at its height and almost all the temples within the range of the mob, some fifty in number, were desecrated, their *sanctum sanctorum* entered into, their idols broken, and their buildings damaged.²⁹

The most serious outbreak occurred at Kohat in N. W. F. P., a predominantly Muslim area. On the morning of 9 September, 1924. the Muslims looted and

burnt all the shops of the Hindus. On the night of 10 September the Muslims made a number of breaches in the mud walls of the city, and committed wholesale plunder and incendiarism, the alleged provocation being firing from some Hindu houses in self-defence. Before noon there were widespread fires in Hindu quarters. The Deputy Commissioner and Brigade Commander were unable to prevent the raid, and apprehending that there was a grave danger of wholesale slaughter of the Hindus, removed them to the Cantonment. Later on the Hindus removed to Rawalpindi. Gandhi, who made a joint inquiry into the incident with Shaukat Ali, observed: On 10 September, "the Muslim fury knew no bounds. Destruction of life and property, in which the Constabulary freely partook, which was witnessed by the officials and which they could have prevented, was general. Had not the Hindus been withdrawn from their places and taken to the Cantonment, not many would have lived..... Even some Khilafat volunteers, whose duty it was to protect the Hindus, and regard them as their own kith and kin, neglected their duty, and not only joined in the loot but also took part in the previous incitement."

The Kohat tragedy formed a subject of discussion in the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha. The manner in which it was treated by these three bodies throws interesting light on the way in which the communal question was looked at by different sections of Indians. Motilal Nehru, who moved the resolution on the subject in the Congress, began by saying that "in Kohat a tragedy has taken place the like of which has not been known in India for many years", but scrupulously avoided casting any blame on any party, merely observing that "this is not the time for us to apportion the blame upon the parties concerned", though more than three months

had passed since the incident. The Congress resolution deplored the incident, urged the Musalmans of Kohat to assure their Hindu brethren of full protection of their lives and property and invite them to return, advised the refugees not to return except upon any such invitation, and asked everybody to suspend judgement till a proper inquiry was made.

The Muslim League repeated all these but added the following : "The All-India Muslim League feels to be its duty to place on record that the sufferings of Kohat Hindus are not unprovoked, but that on the contrary the facts brought to light make it clear that gross provocation was offered to the religious sentiments of the Mussulmans and the Hindus were the first to resort to violence..."

The Hindu Mahasabha "expressed grief at the loss sustained by Hindus and Muslims in life and property, the burning of about 473 houses and shops, the desecration or destruction of many temples or Gurudwaras which compelled the entire Hindu and Sikh population to leave Kohat and to seek shelter in Rawalpindi and other places in the Punjab." Lala Lajpat Rai, speaking on the motion, asked "whether, even admitting that the Hindus were at fault, their fault was such that it deserved the punishment inflicted on them."

All the three resolutions blamed the Government for the tragedy and urged the necessity of an independent public inquiry.

A joint inquiry was made by Gandhi and Shaukat Ali, and as they differed on essential points, both issued individual statements. There was not much difference about the atrocities committed by the Muslims. Shaukat Ali exonerated them on the ground that the burning and firing on the 9th were quite accidental and the Hindus gave the first provocation on the 10th. Gandhi

did not endorse this view and observed : "During these days temples including a Gurudwara were damaged and idols broken. There were numerous forced conversions, or conversions so-called, i.e. conversions pretended for safety. Two Hindus at least were brutally murdered because they (the one certainly and the other inferentially) would not accept Islam The so-called conversions are thus described by a Musalman witness. 'The Hindus came and asked to have their *Sikhas* cut and sacred threads destroyed, or the Musalmans whom they approached for protection said they could be protected only by declaring themselves Musalmans and removing the signs of Hinduism'. I fear the truth is bitterer than is put here if I am to credit the Hindu version".

Shaukat Ali admitted the murder of two Hindus for refusing to embrace Islam and the pretended conversions which, he added, were really no conversion at all. But he was not satisfied that there were any forced conversions to Islam.³⁰

There was a riot at Lakhnau on 13 and 14 September, and the military had to be called in. Serious efforts were made by eminent leaders of both communities to eliminate the causes of discord by drawing up an agreed covenant guiding the relation between the Hindus and Musalmans. A Committee was appointed in the Delhi session of the Congress (1918) to draw up an Indian National Pact. A draft of the Pact, prepared by Dr. Ansari and Lala Lajpat Rai, was placed before the Subjects Committee of the Cocanada Congress in 1923. In the meantime the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee, under the inspiration of C. R. Das, approved of a Hindu-Muslim Pact in respect of Bengal. Its main provisions were as follows :

1. Representation in the Legislative Council on the population basis with separate electorates.

2. Representation to local bodies to be in the proportion of 60 to 40 in every district—60 to the community which is in the majority and 40 to the minority.

3. Fifty-five per cent. of the Government posts should go to the Muslims.

4. No music should be allowed before the mosque.

5. There should be no interference with cow-killing for religious sacrifices, but the cow should be killed in such a manner as not to wound the religious feeling of the Hindus.³¹

The Subjects Committee being in favour of further consideration of the matter, Motilal Nehru moved a resolution in the open session of the Congress to refer back the draft of the Indian National Pact as well as the Bengal Pact to the Committee appointed in the Delhi session, with the substitution of Amar Singh in place of Mehtab Singh, who was in jail. The Bengal Pact was strongly opposed and after a heated debate, lasting for four hours, an amendment for the deletion of Bengal Pact from the resolution was carried by a substantial majority, 678 voting for and 458 against it. It was evident from the discussion that a written pact of compromise was not favourably looked upon by many. Although, therefore, the National Pact was referred back to the Committee, no further action was taken in the matter.

Gandhi's heart was naturally filled with sadness and sorrow when he found that the citadel of Hindu-Muslim unity which he had built and regarded as based on strong and stable foundation, tumbled down like a house of cards. He completely broke down at the news of the tragedies of Gulburga and Kohat. After passing two restless nights in pain he decided to do penance in the shape of a fast for 21 days. While staying at the house of Muhammad Ali at Delhi, he commenced the fast on 17 September, 1924. The news was received

with great concern all over the country. Muhammad Ali, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Swami Shraddhananda issued an invitation to some 200 All-India leaders of all parties and communities to attend a Conference at Delhi to devise ways and means to restore communal amity and thereby save the life of the Mahatma. There was a ready response to this invitation and prayers were offered in temples, mosques and even churches,—the Metropolitan of India himself conducting the prayer in Delhi.

Nearly three hundred delegates met at the Unity Conference at Delhi on 26 September. Motilal Nehru presided and a number of resolutions were passed. One of them clearly defined the rights and obligations of the two communities in respect of those items like cow-slaughter, music before mosque, *arati* etc., which had hitherto been the bone of contention and the immediate causes of the communal riots, as well as the more general questions like conversion or reconversion which had created bad blood between the two communities. Another resolution established a Central National Panchayat of not more than fifteen persons, with power to organise and appoint local *panchayats* to inquire into and settle all disputes and differences, including recent occurrences, where necessary and desirable. In spite of the request of the Conference to break his fast Gandhi continued it for full 21 days, till 8 October.³²

How far Gandhi's fast had any salutary effect on the communal relations may be judged by the fact that four days after Gandhi began his fast there was a serious communal riot at Shahjahanpur in which the military had to intervene and 9 were killed and about 100 injured. On October 8, when Gandhi broke his fast, there were serious communal riots at Allahabad, Kanchrapara near Calcutta, and at Sagar and Jubbulpore in C.P.

Great efforts were made by Hindu-Muslim leaders

of Upper India to restore communal amity, and a series of informal Conferences were held at Lahore under the guidance of Gandhi early in December, 1924. The discussion mainly centred round the representation of the two communities in the various legislatures. The Hindu leaders represented that the recent riots, most particularly the events at Kohat, had produced an atmosphere of coercion and intimidation, and until that atmosphere was changed, there could not be any proper settlement of this question on its merit. The Muslim leaders, on the other hand, said that the disputes over this question alone were responsible for the riots and therefore its settlement was necessary to bring about peace. This was a significant admission on the part of the Muslim leaders, and there is hardly any doubt that they spoke the truth. But, as noted above, the leaders were not prepared to face facts, and so nothing followed from these Conferences.

The Hindu-Muslim relations continued to grow worse in 1925 and 1926. No less than sixteen communal riots occurred in 1925, the most serious being those at Delhi, Aligarh, Arvi (C. P.) and Sholapur. One of the worst communal riots broke out in Calcutta on 2 April, 1926, over the question of music before mosque. The main features of the riot which continued for several days were (1) burning of houses and looting of shops; (2) stray assaults on passers-by and stabbing them; and (3) desecration of both mosques and temples. The riot continued in full fury on April 3, 4 and 5, but isolated attacks and threatening incidents continued till the 11th. According to official report, 44 persons died and 584 were injured as a result of the riots. There was a recrudescence of the riot on 22 April, the casualties being 66 killed and 391 injured. There was a third riot in Calcutta lasting from 11 to 25 July resulting in 26 deaths and 226 cases of

serious injuries. There were also riots in the interior of Bengal, at Rawalpindi and Allahabad ; and no less than five riots in Delhi. In Patuakhali, a sub-divisional town in Bengal, the Hindus offered *Satyagraha* to assert their time-honoured right of playing music before mosque.

The Government issued orders to stop music before mosque during the prayer time in Calcutta and Allahabad, and this question was debated in the Legislative Assembly, but to no effect. Motilal Nehru and Abul Kalam Azad proposed to establish Indian National Union, an organization of non-political and non-communal character, to restore communal amity, but it was a stillborn child. The Congress also asked A.I.C.C. to devise means to improve the situation. It is significant that Gandhi kept himself severely aloof from these communal questions since January, 1925. The year 1926 ended with a terrible tragedy. Swami Shraddhananda of the famous Gurukul, near Haridwar, to whom reference has been made above, was fatally stabbed on 23 December by a Muslim who entered his sick room on a false pretence.³³ Several communal riots broke out in 1927. At Kulkathi (Barisal, Bengal) a Muslim mob refused to allow passage to a Hindu procession which was permitted by the local authorities to proceed. The Police opened fire, killing 17 and wounding 12 Muslims.³⁴ Twenty-seven were killed in a communal riot at Lahore, and eleven at Bettiah in Champaran District, Bihar. It has been calculated that between 1922 and 1927 approximately 450 lives were lost and 5,000 persons were injured in communal riots.³⁵

The Statutory Commission of 1928 observes :

“Every year since 1923 has witnessed communal rioting on an extensive, and, in fact, on an increasing scale which has as yet shown no sign of abating. The attached list, which excludes minor occurrences, records no less than 112 communal riots within the last five

years, of which 31 have occurred during 1927."

The Commission also notes that the riots were not confined to a restricted area, but almost every Province was more or less affected by it. Further, the storm centres had a tendency to shift rapidly from one place to another,—from the larger to smaller towns and then to countryside.³⁶

CHAPTER V

BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDIA

I. BRITISH GOVERNMENT

The general policy of the British Government towards India, after passing the ~~Government of India Act~~ of 1919, was a strong determination to stick to the letter of the Act and not to make any further advance towards Responsible Government in India, until at least the statutory period of ten years was over. The resurgence of national spirit manifested through the Non-co-operation movement left them unmoved. The acts of violence which followed the movement were looked at by them from only a single point of view, viz. maintenance of law and order. They either would not or could not discern in the movement the germs of a popular revolt or national uprising which required a different treatment. So they resolved to crush it by naked force and practically gave a *carte blanche* to the Government of India. They shut their eyes to the veritable reign of terror which the Government of India let loose for the sake of maintaining law and order, trampling under foot the best liberal traditions of Britain. In the name of law and order they ignored all the laws and principles which centuries of effort in Britain had evolved for safeguarding the rights and liberties of the people. They ruled by lawless laws, and their iron hand had not even a velvet glove.

Signs were not wanting to indicate that the British Government had no real desire to introduce Responsible Government in India within any measurable distance of

time. Lloyd George's speech, followed by Lee Commission's Report, mentioned above,¹ cannot possibly leave any doubt that the policy of the British Government was to strengthen the I. C. S.—the steel frame on which the whole structure of the Government of India rested. Yet it is obvious to anyone that such a frame was incompatible with any structure of Responsible Government in India in the true sense of the term.

The old faith of the Indians in the sense of justice and democratic traditions of the British therefore suffered a rude shock. But faith dies hard, and there was still in the minds of many Indians a lingering hope that the Labour Party, if it ever came to power, would do justice to India. Such a hope was not without some foundation. Not only had important Labour leaders like Ramsay Macdonald and Col. Wedgwood expressed sympathetic views about the political aspirations of India, but the British Labour Party repeatedly declared from public platforms their support of the Indian demand for Home Rule. Ramsay Macdonald had sent a message to the Amritsar Congress in 1919, that when Labour comes into office it will not be bound by the objectionable clauses of the Reforms Act. Mr. Adamson, the Chairman of the Labour Party, criticized the Act of 1919 on the ground that "it does not go far enough, and that we are failing to take the people of India themselves to assist in the successful accomplishment of the great tasks we have in hand". In 1920 the Annual Conference of the Labour Party passed the following resolution: "This Conference demands the full and frank application of the principle of self-determination in the organisation of the Government of India in such a way as to satisfy all the legitimate aspirations of the Indian people." The National Executive of the Labour Party issued in November, 1922, a manifesto which said: "Labour advocates the recognition of the real inde-

pendence of Egypt and self-government of India." Even so late as 1923 Ramsay Macdonald attended the meeting at the Queen's Hall held on 17 June, to support the Indian demand of equality of status with the Dominions and delivered a long speech, in course of which he referred to the Rowlatt Act as "that stupid piece of political blundering" which "has been the cause of all the troubles". He denounced that section of the British people who had gone back on the war-time promise of self-government for India. He also declared that "most of us who have liberal minds" must accept Dominion Status for India as the "essential condition of imperial unity".²

Naturally high hopes were raised in India when the Labour Party came into office in 1924, with Ramsay Macdonald as the Premier. But these hopes were soon dashed to the ground. The Prime Minister, on assuming office, declared in unequivocal language that the Indian problems would be regarded not as party question, but as national questions. The meaning of this became quite clear from the reaction of the Labour Government to the resolution passed by the Indian Legislative Assembly in February, 1924, urging the appointment of a Round Table Conference at an early date to revise the Government of India Act of 1919.³ In a long speech on 26 February, 1924, Lord Olivier, the Secretary of State for India, outlined the views and policy of the Labour Party towards India and rejected the Indian demand on grounds which might have easily been taken out of a leaf of the Conservative book. Not even a distant echo was heard of the liberal sentiments expressed by the Labour Party before 1924. The die-hard Conservatives now felt that the "trusteeship" of India was quite safe in the hands of the Labour Ministry. The Indians were reminded of two lines in a poem of Tennyson and felt that "Ministry
19V3

may come and Ministry may go, but the British policy on India goes for ever".

But the Labour Party's power of doing good or evil was shortlived. They were turned out of office as a result of the General Election at the end of 1924. It was with great glee, and not with a reasonable feeling of pride, that Baldwin pointed out to the British electorate in the election campaign against the Labour Party in October, 1924, that "the Labour Party, before it came into office, had never failed to proclaim its sympathy with the extremists of India, who in their turn were lost in amazement that the Labour Party has not yet, in familiar parlance, "delivered the goods".

The parting kick of the Labour Government was the sanction of the Bengal Ordinance of 25 October, 1924. Lord Olivier was under no illusion as to the nature of the Ordinance. Three months after the Labour Government was replaced by the Conservatives, he himself raised the question in the House of Commons and indicated that the Ordinance practically took away any protection for liberty established by British law. He even quoted the following passage from observations of Blackstone to support his view :

"To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom. But confinement of the person"—that is precisely what this Ordinance aims at—"by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings are known or forgotten, is a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government, and yet sometimes, when the State is in real danger, even this may be a necessary measure. But the happiness of our Constitution is that it is not left to the executive power to determine when the

danger of the State is so great as to render this measure expedient. For it is the Parliament only or a legislative power, that, whenever sees proper, can authorise the Crown, by suspending the Habeas Corpus Act for a short and limited time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so doing".⁴

The coming of the Conservatives to power therefore meant no change of policy. Lord Birkenhead became Secretary of State for India, and the somewhat mysterious episode of his negotiations with C.R. Das has been noted above⁵. In a speech on 7 July, 1925, he reiterated the old British policy towards India. He reminded the British people that "of the 440 millions of British citizens, who constitute the British Empire, 320 millions are Indian. The loss of India would mean a shrinkage in the Empire from 13,250,000 to less than 11,500,000 square miles."

Regarding the Indian aspirations for Responsible Government he observed : "The Act of 1919 was admittedly an experiment. We shall not be diverted from its high obligations by tactics of restless impatience. The door to acceleration is not open to menace. Still less will it be stormed by violence....I should, however, be failing in my duty if I did not make plain my clear and definite impression that the tactics hitherto pursued by the most highly organized party in India could not have been more happily conceived if they had been subtly intended to forward the cause of reaction....To talk of India as an entity is as absurd as to talk of Europe as an entity, yet the nationalist spirit which has created most of our difficulties in the last few years is based upon the aspirations and claims of a Nationalist India. There never has been such a nation. Whether there ever will be such a nation, the future alone can show..... If we withdraw from India tomorrow, the immediate

consequences would be a struggle, *a l'outrance*, between the Moslems and the Hindu population."

Referring to the demand for an earlier revision, Birkenhead said: "There will be, there can be, no reconsideration, until we see everywhere among the responsible leaders of Indian thought, evidence of a sincere and genuine desire to co-operate with us, in making the best of the existing constitution.

Lord Birkenhead then defended the policy of the Government in ignoring the decisions of the Legislatures, which apparently was in conflict with the British traditions of liberal and democratic principles. He reminded the intractable members of the Indian Legislatures who refused to support the Government "that, while we have obligations in respect of the voters who number only some eight and a half millions, we have also obligations in respect of the two hundred and fifty millions in British India of whom we are the responsible guardian, and, in a less degree, in respect of the seventy millions in the Indian States."

In conclusion Birkenhead assured his peers that "There is no Lost Dominion" and "There will be no Lost Dominion."⁶

Such was the British Policy towards India in 1925 and such it continued to be for the next fifteen years. There was no vital difference between the Conservative and the Labour Party in this respect. Lord Olivier wholeheartedly endorsed the views of Birkenhead and felt sure that Birkenhead's speech "would be a message of encouragement and sympathy to India for which the community would be grateful to him." It is hardly necessary to add that Birkenhead's speech, and specially the support to it by Labour spokesmen, were strongly resented in India.

It is, however, only fair to add that no exception can be taken to the policy so clearly and accurately

expounded by Birkenhead if we look at it from the point of view of the British alone. For we must remember that the retention of absolute control over India was not merely an imperial sentiment ; it was a question of life and death to the British people. Eminent British statesmen like Churchill dinned into the ears of the British public that every man in Britain out of five was maintained by India. It was evident, specially after the first World War, that England could not maintain her position of supremacy in world politics, unless she could control the resources of India to her benefit. So there was a deadly struggle in British mind between the abstract love of liberty and the instinct of self-preservation. Two most powerful forces in human nature were pitted against each other and the result was a grim tragedy.

II. THE BRITISH PEOPLE

The general attitude of the British people towards India continued to be as before, viz, one of general indifference. The small section which interested itself on Indian questions consisted mostly of die-hard Conservatives, backed up by the retired members of the Indian Civil Service, with a sprinkling of genuine sympathisers for Indian political aspirations.

Among the last the Indians should always remember with gratitude the active sympathy shown to their political aspirations by Col. Wedgwood, Mr. Lansbury, Mr. Scurr, Mr. Pethick Lawrence, and Major Grahame Pole, among others, who often protested against wrongs and injustices to India. But their number could almost be counted on one's fingers and they exercised no influence either on the Government or on the people of Britain.

Nothing more strikingly illustrates the general British attitude towards India than the sympathy and support which General Dyer received from all classes including a Judge of the Court.

The whole episode of Dyer—his brutal measures, the light punishment inflicted upon him, the condonation of his conduct by the House of Lords, and the acclamation of praise with which his inhuman conduct was greeted by Englishmen and English women, both in India and England—illustrates, as nothing else could, the racial arrogance of the English people and the little regard or consideration which they had for Indians as a whole. The verdict of Justice McCardie, in the Defamation Case instituted by Sir Michael O'Dwyer against Sir Sankaran Nair, fully approving of the conduct of Dyer, as well as his whole conduct in the case, shows that even the traditional sense of justice which characterized the British people was sacrificed at the altar of imperialism. The conduct of McCardie could be explained as an individual case of aberration of mental and moral faculty—his reference to the congratulation of Sikh priests as an argument for the defence of Dyer's conduct can hardly be regarded as anything else—but the approval of his findings by the rank and file of the Conservatives clearly demonstrates the moral canker of the British people at large.

The nineteenth century imperialism was still going strong among the English people. After winning the Defamation Case against Sir Sankaran Nair, tried by Judge McCardie, referred to above, and a British jury, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, of the Panjab notoriety, wrote an article under the caption "India at stake" and issued it to the Press. It was full of misstatements and misrepresentations of Indians, deliberately propagated to alienate the British sympathy, whatever there was, from the national aspirations of the Indians. It was circulated and applauded all over England, and its reaction upon British opinion may be judged from the comment of the *Sunday Express*: "In the last resort we hold India by the sword, and as guardians of civilization we dare not let it slip from our grasp."

Mrs. Besant, who was then in England, issued a rejoinder to O'Dwyer's statement. It was couched in very mild language, but pointed out the inaccuracies in O'Dwyer's statement. No British paper printed it except Mr. Brailsford's paper, *The Standard*.⁷ This is an eloquent testimony to the lack of fairness and sense of justice displayed by the British people in any matter concerning India.

But some Britishers were more honest and straightforward, and less hypocritical than the *Sunday Express*. Thus Joynson-Hicks said: "We conquered India by the sword, and by the sword we should continue to hold it—I am not such a hypocrite as to say we hold India for the Indians. We went with a yardstick in one hand and sword in the other, and with the latter we shall continue to hold them helpless while we force the former down their throats." ⁸

III. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

The policy of the Government of India is sufficiently indicated by the repressive laws and attitude towards the Indian demands for political reforms, to which reference has been made above in the preceding Chapters. The Government was almost entirely dominated by the bureaucracy, and the personality or views of the Governor-General counted for little. The bureaucracy never felt any interest in the real welfare of the country, and regarded the sole duty of the Government to be to maintain law and order or rather the supremacy of the British in India. Their attentions were directed mainly to two ends; first, to nullify the effect of the Reforms Act as far as possible without tearing off the mask; and, secondly, not only to maintain the existing power, privileges, and prerogatives, but also to increase them by various means.

Like autocracies in every age and in every part of the world, the Government of India carried on a system

of ruthless oppression in the name of law and order. It will be hardly any exaggeration to say that practically throughout the period from 1908 to 1947, with rare intervals, India was governed by what has been aptly described as a set of lawless laws.

Almost every demand in Legislatures for the repeal of repressive laws was resisted by the bureaucracy on the ground that law and order cannot otherwise be maintained. If this contention were true it can only be interpreted as a failure and breakdown of administration.

In taking recourse to naked force as the only means of ruling India, the Government of India occasionally descended below the level of a standard which every Government, deserving the epithet civilized, is reasonably expected to maintain. The gradual development of the iniquitous methods of the Government of India has been summed up in a remarkably lucid manner by a man of the stamp of Sir Sankaran Nair who cannot be accused of either extremism in politics or bias against the British Government in India. If he had any bias at all it was in favour of that Government, as was evidenced by his open accusation of Gandhi and his methods. The adverse judgement of such a man against the Government of India cannot be lightly set aside, and no excuse is therefore needed to reproduce a lengthy extract from one of his articles, published in an English paper, after the Bengal Ordinance was promulgated on 25 October, 1924.

“When the Partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon and the steps taken by Sir Bamfylde Fuller to suppress the protest against it threw Bengal into a ferment, the “agitators” of Bengal were prosecuted before the ordinary civil courts of the country. In the majority of cases the prosecution failed, because in the opinion of the High Court the case was supported by false witnesses ; it was proved that the police were guilty of suppressing true evidence ;

it was proved that they manufactured evidence in various ways—for example, by placing bullets in incriminating places, and by introducing bombs into the dwelling places of the accused. The High Court found also that certain District Magistrates lent their countenance to Police pressure on witness, and that Sessions Judges in many cases convicted against the evidence. All this appears in the published reports of the cases which are available to any one who desires details.

“The Indian Government availed themselves of the war to pass the Defence of India Act, which it is now sought to revive. Under this Act.....a man might be arrested and kept indefinitely in jail (or interned in a particular locality) without being brought to trial. For those who were to be tried new courts were or could be constituted and new laws of evidence or procedure were prescribed..... The Rowlatt Act, a repetition of the Defence of India Act, was responsible for an agitation unexampled in India. The Punjab...rose in fury: Amritsar, Lahore, Jallianwalla massacres, indiscriminate arrests, trials and convictions which recall the days of Jeffreys in England followed...India lost faith in England...Then the Labour Party came into power. In India there were great hopes...Events have belied these expectations...But no one expected they would go farther and revive a measure which has been responsible for a terrible conflagration and has destroyed England’s moral supremacy and Englishmen’s influence for good. This Act, as I have pointed out, would destroy freedom of speech, of the Press, and of the person. Trials would become a farce. The Labour Party had a great opportunity. They have not risen to the occasion.”⁹

Among the Provincial Governors, Lord Lytton attained an unenviable notoriety by his ill-judged pronouncements. Addressing a Police parade at Dacca, he said: “The thing that has distressed me more than anything else since I

came to India is to find that mere hatred of authority can drive Indian men to induce Indian women to invent offences against their own honour merely to bring discredit upon Indian policemen." ¹⁰ Such an insinuation against the womanhood of India which, from its very nature, is incapable of being satisfactorily proved, naturally provoked an outburst of indignation all over India, and merely proves the depth of degradation to which an English gentleman, not to speak of a British Peer, could descend for maintaining the prestige of the police which was the only bulwark of his Government. No wonder that the Bengal Provincial Conference passed a resolution that he was unfit to hold the office of Governor.¹¹ But the very next year he was appointed acting Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

The inhuman treatment of the detenus, i. e. persons kept in detention without any trial, is one of the most tragic chapters of British rule in India and recalls the memory of barbarous methods pursued by tyrannical rulers in Medieval Europe. Numerous tragic episodes concerning the lot of these detenus were regularly brought to the notice of the Government through petitions and public press, but without any result.¹²

Reference may be made in this connection to a Memorial sent to the Secretary of State for India on July 25, 1924, by some State Prisoners detained in Bassein Jail. It unfolds a gruesome picture of the diabolical method pursued by the Government of India in selecting victims for the lawless laws, the real purpose lying behind wholesale arrests and detention without trial, the farcical procedure of framing charges against them, the so-called judicial scrutiny of the evidence by judges *in camera*, the inhuman treatment of the detenus—all of whom were educated persons belonging to respectable classes of society,—and above all the network of *agents provocateurs*, maintained by the rapidly growing Secret Service with the selfish object of provoking

commitment of crimes in order to justify the organization, the use of the manufactured revolutionary crimes to serve the political end of putting down legitimate activities for the upliftment of the masses and constitutional agitation for gaining self-government. As a pen-picture of the barbarous medieval methods pursued by the British Government in India in the twentieth century, drawn by actual victims from their own knowledge and experience, this document is of great historical importance.¹³ It may be argued that the account proceeds from an interested party, but exactly the same charge lies against the Government version. It is necessary to read both in order to form an impartial opinion on the question. But the Memorial does not stand alone.¹⁴ It has been generally corroborated by the writings and oral accounts of many high-souled patriotic Indians who spent the best years of their lives in detention camps or British jails. The author of this book has taken great pains to ascertain the truth by interrogating a large number of respectable persons, still living, who had personal experience of such life, and have at the present moment no motive or inducement to misrepresent the British Government or exaggerate their iniquities. Every available evidence indicates that in the name, and under the disguise, of suppressing revolutionary crimes, the British Government adopted the most unscrupulous methods to stifle national urge for freedom and inflicted upon the helpless detenus behind the iron curtain varieties of physical torture, a knowledge of whose diabolical nature would shock the civilized world.^{14a}

The policy of 'Divide and Rule' guided the British officials as before. Reference has been made above to the observations of Nevinson about the distinct partiality shown by the British officials to the Muslims as against the Hindus.¹⁵ Far more damaging was the statement of Lord

Olivier. Shortly after he ceased to be the Secretary of State for India, he made the following comments, in a letter to *The Times*, on the communal riots in India : "But there are other causes of the increasing faction fighting. No one with close acquaintance of Indian affairs will be prepared to deny that on the whole there is a predominant bias in British officialism in India in favour of the Moslem community, partly on the ground of closer sympathy, but more largely as a makeweight against Hindu Nationalism."

When challenged in the House of Lords by both Birkenhead and Lord Reading, he made the following observations, among others, in explaining his position : "But what I did say—it is based upon what I have heard from a great many Englishmen who have served in India and from a great many Indians who have a very good reputation in India—was that there is an official bias in favour of the Mahomedan community...I will give you an example. When the Hindu-Muslim pact was made it was a pact which strengthened the probability of an advance towards Swaraj policy in India. A very large number of persons, officials and others in India, regard the advance towards the self-governing Swaraj policy as a movement deleterious to British interest in India, and I say confidently that when the Hindu-Muslim pact broke up, there was a distinct satisfaction on the part of those persons both in this country and in India who were opposed to the Nationalist movement, that the pact had broken up and that there should be political dissensions among those affected."¹⁶

IV. THE ANGLO-INDIANS

The non-official British population in India, who, for the sake of convenience, may be referred to as 'Anglo-Indians', constituted, during the period under review, an unofficial anti-Indian wing of the British bureaucracy in India. The

same causes which alienated the British officials also operated in their case, for they also stood to suffer, in material prospects as well as in prestige and status, with each stage of real political advance in India. But being free from official restraints they could more easily give vent to their anti-Indian feelings. They were the loudest in the denunciation of any reforms or concessions granted to India and took every means in their power to thwart them. The European Associations, in many cases, proved the evil geniuses of Indian bureaucracy and Governments, and evidence is not lacking of their reactionary influence even on high officials. There is also indisputable testimony to their unholy alliance with various sections of Indian people in order to check the constitutional advance of India.

The Anglo-Indians never forgot that though they were in India, they were not of India, and their interests were adverse to those of the Indians. Hence they were opposed tooth and nail to Reforms of 1919 and offered continuous, strenuous and persistent opposition at every step of political reforms. Like all Colonials of an imperial country they were the greatest enemies of the true interest of India, for the very simple and obvious reason that as India politically advances their material prospects, power and prestige almost necessarily decline. The older generations of Anglo-Indians could afford to be generous or indifferent as they had no reasonable apprehensions of any political regeneration of India. The Anglo-Indians of the twentieth century were faced with a national reawakening of the Indians, of the portents and possibilities of which their local knowledge made them fully conscious. They had to gird their loins to fight against it for the sake of their own interests.

Nothing illustrates more strikingly the great changes that had come over the Englishmen in India than the tone of their newspapers. Even the *Statesman and Friend*

of *India* had no longer the least claim to the title though it was more moderate than the *Englishman* of Calcutta, which, as its name implied, correctly represented the views of typical Colonial Englishman. The *Statesman* ceased to be friend of India and became the accredited representative of the Anglo-Indian imperialism.

Apart from the imperial policy, one finds that the general attitude of haughtiness, arrogance and insolence, displayed by the Englishmen in India towards her people, was as characteristic a feature in the twentieth century as in the nineteenth.¹⁷ This has been very critically reviewed by Henry W. Nevinson who paid a short visit to India during the *Swadeshi* movement. He writes : "The attitude of the vulgar among Anglo-Indians towards the people of the country would be incredible to any one who had not seen it and the vulgar are a large and increasing class."¹⁸ As in the nineteenth century, so in the twentieth, even decent young Englishmen, fresh from home, rapidly joined the crowd of their vulgar countrymen. The process is thus described by Nevinson. "They increase by a kind of infection, and the deterioration of a new-comer who has been sent out with the usual instincts of our educated classes in favour of politeness and decency is often as unconscious as it is rapid.....At first they are astonished that Anglo-Indian opinion not only permits but imposes so ill-bred a manner in intercourse with "natives", but the astonishment soon wears off, and the infection of arrogance catches them as a matter of course."¹⁹ But an almost irresistible social pressure also facilitated the conversion. The new arrivals from England would be socially ostracized, if they did not fall in a line with the vulgar Anglo-Indians in their attitude towards the Indians. As Nevinson puts it, many of the young Englishmen and English women were driven to conform to the code of insolence established by the Anglo-Indians, for it is too much to expect that a

young man fresh from home would choose "to cut himself off altogether from the society and amusements of his own people", or "stand alone against feminine dislike and masculine views of good form", and be altogether indifferent to "personal reputation or advancement."²⁰ So Gresham's law operated in Anglo-Indian society and turned the good coin out of the market in favour of the bad. It is still within living memory how a young Britisher belonging to the I. C. S. married a daughter of a very distinguished Indian, well-known for advanced Anglicised mode of life, and for this offence could not rehabilitate himself into the Anglo-Indian society, not to put it more bluntly.

If the insolence of the Anglo-Indians continued as before, its exhibition also conformed to the old style. To quote again from Nevinson's book : "On almost every railway journey one sees instances of ill manners that would appear *too outrageous* for belief at home. But it is the same *throughout*. In hotels, clubs, bungalows, and official chambers, the people of the country, and especially the educated classes, are treated with an habitual contumely *more exasperating than savage persecution*."²¹ There is no doubt that there were also Englishmen possessing good manners, but Nevinson very truly observes : "But one's mere delight in finding them proved their rarity."²²

The social estrangement between the two races, which rapidly increased after Port Said was left,²³ soon made its influence felt also in political and even judicial spheres. A few cases noted below, which are merely illustrative and not exhaustive, show that as in the nineteenth century, so in the twentieth, there was one standard of justice for the Indians and another for the Englishmen.

Sir Walter Strickland, a British Baronet, wrote in 1913 : "The other day, in Lahore, an English or Scottish person of the name of Stirling murdered his Indian servant in the most cowardly and treacherous manner. He first

kicked him out of the room, and then shot him in the back. I cited this case in a letter home to illustrate British even-handed justice.....with the following comment: 'This cowardly scoundrel will be as certainly acquitted, without a stain upon his honour, as the unfortunate servant would have been swung without mercy, if the crime had been the other way'. We have just had the sentence : Mr. Stirling was sentenced to one month's simple imprisonment.'²⁴

The three following incidents were reported in a single year—1921.

1). Khoreal Shooting Case—A European planter of Assam shot at the father of a coolie girl whom he wanted for his lust, but in the trial the European jury acquitted him.

2). A British Major at Sialkot, travelling with his wife without ticket, entered a Railway compartment occupied by some Indians and forced them to leave.

3). Lt. House at Agra forced some Indian First class passengers to leave the compartment by threatening them with a revolver. He was simply fined by the court.²⁵

Nevinson found it disconcerting to discover a prevailing and uneasy suspicion in India that British justice could not safely be trusted. Referring to a few recent instances, he observed : "Killing no murder, outrage no crime, when Indians are concerned and Englishmen are culprits—that was the common conclusion, and it was not unnatural".²⁶ The instances cited above, which may be multiplied almost to any extent, prove that the conclusion was absolutely right, being based on unimpeachable evidence, and that it was a tradition handed down from the nineteenth century.

To complete the analogy between the two centuries, reference may be made to the rabid writings in Anglo-Indian Journals, inspired by racial hatred. Here is a

specimen from the *Asian* of Calcutta. Commenting on the unsuccessful attempt of two Bengali revolutionaries to murder Kingsford, to which reference has been made above, this Anglo-Indian weekly wrote on 9 May, 1908 :

"Mr Kingsford has a great opportunity, and we hope he is a fairly decent shot at short range. We recommend to his notice a Mauser pistol ..We hope Mr Kingsford will manage to secure a big 'bag', and we envy him his opportunity. He will be more than justified in letting daylight into every strange native approaching his house or his person, and for his own sake we trust he will learn to shoot fairly straight without taking his weapon out of his coat pocket.²⁷"

On this Nevinson comments : "I have seen violent and bloodthirsty passages translated from the *Yugantar*, the *Sandhya*, the *Hitaishi* of Barisal, and other vernacular papers. Such papers are fined, suppressed, have editors imprisoned, and under the new Press Act may have their type confiscated. But in none of them have I seen more deliberate attempts to stir up race hatred and incite to violence than in Anglo-Indian papers which suffer nothing. Take, for instance, this obvious instigation to indiscriminate manslaughter by the *Asian*" (and he quotes a long passage including the lines quoted above).²⁸

Referring to the *Englishman* and the *Civil and Military Gazette*, the two leading Anglo-Indian papers, respectively of Calcutta and Lahore, Nevinson observes that "it must have been difficult for any thoughtful Indian who loved his country to read them during 1907 without cursing our race."²⁹

Even Gokhale, the Prince of Moderates, remarked that the insolence of the Anglo-Indian papers like these two "towards our people goes beyond all bounds."³⁰

The British attitude towards India, of which a brief account has been given above, has a great bearing on the

history of freedom movement in India. The niggardly policy of granting too little concessions, and that too not until it was too late, sustained the struggle for freedom even though many leading politicians in India were loyal and staunch supporters of the British rule. They placed great faith upon the Liberal party in England in 1906, but their disappointment gave rise to the Extremists. They again hoped a great deal from Montagu, but the Government of India Act and the Rowlatt Acts practically ruined the Moderate party which they represented. The final coup *de grace* was given by the conduct of the Labour Government in 1924. The British politicians gradually realized their folly, but then it was too late. The Earl of Halifax, speaking on the second reading of the Indian Independence Bill in 1947, made the very melancholy but apposite remark : "All too often in India has British policy suffered the frustration and condemnation of "to little and too late".

But the other aspect of the British attitude, viz. the insolence and arrogance of Englishmen in India, of which a few instances have been given above, was no less an important factor. The discrimination made by the Judiciary and the Executive between the Indians and the Englishmen, both as regards individual crimes as well as the writings in the press, made the Indians lose faith in English integrity and sense of justice, the two main qualities that sustained the British power in India. Few Englishmen realize even today that the impunity with which their countrymen could kick or kill the Indians, treating them more as chattels than human beings, and the stories of their unprovoked assault upon men and unpunished outrages upon women perhaps did far more to undermine the British authority in India than an abstract love of freedom and liberty on the part of the Indians.

CHAPTER VI,

THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT

A EVENTS LEADING TO THE MOVEMENT

I. THE SIMON COMMISSION

The communal riots in and after 1923 merely highlighted the slump in the political activity and decadence in public life which were brought about by Gandhi's action in suspending Civil Disobedience and Non-cooperation movement in 1922. Fortunately for India's struggle for freedom, the fatal inertia that had practically put an end to all its outward activities, was removed by an action of the British Government, namely the appointment of Simon Commission in 1928.

The genesis of the Commission may be briefly told. The Government of India Act, 1919, contained a provision that at the end of ten years after its passing, the working of the Reforms introduced by it should be inquired by a Commission with a view to determining what further action, if any, should be taken to extend, modify or restrict the degree of responsible government then existing. As mentioned above, several attempts were made by Indian leaders of different parties, to accelerate the pace of political progress by revision of the Reforms at an earlier date without waiting till December, 1929, which would complete the statutory period of ten years from the passing of the Act. But the Government of India and the British Government had steadily refused to concede the demand. Suddenly, on November 8, 1927, the British Prime Minister sprang a great surprise upon the Indian

public by announcing the decision of the British Cabinet immediately to constitute the Commission. The motive was apparent to everybody. The life of the British House of Commons would expire in 1929, and there was a growing probability that the new election would return the Labour Party to power. It was generally held in Britain that a Labour Government would be more sympathetic to Indian demands, and perhaps go further in conceding reforms than would be compatible with the vested interests of Britain in India. It was, therefore, considered safer to appoint the Commission forthwith and thus forestall the Labour Government. Thus, as Srinivasa Iyengar, the President of the Congress, put it, "When a Commission was wanted the British Government would not give it ; but they would impose upon the Indian people a Commission which is not wanted and when it is not wanted."

This was not, however a very serious question. But the sting was in the tail. The Prime Minister announced at the same time that the Commission would be composed of seven British members of the Parliament including Sir John Simon, the Chairman. The exclusion of Indians from a body which was to prepare the future constitution of India was so unnatural and unreasonable, that the announcement was received with profound disappointment and righteous indignation by all political leaders in India, irrespective of their party affiliations, and they unanimously decided to boycott the Commission. Never before, within living memory, did the Indian political leaders hold a common view on such an important political issue.

The Congress point of view was expressed as follows by its President S. S. Iyengar : "The reasons for the boycott are of the most cogent description. Indian people, as the Congress has rightly claimed, are entitled to determine their own Constitution either by a Round Table Conference

or by a convention Parliament. That claim has been definitely negated by the appointment of the Commission. That is the most important reason not only from the Congress point of view but from the point of view, I am certain, of all the Indian political parties which concurred in the two resolutions of the Legislative Assembly of 18th February, 1924, and 8th September, 1925. That of course is the fundamental objection. The second reason is that we cannot be parties to an inquiry into our fitness for Swaraj or for any measure of responsible government. Our claim for Swaraj is there and it is only a question of negotiations and settlement between the British Government and the Indian people. The third reason is undoubtedly the affront to Indian self-respect involved in the deliberate exclusion of Indians from the Commission.”¹ The general attitude of the Indians towards the Commission was thus eloquently put by Sapru in his Presidential Address “I do not think a worse challenge has been thrown out ever before to Indian nationalism, and notwithstanding the profuse assurance in Mr. Baldwin’s speech and the yet more profuse assurances in Mr. Ramsay Macdonald’s speech, Indian nationalists of the Moderate school have been compelled to ask if the only way of recognizing the spirit of co-operation is by telling Indians that their lot is to be none other than that of petitioners, that they cannot be trusted to participate in the responsibility of making recommendations to Parliament for the future of their country, and that all that they may aspire to is to put their proposals before the Commission which may accept them or reject them, and again to repeat the same process of persuasion, argument and discussion before the Joint Committee of Parliament. Now, if this is what is meant by co-operation, if this is the new idea of equality of status on which we are to be fed, if our patriotism is a prejudice and if the patriotism of the seven Members of Parliament is to be

treated as impartial justice, then we Liberals feel justified in telling the Government here and in England, 'You may do anything you like in the assertion of your right as supreme power, but we are not going to acquiesce in this method of dealing with us. Neither our self-respect nor our sense of duty to our country can permit us to go near the Commission,'²

While the proposal of boycotting the Simon Commission was adopted by all political parties, the Indian National Congress suggested some practical measures to make it effective. These included (1) mass demonstrations all over India on the day the members of the Commission set foot in this country, and similar demonstrations in every city on the day it was visited by them ; (2) refusal of legislatures to elect their own Committees to co-operate with the Commission or helping their inquiry in any way, (3) rejection of the demand for grant in connection with the Commission, and (4) social boycott of the members of the Commission.

The Congress organization made the boycott a great success. On February 3, 1928, the day of the arrival of the Commission in Bombay, complete *hartal* was observed in all important towns in India, and huge demonstrations marched in processions waving black flags and carrying banners with the words, "Go back, Simon," inscribed on them. Of the numerous public meetings of protest held on that day the one held at Bombay was the most memorable. Over fifty thousand people were assembled in the Chaupatti beach, and political leaders of different parties strongly condemned in one voice the action of the British Cabinet.

On February 16, 1928, Lala Lajpat Rai moved a resolution in the Assembly to the effect that as the scheme of the Commission was unacceptable to the House it would have nothing to do with it at any stage and in any form.

The resolution, supported by an overwhelming majority of elected members, was passed amid cries of "Bande Mataram." The effect of it was, however, somewhat marred by the attitude of the Council of State which elected representatives to participate in the Joint Conference. In the various Provincial Councils, also, the Government succeeded with the help of the official votes in constituting Committees to co-operate with the Commission. The Nationalist members in each Council strongly opposed the motion for the appointment of Committees and then walked out and took no part in any further proceedings in connection with these Committees.

II. ATTEMPTS MADE BY INDIAN LEADERS TO DRAFT THEIR OWN CONSTITUTION.

There is no cloud without a silver lining. Even the universally abused Simon Commission produced at least one good effect on Indian politics. It induced the Indian leaders seriously to think about formulating a scheme of Indian Constitution acceptable to all parties. This feeling was quickened by the open challenge of Lord Birkenhead to the Swarajist party "to produce a constitution which carries behind it a fair measure of general agreement among the great peoples of India." The question was taken up by the Indian National Congress in its Madras session in 1927. It passed a resolution authorizing the Working Committee to confer with similar committees appointed by other organizations, political, labour, commercial and communal, to draft a *Swaraj* constitution for India, and to place the same for consideration and approval before a special Convention to be convened in Delhi not later than March, 1928, consisting of the All-India Congress Committee and the leaders and representatives of the other organizations mentioned above, and elected members of the Central and Provincial Legislatures.

The idea was fully approved by the All-India Liberal Federation and the Muslim League in their annual sessions which met, respectively, at Bombay and Calcutta shortly afterwards. In compliance with the directions contained in the Madras Congress resolution quoted above, the Working Committee issued invitations to a large number of organizations.

Many of these organizations sent representatives to the Conference which held its first meeting on 12 February, 1928, at Delhi under the Chairmanship of Dr. M. A. Ansari. After crossing many hurdles, chiefly created by the difference between Hindu and Muslim points of view, the All-Parties Conference, which met at Lakhnau from 28 to 31 August, 1928, accepted the very detailed recommendations of a Committee appointed by it under the Chairmanship of Pandit Motilal Nehru.

The essential features of the Constitution framed by the Nehru Committee may be summed up as follows :

1. The form of Government should be Responsible, that is to say, a Government in which the Executive should be responsible to a popularly elected Legislature possessing full and plenary powers.

2. The sovereign Parliament should consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, the former to consist of 200 members elected by the Provincial Councils by the method of proportional representation, and the latter of 500 members elected on the basis of adult franchise. The powers of Parliament were to be analogous to those of the Dominions.

3. The communal representation in the Legislatures was to be regulated on the following basis :

- a. There shall be joint mixed electorates throughout India for the House of Representatives and the Provincial Legislatures.

- b. There shall be no reservation of seats for the

House of Representatives except for Muslims in Provinces where they are in a minority and non-Muslims in the N. W. F. Province.

In the Provinces,

c. There shall be no reservation of seats for any community in the Panjab and Bengal.

d. In other Provinces there will be reservation of seats for the minorities on the basis of population with right to contest additional seats.

But the unanimity shown at the Lakhnau Conference did not last long. When the All-Parties' Convention met in Calcutta on 22 December, 1928, the Muslims made new demands, and it was now for the first time that Muhammad Ali Jinnah emerged as the leader of the community.

Jinnah began his political career in the school of Gokhale and was an adherent of the Congress up to the Non-co-operation movement (1920-21). He was an able debater and a top rank political leader. But, as he himself put it, the mysticism of Gandhi was too great a mystery for him. He was also opposed to the orthodox and reactionary Muslim parties. So, out of sheer disgust, he left politics, went to England and made up his mind to settle in that country. A story runs that he was piqued by a casual remark of Jawaharlal Nehru to the effect that 'Jinnah has ceased to count in politics', and decided to return to India in order to show that he was still an important factor to reckon with. Whatever we might think of the story, there is no doubt that Nehru held a very poor opinion of the character and ability of Jinnah as a politician³ and also that when Jinnah returned in October, 1928, he was a completely changed man and at once gave a new turn to Muslim politics in India. He first made himself the undisputed head of the Muslim League, of which he became the lifelong President. There were other

Muslim parties led by Aga Khan and Muhammad Shafi, and there was also the Central Khilafat Committee. But Jinnah's undoubted abilities as a Parliamentarian and an organizer soon brought him into the forefront of Indian politics as the leader of the strongest and most representative Muslim party.

When the constitution, drawn up by the Nehru Committee and unanimously accepted at the Lakhnau Conference came up for discussion at the Calcutta Convention, Jinnah, on behalf of the Muslim League, put forth the following three suggestions, among others, in the form of amendments :

1. The Muslims should have one-third representation on the Central Legislature.

2. The Panjab and Bengal Legislatures should have Muslim representation on the population basis for ten years, in the event of adult suffrage not being granted.

3. Residuary powers should be vested in the Provinces and not in the centre.

After an acrimonious debate the amendments of Jinnah were lost and he left the Convention in protest. Next day the Sikhs also withdrew their support and the Convention was adjourned *sine die*.

Jinnah now joined the more reactionary section of the Muslims led by Aga Khan and Muhammad Shafi and an All-Parties' Conference of the Muslims was held in Delhi on the first of January, 1929. It passed a long resolution supporting the separate electorate as existing at the time, and the first and the third amendment of Jinnah mentioned above. It also demanded that no bill, resolution, motion or amendment regarding inter-communal matters may be moved, discussed or passed by any Legislature, Central or Provincial, if a three-fourth majority of members of either the Hindu or the Muslim community affected thereby in that Legislature oppose the introduction, discussion or

passing of such bill, resolution, motion or amendment.

Apart from the Muslims, some sections of Sikhs, non-Brahmins and Backward and Depressed communities also did not fully approve of the Nehru Constitution, and even the Christians, while expressing general approval, were of opinion that it did not sufficiently safeguard the interest of minorities. On the other hand, it should be remembered that eminent Muslim leaders like Dr. Ansari, Sir Ali Imam, the Maharaja of Mahmudabad and many others approved of the Nehru Constitution and the scheme for communal representation adopted in it. The same thing may be said of the other minority communities and organizations. Besides, the All-India Liberal Federation, an all-India political body next in importance only to the Indian National Congress, gave its blessings to the Nehru Constitution.

It is often ignored, while emphasizing these differences, that there was complete unanimity among all in respect of the chief object of the constitution, viz. the establishment of a fully Responsible Government in India. Although the younger section demurred to it and asked for complete independence, the difference was one of sentiment rather than of substance, for the Nehru Constitution fully provided for the government of Indians, by the Indians, and for the Indians. The discussion following the publication of the Nehru Constitution and criticisms directed against it revealed the all-important fact that on the question of immediate grant of Responsible Government, the whole of India stood united, the difference being only in respect of details.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted, the sentiment of complete independence gradually gained ground. As mentioned above, the Indian National Congress had declared independence as India's goal in the Madras session in 1927. Since then it was reaffirmed in the Provincial Conferences

of the Panjab, Delhi and U. P. A very interesting incident took place when the question was being discussed by the U. P. Muslim All-Parties' Conference held at Kanpur in November, 1928. When some members opposed the goal of independence, the women delegates, from behind the *Purdah*, sent a written statement to the President saying that if men had not the courage to fight for national independence, they would come out of *Purdah*, and take their place in the struggle for independence. This had the desired effect and the resolution declaring independence as goal was passed with one single dissentient voice, that of (Sir) Muhammad Shafi. The younger section led by Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose organized an Independence League and carried on propaganda in favour of independence.⁴

This nation-wide sentiment for independence also found expression in the annual session of the Indian National Congress in Calcutta in December, 1928. In view of the strong sentiment held on the subject, Gandhi, by way of compromise, suggested that the Dominion Status be accepted provided the British Parliament accepts the Nehru Constitution in its entirety within a year. He therefore moved the following resolution :

"This Congress having considered the Constitution recommended by the All-Parties' Committee Report welcomes it as a great contribution towards the solution of India's political and communal problems and congratulates the Committee on the virtual unanimity of its recommendations, and, whilst adhering to the resolution relating to Complete Independence passed at the Madras Congress, approves of the Constitution drawn up by the Committee as a great step in political advance, specially as it represents the largest measure of agreement attained among the important parties in the country.

"Subject to the exigencies of the political situation, this Congress will adopt the Constitution if it is accepted

in its entirety by the British Parliament on or before the 31st December, 1929, but in the event of its non-acceptance by the date or its earlier rejection, the Congress will organise a campaign of non-violent Non-co-operation by advising the country to refuse taxation and in such other manner as may be decided upon.

“Consistently with the above, nothing in this resolution shall interfere with the carrying on in the name of the Congress of the propaganda for Complete Independence.”

But even though Gandhi declared that he would join the movement for independence in case the ultimatum given by the Congress is rejected, his proposal was vigorously opposed by the younger section led by Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose. An amendment was moved by the latter to the effect that the Congress would be content with nothing short of independence. The amendment was lost by 973 votes to 1350. Even as it is, the large number of votes cast in opposition to veteran leaders like Gandhi and Motilal Nehru shows the rising strength of the Left Wing in the Congress. But Subhas Bose claimed even some thing more, and observed: “The amendment was lost by 973 votes to 1350—but the vote could hardly be called a free one, as the followers of the Mahatma made it a question of confidence and gave out that if the Mahatma was defeated, he would retire from the Congress. Many people therefore voted for his resolution. not out of conviction, but because they did not want to be a party to forcing the Mahatma out of the Congress.” Bose believed that the decision of the Congress was a mistake. For while “only madness or folly could have led one to hope that the mighty British Government would concede even Dominion Home Rule without a struggle,” the Congress let slip the great opportunity of commencing it while “there was tremendous enthusiasm all over the country.” He pointed out that attendance in the Calcutta Session was the largest since the inception of the Congress and the President-

elect on arrival was given "an ovation which would excite the envy of Kings and dictators." "Everyone had expected the Congress to act boldly." and "a procession of 10,000 workers visited the Congress pandal to demonstrate their solidarity with the struggle for national freedom." "But all these signs of upheaval made no impression on the leaders," for "while the country was ready, the leaders were not." "The Mahatma, unfortunately for his countrymen, did not see light" and his "temporising resolution" "only served to kill precious time." "The decision that should have been made soon after the appointment of the Simon Commission—and certainly not later than the Calcutta Congress—was not made till the Lahore Congress in December, 1929. But by then the situation was to deteriorate."⁵

The above reflections of Bose no doubt represent the views of the Left Wing of the Congress led by Jawaharlal and himself. But sufficient data are not available to pass any judgement on the value or justice of their criticism, for apart from the great enthusiasm displayed by a large body during the Congress session, which, after all, cannot be regarded by itself as a very important factor, it is difficult to maintain, on the basis of known facts, that a struggle begun early in 1929 would have been a wiser course, or even had any better chance of success than that achieved by the campaign of Civil Disobedience launched in 1930.

III. OTHER ACTIVITIES IN 1929.

The Compromise Resolution of the Calcutta Congress put a stop to active political agitation in 1929, but the ardour and enthusiasm for national struggle found an outlet in other directions. First, there was a sudden revival of revolutionary activity.⁶ It may be mentioned that Lala Lajpat Rai was severely struck by the Police on

30 October, 1928, while leading an anti-Simon demonstration at Lahore, and his death, shortly afterwards on 17 November, was generally believed to be due to the blow he received. Mr. Saunders, who was the Assistant Superintendent at the time, was assassinated at Lahore. A bomb was thrown in the Assembly Hall at Delhi during a sitting, and two young men, Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Dutt, were arrested for the crime. A large number of young men were also arrested all over India and an All-India Conspiracy Case was started at Lahore about the middle of 1929. Bhagat Singh was a nephew of Ajit Singh and leader of the Youth movement in the Panjab, and the fearless and defiant attitude shown by him and his comrades during their trial made a deep impression on the public. Prisoners headed by Bhagat Singh resorted to hunger strike as a protest against their treatment in prison. When their condition became serious there was an intense agitation throughout India. Besides an intensive Press Campaign, meetings and demonstrations were held all over the country demanding humane treatment of political prisoners. Ultimately all the hunger-strikers agreed to take food, except one young man, Jatin Das of Calcutta, who stuck to the last, and died on September 13, 1929. The news of his death produced a wave of intense grief and commotion all over India. As his dead body was removed from Lahore to Calcutta for cremation, thousands assembled at every Railway Station to pay their homage. The most touching of the numerous messages received on the occasion was one from the family of Terence McSwiney, the Irish revolutionary, who had met his death under similar conditions. The laconic message ran : "Family of Terence McSwiney have heard with grief and pride of the death of Jatin Das. Freedom will come." It is somewhat remarkable that Gandhi did not approve of

the hunger-strike. He studiously omitted any reference to the martyrdom of Jatin Das in his speeches and writings and no mention of it was made in his *Young India*.⁸ But Jatin Das did not sacrifice his life in vain. Even the Government was moved for the time being, and promised to revise the regulations about political prisoners. The regulations were ultimately changed, and the prisoners were divided into three classes in respect of the treatment in jails. In actual practice, however, not much improvement was effected in the lot of political prisoners.⁹

The death of Jatin Das also gave a fillip to the Youth Movement. Throughout 1929 Youth and Student organisations grew up all over India and Congresses and Conferences were held at Calcutta, Poona, Ahmadabad, Lahore, Nagpur, Amraoti, and several places in Madras. In December, 1929, an All-India Congress of Students was held at Lahore, presided over by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya.¹⁰

In addition to revolutionary activities and Youth movements, there continued, throughout the year 1929, widespread unrest in the labour world resulting in numerous strikes, mostly organized by the Communist Party in India, to which reference has been made above.¹¹

In the meantime a heavy gale was blowing in the Congress camp. In Bengal the repeated defeats of the Ministry led to the dissolution of the Bengal Legislative Council in May, 1929. Pandit Motilal Nehru, the leader of the Congress party in the Legislative Assembly, instructed the Bengal Congress Party to fight the elections. This they did with the result that the Congress Party came back with added strength, and some of the Nationalist Muslims, defeated in the election of 1926, regained their seats. But suddenly on 15 July, 1929, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution calling upon the Congressmen to resign their seats. There were many surprising fea-

tures in it. In the first place, no attempt was made to invite the opinions of the Congress Parties in different legislatures, nor was even any notice given to them of the proposed change. Secondly, even Motilal Nehru acquiesced in the resolution, though only two months before he had encouraged the Bengal Congress Party to fight the elections and enjoined upon them to recapture some of the Muslim seats. The All-India Congress Committee, to which the question was referred for final decision, met on 26 July, 1929, rescinded the resolution, and referred the whole question to the Congress. But the coalition of Motilal Nehru and Gandhi in favour of the boycott of the Council plainly showed the emergence of Gandhi and his creed once again into active politics of the Congress. The backing up of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru for the Presidentship of the next Congress was another important manoeuvre on the part of Gandhi. Jawaharlal had been a devoted follower of Gandhi, but since his return from Europe in December, 1927, he called himself a Socialist and joined the Left Wing. As mentioned above, he and Subhas Bose led this Wing, maintained the Independence League and openly opposed Gandhi in the Calcutta Congress. But somehow or other Gandhi won him over, and after he accepted the Presidentship of the Congress he became a consistent and unfailing supporter of Gandhi. Thus Subhas Bose and Nehru parted company and the former remained the sole leader of the younger section and the Left Wing of the Congress. There was also a split in the Congress rank in Bengal. There, too, a section under J.M. Sen Gupta became devoted adherents of Gandhi, and Subhas Bose remained the leader of the other. Though Subhas was thus isolated, he continued his duty as a Left Wing leader by organizing opposition to Gandhi on important questions of public policy.

IV. THE VICEROY'S DECLARATION OF 31 OCTOBER, 1929.

In June, 1929, the Labour Party came into Power in Britain. Ramsay Macdonald, the Prime Minister, invited the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, to London for consultation. Evidently, by a sort of pre-arrangement, Sir John Simon wrote to the Prime Minister asking for the extension of the terms of reference so that the methods for the adjustment of future relationship between British India and the States might be fully examined by the Commission. Simon further suggested that after the publication of the Commission's Report, a Conference should be arranged between the representatives of His Majesty's Government and representatives of British India and the States, for the purpose of seeking the greatest possible measure of agreement for the final proposals to be submitted by the Cabinet to the Parliament. The Cabinet agreed to both the suggestions and Lord Irwin returned to India. Shortly after his arrival he issued a statement on 31 October, 1929.

It referred to the Cabinet's acceptance of Simon's proposals and the summoning of a Conference on the lines proposed by him. But the most important part of his statement is the following declaration : "I am authorized on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly that, in their judgment, it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's Constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status."

This declaration was strongly criticized by a powerful section of the British Press, and both the Conservative and Liberal Parties were opposed to it. A debate was raised on the statement in both Houses of Parliament, and though it was generally conceded that the Dominion Status should be regarded as the ideal, the issue of the declaration at that moment was regarded as unwise and

fraught with danger. The Secretary of State won a technical victory, as the declaration was held to be unassailable in theory, and he even remarked in course of a fighting speech, that the Birkenhead spirit no longer inspired or characterized the policy of the Government towards India. But the debate made it quite clear that in the face of the combined opposition of the two great parties the Government would not dare to take any immediate step towards Dominion Status. Indeed the Government assured the Parliament that conditions of conceding further reforms as laid down in the declaration of 1917 held good until they were changed by Parliament.

The declaration was, however, very favourably received in India. Coming as it did after the ultimatum of the Congress, due to expire on December 31, the Viceroy's statement, taken as a whole, was naturally interpreted in India as a conciliatory gesture on the part of the Labour Government to offer Dominion Status before the Congress unequivocally declares in its next session for independence and complete severance of relations with Britain. A Conference of the leaders of all parties was held at Delhi in November, and in accordance with the decision of an overwhelming majority, a manifesto was issued under the signature of the most prominent leaders, including Gandhi and Motilal Nehru. It expressed appreciation of the sincerity underlying the Viceroy's pronouncement and offered co-operation to evolve a Dominion Constitution for India. The signatories expressed their belief that the business of the proposed Round Table Conference would be 'not to discuss when Dominion Status is to be established, but to frame a scheme of Dominion Constitution for India.' They also urged that a general amnesty should be declared before the Conference meets, and the Indian National Congress should have predominant representation in the Conference. The Left Wingers were opposed to this

manifesto. Jawaharlal at first did not agree to sign it, and even intended to issue a counter-manifesto together with Subhas Bose. But Gandhi prevailed upon him to sign the leaders' manifesto. A separate manifesto was, however, issued over the signature of Dr. S. Kitchlew (Lahore), Abdul Bari (Patna) and Subhas Bose opposing the acceptance of Dominion Status and participation in the Round Table Conference. But the leaders' manifesto (known as Delhi Manifesto) won the general approval and support of the country as a whole. It is interesting to note, however, that Jinnah's reaction to the Viceroy's declaration on October 31, 1929, was somewhat different. He felt satisfied at the declaration of Dominion Status as goal and with the procedure of the Round Table Conference for thrashing out the details. Moreover, Jinnah also agreed with a section of the Moderates who regarded as unwise the apparent implication in the Delhi Manifesto that the Congress would not co-operate if the conditions stated were not satisfied. Indeed this was made clear beyond doubt by the Working Committee which regarded the conditions as *sine qua non* for any co-operation and further stated that the offer held good only up to the date of the next Congress. Jinnah, along with the Moderates, thought that the conditions were desirable maximum, but should not be insisted upon to the point of refusing co-operation.

So far as the Congress was concerned, the Delhi Manifesto was merely a preliminary step to an interview between the Viceroy and Gandhi, accompanied by Motilal Nehru, which had already been arranged by Vithalbhai Patel. The two Congress leaders, who met the Viceroy on December 23, sought for a definite assurance that Dominion Status would be granted to India. But the Viceroy was unable to give that assurance. It is generally believed that this was due to the strong opposition in

Britain to the Viceroy's declaration of October 31, 1929, mentioned above.¹²

A foreign writer, Louis Fischer, referring to this interview, has described how, in the meantime, Lord Reading led a combined Tory and Liberal attack in Parliament against the policy of the Labour Government who could not command a majority in the House of Commons. So on December 23, the Viceroy told Gandhi, Jinnah, and others who met him, "that he was unable to prejudge or commit the (Round Table) Conference at all to any particular line."¹³

But whatever may be the reason, no guarantee of immediate Dominion Status was forthcoming, and the two Congress leaders returned empty-handed. Gandhi now declared himself definitely for independence, and thereby, after nearly seven years, regained his position of undisputed supremacy in the Congress. "I have burnt my boats" said, he.

V. THE CONGRESS SESSION OF 1929.

The Congress met at Lahore in December, 1929, in a tense atmosphere. There was an intense fervour all over the country over the impending declaration of independence—a fervour increased, rather than kept down, by the indiscriminate arrests of political workers by the Government. The choice of Jawaharlal Nehru, an embodiment of youthful ardour and indomitable enthusiasm for independence, lent a majestic glamour to the vast concourse assembled at the Congress Pandal. The resolution which embodied the spirit of the audience was worded as follows :

"This Congress endorses the action of the Working Committee in connection with the Manifesto signed by party leaders, including Congressmen, on the Viceregal pronouncement of the 31st October relating to Dominion Status, and appreciates the efforts of the Viceroy towards a settlement of the national movement for Swaraj. The

Congress, however, having considered all that has since happened and the result of the meeting between Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Motilal Nehru and other leaders and the Viceroy, is of opinion that nothing is to be gained in the existing circumstances by the Congress being represented at the proposed Round Table Conference. This Congress, therefore, in pursuance of the resolution passed at its session at Calcutta last year, declares that the word 'Swaraj' in Article I of the Congress Constitution shall mean Complete Independence, and further declares the entire scheme of the Nehru Committee's Report to have lapsed, and hopes that all Congressmen will henceforth devote their exclusive attention to the attainment of Complete Independence for India. As a preliminary step towards organising a campaign for Independence, and in order to make the Congress policy as consistent as possible with the change of creed, this Congress resolves upon complete boycott of the Central and Provincial Legislatures and Committees constituted by the Government, and calls upon Congressmen and others taking part in the national movement to abstain from participating directly or indirectly in future elections, and directs the present Congress members of the Legislatures and Committees to resign their seats. This Congress appeals to the nation zealously to prosecute the constructive programme of the Congress, and authorises the All-India Congress Committee, whenever it deems fit, to launch upon a programme of Civil Disobedience, including non-payment of taxes, whether in selected areas or otherwise, and under such safeguards as it may consider necessary."

There is no doubt that the proposed revival of Civil Disobedience in the Lahore Congress was Gandhi's handiwork. He was somewhat upset by the recrudescence of violence in the country¹⁴ and thought that the best way of preventing it was to canalize the resurgent spirit of youth into a

non-violent campaign. He stated that "Civil Disobedience alone can save the country from impending lawlessness and secret crime, since there is a party of violence in the country which will not listen to speeches, resolutions, or conferences, but believes only in direct action."

As regards the adoption of independence as the goal of India it may be doubted whether Gandhi was really converted to the idea. It has been suggested that his heart was not in it, but he adopted this merely to fall in with the majority. Subsequent events seem to support this view.^{14a}

Yet, for the time being, the Left Wing of the Congress seemed to have won over Gandhi to its ideal and the Congress session of Lahore set a seal upon the future destiny of India. The new ideal, irrevocably adopted by the nation, was hailed with befitting solemnity. An epic grandeur was added to it when, as the clock struck midnight on December 31, and the date of ultimatum issued by the Congress expired, the President of the Congress came out in a solemn procession to the banks of the Ravi and hoisted the tri-colour flag of Indian independence in the presence of a mammoth gathering that faced the biting cold of Lahore winter to witness the historic scene. "As the flag slowly went up the staff, a thrill of joy shook the vast audience, and imbued them with a new hope and a distant vision of the glorious future of India."

The Nehru Constitution got a decent burial in the hands of the Congress at Lahore. Apart from discarding Dominion Status in favour of the goal of complete independence, the Congress also definitely rejected its recommendations about the solution of the communal problem. The resolution by the Congress ran as follows :

"In view of the lapse of the Nehru Report it is unnecessary to declare the policy of the Congress regarding communal questions, the Congress believing that in an independent India communal question can only be solved

on strictly national lines. But as the Sikhs in particular, and the Muslims and the other minorities in general, had expressed dissatisfaction over the solution of communal questions proposed in the Nehru Report, this Congress assures the Sikhs, the Muslims and other minorities, that no solution thereof in any future constitution will be acceptable to the Congress that does not give full satisfaction to the parties concerned."

Bereft of jugglery of words, it plainly put a premium on the intransigence of the communalists by giving them a power of veto on any proposed solution of the communal problem. The Congress should have realized by this time that it was beyond human ingenuity to devise a scheme of communal settlement which would "give full satisfaction to the parties concerned." The Congress, by passing the Lahore resolution, practically precluded itself from accepting any Constitution that might be proposed in future; and it is difficult to imagine a more amazing instance of a political *harikari* than was done by the greatest political organization in India in 1929. It is no less amazing that this and other aspects of the Lahore resolutions received very little attention from the leaders and people who seem to have been carried away by the formal declaration of the ideal of complete independence.

Apart from the great impetus given to the sentiment for independence, the value of the Lahore Congress may justly be questioned by a discerning critic. Although independence was declared to be the goal, no definite programme for achieving it was laid down. Indeed no thought seems to have been bestowed on the all-important question of how to attain independence.¹⁵ The old twin armours,—the negative one, the boycott of Councils, and the positive one, the Civil Disobedience—were called into being, without any thought to avoid the pitfalls which caused

their failure in the past. Everything indicated the revival and triumph of the old Gandhite party. The ground they had lost by the success of the Swarajya Party in 1923 was once more gained, but no proper consideration was given to the good that the Swarajya party had done in the past and might do again in future. The defeat sustained by Gandhi on this point in the All-India Congress Committee in July, only five months before, was now avenged—due mainly to the hopeless split in the Congress organization in the Provinces, specially Bengal, which was a stronghold of the Swarajya Party. It is interesting to note that whereas in July both J. M. Sen Gupta and Subhas Bose offered a strenuous opposition to Gandhi's proposal, now the former supported the policy of boycott of Councils.

As regards the positive weapon of Civil Disobedience, no programme was fixed,—neither the date of its commencement nor the nature of its operation. Everything was nominally left to the All-India Congress Committee but practically to Gandhi. As one studies the activities of the Congress from this time onward no doubt is left on one's mind that once more the Congress had surrendered its judgement to the safe-keeping of Gandhi. Undeterred by the past experience of hopeless muddles in which Gandhi placed himself and the great national organization on more than one occasion, he was chosen to be the Dictator, a position which he maintained, with rare intervals, during the next thirteen years. The saint Gandhi had once more triumphed over the statesman Gandhi. Nehru observes : "He (Gandhi) did give us the impression that civil disobedience, when it came, need not be stopped because of a sporadic act of violence..... This assurance went a long way in satisfying many of us."¹⁶

Such an understanding must have been vague and of a personal or private character.

Some incidents following the Congress session left no doubt that Gandhi had seriously set upon his task of dominating the Congress. By winning over Jawaharlal he had considerably weakened the Left Wing of the Congress which alone dared raise its voice against him. A further step in the same direction was taken by him when he deliberately excluded all the Left Wingers, including Srinivasa Iyengar and Subhas Bose, from the new Working Committee. There was a strong feeling in the All-India Congress Committee that at least these two should be retained, but Gandhi proved adamant. He declared that he wanted a Committee that would be completely of one mind, i.e., his mind. However desirable this ideal might be in an Executive Body like the Cabinet, it was hardly appropriate to a deliberative body, at least to the extent to which Gandhi carried it. The hands of the All-India Congress Committee were forced as Gandhi wanted that his list should be voted as a whole. He practically made it a question of confidence, and as the All-India Congress Committee was unwilling or unable to sacrifice his leadership it had to accept his demand.¹⁷

The new Working Committee met on January 2, 1930. The first thing that it did was to take steps to implement the Congress resolution on the boycott of Councils. It called upon the Registered voters to compel the resignation of those who might not respond to the Congress appeal for resignation, as well as to refrain from participating in the ensuing elections to the Legislatures. As a result of the Congress mandate, by February, 1930, 21 members of the Legislative Assembly resigned along with 9 from the Council of State and 142 from the Provincial Legislatures, namely Bengal, 34 ; Bihar and Orissa, 31 ; C. P., 20 ; Madras, 20 ; U. P., 16 ; Assam, 12 ; Bombay, 6 ; Panjab, 2 ; Burma, 1.

In order to hold up the ideal of independence before the nation the Working Committee decided that 26th of

January should be observed all over India as the *Purna Swaraj* Day (day of full independence). A manifesto, prepared by Gandhi and adopted by the Working Committee, was to be read on that occasion to the people in the villages and towns all over the country, and the assent of the audience was to be taken by show of hands. It read as follows :—

“We believe that it is the inalienable right of the Indian people as of any other people, to have freedom and to enjoy the fruits of their toil and have the necessities of life so that they may have full opportunities of growth. We believe also that if any Government deprives the people of these rights and oppresses them, the people have a further right to alter it or to abolish it. The British Government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom but has based itself on the exploitation of the masses, and has ruined India economically, politically, culturally and spiritually. We believe therefore that India must sever the British connection and attain *Purna Swaraj* or complete independence.

“India has been ruined economically. The revenue derived from our people is out of all proportion to our income. Our average income is seven pice (less than two-pence) per day, and of the heavy taxes we pay, 20 per cent. are raised from the land revenue derived from the peasantry, and 3 per cent. from the Salt Tax which falls most heavily on the poor.

“Village industries, such as hand-spinning, have been destroyed, leaving the peasantry idle for at least four months in the year, and dulling their intellect for want of handicrafts ; and nothing has been substituted, as in other countries, for the crafts thus destroyed.

“Customs and currency have been so manipulated as to heap further burdens on the peasantry. The British manufactured goods constitute the bulk of our imports. Customs duties betray clear partiality for Bri-

tish manufactures, and revenue from them is used not to lessen the burden on the masses but for sustaining a highly extravagant administration. Still more arbitrary has been the manipulation of the exchange ratio, which has resulted in millions being drained away from the country.

“Politically, India’s status has never been so reduced as under the British regime. No reforms have given real political power to the people. The tallest of us have to bend before foreign authority. The rights of free expression of opinion and free association have been denied to us, and many of our countrymen are compelled to live in exile abroad and cannot return to their homes. All administrative talent is killed, and the masses have to be satisfied with petty village offices and clerkships.

“Culturally, the system of education has torn us from our moorings and our training has made us hug the very chains that bind us.

“Spiritually, compulsory disarmament has made us unmanly, and the presence of an alien army of occupation, employed with deadly effect to crush in us the spirit of resistance, has made us think that we cannot look after ourselves or put up a defence against foreign aggression, or even defend our homes and families from the attacks of thieves, robbers and miscreants.

“We hold it to be a crime against man and God to submit any longer to a rule that has caused this fourfold disaster to our country. We recognise, that the most effective way of gaining our freedom is not through violence. We will therefore prepare ourselves by withdrawing, so far as we can, all voluntary association from the British Government, and will prepare for civil disobedience, including non-payment of taxes. We are convinced that if we can but withdraw our voluntary help and stop payment of taxes without doing violence even under provocation,

the end of this inhuman rule is assured. We therefore hereby solemnly resolve to carry out the Congress instructions issued from time to time for the purpose of establishing Purna Swaraj.”¹⁸

Thus, every Indian was to make a declaration of complete independence and take a pledge of loyalty to the Indian National Congress and to the sacred fight for India's liberty.

The Independence Day was solemnly observed and evoked great enthusiasm all over the country. But the ink with which the manifesto was written had hardly dried when Gandhi issued a statement in his paper, *Young India*, which, by no stretch of imagination, could be made compatible with the annual declaration.

He enumerated eleven items of administrative reforms and appealed to the Viceroy in the following words : “This is by no means an exhaustive list of the pressing needs, but let the Viceroy satisfy us with regard to these very simple but vital needs of India. He will then hear no talk of Civil Disobedience ; and the Congress will heartily participate in any Conference where there is a perfect freedom of expression and demand.” One might rub his eyes with wonder and ask himself,—is it the same Gandhi who refused to attend the Round Table Conference save on the express promise of the grant of Dominion Status ?

Again, however important might be the specific reforms demanded by Gandhi,¹⁹ does it lie in the mouth of those who were pledged to fight for *Purna Swaraj* or complete freedom, to bargain over certain administrative reforms under the British Government and promise to abandon the fight as soon as these reforms were conceded ? It is impossible to discover any consistency between Gandhi's statement and the Congress resolution on any rational basis. Curiously enough, the official history of the Congress, written by a devoted admirer of Gandhi, mentions Gandhi's

statement and enumerates the eleven points, but has not a word to say about its incongruous character. On the other hand, he deepens the mystery by saying that the eleven points comprise the terms which Gandhi communicated to Bomanji who undertook to negotiate with Mr. Ramsay Macdonald as early as January, 1930.^{19a}

Evidently, Gandhi's statement did not attract serious notice as the country was passing through excited times. Arrests were going on and Subhas Bose and eleven others were sentenced to imprisonment for a year. The under-trial prisoners in Mirat were committed to the Sessions. A large number of Congress members had defied the mandate to resign the seats in the Legislatures.

The Working Committee met again at Sabarmati on February 14-16 and passed the following resolution on Civil Disobedience :

"In the opinion of the Working Committee, Civil Disobedience should be initiated and controlled by those who believe in non-violence for the purpose of achieving *Purna Swaraj*, as an article of faith, and as the Congress contains in its organisation not merely such men and women but also those who accept non-violence as a policy essential in the existing circumstances in the country, the Working Committee welcomes the proposal of Mahatma Gandhi and authorises him and those working with him who believe in non-violence as an article of faith to the extent above indicated, to start Civil Disobedience as and when they desire and in the manner and to the extent they decide. The Working Committee trusts that when the campaign is actually in action, all Congressmen and others will extend to the civil resisters their full co-operation in every way possible and that they will observe and preserve complete non-violence notwithstanding any provocation that may be offered. The Working Committee further hopes that, in the event of a mass movement taking place, all

those who are rendering voluntary co-operation to the Government, such as lawyers, and those who are receiving so-called benefits from it, such as students, will withdraw their co-operation or renounce benefits as the case may be and throw themselves into the final struggle for freedom.

"The Working Committee trusts that in the event of the leaders being arrested and imprisoned, those who are left behind and have the spirit of sacrifice and service in them will carry on the Congress organisation and guide the movement to the best of their ability."²⁰

The Working Committee thus authorised only Gandhi and his followers in faith to start Civil Disobedience. But the AICC, which met at Ahmadabad on March 21, 1930, i.e. after Gandhi had begun his march for Dandi, not only endorsed the resolution of the Working Committee, but somewhat widened its scope. They expressed the hope "that the whole country will respond to the action taken by Gandhi" and authorised "the Provincial Congress Committees to organise and undertake such Civil Disobedience as to them may seem proper and in the manner that may appear to them to be most suitable."

B. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE MOVEMENT

I. VIOLATION OF SALT LAWS

The whole country was agog with excitement over the Civil Disobedience movement decided upon by the Working Committee. All eyes were turned towards the Sabarmati Ashram, for Gandhi alone could determine the hour, place, and the precise issue on which the Civil Disobedience campaign would be launched. But while the country was in a state of animated suspense, Gandhi could not make up his mind. Asked by poet Rabindra Nath, he said: "I am thinking furiously, day and night, and I do not see any light coming out of the darkness." At last light dawned upon him six weeks later. He decided

to launch the *Satyagraha* campaign by manufacturing salt at Dandi, a village on the sea-coast in Gujarat about 200 miles from Sabarmati, and thereby openly break the salt-law. He wrote a long letter to the Viceroy on March 2, 1930, communicating this decision.²¹ This letter must be regarded as a curious document from whatever point of view one may look at it. After enumerating the evils done by the British Government, more or less on the lines indicated by his "Eleven Points,"²² he asked for immediate removal of those evils. As an eminent historian has rightly observed: "For a lay man, who is not a saint, the eleven points and the letter are in clear contradiction of the Lahore Resolution."²³ This was recognized by the Congressmen who were not blind devotees of the Mahatma. The letter perplexed even Jawaharlal Nehru, who was constrained to remark: "What was the point of making a list of our political and social reforms when we were talking in terms of independence? Did Gandhiji mean the same thing when he used this term as we did, or did we speak a different language?"²⁴ Here Jawaharlal hit upon the real crux of the problem. It is evident from Gandhi's letter that though he supported 'independence' (*Purna Swaraj*) he had no clear conception of it, as distinct from the Dominion Status. In any case he did not distinguish between the two, as is clear from his letter to the Viceroy. Lest the Viceroy dismiss his appeal on the ground of the Congress resolution on Independence, he reassured him: "But the resolution of Independence should cause no alarm, if the word Dominion Status mentioned in your announcement had been used in its accepted sense. For, has it not been admitted by responsible British statesmen that Dominion Status is virtual independence?"

All this must appear as very strange to an ordinary mortal, unacquainted with the ways of saints, when he

remembers that Gandhi, who wrote this letter, fought a battle royal against the Left Wing members in the Congress session of 1928 on the issue of Independence vs. Dominion Status. Indeed Gandhi's letter to the Viceroy lends colour to the supposition that he supported the Congress resolution on Independence in deference to the wishes of the majority, but his heart was not in it. Nor was he really anxious for coming to a final issue with Government. After announcing that if his letter makes no appeal to the Viceroy's heart to the extent of removing the evils of British rule enumerated by him, he would proceed with his followers to disregard the Salt Laws on the eleventh day of March, he added: "If you will care to discuss matters with me and if to that end you would like me to postpone publication of this letter, I shall gladly refrain, on receipt of a telegram to that effect soon after this reaches you." Gandhi took special care to send the letter by a messenger, Mr. Reginald Reynolds, a young Englishman living in the Ashram at Sabarmati. The letter can by no means be reconciled with the Congress resolution either in letter or in spirit. It does not speak the language of a fighter or of a politician, but that of a saint. Lord Irwin had no fear of the saint, and assumed a strong patronizing and almost a dictatorial tone in his brief reply to Gandhi. He refused to see Gandhi and regretted that he (Gandhi) should have been "contemplating a course of action which was clearly bound to involve violation of the law and danger to the public peace." Even to this Gandhi sent a rejoinder: "On bended knees I asked for bread and received a stone instead. *The English Nation responds only to force*, and I am not surprised by the Viceregal reply. The only public peace the Nation knows is the peace of the public prison."²⁵

The die was cast and there was now no retreat. Gandhi decided to start on foot from Sabarmati, with a band of selected volunteers, and march by stages to

22V3

Dandi, more than 200 miles distant, to manufacture salt in defiance of law. For about a week the Sabarmati Ashram witnessed a concourse of thousands of visitors, including leading Indians and newspaper correspondents from different parts of India as well as from abroad. It presented a unique spectacle.

On March 12, 1930, Gandhi with 79 male and female members²⁶ left the Sabarmati Ashram on foot and reached the sea at Dandi on 5 April. It was a veritable triumphal progress. The villagers flocked from all sides, sprinkled the roads, strewed leaves on them, and as the pilgrims passed, sank on their knees. Over three hundred village headmen gave up their jobs. Early on the morning of the sixth of April Gandhi and his party dipped into the sea-water, returned to the beach and picked up some salt left by the waves. It was a technical breach of law but the way in which the whole thing was managed was of great significance. The slow march over 241 miles in 24 days with full publicity to the world that it was a deliberate act of defiance to the mighty British Government, made a profound appeal to all—both leaders and masses—, and as Gandhi intended, it was a signal to the nation. Salt laws were broken in many places, salt was made in pans in the cities, and mass arrests and other repressions followed. Sixty thousand political prisoners were put in jails. Indians remained non-violent despite beatings, kicks and arrests.²⁷

Whatever one might think of the inexplicable vacillations of Gandhi on the eve of his projected expedition to Dandi, it must be admitted that the plan was a grand conception and it was superbly executed with a consummate skill. The slow march on foot from village to village was, by itself, an automatic and intensive propaganda carried on in the neighbourhood, and roused the entire countryside to a realistic sense of the coming struggle for Swaraj contemplated by the Congress. As wide publicity

was given in the press to every detail of the march and display of the unique devotion to Gandhi and enthusiasm for the cause he had espoused, among the masses, the story of the 'Pilgrim's Journey to Dandi' worked up the feelings of the country as a whole, such as nothing else could. At first the Government and their henchmen looked upon the whole thing with ridicule and contempt and the editor of an Anglo-Indian Daily, the *Statesman*, made the taunting remark that "the Mahatma could go on boiling sea-water till Dominion Status was attained." But ere long this scoffing attitude changed to a nervous apprehension. The technical breach of the Salt Law by Gandhi on April 6, 1930, was a signal for the country-wide repetition of the same. Where natural conditions did not permit of the illegal manufacture of salt, violation of other laws was resorted to. J. M. Sen Gupta, the Mayor of Calcutta, defied the Law of Sedition by openly reading seditious literature in a public meeting. An intensive campaign was started on an extensive scale for the boycott of liquor and of intoxicating drugs, as well as of foreign cloth and British goods of all sorts, with the help of volunteer organization of picketers.

Besides these activities which were generally followed all over India, there were special ones in various localities. In defiance of forest laws people began to cut down timber in C. P. and Bombay. A campaign for non-payment of taxes and land-revenue was started in Gujarat, U. P. and Midnapur District in Bengal. In the North-West Frontier Province, the home of the fierce warlike Pathans, the red-shirt volunteers, organized by Abdul Ghaffar Khan (better known as Frontier Gandhi), followed, in a non-violent manner, an intense anti-Government movement in various ways including non-payment of taxes.

But Gandhi made the violation of salt-law his chief object. He announced his intention of raiding the salt depot

of Dharsana in Surat District. As usual he communicated his decision in a long letter to the Viceroy and again requested him "to remove the salt tax and the prohibition on private salt-making." Otherwise, said he, he would reluctantly set out for Dharsana with his followers and demand possession of the Salt Works. But before Gandhi set out for Dharsana, he was arrested and put into prison. Abbas Tyabji took up Gandhi's place as leader of the Salt *Satyagrahis*, but he was also arrested. Then Sarojini Naidu hurried to Dharsana and directed the raid on May 21. 2500 volunteers from all parts of Gujarat took part in it. A series of raids were made on the Wadala Salt Depot. It began on May 22, but the most demonstrative raid took place on June 1 when nearly 15,000 participated in the action.²⁸ Many other Salt raids took place. Everywhere the volunteers were mercilessly beaten and arrested in large numbers, to which detailed reference will be made later.

On April 10, 1930, Gandhi had made a special appeal in his paper *Young India* to the women of India to take up the work of picketing and spinning. The effect was almost miraculous. Thousands of women responded, and even those of orthodox and aristocratic families, who had never before come out of their seclusion, offered themselves for arrest and imprisonment. It took by surprise not only the Government but even the Indians themselves. Miss Mary Campbell, who had carried on temperance work in India for forty years, has vividly described the awakening of the women in Delhi where alone 1600 women were imprisoned. Dhangopal Mukherjee has given a lively description of a meeting in Bombay where a large number of ladies of high class were holding a *purdah* meeting to discuss the situation, while the men were waiting on the other side of the screen dividing the two. The decision of the ladies was announced in

a practical manner by suddenly removing the screen, and exposing them in the full glare of light to the gaze of the bewildered throng of men. Foreign tourists in India, like H. N. Brailsford and G. Slocombe, deeply impressed by the great change that had been wrought on the women-folk of India, almost overnight, observed that if the Civil Disobedience movement had accomplished nothing else but the emancipation of the women of India, it would have fully justified itself. The awakening of women not only added to the number of civil resisters to a considerable extent, but their examples also redoubled the energy and activities of the men and spurred them on to greater efforts and sacrifices for the country.

II. THE TERRORISM OF GOVERNMENT

Before a month had passed since the opening of the campaign by Gandhi, the Government realized the gravity of the situation caused by a wide national movement, and struck hard, in a ruthless manner. The Working Committee of the Congress, in its meeting on 21st January, 1931, gave a summary of the brutal measures in the following appreciation of the sufferers : "The Committee takes this opportunity to record its high appreciation of the courage and firmness with which the men and women and even the children of the country have faced Government persecution that is accountable for the imprisonment of about 75 thousand innocent men and women, numerous indiscriminate and brutal *lathi*-charges, various forms of torture even of those in custody, firing resulting in the maiming and deaths of hundreds of people, looting of property, burning of houses and marching of moving columns of armed Police and *sawars* and British soldiers in several rural parts, depriving people of the right of public speech and association by prohibiting meetings and processions and declaring Congress and allied associa- tions unlawful, forfeiting their movables and occupying their houses and offices."²⁹ For the sake of convenience

the Government measures may be reviewed under three separate heads :

1. Repressive Laws.

i. On April 27, 1930, the Government passed an Emergency Ordinance, called Press Ordinance, reproducing the stringent provisions of the repealed Press Act of 1910. According to an official statement in July, 1930, securities aggregating to two lakhs and forty thousand rupees were taken from 131 newspapers, and nine newspapers declined to pay and suspended publication.³⁰

ii. The Congress Organizations were declared unlawful and Government was authorized to confiscate their property.

But these Ordinances could not paralyze the activities of the Congress organizations. As they could not function openly, their activities like raising funds, recruiting volunteers etc. were conducted in secret. Meetings and processions were held in defiance of the law, and newspapers, bulletins, leaflets etc. were printed and distributed in spite of official ban. In some places, like Bombay, Congress propaganda was carried on by means of the radio, and the Police could not locate the transmitting stations.

2. Arrests.

The defiance of law led to wholesale arrests. Even according to official figures more than sixty thousand were put behind prison bars. But this figure is somewhat misleading for it gives only the number of those who were directly charged with political offence. But many *Satyagrahis* or Civil Resisters were sentenced on charges like stealing, exercising intimidation, rioting etc., and they are not included in the above number.³¹ These false charges were not challenged as the *Satyagrahis*, true to their creed, refused to take any part in the court proceedings. The Working Committee estimated the number of those imprisoned as

75,000, as mentioned above.

Most of the leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru, were in prison, and finally Gandhi was arrested on May 4, 1930. The whole country seemed to be in gaol.

3. Terrorism by Government.

But the prosecutions under the Ordinances or 'lawless' laws formed only a minor part of the devices adopted by the Government to crush the movement. They inaugurated a veritable reign of terror and employed both Police and the military to cow down the people by most ruthless and indiscriminate brutal assaults on unarmed and unresisting men and women. The atrocities committed by the agents of the Government beggar all description. The heads of unarmed men and women *Satyagrahis* were the target of blows from heavy sticks, either iron-shod or covered with leather, which could, and often did, split the skulls. In many localities the Congress agencies had to set up hospitals and organize ambulance corps for the victims of such brutal assault.

Not infrequently there was firing upon unarmed crowd. In answer to a question by S. C. Mitra regarding the number of cases of firing, the Hon. Mr. H. G. Haig furnished the following table.³²

CASUALTIES AMONGST THE PUBLIC.

<i>Locality</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Killed Wounded</i>		<i>Remarks</i>
Madras City	April 27th	2	6	1 died subsequently
Karachi	„ 16th	1	6	„
Calcutta	„ 1st	7	59	„
	„ 15th	...	3	„
24-Parganas	„ 24th	1	3	
Chittagong	„ 18th, 19th & 20th	10	2	Both died subsequently
Peshawar	„ 23rd	30	33	

Chittagong	„ 24th	1	...	
Madras	May 30th	...	2	
Sholapur	„ 8th	12	28	
Wadala-Salt Pans	„ 24th	...	1	
Bhendy Bazaar	„ 26th,27th	5	67	
Howrah	„ 6th	...	5	
Chittagong	„ 7th	4	6	3 died subsequently
Mymensingh	„ 14th	1	Between 30 to 40	
Midnapur (Pratapdighi)	31st	2	2	
Lucknow	„ 26th	1	42	2 died subsequently
Kalu-Jhelum Dts. Panjab	„ 18th	...	1	
Rangoon	„ Last Week	5	37	
N.W.F. Province		17	37	
Delhi	„ 6th	4	40	

A typical instance is furnished by the well-known incident at Peshawar on 23 April, 1930. There was a demonstration on the arrest of some local leaders. It was non-violent, and when the crowds were returning, several armoured cars full of soldiers rushed full tilt into the crowd, without warning, from behind; killing three people on the spot and wounding a large number. Then, it was alleged by the Government, the crowd set fire to the cars. Soldiers were at once rushed to the spot and ordered to open fire. But the crowd did not run away; hundreds of them stood their ground and faced the bullets. The number of unarmed people, killed and injured, according to Government report, were respectively 30 and 33, but the popular version put it at nearly seven to ten times that figure.

Another incident in N. W. F. P. is worth mentioning.

A company of Garhwali soldiers refused to open fire on an unarmed peaceful crowd. They were at once disarmed, and sentenced by a court martial to long terms of imprisonment, ranging from 10 to 14 years.³³

There was a second gruesome incident at Peshawar. "On 31 May, 1930, during the C. D. movement, a gentleman who was a Government servant employed in a Military Dairy, Ganga Singh Kamboj by name, was passing in a tonga in Peshawar city through the Kabuli Gate along with his children when a British Lance Corporal of K. O. Y. L. I. fired at the carriage. Two of the children,—Bibi Herpal Kaur, daughter aged 9 1/2 years, and Kaka Bachitar Singh, son, 16 months,—dropped dead like birds from a tree and the mother, Shrimati Tejkaur, was severely wounded on arm and breast, the breast being completely blown. The dead bodies of the children were taken by several thousand persons in a procession which was allowed by the Deputy Commissioner. Yet, the carriers of the bier and the funeral processionists were shot at by the Military,—without giving any previous warning to disperse,—from a distance of two yards only. The dead bodies of the children were dropped on the ground, but they were carried again and again by others. Thus 9 men were killed and 18 wounded, as per Government reply in the Legislative Assembly, from firing 17 rounds"³⁴

The Government laid the blame on the shoulders of a violent mob, but refused to hold an inquiry demanded by the public. The members of a Committee of Inquiry set up by the Working Committee and presided over by Vithalbhai Patel, who had resigned his office as President of the Indian Legislative Assembly, were not allowed to proceed to the N. W. F. P. When they collected evidence from the neighbourhood and published their Report it was banned.

It is impossible here to refer in detail to the

atrocities perpetrated by the Government. But various public organizations collected facts and published reports which unfold a tale of ruthless and savage persecution unworthy of any Government which calls itself civilized. In a letter written by Gandhi to the Viceroy, published in the *Young India* of May 8, 1930, he refers to his own experience in Gujarat, confirmed by reports from Bengal, Bihar, Utkal, U.P., Delhi and Bombay, where the *Sātyagrahis* "have been often savagely and in some cases, even indecently, assaulted." He refers to unnecessary and unprovoked firing in Karachi, Peshawar and Madras. "Bones have been broken, private parts have been squeezed," said he, "for the purpose of making volunteers give up salt." "In Bengal," he added, "unthinkable cruelties are said to have been practised in the act of snatching flags from volunteers."³⁵ In a small village in the district of Midnapore in Bengal, they still show a spot, held sacred in public memory, where an old woman, Matangini Hazra, leading a procession with a flag in her hand, was shot dead by the police. At first her right hand was shot, but she held the flag with the left, and a second bullet felled her on the ground with the flag still in her hand. Another old woman had cried out *Bande Mataram* from within her house. For this an English tommy entered the house and bayoneted her. Many other gruesome stories of similar atrocities in Midnapore and elsewhere are well authenticated from various sources. But it is not possible here to give more than a general picture interspersed with a few specific events here and there.

At Sholapur in Bombay, the volunteers undertook to maintain order and regulate traffic in the streets, and so came into clash with the police. Four or five policemen were done to death. This led to the declaration of Martial Law. Four men including a rich Seth were hanged and a large number of prisoners were sentenced to long

terms of imprisonment. Firing took place on six occasions, the casualties being 12 killed and 28 wounded.

On 31 July, 1930, a procession was taken out in Bombay in celebration of the anniversary of Tilak's death, when an order was served prohibiting it. The vast crowd of thousands then squatted on the road, and in spite of heavy rain, sat there throughout the night literally in pools of water. When the morning came, a few picked men and a hundred ladies were arrested and *lathi*-charge was made on the unarmed crowd. The arrested persons included Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, V. J. Patel, Mrs. Kamala Nehru (wife of Jawaharlal), Shrimati Mani Ben and Srimati Amrit Kaur.³⁶

The *lathi*-charge in dispersing crowds was improved upon by a new Commissioner of Police in Bombay. "On the very first occasion after his taking over charge, the *lathi*, hitherto flourished on the body, was applied to the head, and when blood began to flow and volunteers fell reeling and rolling on the ground, the spectacle of suffering was so harrowing, and at the same time so infecting, that thousands gathered from the crowds of sight-seers in the neighbourhood and the audience swelled from five to twenty-five thousands,"³⁷ But as the crowd was dispersed at one place they gathered at another, and it was a job for the police to tackle the non-violent volunteers. The Maharaja of Bikaner, who witnessed the beating of the volunteers by the police in Bombay, remarked that Martial Law was much better than *lathi*-charge.

"In Madras, the beating was so indiscriminate that on one occasion a Missionary, the Rev. F. Paton, was severely beaten in the neighbourhood of a Police Station when he was watching the picketing and *lathi*-charges from near, one evening, dressed in *Khaddar* robes and wearing a hat. This was the subject of a severe attack on the methods of the police, but neither the Government

nor the police would make reparation or even acknowledge their indiscretion. In the South, a Missionary named Mr. Khaitan was served with an order to leave India and he had to depart forthwith.

"The Police made a new departure in prosecuting people as forming an unlawful assembly, by gathering together a number of picketers from various centres, putting them in a lorry, taking them a long distance from the city, and leaving them there to find their way back as well as they could without any money. In Bombay, picketing and the sealing of foreign cloth in the shops of merchants was so rigidly carried out, that, when foreign cloth was being surreptitiously removed in lorries, a boy named Babu Ganoo stood across the lorry on the Kalbadevi Road to prevent its progress ; but whoever may have driven the car, it was driven over the boy and the boy succumbed. Ever since this event occurred, Babu Ganoo Day was being celebrated every month, and it added to the list of sacred days observed by the Congress."³⁸

"Local variations did exist, which were based upon differences of degree and kind,—due to environment, the personal equation of the officers concerned, the conditions of tenure of land and various other matters. South India had in one sense seen the worst of it. The *lathi*-charges as well as heavy fines and long-term sentences were an early feature, not a late development, of the movement. Bengal yielded the largest number of prisoners in the country. The measure of boycott of British cloth was highest in Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa, where the figures of import in November, 1930, fell by 95 per cent. as compared with those for November, 1929. We have already referred to Gujarat's unique part and performance in the drama of national emancipation. U. P. was the only Province where a general No-tax campaign was inaugurated, both the Zamindars and the tenants being called upon to withhold,

in October, 1930, payment of rent and revenue. The Punjab pulled its weight along with the rest. The whole-hearted adoption of non-violence by the N. W. F. Province was no less a moral than a political gain. In Bihar, the Chowkidari tax was withheld in large areas, and the Province suffered to the full from the imposition of Punitive Police and confiscation of large properties in lieu of petty sums. In the C. P., Forest Satyagraha was successfully launched and continued, in spite of heavy fines and Police excesses. Karnataka organised a No-tax campaign which was highly creditable to the Province. Three lacs of palm and date trees were cut down, 96 out of 130 Patels resigned in the Sirsi Taluka, 25 in the Siddapur Taluka, and 43 out of 63 in the Ankola Taluka, all in the North Kanara.

"More than 800 families participated in the No-tax campaign in the Kanara District. In the Siddapur and Ankola Talukas which suffered the worst, there were about 800 convictions including those of 100 ladies. The losses by reason of forfeiture of lands and homes, attachments of movable property and loss of crops amount to about 15 lacs of rupees.

"In Ankola and Siddapur, 330 families had their lands forfeited. The population involved was nearly 2,000. The lands forfeited were over 2,000 acres in extent, valued at over 8 lacs of rupees. 166 houses were also forfeited, valued at a lac and a half. The convictions were 218 and the movable property attached was valued at Rs. 20,000.

"Many farmers were ejected from their homes, some of which were used as camps by the Police. Hired labour from outside the Taluka had to be employed for reaping the crops from forfeited lands. There were 37 lady Satyagrahis in Siddapur, who fasted at the door of the persons who had bought the properties of the No-taxers.

The longest fast was for 31 days at Mavinagundi. There were 110 special police posted in Siddapur and punitive police in Ankola. Rs. 37,000 was realised on account of these punitive police. The special Ordinance relating to the non-payment of Revenue was applied to Kanara from January, 1932, to the end of the Campaign, though it was not applied in the later period to Gujarat."

"In Ankola the No-tax campaign was political in character and origin, while in Sirsi and Siddapur Talukas it was undertaken for reasons of economic and agrarian distress as well. In Kerala, the smallest of the Provinces, the banner of Civil Disobedience was kept steadily till the last day of the movement, while, at the other end, Assam, including Cachar and Sylhet, responded splendidly to the call of the Congress.

"Attention may now be drawn to a few outstanding events in some of these Provinces. To all of them certain factors were common,—the closing of the Congress offices, the taking away of Congress papers, books, accounts and flags, *lathi*-charges, dispersal by force of public meetings, promulgation of Section 144 over whole areas, serving notices on individuals under Section 108, raids on houses, searches, seizure of printing presses, securities demanded of newspapers and presses alike. But what struck the on-looker most was that the Government of the country was being run in the interests of foreign cloth and the liquor shops. In Bengal Midnapur was specially unfortunate in the extent of repression. House-holders were imprisoned both in Bengal and in Andhra for giving shelter, food, or water to Congress volunteers, or volunteers who had been beaten and were lying helpless. Orders to fire were issued in Bengal—in Khersai notably, on the slightest pretext. When, in Khersai, a crowd collected round a house where distraint of property was being made, order to fire was given

and one man was killed and several were injured. In Chechna firing on a retreating crowd resulted in 6 persons being killed and 18 wounded. In Contai, a crowd watching preparation of salt was fired upon in June, 1930, and 25 persons were wounded. In Khersai, again, a crowd that gathered at the arrest of a person and would not disperse on warning, was fired upon with the result that eleven persons were killed. The celebration of the death anniversary of Deshbandhu Das was prohibited by the Police in Calcutta on the 22nd June, and, when the men in the procession were mercilessly beaten, the women who had come out of their seclusion flung themselves into the front in order to save the wounded from being trampled under horses' hoofs.

"The Police entered college buildings and belaboured the students sitting in class-rooms. In Barisal, 500 persons were injured in a *lathi*-charge on one day. In Tamluk, the Police were said to have set fire to the property of Satyagrahis and their sympathisers. Reports of indecent assaults were received from many quarters. In Gopinathpur, Congress volunteers were mercilessly beaten, and amongst those beaten there was a Mussalman boy. The village became infuriated and arrested the Police, and after locking them up in a local school, set fire to it. Two Congress volunteers broke the door open and rescued the Police from the flames at the risk of their own lives. On the 31st December, 1931, the anniversary of the passing of Independence resolution at Lahore, Subhas Babu while marching in a procession was severely beaten. He had returned from jail shortly before, after serving his term of a year for sedition. In Lahore the authorities were so nervous as to proscribe the picture of a Non-co-operation tree. A veiled Mussalman lady-picketer was arrested at Ludhiana. Siapa (waiting at funerals) was practised at the houses of those who would sell foreign

cloth. In Rawalpindi prisoners were prosecuted for refusing to take bad food. In Montgomery, one hunger-striker, Lala Lakhi Ram, died after many days of fasting. In Tam Tam a lady was roughly handled. The firing on the Governor of the Punjab at the Senate Hall gave the Police an opportunity to carry on indiscriminate searches. In Bihar the movement made a quiet progress. In Samastipur Sub-division, there is a small bazaar called Shahpur Patoria. Four days after the celebration of the Jawahar Week, 125 policemen under the leadership of the Superintendent of Police surrounded it, made 46 arrests, and took away the property of some of those who were not at their houses, in 12 bullock carts. Similar reports were received from other districts. Monghyr and Bhagalpur were in the forefront of the movement. Picketing of liquor shops caused a loss of 40 lacs to the Government. Military Police and Gurkhas were taken through the paddy fields of Phulwaria in Motihari, crushing the same, and overawing people round about by arresting numerous villagers. Non-payment of Chowkidari Tax was organised in Champaran, Saran, Muzaffarpur, Monghyr, Patna and Shahabad districts. In C. P. liquor bids went down by 60 per cent. At Amraoti, there was a *lathi*-charge for celebrating the Garhwali Day. In Andhra the worst achievement of the Police was the beating of about 80 friends that met at a picnic at Peddapur on 21st December, 1930. Serious injuries were inflicted upon the people including two or three ladies. In Kerala, toddy sales had gone down by 70 per cent. In Tamil Nadu, stoppage of toddy sales was the scene of firing and several *lathi*-charges. In Delhi, a Rai Saheb was the wine merchant who had attained notoriety by being responsible for the arrest of 80 ladies and hundreds of male volunteers.'''³⁹

In Gujarat the exodus of the peasants, due to unbearable sufferings, was a historic event whose description

by Mr. Brailsford is given below :

“And then began one of the strangest migrations in history. One after another, acting with a unanimity of which only Indians with their tight caste organisations are capable, these villagers packed their belongings into their bullock carts and drove them across the border into Baroda. A few even burned the rich crop which they were too late to remove. I visited one of their camps. They have built temporary shelters with matting for walls and palm leaves on sacking for a roof. The rains are over ; they will suffer no grave hardship till May. But they are crowded together with thir beloved cattle, and packed in the narrow space are all their household goods, the great jars in which they store their rice, cloths and churns, chests and beds, shining pots of brass, here a plough, there a picture.. of the gods, and everywhere, at intervals, the presiding genius of this camp, a photograph of Mahatma Gandhi. I asked a big group of them why they had left their homes. The women gave the promptest and simplest answer,—“Because Mahatmaji is in prison.” The men were still conscious of an economic grievance ; “farming does not pay, and the tax is unjust.” One or two said “To win Swaraj” or Self-Government.

“I spent two memorable days touring the deserted villages in company with the Chairman of the Congress organisation of Surat. One passed row after row of the padlocked cottages, and through the bars of the windows .one could see only empty rooms. The streets were silent lakes of sunlight. Nothing moved until a monkey swung himself over a roof.

“To some of these villages, however, a few of the men returned to work in the fields, while their families and goods remained in Baroda. Some of them complained of the terrorism of the Police.

"It was not hard to believe, for I had seen something of their ways myself. As our car was leaving one of these abandoned villages, a policeman armed with rifle, with a fixed bayonet, ordered us to stop. We might leave the village, he said, only with written permit from the Police. The man collapsed promptly when he saw my European clothes and presently began babbling in broken English 'me nice policeman', but it interested me particularly to discover that nowhere on his uniform did he carry a number. When I demanded a number, he assured me that 'every man had a secret number.' He belonged to an emergency force which is carrying for itself reputation that unpleasantly resembles that of the Black and Tans in Ireland. It can hardly have been an oversight on the part of the organisers of this force, that their uniforms show no number.

"One cannot blame a Government confronted by open, if passive, rebellion, if it retaliates within the law. It has proclaimed Congress an illegal organisation. It has confiscated Congress 'Ashram' in the Bardoli district. It arrested my host the Chairman of Surat on the day after we parted. It attached the properties of the Bardoli refugees and will sell their fields to recover the tax, if it can find a purchaser, a risk which leaves the peasants calm.

"All this is within the rules of the game. Terrorism is outside them, and terrorism is being used. My notebook is full of the complaints of the peasants with whom we talked on this tour. I could seldom verify their stories, but I questioned them carefully, and do not doubt their word. These notes with names and dates shall go to the superior officials. One village was haunted every night by a gang of ruffians, who fired guns, tore veils, and on one occasion murdered an old peasant with an axe. When the villagers asked for protection, a high

Police official is said to have answered: 'You have it when you pay your tax.' Most of the complaints were of unprovoked beating by the Police with their formidable *lathis*.

"One scene I managed, after much questioning, to reconstruct. It happened in the abandoned village of Afwa. Here some peasants who own no land had remained behind, and with them were some who had returned from Baroda to cultivate their fields. On October 21st, about 3 a.m., a car arrived with ten policemen under a certain Sub-Inspector. The Police found these men sleeping in the fields. They beat them and then demanded the tax. They were then brought before this Sub-Inspector, who beat some of them with his own hands and kicked others. One was still limping and another showed a painful swelling. The heads of two brothers he knocked together. They were then taken in a lorry to the lock-up in Bardoli. There the Sub-Inspector threatened, with unprintable details, to 'make them useless to their wives.' That threat told and the younger brother, though not himself a landowner, paid the tax for his father's farm. In another case, a passer-by from another village was seized and beaten, and the money in his pocket picked. A receipt was given in the name of a local taxpayer, and the stranger was told to recover it from him. This Sub-Inspector was a person who combined ingenuity with brutality. Finding in the village another stranger, a man from Surat, he appropriated his gold ornaments and tried to force some of the villagers to buy,—a species of summary distraint. But I might continue this narrative indefinitely and still it would record only one morning of this officer's activity. I might have hesitated to believe these peasants, had I not happened to meet this person in the flesh. and caught him out in a ludicrous and palpable lie. By such hands, in brief, far from the heights of

Simla and the security of Whitehall, is law and order dispensed to the 'silent millions.'⁴⁰

In Borsad, the women were dispersed by force and the specific allegation was made that, when the ladies were thrown down, the policemen trod upon their chests with boots.⁴¹ It may be added that in addition to the brutal assaults on the body the Police sometimes resorted to wanton destruction of property. Paddy fields were burnt and eatables forcibly taken. A vegetable market in Gujarat was raided because the dealers refused to sell vegetables to the officials.

The climax was reached when most brutal and cowardly assaults were made on helpless prisoners in jails. Subhas Bose refers to an attack made in the Alipore Central Jail at Calcutta in April, 1930, on a number of distinguished persons including himself. Bose, who was in the front rank was thrown down and remained unconscious for more than an hour. The Government refused the demand for a public inquiry but appointed a Medical Board who examined the injured persons and issued a report.⁴²

The brutalities of the police reached a climax in suppressing salt raids at Dharasana (150 miles from Bombay), Wadala (a suburb of Bombay), and other places. "A mass raid at Dharasana took place on the 21st day of May, when 2,500 volunteers from all parts of Gujarat took part in it. They were led by Imam Shaheb, the 62 year old colleague of Gandhiji in South Africa. The volunteers commenced the raid early in the morning and as they attacked the salt heaps at different places the Police charged them with *lathis* (bamboo sticks) and beat them back.

"Thousands witnessed the spectacle. After this had gone on for two hours, the leaders, Messrs. Imam Saheb, Pyarelal and Manilal Gandhi were arrested, and later

Mrs. Sarojini Naidu also, "The total number of injured volunteers on that day was 290." Two of the injured died from the effect of their injuries.

"Mr. Hussain, ex-Judge, Small Causes Court, Bombay, Mr. K. Natarajan, and Mr. G. K. Devadhar, President, Servants of India Society, who personally watched the Dharasana raid, issued a statement in which they said: "They saw with their own eyes that after Satyagrahis were driven out of the Salt boundary, mounted European Sowars rode at the full gallop with *lathis* in their hands beating people between the spot where Satyagrahis had reached for raid and the village itself. They actually galloped full speed through the streets of the village, scattering men, women and children. Villagers ran into bye-lanes and closed themselves in houses. But if by accident, they were unable to escape, they were beaten with *lathis*." "A succession of raids were also made on the Wadala Salt Depot. On the 22nd, 188 volunteers were arrested and taken to Worli. On the 25th, 100 volunteers were accompanied by a huge crowd of 2,000 spectators. The Police charged them with *lathis* injuring 17, and later arrested 115. The rest with the crowd got off with the salt. On the 26th afternoon 65 volunteers were afield and 43 of them were arrested, when 18 more were injured. The rest with the crowd got off with salt."

"But the most demonstrative raid was to come off on the 1st June for which the War Council was diligently preparing. In the morning of the 1st nearly 15,000 volunteers and non-volunteers participated in the great mass action at Wadala.

"Successive batches marched up to the Port Trust level-crossing and the swelled crowd were held up there by the Police cordon. Soon the raiders, among whom were women and children, broke through the cordon, splashed through slime and mud, and ran over the pans.

Congress raiders numbering about 150 were slightly injured. The raiders were repulsed by the Police who were acting under the immediate supervision of the Home Member.

"Serious troubles ending in two Police charges and the calling out of the Military to cope with the situation occurred at the Worli Detention Camp on the 3rd June, when about four thousand undertrial Wadala 'Raiders' were involved in a brush with the Police, resulting in about ninety casualties, twenty-five of them being serious".⁴³

Lest it be supposed that the Indian accounts are too incredible to be true, reference may be made to the testimony of an English lady, Miss Madeleine Slade, a disciple of Gandhi. "She paid a visit to Bulsar in Gujarat on June 6, 1930, to see with her own eyes how the *Satyagrahi* volunteers, engaged in the non-violent raid on the Dharasana Salt Depot, were being treated by the Police. In a report published in the *Young India* of June 12, 1930, she stated that she had found evidence of the following injuries perpetrated on *Satyagrahi* volunteers. :

1. *Lathi* blows on head, chest, stomach and joints.
2. Thrusts with *lathis* in private parts, abdominal regions.
3. Stripping of men naked before beating.
4. Tearing off loin cloths and thrusting of sticks into anus.
5. Pressing and squeezing of the testicles till a man becomes unconscious.
6. Dragging of wounded men by legs and arms, after beating them the while.
7. Throwing of wounded men into thorn hedges or into salt water.
8. Riding of horses over men as they lie or sit on the ground.

9. Thrusting of pins and thorns into men's bodies, sometimes even when they are unconscious.

10. Beating of men after they have become unconscious and other vile things too many to relate, besides foul language and blasphemy, calculated to hurt as much as possible the most sacred feeling of the Satyagrahis."⁴⁴

Several other European eye-witnesses have left graphic account of the brutality perpetrated by the Government agents in the name of law and order. One of the most notable among them is Verrier Elwin, an Anglo-Catholic Missionary who was formerly an Oxford Don. He personally witnessed many incidents in the *Satyagraha* campaign and left a short account of them. The brutal treatment of the *Satyagrahi* in Bombay in April, 1930, is described by him in detail. He has also given an admirable sketch of the No-tax campaign in Gujarat in the form of a Report entitled *In the Desolate Villages of Gujarat*.

A European had written an article on the Indian situation and sent it to six papers in America, England, France, Norway, Germany, and Italy. But no one would publish it. The mystery was solved when the editor of an Italian paper said that he had received instructions from his Government to publish no anti-British article on the Indian question. It was gathered that similar instructions were issued in America.⁴⁵

III. THE EPIC STRUGGLE AT DHARASANA, AND OTHER EVENTS.

Fortunately for the historians, a detailed account of the heroic non-violent fight put up by the salt-raiders at Dharasana has been preserved by Webb Miller, Foreign correspondent of the United Press, U. S. A., who was an eye-witness of the grim tragedy. His description has an epic grandeur about it, and will go down in history as the finest literary memorial of the martyrs of Civil Disobe-

dience movement launched by Gandhi in 1930. On May 20, 1930, Mr. Miller heard reports of the demonstration of the volunteers near Dharasana, but the Government took steps to prevent persons coming to, and news going out of, the place. Telegraphic messages to Mrs. Naidu were withheld, and Miller was forcibly detained at Bulsar, so that he may not reach Dhingri, the Railway station nearest to Dharasana. Miller, however, managed to reach Dhingri by a goods train and then walked six miles to Dharasana. He found there 2500 Congressmen accommodated in several thatched sheds. The events of the 21st May, 1930, may be narrated in his own words :

“Mme. Naidu called for prayer before the march started and the entire assemblage knelt. She exhorted them: ‘Gandhi’s body is in jail but his soul is with you. India’s prestige is in your hands, you must not use any violence under any circumstances. You will be beaten but you must not resist; you must not even raise a hand to ward off blows.’ . Wild, shrill cheers terminated her speech.

“Slowly and in silence the throng commenced the half-mile march to salt-deposits. A few carried ropes for lassoing the barbed-wire stockade around the salt pans. About a score who were assigned to act as stretcher-bearers wore crude, hand-painted red crosses pinned to their breasts, their stretchers consisted of blankets. Manilal Gandhi, second son of Gandhi, walked among the foremost of the marchers. As the throng drew near the salt pans they commenced chanting the revolutionary slogan, “Inquilab Zindabad”, intoning the two words over and over.

“The salt-deposits were surrounded by ditches filled with water and guarded by four hundred native Surat Police in Khaki Shorts and brown turbans. Half a dozen British officials commanded them. The Police

carried *lathis*—five foot clubs tipped with steel. Inside the stockade twenty-five rifle-men were drawn up.

"In complete silence the Gandhi men drew up and halted a hundred yards from the stockade. A picked column advanced from the crowd, waded the ditches, and approached the barbed-wire stockade, which the Surat Police surrounded, holding clubs at the ready. Police officials ordered the marchers to disperse under a recently imposed regulation which prohibited gathering of more than five persons in any one place. The column silently ignored the warning and slowly walked forward. I stayed with the main body about a hundred yards from the stockade.

"Suddenly, at a word of command, scores of native police rushed upon the advancing marchers and rained blows on their heads with their steel-shod *lathis*. Not one of the marchers raised an arm to fend off the blows. They went down like ten-pins. From where I stood I heard the sickening whacks of the clubs on unprotected skulls. The waiting crowd of watchers groaned and sucked in their breaths in sympathetic pain at every blow.

Those struck down fell sprawling, unconscious or writhing in pain with fractured skulls or broken shoulders. In two or three minutes the ground was quilted with bodies. Great patches of blood widened on their white clothes. The survivors without breaking ranks silently and doggedly marched on until struck down. When everyone of the first column had been knocked down, stretcher-bearers rushed up unmolested by the Police and carried off the injured to a thatched hut which had been arranged as a temporary hospital.

"Then another column formed while the leaders pleaded with them to retain their self-control. They marched slowly towards the police. Although everyone knew that within a few minutes he would be beaten down,

perhaps killed, I could detect no signs of wavering or fear. They marched steadily with heads up, without the encouragement of music or cheering or any possibility that they might escape serious injury or death. The police rushed out and methodically and mechanically beat down the second column. There was no fight, no struggle ; the marchers simply walked forward until struck down. There were no outcries, only groans after they fell. There were not enough stretcher-bearers to carry off the wounded ; I saw eighteen injured being carried off simultaneously, while forty-two still lay bleeding on the ground awaiting stretcher-bearers. The blankets used as stretchers were sodden with blood.

"At times the spectacle of unresisting men being methodically bashed into a bloody pulp sickened me so much that I had to turn away. The western mind finds it difficult to grasp the idea of non-resistance. I felt an indefinable sense of helpless rage and loathing, almost as much against the men who were submitting unresistingly to being beaten as against the police wielding the clubs, and this despite the fact that when I came to India I sympathised with the Gandhi cause.

"Several times the leaders nearly lost control of the waiting crowd. They rushed up and down, frantically pleading with and exhorting the intensely excited men to remember Gandhi's instructions. It seemed that the unarmed throng was on the verge of launching a mass attack upon the police. The British official in charge, Superintendent Robinson of Surat, sensed the imminence of an outbreak and posted his twenty-five rifle-men on a little knoll ready to fire. He came to me, inquired my identity, and said : "You'd better move aside out of the line of shooting. We may be forced to open fire into the crowd." While we were talking one of the Gandhiites, a young university student, ran up to Robinson, his face

contorted by rage, tore open his cotton smock, exposing his bare breast, and shrieked, "Shoot me, shoot me, kill me, it's for my country." The leaders managed to calm the crowd. The Gandhi men altered their tactics, marched up in groups of twenty-five and sat on the ground near the salt pans, making no effort to draw nearer. Led by a coffee-colored Parsi sergeant of Police, named Antia, a hulking, ugly-looking fellow, detachments of police approached one seated group and called upon them to disperse under the assemblage ordinance. The Gandhi followers ignored them and refused even to glance up at the *lathis* brandished threateningly above their heads. Upon a word from Antia the beating recommenced coldly, without anger. Bodies toppled over in threes and fours, bleeding from great gashes on their scalps. Group after group walked forward, sat down, and submitted to being beaten into insensibility, without raising an arm to fend off the blows.

"Finally the police became enraged by the non-resistance, sharing, I suppose, the helpless rage I had already felt at the demonstrators for not fighting back. They commenced savagely kicking the seated men in the abdomen and testicles. The injured men writhed and squealed in agony, which seemed to inflame the fury of the police, and the crowd again almost broke away from their leaders. The police then began dragging the sitting men by the arms or feet, sometimes for a hundred yards, and throwing them into ditches. One was dragged to the ditch where I stood; the splash of his body doused me with muddy water. Another policeman dragged a Gandhi man to the ditch, threw him in, then belabored him over the head with his *lathi*. Hour after hour stretcher-bearers carried back a stream of inert, bleeding bodies.

"I went to see Mme. Naidu, who was directing the sub-leaders in keeping the crowds from charging the police.

While we were talking, one of the British officials approached her, touched her on the arm, and said: "Sarojini Naidu, you are under arrest." She haughtily shook off his hand and said: "I'll come, but don't touch me." The crowd cheered frantically as she strode with the British officer across the open space to the barbed-wire stockade, where she was interned. Later she was sentenced to prison. Manilal Gandhi was also arrested.

"In the middle of the morning V. J. Patel arrived... Patel said: 'All hope of reconciling India with the British Empire is lost for ever. I can understand any Government's taking people into custody and punishing them for breaches of the law, but I cannot understand how any Government that calls itself civilized could deal as savagely and brutally with non-violent, unresisting men, as the British have this morning.'

"By eleven the heat reached 116 in the shade and the activities of the Gandhi volunteers subsided. I went back to the temporary hospital to examine the wounded. They lay in rows on the bare ground in the shade of an open, palm-thatched shed. I counted 320 injured, many still insensible with fractured skulls, others writhing in agony from kicks in the testicles and stomach. The Gandhi men had been able to gather only a few native doctors, who were doing the best they could with the inadequate facilities. Scores of the injured had received no treatment for hours and two had died. The demonstration was finished for the day on account of the heat.

"I was the only foreign correspondent who had witnessed the amazing scene—a classic example of "*Satyagraha*" or non-violent civil disobedience. My problem now was to get the story out to the world".⁴⁶

How this problem was solved may be briefly described as it throws interesting light on the methods pursued by the Government. Miller sent five messages

of 100 words each to London from Bulsar. Three of them and about a half of the fourth reached London office—but the office was requested to cancel them as they had been transmitted “by error”. London office refused to cancel them.

Arriving at Bombay, Miller sent a telegraph of 2,000 words but it was withheld. After interviewing various officials he was told by the Secretary for Ecclesiastical Affairs: “Your messages must have gone. The Government is not interfering in any way with the messages of foreign correspondents.” Miller said: “I know my message has not been sent. Unless it be released immediately I am going to fly to Persia and send them from thereIf the newspaper readers of the world learn that the Government (of India) is censoring or killing messages they won’t believe a word of British officials’ statements thereafter.” The Secretary for Ecclesiastical Affairs now admitted that he had been assigned to act as a censor. After a quarrel for an hour the Secretary agreed to pass the whole story except three points concerning the actions of the Police. The sequel may be told in Mr. Miller’s own words ;

“The remaining material was air-mailed and it reached London and New York about ten days after, along with the story of my troubles with the censorship. My story of the beatings at Dharasana caused a sensation when it appeared in the 1,350 newspapers served by the United Press throughout the World. Senator Blaine read the text of my story into the records of the United States Senate. Representatives of the Gandhi Movement in the U. S. A. printed it as a leaflet and distributed more than a quarter of a million copies.”⁴⁷

Reference may now be made to a few other incidents, reported by Miller, both violent and non-violent in character :

‘Six days after Dharasana beatings, Bombay

mobs attacked the Police Stations in the Bhendi Bazar quarter—a crowd of several thousand natives surrounded Sandhurst Road Police barracks. The crowd showered ‘rocks the size of a fist’ and smashed the windows. Half a dozen police rushed out and opened fire with revolvers point-blank into the streaming mob.....the British sergeants stood and fired methodically into the mass of human beings. With shrieks of rage and yells of agony the mob quickly broke and scattered in all directions. We could see people falling as they ran and the street for a couple of blocks was spattered with blood. Twelve British Police sergeants were more or less badly wounded during the fracas. We learnt afterwards that about eight natives had been killed and eighty wounded in the firing. Attempts were made by the mob to set fire—but it was quickly extinguished.

‘The Bhendibazar riot had nothing to do with Gandhi movements. A Pathan kicked a dog belonging to a British Police sergeant who then tried to catch the Pathan. A crowd quickly gathered and attempted to beat the sergeant who opened fire to save himself. News of the incident spread and mobs rushed to attack the Police station, They were Mahomedans who held aloof from Gandhi Campaign and hence the British regarded it as serious.’⁴⁸

Within a few days there was a Procession of more than 100,000 people as a protest against Gandhi’s arrest. Just opposite the Victoria Terminus Railway Station Police blocked the street. The Procession sat down in the street. “One frenzied Gandhiite rushed in front of the Police, shouting repeatedly, ‘Shoot me in the breast.’ One Gandhi man shouted to the demonstrators, “If you are prepared to die, stay, if not, go home” ; but none left. After four hours, at 8 P.M., the authorities allowed the Procession to proceed into the heart of European Quarters. “This triumph of non-violence over armed force”, says Miller, “gave

Gandhi's idea of non-resistance its first spectacular victory.

But non-violence could not always be maintained. At Wadala in the suburbs of Bombay about one hundred Congress volunteers, leading a mob of about 40,000, made a mass attack on the salt works. It lasted three hours. Gandhi's instructions of non-violence were ignored. Time after time the mob broke through police cordons, invaded the saltpans, and carried away salt. The Police belaboured the mob with clubs while the mob showered the British Police with large stones. In the course of two such demonstrations Miller witnessed 1,000 arrests. Several hundred suffered injuries.⁴⁹

C. ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

While the whole of India was being convulsed by the stirring events described above, the Simon Commission proceeded with its work and its Report was issued on 7 June, 1930. Its chief recommendations were :

1. Federal Constitution for India.
2. Full autonomy in the Provinces subject to the overriding powers vested in the Governor.
3. Enlargement of the Provincial Legislative Councils.
4. The Lower House of the Central Legislature to be enlarged and elected by the Provincial Councils; but no Responsible Government in the Centre.
5. Separation of Burma from India.

The recommendations were so unsatisfactory that the Indian Legislative Assembly, though without any nationalist member of the Congress, rejected it *in toto*. Even the Liberal Party demanded that it must not form the basis of discussion at the Round Table Conference. The Congress leaders, then in jail, were permitted to confer together, and issued a joint statement on 15 August, 1930, that no solution would be acceptable to them or to the Congress which did not guarantee the following :

1. India's right to secede from the Empire.

2. A national Government responsible to the people including control of defence and finance.

3. India's right to submit to an impartial tribunal all British claims and concessions given to the Britishers in the past.

I. THE FIRST ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

The British Government paid no heed to the protest of the Congress. In accordance with the Viceroy's declaration of 31 October, 1929,^{49a} there was a Conference of the representatives of His Majesty's Government and those of India... This, the First Round Table Conference, was inaugurated by His Majesty the King Emperor in London on 12 November, 1930. The session continued till 19 January, 1931, under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald. The Conference was attended by 89 members—16 from the British Parties, 16 from the Indian States, and 57 from British India.

The Congress was not represented in the Conference, but it was attended by several eminent leaders like Sapru, Jinnah, and Muhammad Ali, representing all other important political groups in India. There was a general agreement among Indian members that British India and the Indian Native States should form a Federal Union ruled by Parliamentary system of Government. The British members, however, opposed the immediate grant of Dominion Status and the introduction of British Parliamentary system in India.

When, after the general debate, the Conference proceeded to discuss the framework of the constitution, the ruling princes agreed to "consider an immediate federation on two conditions. British India must be federalised, and the Central Government must cease to be a purely official Government and become in some degree responsible to the Central Legislature. 'We can only federate', said the Nawab of Bhopal, 'with a self-governing and

federal British India.' The other Indian members and the British delegates agreed to this and the main principle having thus been settled a number of sub-committees were appointed to work the details.⁵⁰

The Federal Structure sub-committee, with the Lord Chancellor, Lord Sankey, as the Chairman, submitted its final report on 15 January, 1931. Its main recommendations were :

Executive authority should be exercised, in accordance with Dominion precedent, by the Governor-General as representing the Crown, advised by a Council of Ministers. The Governor-General should be instructed to invite one Minister to form a Government which would be collectively responsible to the Legislature. There was 'general agreement' that the assumption by India of all the powers and responsibility which have hitherto rested on Parliament cannot be made at one step and that during a period of transition the Governor-General shall be responsible for defence and external relations.

The main trouble was in connection with the election of members belonging to minority communities.

A new complication was added by the demand of B. R. Ambedkar that for electoral purposes the Depressed Classes should be treated as a separate community. These and the other Minorities all favoured separate electorates with weightage.

Both Sapru and Jayakar expressed the hope that the communities would settle their differences if they were given the chance of working together side by side for their one country.

It seems that the Labour Government took a similar stand and there was a chance of communal settlement. But Sir Fazl-i-Husain, then a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, pulled the strings from India and the attempts of the Labour Government were foiled. The

following note from the diary of Sir Fazl-i-Husain, dated December 3, 1930 (recorded in his biography by his son, Azim Hussain) is revealing :

“News from Round Table Conference indicates that Labour Government made attempts to make Moslems agree to some sort of joint electorates. Shafi, Bhopal, Sultan Ahmed, Fazl-ul-Huq, Hidayatullah were ready for the game, but others were against it. Mahommed Ali was also helping, and no doubt Jinnah, too, though himself remaining in the background. I had to take strong action, and the situation has just been saved. We must keep our present weightage in six Provinces and Centre and have majority in Bengal and the Punjab through separate electorates. Let Hindus non-co-operate, and let us build up sufficient strength during the next ten years.”⁵¹

How the “situation was saved” we do not yet know. But henceforth the Muslims, of all shades of opinion, insisted that the Muslim claims must be met and that was a condition precedent for their support to the demand for Dominion Status. Sir Muhammad Shafi, M. A. Jinnah, Fazlul Huq, and Dr. Shafaat Ahmed Khan,—all spoke in the same strain. The last-named, perhaps the most liberal-minded of them all, observed : “We have never tried to create an Ulster in India ; that has never beenour wish. On the contrary, we have said that we will fight shoulder to shoulder with our brethren for the cause of India, our common Motherland. But we have at the same time made it perfectly clear.....that our safeguards, our rights, the rights for which we have been fighting for years, must be preserved and guaranteed.”⁵²

But the ‘most unkindest cut of all’ came from the whilom nationalist leader, Muhammad Ali, a devoted follower and ‘dear brother’ of Gandhi. ‘Make no mistake about the quarrels between Hindu and Mussalman,’ said he,

'they are founded only on the fear of domination.' And he reminded the Conference that Islam was not confined to India. "I belong to two circles of equal size but which are not concentric. One is India and the other is the Muslim world.....We are not nationalists but supernationalists."53

Before the Conference closed the Muslim delegation as a whole made a formal statement to the effect that "no advance is possible or practicable, whether in the Provinces or in the Central Government, without adequate safeguards for the Muslims of India, and that no constitution will be acceptable to the Muslims of India without such safeguards."54

The agreement on Dominion Status and all-India Federation was hailed with joy and the speck of cloud in the distant horizon in the shape of the unsolved Minority Problem did not mar the hilarity of the proceedings.

In his concluding speech on 19 January, 1931, the Prime Minister defined the policy of His Majesty's Government as follows :-

(a). "The view of His Majesty's Government is that responsibility for the Government of India should be placed upon Legislatures, Central and Provincial, with such provisions as may be necessary to guarantee, during a period of transition, the observance of certain obligations and to meet other special circumstances, and also with such guarantees as are required by minorities to protect their political liberties and rights."

(b). "His Majesty's Government has taken note of the fact that the deliberations of the Conference have proceeded on the basis, accepted by all parties, that the Central Government should be a Federation of All-India, embracing both the Indian States and British India in a bi-cameral legislature".

(c). "With a Legislature constituted on a Federal basis, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to recognise the principle of the responsibility of the Executive to the Legislature."

(d). "Under existing conditions the subjects of Defence and External Affairs will be reserved to the Governor-General, and arrangements will be made to place in his hands the powers necessary for the administration of those subjects. Moreover, as the Governor-General must, as a last resort, be able in an emergency to maintain the tranquillity of the State, and must similarly be responsible for the observance of the constitutional rights of minorities, he must be granted the necessary powers for these purposes."

(e). "The Governors' Provinces will be constituted on a basis of full responsibility. Their Ministries will be taken from the Legislature and will be jointly responsible to it. The range of Provincial subjects will be so defined as to give them the greatest possible measure of self-government. The authority of the Federal Government will be limited to provisions required to secure its administration of Federal Subjects, and so discharge its responsibility for subjects defined in the constitution as of all-India concern."⁵⁵

'In such statutory safeguards as may be made for meeting the needs of the transitional period, it will be a primary concern of His Majesty's Government to see that the reserved powers are so framed and exercised as not to prejudice the advance of India to full responsibility for her own government.' Finally the hope was expressed that 'those engaged at present in civil disobedience might respond to the Viceroy's appeal and take their part in the co-operative work that lay ahead.'⁵⁶

II. GANDHI-IRWIN PACT

The Round Table Conference was adjourned sine

die on 19 January, 1931. The policy outlined by the Prime Minister undoubtedly marked a considerable advance over the recommendations of the Simon Commission. This was emphasized in a manifesto issued, on the 6th of February, 1931, by the 26 delegates who had returned to India from the Round Table Conference. It was stated in this manifesto that British opinion had undergone a remarkable change in India's favour and that it had been explicitly recognised that the task of governing India should be entrusted to an Indian Executive responsible to the Indian Legislature."⁵⁷ There can be no reasonable doubt that this change was largely due to the strong attitude taken by the Indian National Congress and the recent demonstration of its hold over the country. But it was equally clear that everything depended upon the attitude of the Congress. It alone could deliver the goods and thus determine whether the new British policy would bring peace in India and carry her constitutional progress one stage further. The reaction of the Congress was swift and sharp. Two days after the conclusion of the First R.T.C., on 21 January, the Working Committee of the Congress met at Allahabad and passed a resolution on the Round Table Conference to the following effect :

'The Committee repudiated the representative character of the Conference and considered the declaration of the policy of the British Government made by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister of England, on behalf of the Cabinet on the 19th January, 1931', "and is of opinion that it is too vague and general to justify any change in the policy of the Congress.

"While adhering to the resolution of Independence passed at the Lahore Congress, this Committee endorses the view taken by Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Motilal Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and others in their letter

of the 15th August, 1930, from the Yeravda Central Prison and is unable to see in the pronouncement of the policy made by the Premier an adequate response to the position taken by the signatories to the said letter. The Committee considers that in the absence of such response, and while thousands of men and women including almost all the original members of the Working Committee and a great majority of the members of the All-India Congress Committee are locked in jail, and while the Government repression is in full swing, no general enunciation of policy can be helpful in bringing to a satisfactory issue the struggle which the Nation has entered upon or justifying the suspension of Civil Disobedience. The Committee can, therefore, only advise the country to carry on the struggle with unabated vigour along the lines already laid down and trusts that it will maintain the high spirit it has shown so far.'⁵⁸

The day after the resolution was passed a cablegram was received from Dr. Sapru and Mr. Sastri who attended the Round Table Conference at London, asking the Working Committee "not to arrive at any decision on the Premier's speech, until their arrival and without hearing them." Accordingly the resolution was not published, but, as happens in all such cases, information found its way to Government right enough and almost immediately after it had been passed.

Evidently as a reaction to the resolution, the Government of India released, on 26 January, 1931, the members of the Working Committee in order to afford them an opportunity to meet together and discuss the political situation.

On February 6, 1931, 26 members of the Round Table Conference, immediately after landing in India, sent an appeal to the Congress requesting its leaders "to come forward to make solid contribution to the completion

away the whole Congress case, was agreed to by Gandhi without the knowledge, not to speak of the previous approval, of the members of the Working Committee in Delhi, although they were being kept informed of the progress of the negotiations from day to day. Its reaction on Jawaharlal Nehru is described by himself as follows :

"On the night of the fourth of March we waited till midnight for Gandhi's return from the Viceroy's house. He came back about two A.M., and we were awakened and told that an agreement had been reached. We saw the draft. I knew most of the clauses, for they had been often discussed, but, at the very top, Clause 2, with its reference to safeguards, etc. gave me a tremendous shock. I was wholly unprepared for it. I said nothing then, and we all retired.....

"The question of our objective, of independence, also remained. I saw in that clause 2 of the settlement that even this seemed to be jeopardised. Was it for this that our people had behaved so gallantly for a year? Were all our brave words and deeds to end in this? The independence resolution of the Congress, the pledge of January 26, so often repeated? So I lay and pondered on that March night, and in my heart there was a great emptiness as of something precious gone, almost beyond recall."

Next morning Gandhi had a long talk with Nehru and gave his own interpretation of Clause 2. Nehru continues : "The interpretation seemed to me to be a forced one, and I was not convinced, but I was somewhat soothed by his talk. The merits of the agreement apart, I told him that his way of springing surprises upon us frightened me, there was something unknown about him which, in spite of the closest association for fourteen years, I could not understand at all and which filled me

with apprehension. He admitted the presence of this unknown in him, and said that he himself could not answer for it or foretell what it might lead to.

"For a day or two I wobbled, not knowing what to do. There was no question of opposing or preventing that agreement then.....

"So I decided, not without great mental conflict and physical distress, to accept the agreement and work for it wholeheartedly. There appeared to me to be no middle way."⁶⁰

It will be clear to any unprejudiced mind, as it was to Nehru, that the Congress not only gave up the demand for Independence or Dominion Status, but definitely and substantially receded from the position they had taken up at the Conference with the Viceroy on December 23, 1929, which led to the rejection of the Round Table Conference and precipitated the Civil Disobedience movement, as well as in subsequent negotiations during the movement. The Working Committee also definitely went back upon its own resolution of January 21, 1931, which repudiated the representative character of the Round Table Conference and regarded the declaration of policy made by the British Premier at the Round Table Conference as too vague and general to justify any change in the policy of the Congress. For the Committee now agreed to consider the scheme outlined in the Conference on the basis of the principle announced by the British Premier. It must be evident to all, not blinded by devotion to Gandhi, that what he secured for India, by way of constitutional progress, could be easily had without the Civil Disobedience campaign involving untold miseries and sufferings, but it was deliberately spurned again and again. Gandhi even went so far as to forego his demand for an investigation into the allegations of the police atrocities in different part of

India. It is true that on this particular occasion the credit or discredit must be, technically speaking, shared by the Working Committee which endorsed the Pact. But it must be remembered that Gandhi himself took good care to ensure that all men of independent thinking were excluded from this Committee so that all the members would be completely of one mind, that is, of his mind.

It may be said, without much exaggeration, that no member of the Working Committee, with the single exception of Jawaharlal Nehru, had ever thought of deviating a hair's breadth from Gandhi's opinion. But even Jawaharlal had, of late, been rapidly veering round to this group of devotees.⁶¹ His line of thinking on the present issue has been hinted above. In order to clarify his position he issued a statement 'that he did not approve of some of the terms of the Pact, but as an obedient soldier he had to submit to the leader.' At that very moment he, not Gandhi, was the President of the Indian National Congress.

/The Pact caused a great disappointment to many, particularly to Subhas Bose who held aloft the flag of Independent India, and though driven from the inner Circle of the Congress, had been rallying the country round this banner. His followers, particularly the Youth Organisations, openly expressed their dissatisfaction. Subhas saw Gandhi and argued with him, but could not change his views.

A large section, however, regarded the Pact as a great victory for Gandhi and the Congress. Gandhi himself issued a statement to the effect that 'the settlement did not imply a victory for either party'. This is the least he could do if we bear in mind that on the eve of his march to Dandi he had publicly stated : "Civil Disobedience, begun this time, cannot be stopped and must not be stopped so long as there is a single civil resister left free or alive."⁶²

It is a moot point to decide why Gandhi made such

a *volte face*. The only rational justification that can be urged is a realization on his part that in this unequal fight with the Government the chances of success were very remote, and a compromise in good time is preferable to an admission of failure and voluntary retreat.

But whatever might have been the real ground for Gandhi's ignoble retreat, the Pact should not be judged merely by what it accomplished or failed to achieve. There is one aspect of it which, though generally ignored at the time in India, cannot but appeal to the historian as a valuable gain in a long view of things. For the first time in the history of British India, the British Government condescended to treat the Indian National Congress on a footing of equality as a political opponent, and entered on a prolonged negotiation with its accredited agent to settle terms of peace. The very fact that the Viceroy and Gandhi put their respective signatures on a 'treaty of peace' put the Indian National Congress on a high pedestal, and increased its prestige and stature. What was more important, the British practically conceded to the Congress a status and authority to speak for political India and consciously or unconsciously admitted its right to be heard on all future negotiations. This was no small gain and British statesmen like Churchill fully realized that they had yielded grounds and the British prestige suffered a set-back. The very fact that Gandhi, the half-naked *fakir*—to use Churchill's expression—ascended the staircase of Viceregal lodge, day after day, to carry on diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the Congress, made it patent to all that henceforth the British authority in India must take due cognizance of the great national organization which was fighting for India's freedom. Whether, and if so, how far, this aspect of the question weighed with Gandhi, no one can say.

In spite of its failure to achieve the goal the Civil

Disobedience movement, which came to a seemingly ignoble end, had a great value and importance in India's struggle for *Swaraj*. It demonstrated the awakening of political consciousness among the masses to a degree undreamt of before either by the friends or foes of India. It also gave evidence of the high moral inspiration and unflinching courage, infused among the people by Gandhi, the Saint, which give men strength to endure sufferings for the cause of the country to an extent which appears incredible to ordinary reasoning. The Mahatma's call to the people for sufferings and sacrifice found a response in the hearts of men and women of India to a degree which ensured the success of India's struggle for freedom. It was no longer a question of whether, but when she would reach the goal. Howsoever one might deplore Gandhi's political leadership, lack of wisdom and judgment in critical moments, and inability to carry on diplomatic negotiations with the astute British politicians, there is a consensus of opinion that India must ever remember with reverent gratitude his solid contribution to the moral regeneration of India's fighters for freedom which was an inestimable asset in the impending struggle.

Indirectly, the Civil Disobedience movement fully exposed the real nature of British rule in India in all its naked hideousness and lowered its moral prestige in the eyes of the whole world. As the great poet Rabindra Nath said, it was a great moral defeat for Europe, and Asia could now afford to look down on Europe where before she looked up.

III. THE CONGRESS

The Gandhi-Irwin Pact was considered at the annual session of the Congress at Karachi, held on March 29, 1931. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who presided over the Congress, strongly supported the Pact. He gave the go-by to the Lahore resolution on Independence and advocated

Dominion Status in his Presidential speech. Besides, he dwelt mainly on agrarian grievances and social and economic reforms—topics somewhat incongruous in the midst of a struggle for freedom or at least Responsible Government. The adoption of the Pact was of course a foregone conclusion, for the rank and file of the Congress party had gradually convinced themselves and deluded others into the belief that Gandhi had scored a great victory over the Government. Once again, Gandhi, the Saint, triumphed over Gandhi the politician. Indeed Gandhi's popularity seems to have reached the climax at this moment. An open air meeting preliminary to the regular session of the Congress was arranged at Karachi on March 25 where persons on an admission fee of four annas would be allowed to see and hear Gandhi. The collection amounted to ten thousand Rupees. It was at this meeting that Gandhi said that "Gandhi may die but Gandhism will live for ever."

The resolution of the Congress endorsing the Pact is a curious example of self-delusion and an attempt to mislead the people. The Pact, as mentioned above, clearly states the principle of constitutional development under the British with reservations for such matters as Defence, External Affairs, Financial Credit of India etc. Yet, according to the resolution of the Karachi Congress, while endorsing the Pact, "the Congress desires to make it clear that the Congress goal of *Purna Swaraj* remains intact." The resolution further adds that in the Conference "the Congress delegation will work for this objective and, in particular, so as to give the nation control over the defence forces, external affairs, finance, and fiscal and economic policy etc." An ordinary man, not a follower of a mystic saint, would find it very difficult to reconcile the acceptance of the Pact with the rest of the resolution. The whole thing seems to be a very clumsy

attempt to satisfy the conscience of that section of Congressmen who rightly interpreted the Pact as a clear departure from the declared goal and policy of the Congress. Though asked by Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru at first refused to move the resolution in the open session of the Congress. It went against his grain, he said. But, as usual, at the last moment he 'decided to sponsor it.'

The younger section, though disapproving the Pact for reasons mentioned above, did not oppose it in the plenary session of the Congress. The reasons in support of this attitude, as given by Subhas Bose,⁶³ do not appear to be convincing. But the sullen resentment of the youths found expression in other ways, particularly over the news of the execution of the three youths, Bhagat Singh, Raj Guru and Sukh Dev, convicted in the Lahore Conspiracy Case. They were all leading revolutionaries, as will be related later. According to the official history of the Congress, 'at that moment Bhagat Singh's name was as widely known all over India and was as popular as Gandhi.'⁶⁴ Pressure had been brought upon Gandhi to intercede with the Viceroy for the commutation of their capital punishment. Gandhi probably did his best, but the utmost that he could get from the Viceroy was an assurance to postpone the execution and reconsider the matter. This led the public, including Gandhi, to believe that the execution would be finally cancelled. But on March 23, only six days before the Congress session, Bhagat Singh and his two comrades were executed. The news filled the whole country with poignant grief and cast a gloom over the whole Congress Camp. The usual festivities on the opening day of the Congress were cancelled by the order of the President. The younger section, however, was under the impression that Gandhi did not press the matter upon the Viceroy's attention sufficiently strongly; and when Subhas Bose suggested

to him that he should, if necessary, break with the Viceroy on the question, Gandhi, averse on principle to revolutionary activities, did not go so far. The younger section, therefore, held Gandhi in a way responsible for the death of Bhagat Singh ; and when Gandhi along with the President-elect Vallabhbhai Patel, alighted from the Railway train at a minor station, 12 miles from Karachi, they were met with a hostile demonstration and several young men offered black flowers and black garlands.

The matter did not end there. A resolution was moved at the Congress to place on record its admiration of the bravery and sacrifice of the late Bhagat Singh and his comrades. According to the official history of the Congress, "it is really a point of doubt, even at this distance of time, as to which resolution was the more arresting one at Karachi,—that relating to Bhagat Singh or that relating to the ratification of the Gandhi-Irwin Agreement."⁶⁵ The resolution on Bhagat Singh was taken up immediately after the formal condolence resolutions. Gandhi and the Congress were averse to such resolutions in favour of revolutionaries, and therefore, to save the face, it was proposed to add a few words (*italicised*) by way of preamble to the resolution so as to read : The Congress, *while dissociating itself from and disapproving of political violence in any shape or form*, places on record its admiration of the bravery and sacrifice of...etc. The younger section moved amendments for the omission of the words and the Volunteers' Conference actually passed the resolution without those words. The Congress, of course, adopted the resolution with those words, but while it was being debated in the Congress there was tumult and uproar from the outside. But even with the face-saving preamble, the resolution must have been a bitter pill for Gandhi to swallow. For he had strongly expressed his views against an exactly similar resolution

passed by the Bengal Provincial Conference in respect of Gopinath Saha, and Gandhi was overwhelmed with sorrow when C.R. Das challenged him on this point and was defeated by only a narrow majority in a meeting of the AICC.⁶⁶

But the execution of Bhagat Singh was not the only shadow under which the Congress met. While the Congress was actually in session, a serious Hindu-Muslim riot broke out in Kanpur. The immediate cause was the refusal of the Muslims to close their shops when a *hartal* was declared after the execution of Bhagat Singh on 23 March. This was evidently in retaliation for the refusal of the Hindus to join the *hartal* organized by the Muslims after the death of Muhammad Ali shortly before. The following is the official account of the Congress which passed a resolution and appointed a Committee of Inquiry on the riot. "On the 24th March, began the plunder of Hindu shops. Even on the night of the 23rd March, some fifty were wounded. On the 25th, there was a blaze. Shops and temples were set fire to and burnt to cinders. The Police did not render any assistance ; disorder, arson, loot, murder, spread like fire. Five hundred families abandoned their houses and took shelter in villages. Dr. Ramachandra was one of the worst sufferers. All the members of his family, including his wife and aged parents, were killed and their bodies were thrust into gutters. According to the official estimates, 165 were killed and 480 were injured". The most tragic incident was the cold-blooded murder of Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, President U. P., P. C. C. and a great national worker. He had saved many Muslim families that very day, and in course of doing his duty was decoyed and cut down by a furious mob of Muslims.⁶⁷

The Committee of Inquiry that was appointed under the Chairmanship of Dr. Bhagavandas submitted

25V3

its report in a bulky volume. It began with a long historical introduction with the sole object to prove that the Muslim rulers in India were the most tolerant in respect of other religions. A more ridiculous parody of history it is difficult to imagine, and yet it bore the signature of several Hindus who should have known better. It was a piece of pure political propaganda, and was printed at great expense by the Working Committee of the Congress. Fortunately for the good name of the Congress, and of the authors of the Report, it was proscribed by the Government and did not see the light of the day.

Shortly after the end of the Congress session at Karachi, the new Working Committee met on April 1 and 2 to decide, among other things, the representation of the Congress at the Round Table Conference. Most of the members were of the opinion that the deputation should consist of about 15 members, and the Government were quite willing to accommodate up to 20. But ultimately it was decided unanimously that Gandhi should be the sole representative. This decision appeared to many to be a very unwise one. The official history of the Congress has been at pains to justify it on various grounds. First, that Gandhi was going to London, not to hammer out the details of a constitution but to negotiate the fundamentals of a treaty. Secondly, it signified unity of leadership in negotiating peace. Thirdly, the representation of Congress by a humanitarian like Gandhi "was in itself an achievement in the domain of the moral world."⁶⁸ Now all these ends could be achieved by sending a select team under the leadership of Gandhi, and such a course would have removed the great disadvantages under which Gandhi had to carry on a lonely fight against scores of non-descripts passing as representatives of India. A band of able men, including nationalist Muslims like Dr.

Ansari, would have given a far more realistic impression of Congress position and strength to the Englishmen, generally unaware of the inwardness of Indian politics. As it was bound to happen, Gandhi's voice was merely a lonely cry in the wilderness. The British public, and perhaps even many British members of the Conference, could not properly appreciate the true position and importance of the Congress *vis-à-vis* the other political organizations represented in the Conference, and the communalists seemed to convey, as it was deliberately designed by the Government to do so, a hopeless picture of divided India. Besides, Gandhi's humanitarianism was a very poor substitute for his singular ineptitude for diplomatic negotiations in the R.T.C., which was summoned to devise a constitution for India and not to establish peace and goodwill among mankind.

The execution of Bhagat Singh and the Kanpur communal riots augured ill for the success of the Round Table Conference. The former showed that the official intransigence had not abated a bit and there was no change of heart, which alone could ensure a smooth working of the Gandhi-Irwin Agreement. The Kanpur riot demonstrated the acuteness of the tension between the two communities whose unity and agreement were regarded as a *sine qua non* for the successful formulation of a constitutional scheme in the Conference.

Gandhi's mind was perturbed by both these issues. He strongly felt that he would rather not go to the R. T. Conference if he could not carry a Hindu-Muslim agreement in his hand. Nevertheless, the Working Committee met on the 9th, 10th and 11th of June, 1931, in Bombay, and at the instance of Muslim friends, and much against the inclinations of Gandhi, passed a resolution to the effect that even if efforts for communal agreement failed, Mahatma Gandhi should represent the Congress at

the Round Table Conference for the presentation of the Congress position.⁶⁹

This short official account may be considered along with the more elaborate version given by Subhas Bose. Referring to the attitude of Gandhi towards the communal problem after he was elected the sole representative at the Round Table Conference, Bose says :

"In private and in public, he (Gandhi) began to say that his going to the Round Table Conference depended on his ability to solve the Hindu-Moslem question beforehand. Along with this statement he also began to say that if the Moslems made a united demand on the question of representation, electorate, etc. in the new Constitution, he would accept the demand. The effect of these statements was a most tragic one. After the Delhi Pact, the reactionary Moslems had been somewhat overawed by the strength and power of the Congress and they were in a mood to come to terms with that body on a reasonable basis. The first statement of the Mahatma immediately changed that mood and made them feel that they held the key position, since if they refused to come to an understanding with him, they could prevent his attending the Round Table Conference. The second statement of the Mahatma made the reactionary Moslems feel that if only they would remain firm and secure the support of the Nationalist Moslems, the Mahatma could be forced to accept all their extreme demands. After the above statements had been made, the Mahatma had a conference with some reactionary Moslem leaders in Delhi in April. I was in Delhi at the time and I went to see him the same evening, after the conference. He seemed to be in a depressed mood, because they had presented him with the fourteen demands made by Mr. Jinnah (known in India as Jinnah's fourteen points), and he felt that an agreement would not be possible on that

basis. Thereupon I remarked that the Congress should only care for an agreement between Nationalist Hindus and Nationalist Moslems and that the agreed solution should be placed before the Round Table Conference as the Nationalist demand and that the Congress need not bother what other anti-Nationalist elements thought or said. The Mahatma then asked me if I had any objection to separate electorates since it could be argued that in the absence of the third party the different communities would live and work in concord. To this I replied that separate electorates were against the fundamental principles of Nationalism and that I felt so strongly on the subject that even Swaraj on the basis of separate electorates was, in my opinion, not worth having. While we were engaged in this discussion, Dr. Ansari and some of the Nationalist Moslem leaders, including Mr. Sherwani, arrived on the scene and joined in the discussion. They said that if for any reason the Mahatma gave up the demand for a common electorate for both Hindus and Moslems and accepted the demand of the reactionaries for a separate electorate for each community, they would oppose the reactionary Moslems and also the Mahatma, because they were convinced that separate electorates were bad not only for the country as a whole, but also for the different communities. The strong attitude of the Nationalist Moslems on this occasion was largely responsible for preventing the Mahatma from agreeing to separate electorates, and forced him to wriggle out of the uncomfortable situation in which he had placed himself. Soon after this, the Mahatma issued a public statement saying that he could not accept the demands made by the communalist Moslem leaders, since the Nationalist Moslems were opposed to them."⁷⁰

The Working Committee of the Congress made an attempt to undo the mischief committed by Lahore

Congress by presenting for the adoption of the country a scheme of communal agreement, which they claimed to be 'as nearly national as possible,' though communal in appearance, and hoped would be generally acceptable to the communities concerned.

A long statement was issued by the Working Committee on July 20, 1931, and it is described in the official history as the *magnum opus* of the Congress. In practical supersession of the Lahore Resolution mentioned above,⁷¹ the Working Committee offered a scheme of communal settlement on the following basis :

- "1. (a). The article in the Constitution relating to Fundamental Rights shall include a guarantee to the communities concerned of their cultures, languages, scripts, education, profession and practice of religion, and religious endowments.
- (b). Personal laws shall be protected by specific provisions to be embodied in the Constitution.
- (c). Protection of political and other rights of minority communities in the various Provinces shall be the concern and be within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government.

...

3. (a). Joint electorates shall form the basis of representation in the future Constitution of India.
- (b). For the Hindus in Sind, the Muslims in Assam and the Sikhs in the Panjab and the North-West Frontier Province, and for Hindus and Muslims in any Province where they are less than 25 per cent. of the population, seats shall be reserved on the Federal and Provincial Legislatures on the basis of population with the right to contest additional seats."

...

7. Sind shall be constituted into a separate Province,

provided that the people of Sind are prepared to bear the financial burden of the separated Province.

8. The future Constitution of the country shall be federal. The residuary powers shall vest in the federating units, unless, on further examination, it is found to be against the best interests of India."⁷²

But the communal problem, in spite of its great importance, justly stressed by Gandhi, was cast into shade by the deliberate policy of the Government to ignore the stipulations of the Gandhi-Irwin Agreement.

Lord Irwin was succeeded by Lord Willingdon as Viceroy on April 17, 1931, and in spite of his sympathetic speeches, officials had resumed the repressive campaign in various ways. Gandhi felt obliged to make complaints of the violation of the Agreement he made with Irwin, and there ensued a long correspondence between him and the Government. The Government maintained that "Local Governments have been scrupulous in carrying out the obligations imposed on them" by the Agreement, and in support of this view sent extracts from official reports to Gandhi. Gandhi replied that the information that he was receiving almost daily from the workers, who were thoroughly reliable eye-witnesses, made him distrust the official reports. He therefore requested the Home Secretary to the Government of India to appoint Boards of Inquiry in different Provinces, each consisting of an official and a Congress nominee, to conduct a summary inquiry into the allegations on either side. This the Secretary refused point-blank. His argument was that of the typical bureaucrat. Referring to Gandhi's proposal he observed: "In other words, the duty of maintaining law in this particular respect (picketing) would be transferred from the Police, who have statutory duties, to a board of enquiry the members of which might well arrive at a different conclusion, while the *police, of course, must act only in accord-*

ance with the law. It is not practicable nor was it intended by the settlement that their duty in this respect should in any way be abrogated.”⁷³

Similarly the Government also turned down Gandhi's suggestion for the appointment of a permanent board of arbitration to decide questions of interpretation of the Agreement.⁷⁴ Gandhi forwarded a specific list of eleven points on the interpretation of which there was a difference between the Government and the Congress, and requested that they may be referred to an impartial tribunal. But the Government turned it down on the ground, “that it would not be possible for the Government to agree to any arrangement which involved the suspension of the ordinary law or of the regular machinery of administration, or which included the appointment of an external authority to whom the Government would delegate the responsibility for reaching decision in matters closely affecting the administration.” On the other hand, the Government complained that “the activities of the Congress during the past five months i. e. March-July, were contrary both to the letter and spirit of the Delhi settlement and had involved a constant menace to the maintenance of peace in U. P. and N. W. F. P.”⁷⁵

While this correspondence was going on, reports reached Gandhi from different quarters, particularly U. P. and N. W. F. P., of serious violations of the agreement he had made with Irwin. In disgust he wired to the Viceroy on 11 August that he would not sail for England. He was particularly mortified at the attitude of the Governor of U. P. and at a letter from the Bombay Government in which it was claimed, in effect, that the Government must be the final judge of facts as well as of law. Gandhi referred to it in his telegram to the Viceroy and said that “in naked terms, this means that the Government should be both the prosecutor and the judge

with reference to matters arising out of a contract to which they and the complainants are parties.”⁷⁶ As the Viceroy, in his reply dated 13 August, supported the actions of the Governors of Bombay and U. P., Gandhi wired back on the same day that “it shows fundamental differences in our respective outlooks upon the settlement”, and repeated his decision not to go to London to attend the Round Table Conference. Gandhi’s decision was endorsed by the Congress Working Committee on 13 August.⁷⁷

Gandhi’s decision not to attend the Round Table Conference was also partly influenced by the fact that in spite of an assurance given by Irwin, Dr. Ansari, the Muslim Nationalist, was not nominated to the Round Table Conference. Lord Willingdon justified his action on the ground that the Musalman delegates were opposed to Ansari’s delegation. It obviously fitted in with the policy of the Government to show that the Muslims were *en bloc* opposed to the Congress.

The events, however, took a dramatic turn. To remove misunderstanding Gandhi wrote a private letter to Lord Willingdon refuting the charges that he insisted upon a Board of Arbitration and was trying to set up a parallel Government. The main purpose of the letter was to inquire whether his decision not to attend the Round Table Conference meant an end of his Agreement with Irwin.⁷⁸ The Viceroy’s reply pointed out that the failure of the Congress to attend the Round Table Conference defeated one of the main objects of the Agreement, but added that “Government would continue to avoid resort to special measures so far as possible restricting action to the requirements of the specific situation.” Gandhi immediately wired to the Viceroy for an interview and met him along with Vallabhbhai Patel, Jawaharlal and Prabhasankar Pattani, the only delegate for the Round Table Conference who had not sailed with the rest by the *S. S. Mooltan* on 15 August.

The results of the interview were summed up in an official communique. The Government agreed to hold an inquiry into the alleged coercion in collecting land-revenue in some villages in the Surat District, but 'not in regard to other matters hitherto raised by the Congress.' Gandhi accepted it with the reservation that if in extreme cases of hardship no inquiry is held, the Congress retains the right of seeking relief in the shape of defensive direct action.⁷⁹

The official history of the Congress takes it as a triumph for Gandhi, and writes : "Ultimately, after several hitches, matters were squared up and Gandhi left Simla by a special train so as to catch the train on the line which would enable him to sail on the 29th August."⁸⁰

A mind, not obsessed with the infallibility of Gandhi, would find it difficult to admit that "matters were squared up," and would fail to understand how an important decision of national importance could be made and unmade in such a light-hearted manner. Considering the nature of the concessions made by the Government, any rational being is bound to hold that either Gandhi had not adequate grounds to boycott the Round Table Conference, or his eleventh hour decision to attend it was more an act of impulse than of reason. A devoted admirer of Gandhi had observed : "Gandhi saw things as if by a flash and framed his conduct by impulse. To the righteous man these two are the supreme guides of life, not reason nor intellect."⁸¹

Perhaps this is best illustrated by the conduct of Gandhi in August, 1931. Such a righteous man or saint is, of course, above historical judgment, which can only proceed on the assumption that men's acts are, or should be, dictated by reason and intellect rather than by impulse. It is hardly necessary to add that the Working Committee, as in duty bound, duly endorsed both the decisions of Gandhi, first to abstain from the Round Table Conference, and next to attend it.

IV. SECOND ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE.

There was a change of Government in Britain before the Second Round Table Conference opened on 7 September, 1931. The Labour Government was replaced by a National Government dominated by the Conservative Party. Ramsay MacDonald was still the Premier, but Sir Samuel Hoare, a Conservative, was the Secretary of State for India.

Gandhi arrived in London on 12 September. He delivered many fine speeches, both in and outside the Conference, elaborating his ideas of peace and goodwill on earth, emphasizing the unique position of the Indian National Congress as a national and not a party organization, explaining the supreme need of a partnership between Britain and India as between two equal nations, stressing the determination of the Congress to infect the British people with love for India, etc. Oblivious of the decisions already arrived at in the First R. T. Conference to which he had already subscribed in his Agreement with Lord Irwin, Gandhi stuck to the Karachi Resolution. He demanded that the Responsible Government must be established, *immediately* and *in full*, both at the Centre and in the Provinces, including complete control over the finance, army, defence and external relations. Safeguards were not needed and therefore no special powers should be given to the Governor-General. His presence and lofty idealism created great sensation, but his pious platitudes cut no ice with the British people or Government. Certain it is that his speeches, personality and appeals did not influence the deliberation and decision of the Conference in the slightest degree.

The outstanding feature of the Conference was the unending discussion on the communal problem. The representatives of the Muslims, Depressed Classes, Anglo-

Indians, a section of the Indian Christians, and the European commercial community concluded an agreement among themselves, but the Hindus and Sikhs did not accept it. Gandhi pointed out that the question of framing a Constitution should have precedence over the Communal problem and the Constitution might provide that failing any amicable agreement the question should be referred to a judicial tribunal for final decision. Nobody paid any heed to this and Ramsay MacDonald held that the inability to solve the communal question was hampering the progress of constitution-making. A suggestion was made in course of the discussion that the British Government should settle the dispute on its own authority. The Premier asked a plain question on this subject: "Will you, each of you, every member of the Committee, sign a request to me, to settle the community question and pledge yourself to accept my decision? That, I think, is a very fair offer."⁸² Most of the members, *but not all*, signed such a request.

Regarding the main problem of constitutional progress of India, the Second Round Table Conference did not make any further progress beyond working out some details of the plan already decided upon, and the Prime Minister closed the session on 11 December, 1931, by reiterating the policy he had announced before, at the beginning of the year.

Though Gandhi had failed most miserably, he received a grand ovation on his return to India, on 28 December, 1931. The grandeur of the ovation, we are told, exceeded all limits, but it also exceeded even the most incredible folly ever perpetrated by the devotees of Gandhi in his name. What, one may ask, was the occasion for the ovation? Had Gandhi returned with *Swaraj* in the hollow of his hands, or had he brought back, what could be termed by the remotest stretch of imagination, peace with

honour ? As he himself admitted, with truth, he returned empty-handed. The popular demonstration was nothing but a ludicrous exhibition of the pathetic lack of a sense of political realities among the Indians in general and Gandhiites in particular. The day should have been observed as one of mourning and humility, not of joy and gaiety.

D. RESUMPTION OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE.

I. REACTIONARY POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

Immediately after his return to India on 28 December, 1931, Gandhi was apprised of the tense political situation in India, of which he had some inkling even while he was in London.

The promised inquiry into the alleged police excesses in connection with the collection of revenue in Surat District on the basis of which he agreed to attend the Round Table Conference, had ended in a fiasco.

The no-rent campaign in U. P., which was suspended after the Gandhi-Irwin Agreement, was revived. The Government demanded that the peasants should pay up their dues pending negotiations, while the peasants asked for suspension of payment during the negotiations. On the refusal of the Government, the Provincial Congress Committee had advised the peasants to withhold payment of rent during negotiations. The Government thereupon made wholesale arrests of Congress workers. Jawaharlal and Purushottamdas Tandon were arrested only five days before the return of Gandhi from London.

In the N. W. F. P. the organization of the Khudai Khidmatgars or Red Shirt Volunteers of Abdul Gaffar Khan was declared illegal. The Khan, who was called Frontier Gandhi for his scrupulous non-violent policy, his brother, and some other leaders were thrown into prison, and within a few months several thousand Red

Shirts were put behind the bars. Thereafter troops were sent into the villages to terrorize the people and break up the organization.

An acute situation had developed in Bengal. There were several terrorist outrages, generally believed to have been acts of reprisals for oppressive conduct. The murder of the Inspector-General of Prisons and of three successive Magistrates of Midnapore was evidently the result, respectively, of ill treatment of prisoners and the atrocities committed to suppress the no-tax campaign. To retaliate such terrorist outrages, reprisals were made by, or at the connivance of, the Government. The town of Chittagong was left at the mercy of non-official Europeans and a band of hooligans for three days, and looting went on in broad daylight without the least interference by the Police. Even the State-prisoners at the Hijli (Bengal) Camp were fired upon and struck with the butt-end.

These incidents are merely illustrative and not an exhaustive list of official repression. In addition, repressive ordinances were in force in Bengal, U. P., and N. W. F. P. Thus, on his return to India on 28 December, 1931, Gandhi found the whole thing in a pretty mess. He sent a telegram to the Viceroy on 29 December, referring to the Government oppression and asking for an interview. The Viceroy wired his reply on 31 December. He justified the actions of the Government on the ground of terrorism and rebellious attitude shown by the people, and then added: "The Viceroy was unwilling to believe that Gandhi was personally responsible for the Congress activities in U. P. and N. W. F. P. or approved of them. "If this is so", the telegram continued, "he is willing to see you", but he "feels bound to emphasise that he will not be prepared to discuss with you measures which Government of India, with the full approval of His Majesty's Government, have found it necessary to adopt in Bengal,

U. P. and N. W. F. P. "These measures must in any case be kept in force."⁸³

Gandhi wired a very dignified reply to the Government telegram of the 31st December, on the very next day. He pointed out that the Viceroy in effect asked him to repudiate his valued colleagues in advance before he could be granted an interview and even then could not discuss the matters of vital importance to the nation. He then challenged the correctness of the official version of happenings in U. P. and N.W.F.P. As regards Bengal he said, "whilst the Congress would condemn in unmeasurable terms the methods of terrorism, it can in no way associate itself with Government terrorism as is betrayed by the Bengal Ordinance and acts done thereunder, but must resist, within the limits of its prescribed creed of non-violence, such measures of legalized Government terrorism." Gandhi repeated his offer of co-operation and his willingness "to go to the respective Provinces and, with the aid of the authorities, study both sides of the question." But he pointed out that if his efforts failed to persuade the Government, he would have no other course left but to resume Civil Disobedience.⁸⁴ The plan was already tentatively sketched by the Working Committee and he communicated to the Viceroy the full text of the Resolution, which is merely an amplification of Gandhi's telegram. The operative part of the resolution reads as follows :

"The Working Committee is prepared to tender co-operation to the Government, provided His Excellency the Viceroy reconsiders his telegram and adequate relief is granted in respect of the Ordinances and its recent acts, free scope is left to the Congress in any future further negotiations to prosecute the Congress claim for Complete Independence, and the administration of the country is carried on in consultation with popular representatives, pending the attainment of such Independence.

"In the absence of any satisfactory response from the Government in terms of the foregoing paragraph, the Working Committee will regard it as an indication on the part of the Government that it has reduced to nullity the Delhi Pact. In the event of a satisfactory response not forthcoming, the Working Committee calls upon the Nation to resume Civil Disobedience including non-payment of taxes."⁸⁵

The Government reply to this was, of course, a foregone conclusion. In a telegram dated 2nd January, 1932, the Viceroy refused even to contemplate the possibility of an interview "held under the threat of resumption of Civil Disobedience." In his reply and final telegram, dated the 3rd, Gandhi reminded the Government of India that negotiations between him and Lord Irwin were opened whilst Civil Disobedience was on, that when the Agreement was concluded Civil Disobedience was not given up but only discontinued, and that this position was re-asserted and accepted by Lord Willingdon in Simla in September last.⁸⁶ This telegram marked the end of the correspondence between the Viceroy and Gandhi which covered exactly six days from December 29, 1931 to January 3, 1932, and heralded the revival of Civil Disobedience.

Long extracts have been quoted from the correspondence in order to convey a fair idea of the attitude of both the parties and provide sufficient materials for forming a fair judgment on the responsibility that must be shared by each for the resumption of hostilities. It would appear that each accused the other of violating the Agreement, and there was fundamental difference between the two regarding the nature and course of events that actually took place. The Government of India took up the position that the official statements of facts must be regarded as true. Such a claim cannot stand a moment's scrutiny as it can be proved by numerous instances that

the official version proved to be quite inaccurate and not unoften a deliberate distortion of facts to justify the official action. It is a matter of common knowledge that on an ultimate analysis the facts supplied to the Government of India emanated originally from the local officials of a lower grade and passed through senior officers who based their actions on them. If there was any outcry against any course of action the very official who was directly or indirectly responsible for it was also usually entrusted with the investigation. It is obvious that in such circumstances there was little chance of finding out the truth if there were no independent inquiry. Gandhi showed remarkable fairness of mind, and demonstrated his innate love of truth, when, in spite of allegations of Government terrorism and violation of agreement made by reliable persons of unimpeachable character, he approached the Viceroy for discussing a *modus operandi* for ascertaining the truth. By persistently refusing this very reasonable demand the Government undoubtedly put themselves in the wrong, and they must share the chief responsibility for plunging the country once more into the throes of Civil Disobedience campaign, involving chaos and confusion and inflicting untold miseries and sufferings on a large section of innocent people.

The elaborate defence of the Government of India in a statement issued on January 4, 1932, over the signature of Mr. Emerson, was smashed to pieces by the rejoinder published in the *Young India* of January 14, which fully exposed its unscrupulous character by showing how "it is packed full of evasions, false statements, suppressions, and dishonest distortions."⁸⁷ Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya also thoroughly exposed the hollowness of the Government pleas in justification of their conduct. Mr. Brailsford, writing in the *New Leader*, condemned the Viceroy's conduct, which was "as petty as it was unreasoning".

"It is fantastic", observed he, "to summon Mr. Gandhi to London to discuss the rights which Indians shall enjoy tomorrow and at the same time to refuse to listen when he would defend such rights as they ought to enjoy today". Even the semi-official organ, *The Times of India*, regretted the Viceroy's action, while the moderate *Servant of India* observed: "The Viceroy's action in refusing to let the greatest political leader in the country place his views regarding the Ordinances before the head of the Government cannot but be deplored as a blunder. It was both indefensible and discourteous."⁸⁸

The most impartial account and dispassionate judgment of the whole episode are to be found in a short treatise written by an eminent English scholar, Verrier Elwin.⁸⁹ Referring to the charge that Congress precipitated the conflict with Government in the United Provinces, he makes the following observations :

"The state of the United Provinces peasant is pitiable. To visit the villages in the eastern districts of the province is a heart-breaking experience There is almost nothing to eat..... Upon these starving villagers there falls with merciless regularity the demand for rent. Unable to pay, they are beaten, abused, turned out of what shelter they have, robbed of half the possessions. And while their earning capacity has fallen by 50 per cent. the rent and revenue demands have been steadily rising... Government sanctioned remissions to the extent of a little over two and a half annas in the rupee. But the price of agricultural produce had fallen by over eight annas in the rupee, and the Congress voiced the feelings of the peasants in declaring the proposed remissions totally inadequate. Negotiations between Government and Congress were in progress when the rents for the coming year began to be demanded. The peasants were told that if the year's rent was not paid within a month, even the

remissions might be withdrawn. No objections could be raised without making payment of the rent demanded. Still the Congress tried the way of negotiation, but when this proved ineffective, it had no alternative but to advise suspension of payment pending the result of negotiations. It was made clear, however, that Congress would withdraw this advice if the authorities on their own initiative suspended collections on the same condition.....This can hardly be called a no-rent campaign...Government could easily, without loss to itself or the landlords, have issued instructions for the temporary postponement of the collections of rents until negotiations were concluded. But Government precipitated a conflict, first by demanding payment while negotiations about the payment were still in progress, and then by promulgating an Ordinance of a severity out of all proportion to the necessities of the situation.

"In the N.W.F.P. the action of Government was more indefensible", continues Mr. Elwin. "It is true that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan used the Truce as an opportunity to organize the Congress movement on the Frontier..... What he did achieve was to spread the idea of non-violence widely among the Pathans, to create in them some sort of political consciousness, and to organise a very large army of strictly pacifist volunteers. His great crime was that he was too successful. He became a rival to the Chief Commissioner.....Some of his speeches, if correctly reported, do indeed seem likely to foment racial hatred, but if the Khan Sahib were fomenting racial hatred he was entitled to an open trial where he could have defended himself against the accusation.

"There was no warrant whatever for the promulgation of the Frontier Ordinance except the desire of Government to crush the Congress movement in the Province. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was no danger to the

public peace. There were no riots, no assassinations. My own impression, after a personal visit to the Frontier, was that Abdul Ghaffar Khan had lessened the amount of racial hatred, he had not increased it. As a speaker in the Assembly observed, he deserves a reward rather than imprisonment for his great national service of promoting the spirit of non-violence. He was in fact simply doing what the Government (if it were sincere in its professions to hand over political power to India) should have welcomed—creating a political consciousness among the people, and thus preparing them in the most practical way for self-government. By the Ordinance (of which Sir Abdur Rahim said that he could hardly believe his eyes when he read it) Government declared war on the Congress in the Frontier Province and deliberately provoked a conflict.”

After reviewing the whole situation in detail Mr. Elwin makes the following general observations: “The real failure to observe the spirit of the Settlement appears to me to have been on the other side. Local Governments showed their utmost unwillingness to follow the lead of Lord Irwin. Mahatma Gandhi had great difficulty in persuading them to give full effect to the political amnesty He never managed to secure the readmission of students who had been dismissed on political grounds from educational institutions. The local authorities put every obstacle in the way of restoration to the original owners of lands in Kaira and Bardoli that had been sold to third parties. In Ahmedabad, rules about the hours and places of the sale of liquor were deliberately relaxed in order to circumvent the peaceful picketing that was permitted under the Settlement.....

“Nor was Government itself behindhand in preparing for a future conflict. Ceaseless propaganda was carried on against the Congress. A circular letter, for example,

was issued by a United Provinces Collector directing taluqdars to furnish complaints against Congressmen. A similar letter was issued by a Collector in Karnatak to police officers. The revival of civil disobedience sooner or later was to be regarded as a foregone certainty, and district police officers were asked to keep a close watch on the movements and utterances of all congressmen with a view to facilitating their prosecution when the time for it came. The speed and thoroughness with which it was able to strike on the renewal of civil disobedience show how well Government used the Truce as a preparation for conflict.”⁹⁰

Indeed a careful review of all relevant circumstances leads a historian to the justifiable belief that the Government of India, under Willingdon, smarting under the indignity of Gandhi-Irwin Agreement, made a deliberate plan to undo the ‘mischief’, as far as possible, by forcing the resumption of civil disobedience so that they could put it down by brute force and thus wipe away the ‘disgrace’ of asking for truce in the first round of the fight.

This is abundantly clear from the fact that under the cover of truce the Government had made elaborate preparations to fight the impending Civil Disobedience. They were caught unawares in 1930, but being now fully cognizant of the method followed by the Congress they had made arrangements to grapple with the situation at a moment’s notice. They had already promulgated three Ordinances and four more were kept ready, The net result of these Ordinances, whose provisions will be described later in this Chapter, was to arm the Executive with all necessary powers over the life and property of the people. In short, the fiat of the Executive took the place of Law. The Government did not neglect even minute details. At least one local Government had ordered thousands of new *lathis* during the truce period. Whatever we may think

of this, the fact remains, that whereas *lathi-charge* was a later development in 1930, it was "the first friend that greeted the Satyagrahis" in 1932.

II. THE PART PLAYED BY NON-OFFICIAL EUROPEANS.

But the Government were not acting alone. They were backed by the entire non-official European community. Like the Government they had scant regard for the Gandhi-Irwin Agreement and were devising plans to kill the Civil Disobedience movement, which they feared—or rather hoped—, would soon be resumed. How their mind was working even during the period of truce will be evident from a letter which the Bombay Branch of the European Association wrote to the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Bombay, after the presentation of an address to him on 15th October, 1931, by the Europeans of Poona. It made the following specific suggestions to counter Civil Disobedience in the event of its revival :

(1) That immediately Civil Disobedience was declared Congress should be declared an illegal body, and Congress property and property used for Congress purposes should be confiscated and at once sold or destroyed.

(2) That the flying of the Congress flag, and all kinds of ceremonial connected therewith, should immediately be forbidden.

(3) That similar action should be taken in regard to parading or drilling of volunteers and similar operations of a military nature.

(4) That all those who are known to have been responsible for the organisation or financing of the last Civil Disobedience movement should be at once brought under control and, if necessary, put under restraint. It is suggested, in fact, that they should be treated in the same fashion as enemy subjects interned during the war.

(5) That provision should be made to prevent any

person or bodies from deriving financial benefits as a result of political upheaval. Both regulations might be compared with those adopted in the United Kingdom against profiteering during the war. Two specific methods by which it is suggested that such provisions might be made effective are : (a) That steps should be taken to stop Congress funds at source, accompanied, if necessary, by an Ordinance compelling the production of banking accounts; (b) that textile mills or other commercial undertakings which have signed agreements with Congress, while that body has not been proscribed as illegal, should be required immediately to withdraw adherence to any compact with Congress on pain of being denied rail transit for their goods. Something of this kind would appear to be vital, one of the terms accepted by at any rate some of these signatories, being an undertaking to give Government no assistance in any action which they may take against so-called national activities.

The Deputation which made this representation was led by Mr. Abercrombie, who, in his letter to the Home Department, sent on the suggestion of the Home Member, wrote :

"My Committee, therefore, request that persons in the employ of the Government may be sent in the guise of ordinary citizens to picketed shops, demand the goods of mills banned by Congress, with the police in readiness to arrest picketers if any coercion or intimidation is used."

The Home Member was also informed that unless this was done there would be counter-picketing, or merchants would "take the law into their own hands in other ways."

".....If the Government make all other considerations subordinate to the need for prompt and decisive measures against the movement the moment it reappears, there will be no room for doubt as to its object, and an attitude of conciliation will be tantamount to suicide.

The greater the latitude permitted, the longer and more bitter will be the struggle and the worse the suffering. It cannot be too strongly urged upon the Government that if the revolutionary movement again gets under way their action must be prompt, vigorous and even ruthless. Congress must not be given time for the full mobilisation of its undoubtedly powerful forces."

"A copy of Mr. Abercrombie's letter to the Home Department, from which the above extracts are taken, was circulated on the 28th October, 1931, by Mr. Chapman Mortimer, General Secretary of the European Association of India, to all circles and branches, with the comment that the views of the Bombay branch had the full support of the President and Council of the Association.

"The Abercrombie circular may thus be regarded as the view of the organized European community in India during the period of the Truce, when the Round Table Conference was sitting in London."

It is significant that the policy actually adopted by the Government closely followed the lines suggested by the European Association. The Council of the European Association, at its meeting in Delhi in February, 1932, urged (1) that the main provisions of the Ordinances must remain operative ; (2) that Congressmen and women then in prison should remain in jail unless prepared to recant ; (3) that if the Government were to announce a policy of not releasing these it would secure co-operation from those who are at present doubtful of the Government's intentions, in addition to maintaining the support of those who already co-operate ; (4) that these men and women should remain in prison until provincial institutions are established.

The Bombay Branch of the European Association, on the 31st March, 1932, when the Ordinances were in full swing, demanded stronger action. At the Annual Meeting, at which H. E. the Governor of Bombay was

present, Mr. Miller, the retiring President of the Association, said :

"We fully support the Government of India in the manner in which they have tackled the situation since the beginning of the year, which, if anything, in my opinion, has erred on the side of leniency.....We are satisfied that there will be no weakening on the part of the Government, and indeed there may be need for stronger action, though we sincerely hope this may not be necessary....."⁹¹

III. REPRESSIVE MEASURES OF THE GOVERNMENT

Gandhi sent his final telegram on 3 January, 1932. To this there was no reply. On 4 January, the Government issued a manifesto in justification of its policy and began the offensive by promulgating four new Ordinances, and arresting, in the early hours of the morning, both Gandhi and Vallabhbhai Patel. Khan Shaheb and Jawaharlal were already in prison and the other political leaders were secured in batches. As to the rank and file nearly ninety thousand men, women, and children were convicted and sentenced.

The lot of the prisoners was miserable in the extreme. "More than ninety-five per cent. of the persons convicted were placed in the 'C' class. There was a very small sprinkling of Congressmen placed in the 'B' class, while the 'A' class was maintained only in name in several places, and very sparingly granted in others... Graduates, Professors, Lawyers, Editors, well-to-do traders and businessmen, rich Zamindars, high grade agriculturists, and philanthropic workers, including men whom the Government themselves recognised as well-to-do by imposing heavy fines running often into four figures, were all thrown pell-mell into the last class, with the food and clothing of ordinary convicts."⁹² These people were not likely to submit always to the most humiliating conditions (such as

sitting in a particular posture) imposed upon the ordinary convicts, composed of thieves and robbers. For disobeying these laws further penalties were imposed upon them, and they were not unoften victims of beating and other kinds of torture as these could be inflicted with impunity within the four walls of the prison house. It would appear from the testimony of numerous prisoners of those days that in many police lock-ups and jails "unmentionable atrocities and tortures were perpetrated, the variety and cruelty of which varied with the intelligence, resourcefulness and callousness of the particular officers concerned. Even women, boys and children were not spared."⁹³ Unutterable things were said and unspeakable punishments were planned. In spite of all precautions cases of such brutality sometimes came to the knowledge of the public. "For instance, in the Nasik Jail on October 27th, Mr. Amritlal Morarji, a political prisoner who had been given bar-fetters, was taken to a cell, beaten by five jail-officials with batons and lifted up and dashed down till he became unconscious. There was intense indignation when the news saw the light of day, and Government had to order the prosecution of the jail-officials responsible for the incident.'⁹⁴

As could be expected, *lathi*-charge, i. e. merciless and reckless beating on any part of the body with iron-shod heavy bamboo sticks, was the order of the day. There were several new features in the repressive programme of the Government. In the first place, the Ordinances covered much wider ground, and any act which might be even remotely construed as 'dislike of or disaffection towards any official, down to a petty Chaukidar,' such as refusing to rent a house on reasonable (according to the official) rent, sell articles at reasonable prices etc., might involve punishment with fine or imprisonment.

Another novel method was an elaborate plan to cut

off the resources and supplies of Congress and other disapproved organizations. The Bombay Government forfeited an amount of more than thirty-three lakhs of Rupees belonging to the Gujarat Sabha.^{94a} There were other cases of this nature. Among other prominent features of the Government repression may be mentioned :

1. Mass punishments, punitive impositions, victimization of neighbours, relatives etc.

2. Confiscation of lands, cattle, utensils and personal belongings ; destruction of property and closing down of social service and similar institutions. Government had taken possession of Congress offices and *ashrams*.

3. Ill-treatment of women and children.

- 4 Externment and internment at the direction of the Executives.

5. Whipping of juvenile and flogging of adult volunteers who were guilty of picketing, hoisting of Congress flags or such acts of Civil Disobedience as breaking of forest laws.

6. Frequent resorts to firing on unarmed crowds. Replying to a question in the Indian Legislative Assembly, the Home Member to the Government of India, Mr. (later Sir) H. G. Haig stated that in dispersing assemblies, "firing was resorted to seventeen times in Bengal, seven times in the United Provinces, three times in Bihar and Orissa, once in Madras Presidency, once in the Frontier Province—while in Bombay Presidency the casualties from shooting were thirty-four killed and ninety-one wounded."⁹⁵

As regards the nature of the crimes to punish which all these terrors of repression were let loose by the Government of India, it is described as follows by the India League Delegation to which fuller reference will be made in the next Section.

"Civil Disobedience is often spoken of as lawlessness. Inasmuch as it is defiance of existing law it is "lawless."

But it would be a gross misrepresentation to describe the Civil Disobedience campaign as a movement which lets loose lawless people on society ; a campaign in which everybody was asked to do as they pleased. Still more would it be grotesque to describe it as an encouragement to violence, crime, or licence. Civil resisters do not go about breaking laws as they please, nor interfering with the liberty of others. Civil Disobedience is a form of direct action against the Government of the day. Its moral basis is that law in India is not based on consent; its administration is under alien direction ; and its ends are not determined by Indian wills or purposes. Civil Disobedience thus becomes both a moral protest and weapon of attack on the present system of administration.”⁹⁶

So far as the Civil Resisters were concerned their activities were mainly the following :

1. Leading processions in contravention of Police and prohibitory notices.

2. Holding public meetings and conferences in spite of bans imposed on them.

3. Picketing and boycotting of British goods, banks, insurance companies, mints and bullion exchanges.

4. Issuing unauthorized bulletins and cyclostyle leaflets and distributing them among the people.

5. Saluting the national flag in public and hoisting it over civil and criminal courts and public buildings.

6. Withholding of land revenue and Chaukidari tax.

7. Violating restraint orders and refusing to be on police parole.

8. Attempting to reoccupy Congress offices taken possession of by the Police.

9. Manufacturing salt.

In addition to these local activities of a routine nature, there were also campaigns of an all-India character planned and organized by the Working Committee. Among

these may be mentioned the celebration of the National Week (April 6-13) and the holding of the Annual Session of the Congress at Delhi despite the Police ban and the strictest surveillance. It was followed by Political Conferences all over the country and the celebration of special 'days' like the All-India Prisoner's Day, Peshawar Day etc. It must be noted that the Civil Resisters made no physical resistance, even when they were arrested or mercilessly beaten, and did not defend themselves in court even against false accusations, for they took no part in any judicial trial.

While the Officials took credit for successfully stopping the Congress Session at Delhi, the facts ascertained on the most reliable authority are as follows :

It was announced that the annual session of the Congress will be held at Delhi on 24 April. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the President-elect, was served with an order on April 22 at the Jumna Bridge entrance to Delhi, prohibiting the entry of himself and his party into Delhi. Malaviya, having disobeyed the order, was arrested and taken to the Central Jail in a lorry. In spite of Police vigilance and the arrests of delegates at all Railway stations, about 1500 delegates succeeded in reaching Delhi. Although many private houses were searched and guarded, the Subjects Committee of the Congress met on April 23, drafted five resolutions, and circulated them among the delegates for signature. On the 24th there was a *hartal* in the city in contravention of the Police order, and armed Police, mounted, in foot, and on lorries patrolled the town. While the Police were still combing out houses and scouring premises of all kinds, about 500 delegates, who were not yet arrested, gathered at the Clock Tower at the Chandni Chawk, and Seth Ranchhoddas, a delegate from Ahmadabad, officiated as the Chairman. The printed resolutions of the Subjects Committee, which had been circulated the previous

day, were read aloud by all together in unison and were adopted. They referred to the imprisonment of the Congressmen and the leaders, confirmed the Karachi resolution on Independence, the leadership of Gandhi, and the Civil Disobedience programme issued by the Working Committee. The session lasted only ten minutes. By the time the Police lorries arrived the session was over. The acting President and the delegates were arrested. Prosecutions were launched against a few, and the rest were released. Pandit Malaviya was released on May 1. The whole incident showed how deeply the Congress was rooted in the affection of the people and how futile was the endeavour of the British Government to crush the Civil Disobedience movement.

IV. GENERAL REVIEW OF THE SITUATION BY INDIA LEAGUE DELEGATION

It is extremely fortunate for history that we possess a very detailed account of the political situation in India during the Civil Disobedience campaign of 1932, by an authoritative, independent and impartial body. It was a small delegation sent by India League, London, to study at first hand the complex situation in India. The Delegation consisted of Miss Monica Whately, Miss Ellen Wilkinson (ex-M. P.), Leonard W. Matters, and V. K. Krishna Menon. The composition of the Delegation is a guarantee that the report is not likely to be partial to the Indians and cannot, in any case, be charged with any preconceived prejudice or hostility against the British.

The Delegation reached Bombay on August 17, 1932, and left India on November 7. During this period they went to every Province of British India except C.P., visited many important towns and villages, and met Indians of every class and shade of opinion as well as officials, both British and Indian. The facts and views they collected in this way formed the basis of their report, published in

1934.⁹⁷ Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, had stated in the House of Commons that "the scenes were stage-managed (by the Congress) for this delegation, and from start to finish they saw this carefully managed side of the picture." But the Delegation fully exposed the hollowness of this charge which could not be sustained by him when challenged by the Leader of the Opposition. It is hardly necessary to refute the view expressed by Hoare that all his Indian correspondents, from the Viceroy downwards, were of opinion that the Delegation "were biassed in the views they took." Every unprejudiced reader will admit that the Report is a very valuable record of acts of terrorism perpetrated in 1932, collected with scrupulous care, and accepted after a critical scrutiny of evidence. It is difficult to conceive of a more impartial judgment on the British excesses that anyone could think of, than by a set of four persons of whom three were Britishers and on whose judgment a historian could safely rely. It is seldom indeed that such an account of a complicated and extensive civil turmoil in a vast country like India is available for the purpose of ascertaining truth. After narrating briefly the circumstances that led to the breakdown of the Gandhi-Irwin Agreement the Delegation observes: "The officials in India rebelled against the approach and the settlement made by Lord Irwin. They regarded it as a surrender of Government prestige and the recognition of the Congress as a rival authority. They regarded the settlement as an administrative blunder and their own position under it as humiliating. They therefore desired the truce conditions to come to an end." The Delegation says that the view contained in the first sentence was "put to us in so many words by a very high official in the N. W. F. P. in his very frank conversation. As to the rest Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel has stated that he has in his possession letters and circulars to substantiate this

contention.”⁹⁸ The view of the Delegation is in full accord with what has been said above.

The Report comments : “We found throughout India that the Viceroy’s refusal to allow Mr. Gandhi to see him was regarded as a mistake.....For the Viceroy’s action in January last we could find no support in India ; it is also clear from the press correspondence and statements issued by party leaders at that time that Lord Willingdon’s action brought about the conflict.”⁹⁹

The Delegation further observes :

“Large numbers of organisations and individuals, the majority of whom have consistently supported the Government, made representations to the Viceroy to revise his decision. In Bombay a section of progressive European opinion urged the Viceroy to receive Mr. Gandhi unconditionally, irrespective of what had transpired or was thought necessary in the future. The appended list will show that the protests came from a variety of groups of opinion.” (List of seven organizations and four leaders, two Indian and two European, follows).

These important organisations and individuals endeavoured to intervene during the critical days of the first week of January, 1932. The list does not include the hundreds of organisations all over India which protested against the Government’s decision, nor does it claim to be exhaustive.¹⁰⁰

The Delegation also supports the view that the Government deliberately precipitated the conflict and planned it long beforehand. It observes : “Though from the communique released by the Government it would seem that the cause of the precipitate action taken by the Government was the resolution passed by the Working Committee following the events in the U. P. and the N. W. F. P., the impression that the Government had decided on policy of repression even before the Second

R. T. C. concluded cannot be regarded as unjustified in the light of certain obvious facts.

As an instance of the irresponsibility of the Executive authority the Report refers to the following incident.

"At the Hijli Detention Camp, sentries opened fire on untried prisoners on the 15th September, 1930. An official committee consisting of Justice S. C. Mallik, I.C.S., and Mr. J. G. Drummond was appointed by the Bengal Government, as a result of public agitation, to inquire into the incident. The Committee found that there was a regular fusillade from the *sepoys* (the armed guard), that there was "no justification whatsoever for the indiscriminate firing," and that the *detenues* were assaulted by the *sepoys* with *lathis* and bayonets also without justification. In the face of the facts of the conduct of the prison officials and the executive which this official report brought to light, it is rather extraordinary that the Bengal Government should decide to arm the officials and prison authorities with greater powers. Mr. Gandhi, while in London, challenged the British press publicly to publish the facts. The challenge was not accepted. The Government deliberately misrepresented the state of things in India to the British public and kept them ignorant of the atrocities perpetrated in the name of law and order. The Delegation observes :

"We, in this country, were told that the Government's policy was a success and that more and more Indian opinion was supporting the Government. At the same time stories of atrocities and oppression reached this country through private channels. The Press appeared either to be badly served or to be suppressing news about India. Allegations made in Parliament were denied by the Secretary of State. The Forrester Paton Case^{100a} opened the eyes of some who had hitherto believed that the British administration was incapable of the things with

which it was charged.¹⁰¹

The Forrester Paton Case is thus described in the Report. Dr. Forrester Paton, a Scottish missionary, was severely beaten with *lathis*, wounded on the ribs, legs and arms and then drenched with coloured water. When he tried to move away, the police turned a hose on him a second time. Dr. Forrester Paton is a member of a well-known Scottish Liberal family and had powerful friends in the House of Commons. The case was taken up by the late Sir Duncan Millar, and Sir Samuel Hoare expressed regret. The Home Member of the Madras Government, in answer to questions in the Madras legislature, however, declined to accept the position taken up by the Secretary of State. Dr. Paton was arrested on a false charge of picketing, which was withdrawn. Actually Dr. Paton was in Madras to make inquiries about Red Cross work, and he had no connection with the Civil Disobedience Movement.¹⁰²

In conclusion we might consider the all-round effect of the Civil Disobedience campaign and the measures by which the Government sought to repress it. On 13 October, 1932, Lord Willingdon, the Viceroy, said in course of an interview :

"Eighteen months ago things were in a mess. I will guarantee that conditions are to-day a hundred per cent. better than they were then, and I go further and guarantee that the people of India are a hundred per cent. happier—now that they can be sure of protection and liberty to go about their business as they wish."

Diametrically opposite view was expressed by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, one of the most renowned leaders of the Moderate Party, who never supported or sympathized with the Civil Disobedience movement.

"Bitterness has increased tenfold and suspicion and distrust of Government is not peculiar to Congressmen

but is shared by non-Congressmen... .. I am absolutely certain that the sentiment of the people is decidedly anti-Government, and I have no doubt whatsoever that if Congress should decide to contest the elections they will sweep the board nearly everywhere.”¹⁰³

The view expressed by the India League Delegation may be quoted in part :

“The Indian villager, in our experience, belied the stories about him that are so common. He is not apathetic, nor is he ignorant (though illiterate). He is fully aware of his plight and its economic and political causes. He is no admirer of the British Raj. He knows that the fight for Swaraj has to be carried on till it is won. He looks on the Congressman as his friend. Indeed, in these villages a Congressman or volunteer is always welcome, every house, except that of Government loyalists, is open to him and he retains the affection of the people. The Indian village is a homogeneous unit. It has a voice which covers Hindu and Mussalman, and farmer and labourer. It is prepared to fight and suffer or make compromise as a whole. The subtle arguments and the distinctions which obsess the town politician do not agitate the villager. The women-folk, old and young, particularly in Hindu areas, are conscious partners in the awakening of the village, and it is this that lends to the resistance put up by the Congress movement much of its fighting material, and its tenacity of purpose is very great.

“In every village in India Gandhi’s name was known and revered. In Gujerat, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and in the United Provinces the Pundit Nehru are household names. Their imprisonment has only added to the affection in which they are held and increased their prestige.”¹⁰⁴

The general impression of the methods pursued by the Government in dealing with the Civil Disobedience campaign has been thus expressed by the Delegation :

"We had not understood what the expression Police Raj, which we have heard used so often, meant till we came to India and saw it in action. The Police are a law unto themselves. Petty officials exercise very wide powers which are freely used. The statement that in India "the police beat first and inquire afterwards" is only partially true to-day, as there is no necessity for any inquiry. The Ordinances have destroyed every safeguard against police oppression, which obtains all over India and is by no means confined to the ill-paid ranks of the Force.

"Police methods are cruel and vindictive. Men are beaten inside lock-ups ; brutal force is used in 'dispersing' resisters (often only one, as in the case of picketing), under-trials are starved in lock-ups, and property is appropriated or destroyed. Vulgar abuse and the infliction of humiliation and violent assault are pretty common. It is difficult to understand why force should be used at all in effecting arrest of civil resisters, as it is admitted that they neither resist nor evade arrest. In any case, beating-up or *lathi*-charges, or kicks and bullying preliminary to, or instead of, arrest, is a wanton piece of brutality. One explanation to us was that such methods were more effective and cheaper than arrests. The explanation carries with it its own condemnation. Another gross abuse that appeared to be widely prevalent was the practice of allowing the police to buy, directly or indirectly, goods that had been attached or confiscated.

"JAILS.....We had great difficulty in obtaining permission to see jails, and had to take refusals in several cases. The total number of jails that the Delegation saw is eight. We have, however, collected evidence from ex-prisoners in different parts of the country. We have no doubt in our mind that ill-treatment of political prisoners is widely prevalent. Even the jail code is not observed by

the officials, who impose several penalties for the same jail offence, though the code allows only one at a time. Solitary confinements, different kinds of fetters, flogging, unofficial beating and kicks, the oil mill, and humiliating treatment are among the methods which jail authorities use against political prisoners. The majority of the prisoners are in 'C' class and treated as common criminals. Their warders are criminal. The quality of food varies from jail to jail. Some of the food we have seen is dirty, deficient and quite bad. The news recently published about beating in the Nasik Jail does not surprise us. The practice is not confined to Nasik. Rae Bareilly, which we saw, provided enough evidence that the practice of beating by jail officials was prevalent there..

“OFFICIALS. ..They were willing to listen to us, but their attitude was uncritical of excesses. The Ordinance mind pervades the administration. If a bureaucratic form of Government is bad, a bureaucracy ruling by Ordinances is a serious menace to the most innocent people. There are district officials who recognise that excesses are going on and some who even regret them. Even those latter, however, do little or nothing to check abuses and excesses. We think that the Ordinances are responsible for this indifference to wrong-doing which appears to have affected even the better class of officials.

“THE FUTURE ..We regret that the Government persists in its mistaken view that the coercion will crush a people. The way of looking at the nationalist movement as an evil which must be put down, of demanding a surrender from Mahatma Gandhi and of excluding from Government discussions any one who is likely to disturb Government plans, is bound to fail. It is a tragedy that the Viceroy's Government is by its policy blocking every avenue to real peace. The refusal to allow Maulana Shaukat Ali to interview Gandhi in prison is an act of belligerency against

Indian nationalism which will not allow any bridge to be built across the present gulf. It is enforcing a blockade on Indian nationalism. In the face of such a policy it is little wonder that no Indian trusts British bonafides or believes in declarations of good intentions.

"We are leaving an India which has seen ten months of Ordinance rule. The Ordinances were originally meant for three months, and now the Government finds it necessary to give them statutory permanence. No better proof of their failure is required. Ordinances have only produced more of them and more discontent. The volume of resentment and discontent—however expressed—has grown. The sufferings of the common people have been great, but they have borne them with a courage and endurance which has stood the test of savage repression."¹⁰⁵

E. THE REIGN OF TERROR IN 1932

The one outstanding feature of the suppression of Civil Disobedience movement in 1932 was the creation of a veritable reign of terror, where any conception of rule by law and administration by civilized methods of modern age was conspicuous by its absence. The British rulers in India again sank to the level of those barbarous tyrants of the Medieval Age, annals of whose brutality fill the mind of a modern reader with unspeakable horror and whose modern parallel in Europe is only to be found in the atrocities of Hitler and his associates in Germany. Fortunately for the historian, such an extreme condemnation of a nation, which justly occupies a high place in modern world, is fully supported in the present instance by the greatest Englishman now living, namely, Bertrand Russell, who wrote a Preface to the Report of the Delegation of the India League. This Preface is a severe indictment of the British rule in India in 1932, and should be read and re-read by every Englishman who wants to know its real nature and has any regard for truth and justice. The view of Bertrand Russell will be sufficiently clear

from the following passage : "There has been no lack of interests in the misdeeds of the Nazis in Germany, they have been fully reported in the Press, and have been commented on with self-righteous indignation. Few people in England realise that misdeeds *quite as serious* are being perpetrated by the British in India."¹⁰⁶

The repressive action of the Government falls broadly under two classes. The first is a series of Ordinances which practically suspended all the normal laws safeguarding the life, property, and personal liberty of the Indians, and placed them under the regime of executive orders. The most important among these were (1) Bengal Emergency Powers (Supplementary) Ordinance of 2nd January, 1932 ; (2-4) Emergency Powers, Unlawful Instigation, and Prevention of Molestation and Boycotting Ordinances, all passed on 4th January, 1932 ; (5-6) Amending Ordinances Nos. 7 and 8 of 1932 ; (7) Special Powers Ordinance of 1932 ; (8-10) Three Bengal Emergency Powers Ordinances, Nos. 9, 11 and 12 of 1932, passed respectively on 28th May, 30th June, and 20th July, 1932.

The second class comprises the actual measures taken against individuals, groups and organisations in order to put down Civil Disobedience.

The Report refers to the ten Ordinances which were in force at the time the Delegation visited India. After describing briefly their provisions and the judgements in courts, the Delegation observes : "It would appear not merely from what actually goes on in India, but from the decisions of courts that the rights that the Indian subject enjoys are in fact determined by the acts of "competent" authorities in India, in which category would come all executive orders and Acts" (p. 32)." As against executive authority and "suspicion" and orders of the "Local Government" the subject has no rights in India.

The Delegation sums up the position created by the

Ordinances as follows :

“In 1932 the Ordinances and now the Acts recently passed deprive the Indian people of the rights of personal freedom and safeguards which, most British people believe, exist under British law everywhere.”

“Martial Law conditions obtain now to the extent that there is : (a) Suspension of ordinary law ; (b) The substitution of executive discretion for law (in fact) ; (c) The use of soldiers for maintaining order ; (d) The use of armed police as a normal practice ; (e) The discretionary rule of the executive functioning in the main through the police (but not the military) ; (f) Billeting, punitive fines and commandeering of supplies ; (g) Curfew ; (h) The power to stop and search any person suspected of carrying arms or information ; (i) Blockading of areas (villages) ; (j) Control of information about movements of police and military ; (k) Control of the movements of individuals and sometimes of sections of the population by means of passports, etc. (even within a province) ; (l) Special tribunals and procedure displacing and barring judicial processes and the normal system and ideas of Criminal Jurisprudence ; (m) Quartering of troops on peasant villages ; (n) Firing by sentries on suspects and villagers who are alleged to fail to answer a challenge ; (o) Mass intimidation by the display of armed force in villages ; (p) Indemnity for official acts, civil and military, which is given in advance, not after, as even in martial law”. (pp. 56-59).

Regarding the measures taken and the methods adopted by the Government the Report gives the following list.

(1) Declaring illegal disapproved organizations (not merely Congress)

(2) Confiscation of funds of Congress and other disapproved organisations.

(3) Control and right of examination of accounts of those likely to subscribe to any Congress or to allied activities.

(4) Arrest and imprisonment of leaders, national, provincial or local (right down to the village leaders), in the first few weeks of the Ordinance.

(5) Use of excessive force in dispersal of assemblies, ill-treatment in lock-ups and gaols.

(6) Intimidation of villages, crowds, etc.

(7) Mass punishments, punitive impositions, victimisation of neighbours, relatives, etc.

(8) Confiscation of lands, cattle, utensils and personal belongings.

(9) Ill-treatment of women and children.

(10) Police and executive action and severe penalties for technical breaches of the law.

(11) Illegal police and executive action against flag-hoisting, use of handspun, closing of shops, processions, etc.¹⁰⁷

(12) Censorship of the press, interception of correspondence, and interference with travel, etc.

(13) Imprisonment after summary trials or without trials.

(14) Searches, with or without warrant.

(15) Prohibition of meetings, or assemblies of more than five persons, and surveillance over every kind of meeting.

(16) Beating of pickets and volunteers.

(17) "Parole" orders (cat and mouse procedure).¹⁰⁸

(18) Externment and internment at executive discretion.

(19) Marching of troops through villages ("showing the flag").

(20) Police surveillance on an unprecedented scale.

(21) Destruction of property and closing down of

social service and similar institutions. (pp. 142-44).

The Report then adds concrete cases under each of the above heads, with full details. It is a voluminous document, and only a brief summary must suffice.

1. TREATMENT OF WOMEN RESISTERS (Item no. 9),

"The worst cases of ill-treatment of women and children have, like most of the excesses and atrocities, occurred in the villages and inside the prisons...In many instances, of which we have the facts, the women were savagely set upon, beaten or insulted by the police with the object of preventing them from participating or to frighten them and others from such activities. In the many statements made to us or sent to us, complaints of foul and filthy language and threats of dishonour, either expressed or but thinly veiled, are made against all ranks of police officer." Ill-treatment and excess include :

(1). Taking women resisters on police lorries and leaving them far away in lonely places.

(2). Actual beating and threats of violence.

(3). Abuse, indecent suggestions and insults.

(4). Compulsion to travel (as prisoners) in male custody.

(5). Rape and indecent assault, etc.

"The extent to which ill-treatment of women has occurred has varied from province to province." 'Bengal villages had the worst record and in Calcutta itself the 'beating of women' was done by the European Sergeants.'

Caning of Women.

"The Delegation arrived at Siddapur, Bombay Presidency (Kanarese area) on September 1st, 1932. The officials and the police whom we met assured us that all that appeared in Congress bulletins was untrue. Policemen never seized stocks of foodstuffs, grain or funds as alleged by Congress, and in no case were women beaten.

"While we were with the Mamlatdar and Circle Inspector of Police, shouts and cries were heard in the streets below. An old woman approached us and spoke in Kanarese. This was interpreted to us. She said that many women had been arrested and among them was her daughter, who had been beaten by the police. The Inspector and the Mamlatdar were unable to give any explanation. The latter asked us to go with him to the police compound and see the prisoners. Squatting on the verandah were fifteen women and two girls, the latter aged seven and nine. The Sub-Inspector who had been with us at the beginning was now here and was walking up and down before the women and looking at them fiercely.

The Women's Story :

"They had come into the town half-an-hour after the Delegation's arrival. They were determined to make a demonstration. A crowd had followed them ; the shouting we heard in the bungalow was the shouting of the people. The Sub-Inspector and his police dispersed the crowd, arrested the seventeen women who had come from outlying villages, and had caned them on the way to the police station. They made no resistance and were non-violent, and yet they were struck from behind by the police as they were marched off.

Injuries

"On the right shoulder of one was plainly visible a recently caused stripe; another had a contusion on the head; a third showed a mark on the arm....

Official Admission

"We inquired if they were arrested. The reply was : "They are not arrested, Sir, they are only detained. They will be released tonight."¹⁰⁹

"On being further pressed for the reason for beating the women, the magistrate said : "Others must be shown

that they cant do this sort of thing. They will be released and no harm will come to them."

"While the discussion was going on the women protested against the Sub-Inspector (who had done the beating), and he shot out, "You will get worse than this." The women defied him to do his worst.

"We took up the case with the Circle Inspector at the bungalow, later, and he denied knowledge of the facts of the case, but warned us that he knew of a case in which complaints had been made to Mr. Clee, Home Secretary to the Bombay Government, and in this case it was found that one woman had beaten all her arrested companions in order to make out that the police beat women.¹¹⁰

"We subsequently learned that the women were released at dark that night, when it was raining very heavily. No food was given them and they were sent out of the town to walk many miles back to their villages."

A Hospital Case

"We took a statement concerning Mani Devi Temmana of the village Vasare, Ankola. She, a widow of about forty, refused to vacate her house, which had been attached under the law for non-payment of land revenue. The head constable entered the house and beat the woman with his shoes until she was unconscious. She was then dragged out of the house and left in the field. Her neighbours picked her up and took her to Ankola in an unconscious condition. She was admitted to the public hospital for treatment. The incident took place ten or twelve days prior to our visit."

Policeman in a Ladies Compartment

'Miss. P. Kameswari - Amma, B.A., a young lady graduate of the Queen Mary's College, Madras, was one of our hosts at Rajahmundry. Among other incidents she told us about a constable forcing himself into a second-class

ladies' compartment on a train. Mr. Abdul Hameed Khan, M. L. C., interrogated the Government of Madras in the Legislature on this matter, and the Home Member replied that the Government had found the allegation untrue. Miss Kameswari then wrote to the Home Member, giving him all the facts. No attempt was made to obtain any information from her, who was an aggrieved party, and on whose behalf the matter had been raised in the Council. This is one of those cases which, in our opinion, make Government "investigations" and denials unconvincing. We know the party concerned in the case, and have not the slightest hesitation in believing her version, which she has published and the Government has merely ignored. The police knew her as a Congress woman, and indeed she had once been beaten by the police.'

Mrs. Nehru (mother of Jawaharlal) beaten

'Mrs. Motilal Nehru, the widow of the late Pandit Motilal Nehru, was witnessing a Congress demonstration in Purshottamdas Park, Allahabad, on the 8th April, 1932. She was pushed off her chair and fell down. She was beaten with *lathis* on her body and on her head. She was wounded on the head and was bleeding and fainted.'

Molestation

"We have in our possession copies of signed statements of many women victims of Police Raj. Some of the statements from Bengal and Gujarat refer to cases of attempt at or committal of rape on women by police.

"Mr. Neogy, M. L. A., referred to another form of terrorisation of women which, he said, obtained in his district. Our information, gathered in the different Provinces, is that the alleged method was widely used in other parts of India as well, particularly in Gujarat and Madras.

"Mr. Neogy stated that ladies were arrested, taken into custody, then taken some miles away from their

homes or places of arrest to island Chars. Mr. Neogy explained that 'there are small islands thrown up in the middle of the rivers of Eastern Bengal, and these Chars are in many cases uninhabited and full of jungle. The ladies are left in these places at dead of night.' Mr. Neogy also stated that he had with him several statements from persons who had been treated in this fashion."

2. THE BENARES WOMEN CASE

It created a great sensation, and as it is a typical instance of Government attitude in such cases it may be quoted at some length.

A number of women were alleged to be beaten by the police, but the Government denied it. "A public meeting to protest against this incident was held in Benares, presided over by the Pundit Malaviya. The meeting demanded a public inquiry."

Officials Disagree.

"A magisterial inquiry had already been ordered by the District Magistrate, and the Deputy Magistrate, who made the preliminary inquiry under his instructions,

- (1) examined all the eight women in the case ;
- (2) had four of them examined by a lady doctor ;
- (3) held an identification parade of 100 constables ;
- (4) examined the constables against whom the charges were made.

"After recording further evidence, the Deputy Magistrate "found that the police were undoubtedly guilty." The result was communicated to the District Magistrate. Five constables were suspended and their prosecutions ordered. The District Magistrate himself tried the case. The District Magistrate rejected the sworn statements of the eight women and accepted that of the accused police constables and acquitted them.

An Insinuation

"In his reply in the House of Commons the Secretary of State said that.

- (1) The case was a malicious concoction.
- (2) That the preliminary inquiry was worthless.
- (3) That the women were "not members of respectable families, but Hindu widows who had left the protection of their husbands' families and had no visible means of support."

"The insinuation in the third item is one which attempts to discredit the women's story by reflections on their characters. That the Secretary of State should have chosen to make such a statement against those who have not the access to the publicity that a Minister of the Crown has, is regrettable.

Our Testimony

"We examined one of those women, Bagala Devi, while we were in Benaras. Whatever may be the facts of the case itself, we should like to place on record our view that the insinuation in the official statement to which we have referred is wholly unfounded. The lady is a widow, aged 22, and stays with her mother and brother. Her father was a physician. She is a Brahman. Her husband owned a little property in Jessore and she still receives some support from her husband's brothers. The suggestion contained in the official statement is as untrue as it is wicked.

Official Allegation on Oath.

"The District Magistrate says of another of the women :
"Kulada Devi is an unattached woman, by trade a maid-servant. She varied this by being the kept woman of a Bengali for a year."

"The lady was in jail, and we could not meet her. The statement taken by Pandit Malaviya from Banamali Das,

who is the alleged paramour, says :

"Kulada-Ma (Mother Kulada) is a respectable Brahmin widow. She is about fifty years old. I am thirty, and married and have two children. For the last eight years I have known Kulada-Ma. She has always treated me as a son and I have treated her as a mother. The suggestion that there has been any improper relation between me and Kulada-Ma is a wicked lie."

"Kulada Devi was a Brahmin cook, who in India is rather different from a maid-servant, as she is described by the District Magistrate, who is a British official. He cannot be expected to know these differences.

Medical Evidence.

"The Secretary of State further asserted that he felt sure that the victims were medically examined. One of the doctors who made the examination was never called to give evidence, and the other, Dr. Thungamma, was not examined on certain points, and the inference drawn from her testimony is unwarranted.

"Kulada Devi stated in court that she had been examined by Dr. Amarnath, a well-known practitioner in Benaras, but he was not called. Pundit Malaviya questioned Dr. Amarnath, who stated :

"I quite remember that a middle-aged woman, who said she was a Congress volunteer, came to my residence in the afternoon of 12th March, 1932. I remember it because she complained that she had been beaten and kicked by the police the night before. I examined her and found she had a swelling on her right thigh. It was very tender and partially discoloured. I gave her liniment to apply. She did not come to me again. About three days after that, another Congress volunteer, this time a young woman, came to my dispensary and complained of pain in her back and of fever. She also said she had been beaten by the police three or four days

earlier. I examined her and gave her two prescriptions, one for application and the other for taking internally. I find copies of the said prescriptions entered in my Mangala Pharmacy Register as Nos. 504 and 505, under date 15th March, 1932. Her name is mentioned there as Bagala Sundari Devi.

Prosecution for Perjury.

"Lord Winterton, M. P., inquired whether any steps were being taken to prosecute for perjury persons both in India and this country who have repeated these statements.

"Major Beaumont Thomas inquired what action was being taken against the *Aj* newspaper, which, Sir Samuel Hoare alleged, was responsible for concocting the story.

"To both questions the Secretary of State replied that he was already making inquiries.

The Pundit's Challenge Still Open.

"Over a year has elapsed and no prosecution has been launched. Pundit Malaviya has published affidavits, and the facts of the case, and repeated his allegations asserting that the police lied, that the whole defence is a concoction, and that the treatment of the women was revengeful and inhuman. He has also stated that the District Magistrate "unwittingly added gratuitous insult to injury." He has also referred to the viciousness of the extra-judicial system of the Ordinances.

"The Pamphlet, "The Congress Women Volunteers' Case of Benaras," is signed by Pundit Malaviya and is published by his son. No prosecution has been launched against either of them so far on account of this publication."

This case has been treated at some length because it supplies an authentic testimony to the absolutely worthless character of official statements in defence of officers charged with serious crimes against political workers in India. This denunciation applies even to the statements

of the Secretary of State—a member of the British Cabinet—and, by implication, to those of the whole hierarchy of officials in India from the Governor-General down to the Police Constables who supply (or concoct) the information.

The conduct of the Magistrate not only shows the travesty of justice in political cases which had become the normal practice in British India in those days, but also the depth of degradation to which an educated Englishman—a member of the I.C.S.—can descend in order to wreak vengeance on those whose only offence, real or supposed, was to defy the lawless laws passed by a Government which prided itself on being established by law. The demoralisation of these high British officials was rendered all the more pathetic by the absence of that spirit of chivalry and respect for women which is seldom wanting in an English gentleman, at least at home. It is hardly necessary to add that the revelations made in the Banaras case were the rule rather than exception.

Molestation (including rape)

On this the Delegation observes as follows :

“We have in our possession copies of signed statements of many women victims of Police Raj. Some of the statements from Bengal and Gujarat refer to cases of attempt at or committal of rape on women by Police. In the reports and accounts¹¹¹ which we obtained in the places we visited were included assaults on women and attempts or committal of rape. There are also instances where the aggrieved party has been before us.

“At Barhee, Monghyr District, we met a woman named Dhanma. A policeman in plain clothes entered her home on the 24th August. He took her in his arms and brought her to the yard of the house. He made indecent jokes and asked for intimacy, when she raised the alarm, and her husband, who heard the cry, fetched another policeman. A complaint was filed before the

District Superintendent of Police. He took notes of the case. The policeman was taken to the Inspector of Police.

Allegations in The Assembly : Rape Cases.

"On the 3rd December (after we had left India), Mr. S. C. Mitra, Member of the Legislative Assembly, placed in the Library a copy of a report of an investigation made on his behalf by an ex-captain, who served the Empire during the war, who visited sixteen villages. Mr. Mitra, in his speech, refers to the part of the Report¹¹² dealing with the oppression.

"He (the-ex-captain) gives instances of two women on whom rape was committed. I have here their photographs, with their statements and thumb impressions, which I place on the table of the House for the inspection of Honourable Members, as well as that of the Government. It is known that in Eastern countries chastity is so highly valued that when a woman loses her chastity she is outcasted. Therefore no woman in India will ever make a false statement that rape was committed on her. I read one of them. In the statements she says her name is Kusum Kumari Mondal. On the 15th September, on Thursday night, she was sleeping with her husband. At about midnight a contingent of police came and took away her husband and all the male members of the adjoining house. Some time after, her brother-in-law alone returned. Afraid to live alone, she went to her brother-in-law's house. She was in bed with her sister-in-law and other female members. A Pathan policeman came and took away her brother-in-law. That policeman came back and with the help of a torchlight picked Kusum up and forcibly dragged her to her house and beat her; when she screamed, he gagged her and committed rape on her. Her thumb impression and statements are laid on the table of the House.

"Another case of rape is that of Sushila Bala Pradhari, of Sutamata. I place also her statement with thumb impression on the table of the House. To save herself from the police she took shelter in the house of another woman, Puti, a neighbour, who was not assessed with any punitive tax because she was too poor. The police knocked at the door and asked if there were any volunteers in the house and wanted to see the house and personally satisfy themselves. They opened the door. Instead of looking for volunteers, they closed the door and forcibly thrust Janaki and the other female into another room. Then she was threatened and raped. These are the statements of the women and there are their thumb impressions also. I place them on the table of the House so that Honourable Members can see them if they want to.

"There are six other statements of Khemankari Barnek, Girivala Roy, Bilashi, Parul Bibi, Bishnu Maiti and Saraswathi Pal, who definitely allege that attempts were made to outrage their modesty. I shall not go into details..."

II. THE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE

"The use of force against the subject, except when it is a legal punishment, can be justified only on grounds of necessity and expediency. It should be the last and not the first resort. It should follow warnings and, in the case of assemblies, commands to disperse. It becomes even less justified when it is realised :

(1) That Civil Disobedience volunteers do not evade or resist, and to carry out the requirements of the Ordinances and the duties of the police as generally understood, their arrest is all that is required.

(2) That volunteers are beaten even (a) after they attempt to run away, (b) after they have been arrested, (c) when they take all the beating without retaliation, (d) after they fall semi-conscious or are otherwise on the ground, and (e) when the victims include women.

(3). That the beating is accompanied by vile abuse, drenching with coloured water, dragging along the roads and the infliction of other injuries.

(4). That the victims of the beating are not the volunteers alone but also innocent sight-seers, who are merely members of the general public.

(5). That 'dispersal' in this manner is not merely of 'assemblies' but of individuals. The police 'disperse' individual pickets, who cannot by any stretching of the law be called a gathering tending to create a mob riot.

Each of these five assertions is based on our experience, and the admissions made in the Legislatures by Government spokesmen. We shall give here a few samples not necessarily of the worst or extraordinary cases of instances in illustration of each of the five categories mentioned here"(pp. 168 ff.).

According to the Delegation Report the Madras Government instructed the Police not to beat the volunteers while the members of the Delegation were present at the scene. Actually beating was stopped as soon as they appeared. Two instances are cited. "In Calicut, however, the stopping of the procession was followed instantly by a shower of lathi blows on the volunteers on the left front of the procession. They immediately squatted on the road; a few more blows followed. In the meanwhile the police noticed that the crowd which gathered in the buildings on either side of the road was looking away from the procession. We had reached the spot from the opposite direction and had been noticed. We saw no more beating. This incident shows the police method and the lack of any justification of necessity. The arrests did not require force; at the same time we saw enough to verify for ourselves the widespread allegations against the police."

At Rochasan in Gujarat, the members of the Delegation reached before morning and hid themselves on the

terraces of a house. What followed is thus described : "The procession consisted mainly of women, the total number being perhaps about thirty or forty. Policemen with full-sized lathis met the procession near our house and the procession stopped. We witnessed the most savage beating that we had seen till then. The men and women squatted down. Policemen swung their five-foot lathis with both hands and delivered blows on the heads and shoulders. One of the victims was an old woman, another whose statement we took afterwards. It was a ruthless performance, savage in the fury with which the police delivered the blows." A few more extracts may be quoted at random, just to indicate the nature of the police assault on picketers. "The pickets were not arrested in the places we visited. They were dragged along the road and blows with fists were delivered on their bodies by the constables. In one of the places we saw a Sub-Inspector directing the operations. The constables and Sub-Inspector were shouting most of the time and we understood from our friends that they were abusing the crowd and the pickets in the filthiest language."

"In one case four Brahman boys and four fisher youths picketed a toddy shop and when they refused to move they were beaten by the police and fell senseless. Water was then poured on them to revive them and afterwards, it is alleged, they were again beaten. This heartless conduct so incensed the fishermen that they wrested the lathis from the hands of the police and beat them to save the boys 'from being killed.'

"P.L.N.K. Chettiar, Ramnad district, a banker worth about two lakhs of rupees, was present at an open-air meeting on the 9th January, 1932. The Police Inspector said they should not crowd there. Mr. Chettiar moved when a policeman beat him with a lathi and fractured his knee. He fell. Someone in the crowd carried him

out. He was taken to a doctor, who said that the leg must be amputated. He insisted on seeing his own doctor, whose certificate we refer to above. Mr. Chettiar will never be able to bend his knee."

"The Delegation witnessed a Congress procession on the 11th September, 1932, at Burrabazar. It was stopped and the processionists were set upon by the police with lathis.... The demonstrators were mainly students. We saw no signs or tendencies to violence or resistance. No stones were thrown at the police, there was no obstruction of traffic and no insulting behaviour. A Congress flag was carried. The procession was soon surrounded by police constables. British sergeants then 'charged' the Congress volunteers, which is the name apparently given to the merciless beating with lathis which we witnessed. Those who dispersed were chased by the sergeants and beaten. The sergeants then proceeded to deal in the same way with members of the crowd, chasing and beating them. One boy was arrested, and the police appeared to have captured some Congress flags."

"We saw the results of lathi blows on children, and some quite savage beating. The statements that we received and took in different places contain quite a number of instances of loathsome horrors, some of them unprintable. We propose to quote here one or two cases in which we saw the victims ourselves. On our return from Sylhet to Chittagong, a party of people came to see us on the steam launch. Among them was a frail little girl aged about twelve. We saw on her head scars of wounds inflicted by the lathis and on her back some marks of savage beating. On a child of such tender years, whose crime appears to have been that she was distributing handbills, such cruelty may without any apology be classed as gruesome. We cross-examined the child and we are convinced in our minds that the child was savagely beaten."

Hair Set On Fire.

"At Madura we met a Dhobie (washerman). He wore khaddar and picketed. He was beaten severely and then taken to the house of the Police Inspector, who was an Indian. He was again beaten, then kerosene oil was poured on his hair and set alight." The rest of the story may be said in the words of the man himself. "The Circle Inspector's wife cried out in horrified protest. A constable put out the fire with his hands. There were burns all over my head. The Circle Inspector then beat me with a ruler with one hand and a lathi in the other on the elbow, shoulder, wrist, knee-cap and thigh, and on my back and fingers. My hands were bleeding. I had five wounds on the head, six or seven on my left arm, seventeen on my right arm, displacement of three finger nails of the left hand....At the end the Circle Inspector asked me whether I had tasted Swaraj and asked me to apologise, and I was beaten again. The Circle Inspector's wife pleaded for mercy for me. The Circle Inspector became more angry and flung the lathi and rule at his wife."

'Four young boys, aged 7, 10, 12 and 16, were beaten, kicked and slapped for the alleged offence of their eldest brother, who was absent. The Police tied their legs with ropes and hanged them by their feet from the roof and beat them.'

At Mardan, when the Delegation was taking down statements from the people, a crowd gathered in the adjacent lane. They behaved in a quite orderly manner and dispersed at the request of the Delegation who then resumed taking notes. What followed is thus described :

"About half-an-hour afterwards we looked out through the window out of curiosity. We saw in the lane, in front of the Hujra, a party of constables, armed with lathis and rifles, lined up. When we returned to our

work of taking statements, we suggested that those who had already spoken to us or had no business should leave, as it was rather close and warm. Some of the men inside then proceeded to leave. In a minute or so there was noise downstairs, and we looked through the window. We saw the party of constables pushing the people who were leaving the place back into the Hujra and belabouring them violently with their full-sized lathis and hitting men with rifle butts. A number were savagely beaten with the lathis swung against their heads and bodies. An old man who was going away had his turban snatched, his hands tied up with it and his head subjected to rain of lathi blows. We also noticed that the constables pounded people on their chests with the stout ends of the lathis with great violence. Some of the men who were thus pushed back came upstairs, and we saw their injuries. In addition to contusions and bleedings, we noticed that the pounding on the chest had removed thick layers of skin and tissue.

III. FIRING ON CROWDS

"The instances to which we are about to refer relate to cases where police have opened fire on crowds. In some cases stone-throwing at the police has been alleged. In no instance is there evidence of an actual riot which had to be quelled.

"In the course of a reply to a question by Sardar Santa Singh, M. L. A., about the number of times the Police or Military had to use force in dispersing unlawful assemblies in 1932, Mr. Haig, the Home Member, gave the following figures of those killed and wounded : Killed...80, Wounded...319. The figures in the schedule obviously refer to casualties on account of firing, since total wounded by other forms of police action are many times the total given."

The Delegation refers to a number of cases of firing

on village people either by police, military police, or troops :

"At Hashanabad a very large meeting of peasants was held on the 14th February, 1932. It was an illegal meeting, as it had been prohibited under Section 144. The police arrived and declared the meeting unlawful and ordered the people to disperse. The order was not obeyed and the police opened fire, killing two and wounding many others. Three of the wounded died in hospital later.

"Another village gathering on which the police opened fire was at Tamluk, in Midnapore District, Bengal, where numbers of village men and women had assembled to make salt as part of the Civil Disobedience programme. The police declared the assembly unlawful and made a lathi charge. The assembly did not disperse and they opened fire. (Press report 1-4-32).

"A third instance is that of an incident in Muza-ffarpur. The official version is that a determined attack was made on the Sheohar Thana, in the Sitamarhi Sub-Division, on the 28th February, 1932, by a crowd of 7,000, armed with brickbats and lathis. An officer and two men of the Gurkha Military Police were alleged to have been injured by brickbats. The crowd was dispersed by firing, killing four and injuring eight persons. These are the official figures.

"The unofficial version is that several thousand persons marched towards the Thana to hoist the Congress flag over the building, where the authorities, who had notice of the intended demonstration, had posted soldiers, and the Deputy-Magistrate was present to watch the situation. Crowds gathered ; the police snatched the flags from the volunteers who tried to hoist it and the onlookers threw some brickbats, when a soldier beat a volunteer with the butt end of a rifle. Of those killed the youngest was twelve and the oldest thirty."

Cases in towns and cities.

"In Bombay, according to Mr. Haig's statement, thirty-four persons had been killed and ninety-one injured as a result of firing. In Allahabad the police dispersed a procession on the 9th April by opening fire. They were men and women who had squatted on the road when prohibited by the police from proceeding with the procession. It was reported that brickbats had been thrown at the police by members of the crowd. Several rounds were fired."

Government Figures Challenged.

"At Tehatta, in Bengal, a conference of the Nadia District Congress Committee had been called on the 19th June, 1932. Police interfered with the arrival of delegates, refusing to allow the train to stop and prohibiting ferry boats from plying. Despite this, about four or five thousand people, according to police reports (ten to twelve thousand according to Congress and local estimates), gathered at Tehatta, a country place, whose normal population is 1,200 or so. Armed police were brought in, though Nadia is a district of Bengal where the violence party has no following. The crowd was non-violent; police broke up the gathering with lathis, bayonets and the butts of rifles. The crowd regathered in another place. The police now opened fire and wounded about twenty-five people and killed Satish Sardar. Mr. Haig's figures are one killed and three wounded.

"Satish Sardar was not a Congressman but a spectator. He leaves a widow and five children between the ages of one and twelve. A number of people, including the wounded, were later on tried and sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment each. During the trial the police alleged that brickbats were thrown at them, but no independent witnesses were called. There was no inquiry¹¹³ into the firing and no compensation either for the widow

and children of Satish Sardar or to any of the wounded. A woman, Nital Chand Biswas, who received a bayonet wound in the hand on this occasion was acquitted at the trial. She states that while she was picketing the Union Court, one of the armed police grabbed her by the throat and a rifle was pointed at her. She was threatened with instant death.¹¹⁴

"We also interviewed a Moslem lad, Fazalulla, who had been shot through the thigh. He had nothing whatever to do with the rioting, but had come into Tehatta to buy oilcakes for his bullocks;"

No Inquiry

"The practice that obtains in India, of not ordering an inquiry even after people are killed as a result of firing by the Police or the Military, coupled with the visiting of penalties on the publication of accounts in newspapers, justifies our giving here some of the information that we collected, side by side with the official version. Ordinance rule appeared obviously more arbitrary than even a Martial Law regime when Police, Military and District Civil Officers may shoot people dead or order firing and no inquiry is held after the incident and no compensation offered to the relatives of those killed, even when they happen to have been neutral citizens who are spectators."

IV. RAIDS AND SEARCHES

"The Ordinance conferred on Magistrates power to issue warrants, to search premises and to seize property suspected of being used or about to be used for any purpose prejudicial to public safety."

"Raids and searches were made by the police all over India. We have the figures of the total searches in six months in 1932. Two random instances would suffice to show the extent : Contai Sub-division of Midnapore

District, 45 searches, Muzaffarpur (Bihar), 39, in approximately six months. The worst cases are in the villages."

"Mr. Neogy, a Member of the Assembly, gave an instance in the Legislative Assembly on the 2nd February, 1932. The house of Rai Bahadur G.C. Nag, a Government title-holder and pensioner, a retired Deputy-Collector, was raided one night. Mr. Nag was grossly abused by a European police officer. When he remonstrated, the officer told him, "If the Police Superintendent had come he would have beaten you." Mr. Nag's son and daughter were taken away and the lady was kept in custody without any charge and removed from place to place under male escort. The police smashed all the furniture in Mr. Nag's house. Mr. Neogy informed the Assembly that Mr. Nag had written to him about the facts."

"Mrs. Purna Devi, whom we met in Lahore, informed us that in 1930 her house was searched while her husband was in prison. The police came at 2 a.m., and as she was alone she told them she would not open the door till the morning. They then broke open the door and entered the courtyard and climbed the pillars and got into the house. She also said that such searches were common. Three or four policemen would come and turn places upside down. The police are supposed to bring ordinary citizens to witness the search. In fact, such people as they bring are men in their own pay. Arrests are often made at night."

"Mr. Abdul Matin Choudry read in the Legislative Assembly a telegram which had been sent to the Governor of Bengal by the Imam of the Jama Masjid of Chittagong.

"Grossly insulting searches of about 150 respectable Moslem houses of Alkaran in the town made Wednesday, 16th instant, on meagre information regarding absconders. Indignities caused to pardanashin ladies, some inside the houses and some dragged to considerable distance and

exposed in public street after removing the male members under arrest to another place. Some pardanashin ladies roughly handled and rudely treated in the name of searches and Moslem males beaten and some grossly insulted...."

V. BEATINGS IN LOCK-UPS.

"Beating, or other forms of torture, in a police lock-up, which are entirely illegal, appear to have been adopted by the police in almost every province. Madras, Gujarat, Bengal and the United Provinces furnished us with instances. It is at once one of the worst forms of atrocity and the most difficult to prove. We examined at some length the cases. One was that of a barber boy, aged perhaps nineteen, who was not a volunteer. He stated to us that he went near volunteer camps and that his sympathies were with Congress people. He had in consequence refused to shave policemen in his saloon. He was taken by the police one day and severely beaten in the lock-up. We saw marks of the beating all over the lad's body. Another young man whom we met there was a Congress volunteer, who had been arrested at Quilandy (Malabar) and severely beaten and kicked by policemen with their boots. He was under treatment for several months afterwards. The police tried to extract an apology.

"Apart from these two instances on which we questioned these men and convinced ourselves, the reports of savage beatings in the lock-ups which appear to have been a special feature of the Calicut police methods, were mentioned to us by many people, mostly opponents of Congress....

"Mr. Russell, the Collector, received us in his bungalow, and our interview was most friendly. We took up the matter of the police lock-ups. He did not deny that such incidents took place, though he made no admissions. But he said that the police denied it, and since there

was no independent testimony, all he could do was to ask the District Superintendent of Police to tell his men to use authority with discretion. The interview confirmed our feelings about the police beatings in Malabar. The "evidence" that the Collector referred to would never be obtained, since in a lock-up the only people are the police and the victims.....

"Kushalbhai Vara Sabhai, aged 20, of Yorawadi, Taluka Mandavi, made a statement before us. He is almost blind; from a distance of two feet he described a watch as "a metal piece." The statement is as follows :

"In February, 1932, I was one of a party selling contraband salt. The police caught the party and took us to a police thana, beating us with lathis on the way. Four of us were separated and beaten again with lathis. I was made to sit and was kicked with heavy boots on my back. There was one European officer present. He compelled us to bend down and hold our toes; while we were doing this we were beaten on the back till the cane broke. Another cane was then brought. We were then asked to take care next time on pain of death, and driven away in different directions. I was in bed for fifteen days afterwards."

"Chunilal, of Rastampur village, Rae Bareilly District (United Provinces), arrested on the 5th March, 1932, for picketing foreign cloth, in a statement made to us said that from the street he was taken by constables to Rae Bareilly kotwali. They let him sit there and said nothing for one day. The second day at 10 o'clock the Police Sub-Inspector came and took him by the ear and asked him to apologise. He declined. The Sub-Inspector then dragged him by the tuft (of hair) and ear and knocked him against the wall, several times. "From the 5th to 11th I was given water alone, and no food." Food was sent by his people, but the police did not allow it to

be given to the man. They said that unless he apologised no food would be allowed. The Sub-Inspector came three times a day and beat him and knocked him about, with his hand and with a stick. There were four other people in the lock-up who were similarly treated."

"We were shown in many of the places that we visited medical certificates issued by qualified doctors relating to injuries inflicted by the police. We were also informed that in several places hospitals which received Government aid would not render medical assistance to the victims of police excesses."

"A Congress volunteer, Kumaraswami, aged 27, was beaten to death at Tiruppur (Madras Presidency) on the 11th January, 1932."

VI. OTHER FORMS OF POLICE EXCESSES

"That photographs of Indian leaders, not only in shops but in private houses, were pulled down and taken away by the police, and the parties concerned either assaulted or threatened, was frequently mentioned to us in India. In the earlier part of 1932 this form of police action was widely prevalent in Madras, Gujarat and other areas. We made inquiries of a number of shopkeepers...."

Investigated Cases

"The Police authorities asked the shopkeepers to withdraw all calendars bearing Mr. Gandhi's picture or that of other leaders. Otherwise they would share the fate of the tobacconist Nagindas. This latter gentleman had refused to remove Mr. Gandhi's photograph from his shop, and had been sentenced under the Ordinances to two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine.

"On the day of our arrival at Sayan, the 31st October, 1932, three boys came to Sayan with framed portraits of Mr. Gandhi and a few Gandhi caps for sale. They were immediately arrested by the Head Constable.

We went to the police station and asked for the Head Constable and saw the three boys. We asked the officer-in-charge for particulars and he told us that he had his orders to arrest anybody selling Gandhi pictures or khaddar or white caps. He could not say under what law this was ordered, but his orders were to prevent anyone selling swadeshi."

"The ill-treatment of members of the public by the police is indicated by the views which Dr. Hogg, the British missionary, who is the Principal of the Madras Christian College, communicated to us, and we understand, to persons in authority. He says: "Government desires, and with all my heart I desire, that Indian youth shall not be seduced into sympathy with revolutionary methods, and yet Government is taking the most direct route to this undesired result, by the spectacle which lathi charges and beatings daily provided.

"It is impossible to employ police in this kind of work without their frequently overstepping intended limits and committing unauthorised excesses. And the combined effect of the horror I know of people feeling at brutalities witnessed, of the indignation at the lathi charges on inoffensive bystanders, of the resentment at the indignity of the coloured water douche and at the inhumanity of prohibiting immediate succour to the injured, is rapidly alienating persons whose habitual disposition has been strongly loyal."

"Dr. Hogg also gives an instance of what happens in Northern India, as told him by an Indian friend, a University lecturer :

"As I write this six of our dear boys are lying in our hospital, wounded in to-day's firing. Their fault, if it was a fault, was that they went to witness, but not to partake in, a meeting which turned out to be another Black Hole and Slaughter of the Innocents.....Our doctor

29V3

saw seven lying dead, one being a lady and another a child...Organised terrorism like this may quell the present movement, but it will embitter and unite the nation... The Civilians must be mad if they fancy that we will be thankful for a reform which is to be granted only after our self-respect is broken in this brutal fashion."

Specific Instances.

"About the excesses committed by the police on the public, a number of signatories, including 24 lawyers, of Madura, one doctor, two first-class Hon. Magistrates, two merchants, and one member of the Madura District Board, in their memorandum, state :

"For the past five days Madura is passing through a reign of horror during nights. Parties of Reserve Policemen in their uniforms go about the streets at night after 9 p.m. and molest all and sundry they can lay hands on.

"From the statements given by some of the victims it appears :

- (a) That innocent pedestrians have been beaten and some of them robbed by the Reserve Police party.
- (b) That shopkeepers have been plundered and articles in the shops broken and otherwise damaged.
- (c) That during the assault on the victims, if these latter happen to wear khaddar clothes, such khaddar clothes have been slipped from them and the victims have been left in the streets stark naked. Such khaddar clothes taken away from the victims have been burnt by the police at the junction of streets and several other public places.
- (d) Instances have been reported of cases when people going in *jutkas* (horse carriages) have been plundered, beaten, and let off.
- (e) On the night of 29.4.32 the son of Soyaj Aiyar, an Advocate, was severely beaten with lathis,

by the Reserve Police, while he was standing innocently in front of a house.

- (f) There have been instances where very respectable people have been chased by the Reserve Police and escaped beating only by taking refuge in the nearest house.
- (g) People are afraid of sleeping on pials (verandah) because of the incidents that are happening. Business is paralysed and shops are compelled to close much earlier than usual.

“Such acts of uncontrolled police licence are bound to react on the temper of the people and incidentally on the morale and discipline of the Reserve Police themselves.

It is therefore prayed that an impartial inquiry be held into the conduct of the Reserve Police from 25.4.32.”

“The District Magistrate, Mr. Hall, sent for the signatory first on the list, and asked him if he knew anything personally of these happenings. He said he had taken statements on oath and could produce them. Copies of the statements were sent to the District Magistrate along with the memorial.

“It was reported in the press in May (1932) that an official inquiry would be held. We were in Madura in August, 1932. Nothing further had happened till then.

“We have in our possession copies of eight statements taken on oath relating to this memorial, and the victims include petty shopkeepers, watchmen, bank clerks, and merchants.”

Official Denials

“The allegations of atrocities made by public men have often been denied or explained away by official

departments or spokesmen in the Legislatures or in press communiques. In no case has a public inquiry been instituted, and when, as in the case of the firing at Hijli Detenue Camp, an official committee has found fault with the official side, no action has been taken."

A Bezwada Memorial.

"Twenty lawyers of the Bezwada Bar sent a memorial to the Madras Government and members of the Legislative Council concerning "police excesses in Bezwada" and other villages in the District. They state that their memorial deals not with "vague allegations, but particulars with dates and names whose authenticity can easily be verified." They also state that the "cases are only illustrative, not exhaustive," and appeal for an "open and public inquiry."

The Official Denial.

"Questions were asked about some of these cases in the Madras Legislative Council in July. The Government at first denied knowledge, the usual answer, "No information," being returned. Questions were repeated and particulars of beatings, injuries and excesses mentioned, on succeeding days, and in each case the Government denied knowledge. The Home Member added that the "Government have no reason to suppose that the volunteers were beaten in the manner indicated," the reason for the supposition being that "it has not been brought to our notice."

"The demand for the public inquiry was now supported in a public statement issued by three members of the Legislature from the Telugu area, who stated that there was strong public feeling about these incidents and urged the Government to act.

"The memorial was submitted on the 14th July, 1932 ; the questions to which we have referred were asked on the 4th August and subsequent days. On the 17th August the Government issued a press communique in which the

allegations were dismissed as untrustworthy, and it was announced that the Government "do not propose to order any general inquiry into the allegations contained in the memorial."

"From a perusal of the papers relating to these requests for inquiry, the procedure adopted by the Government appears to be to plead "no information" when questions are asked in the Legislatures soon after the incident and suggest that there has been no time to inquire, and when a memorial with particulars is submitted at a later date to dismiss the whole affair as being a "belated" complaint.

VII. CONDITIONS IN JAIL.

"The food that is prescribed under the rule is coarse and unsuited to the average prisoner even of the habitual criminal class."

The Facts.

"In actual fact the flour contains sand and dirt, and the *chapathis* (bread) made out of it are unfit for normal human consumption. The food is often half-cooked, to make it weigh more. The grain troughs, we are told by prisoners, were dirty. The eating and cooking utensils we saw in Peshawar made one sick to look at. They were dirty in the extreme. Though jail gardens grow excellent vegetables, it is a well-known fact that these find their way to markets and supply the jail officials. The food of the Class C. prisoner is mostly leaves and stalk. We were told this by men in jail, as at Rae Bareilly, and by almost every prisoner we met."

Complaints.

"Complaints led not to rectification of evils, but to punishments which included solitary confinement and fetters, beating and kicks. Worms and insects in grain and vegetables served to the prisoners are common. The complaint that the supply of drinking water was in-

sufficient was common to almost every province. For washing purposes the supply is even worse and the children suffered the hardship most.¹¹⁵ At Benares Mrs. Usha Malaviya, who was a Class A. prisoner, complained to the jail authorities about the hardship suffered by the women in Class C. One of the complaints was that there was insufficient supply of drinking water in the heat of the Benares summer. The result was that the women concerned were taken away and Mrs. Malaviya, in fact, became a solitary prisoner. In some jails, the water was foul and cases of typhoid were reported. Devadas Gandhi, one of the sons of the Mahatma, was victim of typhoid at one time while in jail.

Children.

“There are two distinct problems concerning the juvenile inmates of the prison. First, there are those in various prisons in India sentenced to rigorous imprisonment (Hard Labour) for Civil Disobedience offences under the Ordinances. The sentences vary from six months to a year and the age from 9 to 16 years. Their aggregate number is not large compared to the others, but detention of these in prison, specially under the conditions obtaining in Indian jails, is nothing short of a crime. Some of these young offenders are flogged or whipped; they also do the labour of adults. Their youth makes them the victims of foul and abusive language and, we were told, of worse forms of tyranny. These boys were often unable to do the prescribed amount of labour and beaten in consequence. The jail Manual provides that juveniles shall not be kept along with adults, but our information about the prisons in the United Provinces is that the juveniles were kept along with habitual adult criminals.

Infants.

“Then there is the problem of infants living in jails

with their mothers. The jail rules provide that mothers may keep their children with them if the children are under six years of age. We were informed that in the case of Civil Disobedience women prisoners of Class C. this rule was broken. The mothers were put on to hard labour and the children isolated in another barrack during the period. Even the dietary as prescribed in the Manual, namely, half the adult prisoner's coarse food, is entirely unsuitable for infants. Further, there were no facilities for boiling the milk supplied or obtained, which was not merely adulterated, but often dirty. We were told of the hardships of children by ex-women prisoners in the United Provinces and the Bombay Presidency, one of these a mother, a schoolmistress, who had her baby under a year with her while in prison.

"These children are innocent of any crime or offence whatever, and the infliction of hardship and cruelty on them in their tender years should rouse the indignation and protests of all decent-minded people."

Women Prisoners.

"We were informed by women ex-prisoners that in Class C., prisoners were herded with habitual criminals and prostitutes. Many of the women Civil Disobedience prisoners are young women who have led sheltered lives, and the throwing of them into the company of the habitual criminal and the prostitute is not only against jail regulations but reprehensible."

Transport of Prisoners.

"Women prisoners were escorted over long journeys by policemen and head constables, without women warders, or other female company. The policemen always insisted on occupying the same third class apartment, however small, as the women prisoners.....They squeezed themselves in, used the same lavatories, made

vulgar jokes and sang ribald songs, and used foul language."

"Mr. Hall, the District Magistrate, as well as the jail superintendent, had asserted that all educated women were given Class A. and B. But this we found was not true. The rice and flour supplied contained worms. The mat (for bedding) was too dirty to be used. The women were ordered to break stones. They refused."

"Bina Das Gupta, sentenced to ten months' rigorous imprisonment, stated that she was beaten in prison in June last. She was also given solitary confinement for one month. Arati Mukherjee, aged 26, it was stated to us, was beaten by a British police officer."

Latrine parade

"The term "latrine parade" was at first incomprehensible to us, but we heard about it everywhere. There are an insufficient number of latrines, and they are not kept clean. To give an instance, in Meerut Jail, our information is that the time allowed for the "latrine parade" is ten minutes for 80 prisoners, who have to use ten seats among them. During the twelve hours that the prisoners are locked in, they are not permitted to use the lavatories.

Prison Labour

"Hem Chandra Rassler, who was a Class C. prisoner in Chittagong Jail, in his statement made to us, said that he was put to work ten or eleven hours a day on the oil mill. It was ten hours continuously without a break. At about 11 o'clock food was given to him which had to be eaten in a few minutes while on the mill. No bath or rest, even for a few minutes, was allowed.¹¹⁶ He did this work for the whole of February and uptill the 22nd March.

'At the oil mill, politicals and others who do not work are beaten by convict overseers and warders. I was not beaten, but I witnessed the beating of two young

men who fainted. They were not political. The beating is done with hands and with batons.' Hem Chandra was transferred to Dum Dum after six weeks at Chittagong and given Class B. He was by profession a teacher and a weaving expert with a Government Certificate."

Mass Arrests.

Numerous cases are cited where for a political crime, such as robbery and murder, number of people,—sometimes fifty, sixty, or even seventy,—were arrested, and released after two or three months. These were Congress workers.

Shooting of Detenus.

"Complaints of ill-treatment and violence by jail officials in these internment camps were made to us in Bengal. There have been cases of firing on detenues. The Bengal Government appear, from the order we quote below, to have given wide powers to prison officials :

"If any detinue under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, disobeys or neglects to comply with any order made, direction given or condition prescribed by virtue of any rule made under Section 13 of the said Act, the authority which made the order, gave the direction or prescribed the condition may use any and every means necessary to enforce compliance with such order."

"The shooting of unarmed detenues at Hijjli in September 1931, by the armed guards of this camp and the findings of an official committee, consisting of a British official and an Indian judge, which state that the shooting was 'indiscriminate' and 'without justification' and resulted in serious injuries and two deaths, should have been sufficient reason for the Bengal Government to desist from placing such unrestricted powers as provided in the Order quoted, in the hands of prison officials."

Women's Camps.

"Among the (women) detenues are many women, mostly

college girls, suspected of terrorist crimes, but not proved guilty or charged with such. The condition of one of these places, the Suri Camp, will be evident from the following account of a hunger strike which appeared in the Press. Even the local officials seem to agree that the conditions were unbearable. Seven young lady detenues were sent to Suri and lodged in a room 25 feet by 15 feet, part of which was used as a store and the remaining portions furnished for the detenues. The south and east sides of the room were completely blocked and the room had no windows. The heat in this part of India is excessive in the hot months. The detenues petitioned for transfer to some other jail. The Press report says that the petition was submitted in January, and the magistrate assured the prisoners that their transfer had been decided upon, and would take place about the middle of April. No order came, and about the 15th April the Superintendent asked them to wait a little more. They then asked for permission to sleep on the verandah, as it was very hot. This request was refused. The detenues, however, insisted on sleeping outside and the authorities called in the female warders, but the detenues refused to sleep inside. Twenty-eight male warders were then requisitioned. Fearing insults, the detenues went inside the room and started a hunger strike.

"The District Magistrate sent for the guardians of the detenues, and on their intervention the hunger strike came to an end by the authorities agreeing to extend the lock-up hour."

Chain Gangs, Solitary Cells and Beatings.

"R. M. Sangal, Banker of Rajasahi, stated to us : 'I was put in a solitary cell for two months and allowed out only for an hour each in the morning and evening. I was allowed no reading and given no work. I lost 9 lbs. weight

and suffered from insomnia. I was transferred from there to a cubicle 5 feet by 7 feet by 7 1/2. feet, all sides wire netting in a house of 94 such cubicles.'

"In the Peshawar jail we ourselves saw prisoners under trial who had been in jail for over a year with bar fetters.

"Debendranath Sen, a University graduate of Dacca, was sentenced to eight months in Class. C., and after being in Dacca jail for a fortnight was sent to Dum Dum jail. At Dacca he was handcuffed at night and put on "penal rice." At Dum Dum several prisoners were handcuffed and prisoners were tied to each other. There was no attempt at escape by political prisoners in that jail."

"We take the following cases from the Report of the non-official jail Committee in the United Provinces :

(1). Sewa Ram of Bareilly was seen talking to Shiva Shaukad of Muzaffarpur. He was given standing handcuffs for four days as punishment. He had to answer the calls of nature while still in standing handcuffs.

(2). Ram Dutta, of Bahampur (Gonda jail), was given solitary cell for not wearing jail cap. He actually remained in the cell for about a month.

(3). In April, 1932, Mata Prasad (Gonda jail), a lad of sixteen, was given work on the pumps. The boy got sores on his hands and asked the jailor for change of task. He was given bar fetters as punishment.

(4). Rama Tirtha went on hunger strike in February-March, 1932, as a protest against bad food, in Basti Jail, which lasted one month. He was transferred to Gonda jail in a very weak condition, but he was kept in solitary cell and put in bar fetters. He became unconscious on the 6th March. The rest of the prisoners went on hunger strike in protest and there was a lathi charge. Ram Tirtha, who at the time of the hunger strike and the lathi charges was lying in bar fetters, was tried a month later when he had recovered and sentenced to additional imprisonment

for four months for creating a disturbance in jail.

(5). Bharat Singh, 20 years, of the village of Kanta, Aligarh District, was chained at night along with twenty or so others, all under 20 years of age. During the day Bharat Singh was locked in. This is confirmed in an independent statement made by Kandhan Singh, of Ranlpan, aged 20, who says that after a few days in jail he was deprived of his blanket and chained with 25 or so others, all boys, while sleeping on the verandah, which they were compelled to do, though it was the cold season.

(6). Madan Lal Parmi, aged 26, of Menak Chouk, Aligarh, was chained with 54 others and was also deprived of blankets.

The above are random samples of punishments given in the jails and the alleged offences are mostly making complaints about conditions or of the ill-treatment of a fellow prisoner, hunger strikes or refusal to submit to some humiliation or other."

Assault By A British Official.

Another case is described by Mr. Neogy, thus :

"Here I have an account which was made the subject of an interpellation in the Bengal Legislative Council regarding an assault that was committed by no less a person than a European member of the Indian Civil Service, the Sub-divisional officer of the particular Sub-division where this assault took place, on a Civil Disobedience prisoner on his refusal to give the usual thumb impression. This particular man was so ill on that day that he had to be carried on a stretcher to the Court. The Sub-divisional officer, I understand, was holding his Court inside the jail premises, for the purpose of trying this offence of refusal to give the thumb impression. Now this man having been carried on a stretcher was convicted to two months' rigorous imprisonment for having refused to give his thumb impression. Having received this punishment,

this man, along with another who was not ill, was returning to their ward, when the Sub-divisional officer called them back. Some jail sentries were also called and the Sub-divisional officer then asked them again to give their thumb impressions. But they persistently refused. At this he flew into a rage, and, snatching a baton from a police officer, struck this sick man on the head, hip and other parts of his body. The police officer and the sentries also took up the cue and made free use of whatever they could put their hands on. The Sub-divisional officer sat upon the chest of this sick man, dislocated his thumb and forefinger joint by applying force, and then his thumb impression was taken."

The other prisoner, Mr. Neogy states, was assaulted. "His hand was fractured. He was struck on the head with a baton and kicked in the stomach. Both these men became unconscious, and the sick man's wound was bleeding profusely. Hearing the tumult, the jailor rushed to the place and sounded the alarm, but on understanding the situation he stopped the alarm and tried to pacify the prisoners with the assurances that proper steps would be taken. It was found that the sick man had a deep and long wound on the forehead, apart from other marks of assault, and his fingers of both hands had been damaged, and abdomen swollen with kicks."

"The Berar representative interposed to say that in the Central Provinces similar treatment was meted out to an ex-Member of the Legislative Assembly."

The Official Version

"The Bengal Government's version of the case, elicited in reply to interpellation, was next quoted by Mr. Neogy, and it said :

"The prisoner refused to give his thumb impression as required under Section so-and-so of the Identification of Prisoners Act of 1920. He was informed of the fact that

the provisions of the law clearly contemplated that such impression should be taken by force, if necessary, and after every effort was made to make him give his thumb impression, he resisted the officer discharging his duty. A struggle ensued (mind you, with a man who had to be carried on a stretcher), and, in the course of the struggle, the prisoner received minor injury. The prisoner was not deliberately assaulted."

Another Case

"Another case is that of Mr. Dhiresh Chandra Chakravarty, M.A., editor of an English weekly in Calcutta, the *New Era*, who had been sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment for preaching the Congress programme at a meeting. Mr. Neogy described the treatment meted out to him :

"He was removed from the Munshiganj sub-jail to the Dacca Central Jail on the 27th January in a hand-cuffed state. A large number of people gathered on the roadside and greeted him with shouts of 'Bande Mataram'. At this, an Assistant Superintendent of Police, who was then at Munshiganj Thana, rushed out and assaulted Dhiresh Babu with blows on the left eye and temple. Being hand-cuffed, he could offer no resistance. The spectacles he wore were smashed to pieces. For the time he was rendered unconscious. It was most fortunate that the broken pieces of glass only scratched the lids and did not pierce into the eye, which had been narrowly saved. After this, the authorities left him without any glasses, for days together, and ultimately these had to be supplied from his home. This incident also formed the subject-matter of interpellations in the Bengal Legislative Council, and this is what the Chota Home member said :

"Yes, one blow was struck, but there was a certain amount of provocation, and the officer was totally unaware that Dhiresh Babu was handcuffed."

VIII. NEWSPAPERS.

Between January and July, 1932, security was demanded from 109 journals and 98 printing presses in India. "The *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta) had to deposit the maximum security (Rs. 2,000 each from the Keeper of the Press and Publisher) for publishing an article entitled "India in Travail", by Prof. S.K. George, in its issue on the 25th May. The article referred to Christian principles and non-violent resistance."

In November, 1932, the *Free Press Journal* of Bombay "had been called on to forfeit its security of Rs. 10,000 and to pay another Rs. 20,000 for reprinting an article which was written by Mr. Gandhi two years ago in his paper *Young India*." Cases of five other presses are referred to.

IX. NO-TAX CAMPAIGN AND POLICE RAJ.

"The no-tax campaign was pursued on a mass scale in the Allahabad and Rai Bareilly districts of the United Provinces, in the Kaira and Surat districts of Gujarat, in the Canarese districts of the Bombay Presidency, in certain areas of Bengal, such as Contai, Midnapore, and Tamluk, in Bihar and in the North-West Frontier Province. In the rest of India, this item of the Civil Disobedience programme was not widely adopted, and where it obtained it was a matter of individual rather than mass disobedience.

"We visited villages in all these areas and made close investigations. The campaign was still in progress everywhere except in the United Provinces. Gujarat, Bengal, and the North-West Frontier Province had suffered the most. In the villages in these areas Government servants resigned their posts and cultivators allowed their land to be seized. The extent of the movement may be gauged from the following figures taken from a number

that we collected. In the United Provinces, in the district of Cawnpore, in one Tashil alone, 209 summonses had been issued, 298 attachments made, and 44 auctions had taken place.

"The Government measures included :

1. Proclaiming that landlord rents may be recovered as land revenue.
2. Police camps.
3. Special attachment officers.
4. Blockading of villages.
5. Prohibiting reaping of crops.

"Apart from these measures sanctioned by law, as under the Ordinances, the police terrorised the villages, and landlords took the law into their own hands and smashed up tenants' houses, and took their property with the aid of the police."

Police Camps

"Punitive police, for which the villagers had to pay, were stationed in many areas. Police camps were built round the crops to prevent tenants reaping their crops. In Ras we saw crops rotting in the fields. In some places, police had mowed the corn....In some areas the tenants set fire to the crop rather than allow it to be reaped by others. The police encampments, with the armed pickets, gave the place the appearance of area under occupation.

"Attachment of property, usually a revenue process, has now become a police job. The police raided the villages, beat the foremost resisters, seized livestock, fodder, foodstuff from them, pulled down parts of houses, and none of these can be questioned in a court of law even if Congress people decided to fight actions in court."

Blockading of Villages.

"Villages were blockaded, to round up people, and as a particularly noxious form of coercion. In the Gujarat

districts the police made a practice of blockading villages for twenty-four hours or more. It is the residential part of the village which is thus besieged, and the object is to prevent people from going out into the fields for their natural functions."

Looting And Pillage.

"Where punitive police are stationed, entering of houses, taking away of goods, looting and destruction take place as part of Police Raj, according to the evidence we received and the results that we saw. In the villages, mainly in Gujarat, looting has followed in the wake of tax collection."

Houses Entered

"We went into a large number of houses in the Gujarat villages and saw the destruction that had been wrought. Utensils and furniture had been broken up where they had not actually been taken away. In Ras and Bochasan we saw house after house, in which the huge earthen jars, in which grain is stored, were broken up. These are part of the peasant's stock, and they have been in possession of these families for generations. It was stated to us that armed police had entered and broken up things with the butt ends of their rifles, or anything else they could lay hands on. Beds, food, etc., had also been taken away in villages in Bengal, the North-West Frontier Province, and Gujarat. We have the particulars of a number of instances, some of which we give below."

"Khusalbhai Hathibhai made a statement that about 'fifty policemen, who were brought from Anand by Revenue officer Manilal Gandabhai, were posted at every corner in the village and practically all the houses were entered. They broke up water pots, big jars, and boxes, and beat people, several of whom were aged men."

"We saw the results of some of the looting and

destruction in Bhanubil, in Sylhet.....The village belongs to a Zemindar, who is alleged to have increased the rent from 13 1/2 annas to Rs. 2.80. The tenants refused to pay, and the Zemindar got a decree of ejectment. Armed Gurkhas and constables, headed by a Superintendent of Police, helped in the ejection of the tenants. The Zemindar brought his elephants and pulled down the houses, which were razed to the ground and all the property trampled on. Over fifty houses were thus destroyed.

"We met one of the victimised families. Lapoi Devi, whose husband was in jail, told us that these elephants were brought out and three houses which belonged to her family, all in the same compound, were destroyed. Her father, Bijendranath Sharma, and her uncle Harimohan Sharma, were arrested, one for being a member of an unlawful assembly and the other for trespass, for building the house in which she now lived. "The Police," she said, "even now come into our houses and take away our utensils, grain, beddings and clothes. The Sub-divisional officer visits the house and abuses us from a distance."

"In Bengal, as in the North-West Frontier Province, police pillage has reached excesses comparable only to conditions under military occupation in times of war."

Cases Cited In The Assembly.

"Mr. S. C. Mitra cited^{116a} in the Assembly cases,^{116b} and produced documents and photographs in evidence. The details could not be published in the press owing to the Press Law. We quote some extracts :

"In the house of Mahendra Nath Jana, of Dalimba Chauk, Sutahata Police Station, all his movable properties were looted, and even the image of the goddess "Laxmi Devi" was thrown away from its place. The other is about the occurrence in the house of Jogendra Nath Kalsa, of Dundipur, on the 22nd September, 1932.

Here the District Magistrate, Mr. Burge, and the Sub-divisional Officer, Mr. Richardson, were also present when the police destroyed their granary and spoilt the paddy collected there.

"This is the photograph of that place (shown). Here is another case where, in the village of Bar-Basudebpur, in the house of Brojalal Maiti, the Bhagwat-Geeta was torn to pieces and put into the boiling handi, and the man was beaten. This is the statement, and this is the photograph, which will indicate how these things are done.... In the village of Hadia, they entered the house of Kartick and burnt the doors and windows. In the same village, in the house of Pran Krishna Das, they entered the temple and stole ornaments even from the body of the image of the family god. I particularly give these instances to show that in Eastern countries people are very sensitive when their religious sentiments are hurt in this way, so that the mighty Government at Simla also should know how the day-to-day administration is being carried on under the Ordinances that are now going to be made law.....

"There are numbers of pictures taken. I am now showing the House a few only to prove that we do not draw these pictures from our mere imagination. Here is another case where, on the 24th September, 1932, in the house of Bihari Lal Maiti, for a tax of Rs. 24.9, 320 maunds of paddy were taken away in the absence of male members. Then this is another picture of a place where Swadeshi Khadi is sold, and they have destroyed all these things. Of course, they may have a special grudge against the Swadeshiwallahs. This is the photograph of the house of Ajit Kumar Maiti, of Dar-Bera, where the doors and windows have all been taken away, and property destroyed. Here is the photograph of a place of the house of Rakhal Chandra Samanta, of Hadi, where

the corrugated tin shed has been destroyed. Here is a picture of a house belonging to Gora Chand Kalsher, of Dundipur village, where the cottage has been destroyed and all the thatched roofs have been brought down.....

"Here is a photograph of a place where all the trees, banana trees, were cut, etc. How all these things are necessary for the realisation of a tax one can easily imagine. Here, on the 24th September, 1932, at about one o'clock, the second officer of the Thana, Dharendra Nath Chatterjee went to the house of Sukumar Maiti for collecting the tax, but he destroyed his thatched house and his walls. This is another picture of a house of Keshab Chandra Mandal, of Dundipur, where all the ceilings have been destroyed. How the destruction of property or the ducking of a man in the tank helps the realisation of punitive tax has got to be explained. This is another picture of a stationery shop belonging to Nagendra Nath Das, where the entire property was destroyed. Now, this is the picture of a pharmacy where all the medicine bottles have been thrown out and destroyed."

Intimidation And Humiliation.

"The presence of troops in the villages of Bengal is one of the more glaring instances of mass intimidation. Sieges of villages by police and threats to women and those giving hospitality to Congressmen, collective fines, and action against the neighbours of persons arrested, are other forms.

Some Cases.

"At Kareli, villagers stated to us that those who gave shelter to non-co-operators were beaten. Villagers who took food and water to women non-co-operators were also maltreated. The police sealed the doors of the temple where the non-co-operators were staying. Villagers removed the doors. They were charged with theft. They were

acquitted after six months, but had been beaten severely. Some cases were treated in the Government hospital at Broach.

"Sama Shankar stated that on the 18th September he was stripped naked by the police. Bahji Bawa, aged 14, also stated that he was stripped of his clothes and beaten by Constable Mahomed Mustafa. Sub-Inspector Babu Bhai took out his knife and threatened to cut off his genital organs. Jetha Bhai, aged 19, made a similar statement, that P. C. Mahomed Mustafa stripped him naked. P. C. Mahomed Mustafa was present when Jetha Bhai made this statement, and we asked him if it was true. He said: "It was not I who stripped the boy naked; the Sub-Inspector did it." On second thoughts, he added: "Nobody stripped him naked. A search was made of everybody." We asked, "What kind of a search? for weapons? These people, with so few clothes, can be searched without taking off their clothes." Mustafa made no reply.

"Village of Gujara.—One hundred and fifty people were arrested at a Taluka conference on the 18th September. Forty were taken upstairs one by one and beaten. Six were severely injured, others were given blows on the face and body. Fifteen were stripped naked. Inspector Khambatta and Sub-Inspector Bapu Bhai were concerned in the beatings, but the former was not present when the stripping took place.

"Desai Pursotam, aged 35, cultivator of Kareli, stated that Sub-Inspector Bapu Bhai slapped him and kicked him with nailed boots till he fainted. He was taken the next day to Jambasur lock-up for two nights. He was then bleeding from the intestines. He was convicted for six months, and was in the jail hospital for three days.

Women Insulted.

"In Jahman Village (Punjab), women alleged attempts by the police to dishonour them. One lady said that

her door had been broken open many times, and if there was a prosecution of the police she would be willing to give evidence.

"Rami Nathabhai Kalidas, aged 65, stated that he was taken to the village office, and his shirt and cap removed by force. The police entered the house, took utensils and other movables, threatened his daughter-in-law who was ill in bed, with beating, and asked for her ornaments. The Mamlatdar (Magistrate) Manibhai Gandabhai took her out of the house, locked it up and took the keys away. His son was also brought to the village office. They were taken to the field after an hour. In the field they were stripped all of their clothes, and they were made to bend and touch their toes. Two police with sticks were on either side, and whenever they tried to stand up they were given blows by the Mamlatdar.

"Gangaben, the wife of the owner of the field, was then brought by the village police to see them in that condition. She was questioned about her husband and ordered to look at the naked men.

"The old man said he was kicked with nailed boots, at intervals, violently. (Scars of nail marks were visible on his back.)

"Gangaben, the wife of Chaturbhai Bhajibhai, aged 26, who, it was alleged in the previous statement, was insulted and intimidated, was then examined by us. She confirmed the story and also said that the Mamlatdar used foul language."

Looting By Punitive Police.

"Houses have been entered and property smashed. We have already referred to some of these. In Madhkaul, a small village, we saw some of the results of the conduct of the punitive police. Granaries had been looted, women insulted, bayonets thrust into kitchen pots and vessels. In the village we saw a store which had been

wrecked. The kerosene oil in the store had been poured over the stores of rice and pulses. The villagers, through their sopkesman, told us a story of wrecking and looting.

"Complaints had sometimes been made to officials, but it was little use, as the police did what they liked and the regular officials had little control over them."

Terrorisation.

"From the statements and information in our possession we could give instance after instance of the terrorising activities of the police garrison, which is what the punitive police resembles. They levy blackmail, and rob women, visiting the area, of their jewels.

"At Sheohar, Sobhai, a Moslem, told us the story of his daughter, a married woman, who, while cutting corn in the field, was rushed at by the punitive police and violated.

"At Midnapore, we saw people who had received wounds at the hands of the punitive police. In Tamluk (Bengal) Pathans, Punjabis, and Gurkhas have been planted all over the district. The people had been beaten, robbed, fired on, and tortured, and made to pay for the very force that was responsible for these acts."

Lieut.-Colonel Arthur Osborn, D. S. O., in his book, *Must England Lose India?*, quotes an official who told him : "I give you my word that after some of my punitive police have been stationed in a village for a few days, the spirit of the toughest of the political agitators is broken." Lieut.-Colonel Osborn inquired, "How?" "Well, they will help themselves to everything. Within twenty-four hours there will not be a virgin or a four-anna piece left in that village."

The account of the reign of terror in 1932 may be fittingly concluded with this boast of an English official in India that within 24 hours after

the Punitive Police have been stationed in a village, not a virgin or a four-anna piece will be left in that village.¹¹⁷

The seventeenth century British tradition in Ireland served as an inspiration to British officials in India three hundred years later.

F. THE END OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE.

Deshabandhu C. R. Das is reported to have frequently made the following observation about the virtues and failings of Gandhi's leadership : "The Mahatma opens a campaign in a brilliant fashion ; he works it up with unerring skill; he moves from success to success till he reaches the zenith of his campaign—but after that he loses his nerve and begins to falter."¹¹⁸ The truth of this remark is well illustrated by the history of Gandhi's Campaigns both of 1921 and of 1930-33.

While the Civil Disobedience was going in full force in spite of the unabated fury of Government repression and the imprisonment of almost all notable leaders with nearly ninety thousand workers, Gandhi suddenly side-tracked the whole Campaign by raising a side-issue and staking his own life on a satisfactory solution of the same.

It will be remembered that in the Second Round Table Conference in London, Gandhi opposed with his whole might the creation of a separate electorate for the Depressed Classes and even rejected the proposal of Ambedkar to reserve a certain number of seats in the Legislatures for them on the basis of a common electorate for Hindus.¹¹⁹ In course of one of his speeches in the Conference with reference to the proposal of separate electorate for the 'untouchables' he said : "If I was the only person to resist this thing, I will resist it with my life."¹²⁰ On March 11, 1932, Gandhi wrote to Sir Samuel Hoare in the same strain, and said that if the depressed

classes were granted separate electorate he would "fast unto death."¹²¹ On August 17,¹²² 1932, the Communal Award of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald was announced. According to this Award the Muhammadan, European and Sikh voters would elect candidates by voting in separate communal electorates, but provision would be made in the Constitution itself to empower a revision of this electoral arrangement after 10 years with the assent of the communities affected. The most important part of the Award, namely, that relating to the Depressed Classes, ran as follows :

"Members of the Depressed Classes qualified to vote will vote in a general constituency. In view of the fact that for a considerable period these classes would be unlikely, by this means alone, to secure adequate representation in the Legislature, a number of special seats will be assigned to them as shown in the table. These seats will be filled by election from special constituencies in which only members of the 'Depressed Classes' electorally qualified will be entitled to vote. Any person voting in such a special constituency will, as stated above, be also entitled to vote in a general constituency. It is intended that these constituencies should be formed in selected areas where the Depressed Classes are most numerous, and that, except in Madras, they should not cover the whole area of the Province (as was the case with the Muhammadans, Europeans and the Sikhs)."¹²³ Mr. Macdonald, however, promised to accept any alternative scheme mutually agreed upon by the Hindus and the Depressed Classes.

On August 18 Gandhi addressed a letter to the Premier that he had resolved to commence fast unto death at noon on September 20, and it will cease if only the scheme is revised and a common electorate is restored.¹²⁴

It is needless to say that alarm and anxiety spread over the whole of India at the news of Gandhi's pro-

posed fast unto death. Frantic appeals were made to him to desist from this grim resolve, but in vain. When the fast commenced on September 20, it naturally stirred the whole country to its depth and produced some commotion even in England, and an appeal was made over the signature of some influential persons, for a special prayer throughout the country. In India, September 20 was observed as a day of fasting and prayer. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya summoned a Conference which met, first in Bombay and then at Poona. Dr. Ambedkar, the most prominent leader of the Depressed Classes, was induced to join it, and he fully exploited the situation to his advantage. After a prolonged negotiation, and a great deal of bargaining, a settlement was arrived at on 25 September, i. e. the fifth day of the fast. A common electorate of all the Hindus was agreed upon, subject to two conditions. First, one hundred and forty-eight seats in the different Provincial legislatures were reserved for the Depressed Classes in place of seventy-one. Eighteen per cent. of the seats in the Central Legislature which were allotted to the general electorate for British India were similarly reserved for them. Secondly, there would be a primary election, by the voters of the Depressed Classes alone, of four candidates for each reserved seat, and the election by the General (Hindu) constituencies was restricted to these alone. The agreement, or the Poona Pact¹²⁵ as it came to be known, was ratified by the Hindu Mahasabha and accepted by the British Government, and the constitution amended accordingly. Thus the Depressed Classes benefitted both ways. They secured double the number of seats reserved for them in the Communal Award, and also enjoyed the benefits of a separate electorate, though in a modified form.

For the time being all these considerations were absent from the minds of men who were only concerned with

saving the life of Gandhi at any cost. This immediate object was achieved, and Gandhi broke his fast on 26 September. It was not long, however, before people wondered whether the 'epic fast' was worth either the issue involved or the decision arrived at.

But whatever one might think of the merits or the demerits of the Poona Agreement, there cannot be two opinions on the extreme unwisdom of Gandhi's action from the political point of view. Jawaharlal's reaction on this, like that on Gandhi's suspension of Non-co-Operation movement in 1922 and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of 1931, may be taken as representing the views of those whose vision was not blinded by the mysterious influence of Gandhi :

"I felt annoyed with him (Gandhi) for choosing a side issue for his final sacrifice. What would be the result on our freedom movement? Would not the larger issues fade into the background, for the time being at least? And, if he attained his immediate object and got a joint electorate for the depressed classes, would not that result in a reaction and a feeling that something had been achieved and nothing more need be done for a while? And was not his action a recognition, and in part an acceptance, of the communal award and the general scheme of things as sponsored by the Government? Was this consistent with non-co-operation and civil disobedience? After so much sacrifice and brave endeavour, was our movement to tail off into something insignificant?

"I felt angry with him at his religious and sentimental approach to a political question, and his frequent references to God in connection with it. He even seemed to suggest that God had indicated the very date of the fast. What a terrible example to set !"¹²⁶

These and similar thoughts were uppermost in the minds of a large section of people after the immediate crisis was over. There can be no doubt that the effect of

Gandhi's action upon the Civil Disobedience movement was disastrous. It diverted all attention from the actual fight, at least for the time being, when it was at its height. But far more disastrous was the fact that henceforth Gandhi devoted his whole energy and attention to the question of untouchability and seemed to have lost interest in the political issue. When questions were put to him whether political or social work should be done, he gave replies that were vague and not to the point. Gradually the idea dawned upon the minds of all that Gandhi's heart was no longer in the Civil Disobedience campaign.

In spite of such feelings the fight was kept on. The Independence Day on January 26, 1933, was celebrated with great enthusiasm all over India. Demonstrations were broken by force, large numbers were arrested, and at Badangunj in Hooghly District (Bengal) the police resorted to shooting for dispersing the Congress procession. Mrs. Gandhi was arrested while leading a procession of women at Borsad (Gujarat), and sentenced to six months' imprisonment on February 7, 1933. But the most outstanding event was the Calcutta session of the Congress, held on March 31, 1933. The enthusiasm and spirit of resistance manifested on the occasion was by no means less than that displayed at Delhi, in April, 1932. More than two thousand delegates were elected from different parts of the country of whom about a thousand were arrested before their start or during the journey. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya was elected President and the old widowed mother of Jawaharlal Nehru decided to attend. But these two, along with a number of other leaders, were arrested on their way.

In spite of the ban more than a thousand delegates met at the place selected for the session. The police soon arrived at the scene and began to strike the Congressmen with *lathis*. But even while the heavy *lathi* blows were breaking their heads, the delegates who were in the centre of the

circle held the session under the Presidentship of Mrs. J. M. Sen Gupta. Resolutions were passed reaffirming (1) the goal of independence, (2) Civil Disobedience, and (3) boycott of foreign cloth and British goods. About 250 persons, including 40 ladies, were arrested, but most of them were released. Mrs. Sen Gupta was sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Malaviya, after his release, went to Calcutta and collected authentic information about the brutal assault of the Congress delegates by the Police. He challenged the Government to hold an inquiry, but the challenge was not taken up.

The following extract from the speech of the President-elect, the venerable Pandit Malaviya, reflects the feeling of the country at the time :

"It is estimated that nearly 120,000 persons, including several thousand women and quite a number of children, have been arrested and imprisoned during the last fifteen months. It is an open secret that when the Government started repression, the official expectation was that they would crush the Congress in six weeks' time. Fifteen months have not enabled the Government to achieve the object. Twice fifteen months will not enable it to do so."¹²⁷

On this Subhas Bose comments :

"This was not the review made by a young hot-head but by one of the oldest and most moderate leaders of the Congress. Consequently, the response made by the country to the Congress appeal in 1932 and 1933,—in spite of lack of preparation, in spite of the sudden arrest of the organisers and financiers of the Party early in January, 1932, and in spite of the diversion caused by the Mahatma's fast in September 1932 and the anti-untouchability campaign thereafter—can by no means be regarded as unsatisfactory."¹²⁸

But while the Congressmen continued their fight with grim determination and held aloft the banner of their freedom, Gandhi had no heart in the Civil Disobedience

movement and his mind was fully occupied by the anti-untouchability campaign.

While the heroic fight and sacrifice of the Congressmen in Calcutta were still fresh in public memory Gandhi threw a bombshell in the shape of an announcement on May 8, 1933, that he would begin a fast of 21 days for purification of himself and his associates for "greater vigilance and watchfulness in connection with the Harijan cause." The Government issued a communique that they had decided to release Gandhi in view of the nature of the object of his fast and the attitude of mind which it disclosed. Immediately after his release, on May 8, Gandhi issued a long statement recommending to the President of the Congress to suspend Civil Disobedience Campaign for one full month or even six weeks. The reasons given for this momentous step were the following :

1. "The whole purpose of the fast will be frustrated if I allowed my brain to be occupied by any extraneous matter, that is any matter outside the Harijan work.

2. The secrecy that has attended the movement is fatal to its success.

3. Fear has seized the common mass. The Ordinances have cowed them down, and I am inclined to think that the secret methods are largely responsible for the demoralisation. The movement of Civil Disobedience does not depend so much on the quantity as on the quality of men and women taking part in it.

4. During these three weeks (of fast) all Civil resisters will be in a state of terrible suspense.¹²⁹

These arguments, on the face of it, are hardly convincing, to say the least of it. The first argument is entirely out of place, as the Civil Disobedience movement did not depend upon Gandhi so long as he was in prison and was actually being carried on without him. The next argument must appear to be most curious to any rational

mind.¹³⁰ The third is really an admission of failure couched in a verbiage which does little credit either to the heart or head of a great leader. Besides, it was a matter of opinion, and not easily reconcileable to the facts stated above in connection with the progress of the movement in 1933. As regards the fourth or the last argument, it is sufficient to point out that if the Civil Disobedience movement had survived Gandhi's 'epic fast' unto death, it could easily be kept alive during the fast of three weeks. On the whole, an ordinary man cannot but regard the statement as an effusion of a mystic and a saint. In the same statement Gandhi made an appeal to the Government of India to withdraw the Ordinances and release the Civil Disobedience prisoners. Unfortunately, Lord Willingdon was neither a mystic nor a saint, but a die-hard politician, and therefore he not only paid no heed to the appeal, but gave Gandhi a strong rebuff.

An official *communique*, dated May 9, clearly explained the position of the Government of India. A mere temporary suspension of the Civil Disobedience movement would not suffice, but the Government must be fully satisfied that the movement was definitely abandoned, before they could release the prisoners. The Government were determined not to let out the prisoners, as their release might lead to the renewal of the Movement. But the sting was in the tail. The *communique* concluded as follows: "There is no intention of negotiating with the Congress for a withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience movement or of releasing prisoners with a view to arrive at any settlement with them in regard to these unlawful activities."¹³¹ In other words, Willingdon reminded Gandhi that the days of Irwin were over, and there would be no further agreement between him (Gandhi) and the Viceroy. It is an indication of the Government's view as to the extent of humiliation and disgrace which Irwin had brought

upon it by concluding an agreement with Gandhi.

The Acting President of the Congress, Aney, in obedience to Gandhi's request, suspended Civil Disobedience, at first for six weeks and then for a further period of six weeks. As soon as Gandhi had sufficiently recovered from the effects of the fast an informal Conference of Congressmen was held at Poona on July 12, 1933, to review the political situation and determine the future plans. The official history of the Congress does not give either the names of those who participated in the Conference or the trend of discussion at the meeting. It merely says that there was a general discussion on the first day; next day Gandhi made an exhaustive statement "dealing with the points raised by the members of the Conference and placing before them his suggestions." It is evident, however, that there was sharp difference of opinion, for we are told that the Conference "rejected a motion for the unconditional withdrawal of Civil Disobedience but also threw out a motion favouring Individual Civil Disobedience." In the end it was decided that Gandhi should "seek an interview with the Viceroy for arriving at a settlement with the Government."¹³² It passes one's comprehension how such a proposal could be entertained in the face of the Government *communique*, of May 9, quoted above, definitely closing doors against any such negotiation. The Viceroy, as could be expected, declined to interview Gandhi (17 July), and the Congress had to thank itself alone for this humiliating rebuff. This, we are told in the official history of the Congress, "forced the Nation, if it was to conserve national honour, to continue the struggle."¹³³ One would be naturally tempted to say that the national honour would have been maintained far better if the struggle were continued without eating the humble pie. Then, again, it must be regarded as a very poor service to the 'national honour' if we think

of the way in which it was decided to continue the struggle. Mass Civil Disobedience was suspended and only those "who were able and willing were advised to offer Individual Civil Disobedience". As if this was not enough, "under the orders of the Acting President, all Congress Organisations and war councils ceased to function in view of the suspension of mass Satyagraha."¹³⁴

It is difficult to say how or why the idea of Individual Civil Disobedience was revived after it was rejected by the Poona Conference of 12 July. A member of the Congress Working Committee, Mr. F. K. Nariman, maintained that it was merely a protest against the Viceroy's declining to interview Gandhi. He made a caustic comment on the whole procedure and ideology of Gandhi. "Interview or Death", said he, "is the national slogan for the present This renewed fight in August last is not for Swaraj, nor even for political constitutional advance, but for the assertion of a supposed 'national right' of an unconditional interview." On the resolution about Individual Civil Disobedience, he commented: "Does it need an Indian National Congress to tell an individual to break laws on his own responsibility and take the consequences?" Criticising the decision to dissolve or suspend all Congress organizations he maintained that 'none can dissolve the National Assemblies that have come into existence by popular vote.'¹³⁵ Mr. Nariman's scathing criticism of the whole ideology and procedure of Gandhi leading to the suspension of Civil Disobedience movement deserves special notice. For, irrespective of the question whether and how far his views were right, they show that independent rational thinking was not altogether dead in Indian politics, and there were at least some leaders, even inside the Congress Circle, who successfully resisted what may be regarded as mass hypnotism exercised by Gandhi.¹³⁶

The history of Individual Civil Disobedience move-

ment may be briefly told. Gandhi "inaugurated the campaign" by disbanding the Sabarmati Ashram which he had founded 18 years before. He vacated the Ashram and disposed of its property, and thereby "divested himself of any little germs of attachment to things mundane, which might possibly take root in his breast."^{136a} Whatever we might think of this explanation by a devotee, there was an unmistakable Gandhian touch in the offer of the land, building and crops to Government, which was, of course, not accepted. But there was a solemn aspect, too. It naturally recalled to men's minds the statement that Gandhi had made on the eve of his march to Dandi that he would never return to the Ashram until Swaraj was won.

Gandhi decided to open the campaign on August 1, 1933, by commencing his march to the village of Ras, but was arrested during the previous night with 34 other inmates of the Ashram and all were sent to prison. Gandhi was released on August 4, and served with an order to reside in Poona. Gandhi, having disobeyed the order, was arrested again on the same day and sentenced to one year's imprisonment. Gandhi's example was followed by hundreds of others all over the country. An important decision taken at this time must be noticed. When the Civil Disobedience campaign was resumed in January, 1932, Vallabhbhai Patel, the then President of the Congress, drew up a list of persons who were to succeed him as Acting President, one after another, as each was put in prison or otherwise unable to act. Aney was the President when Civil Disobedience was suspended in May, 1933, but he offered Individual Civil Disobedience and was arrested on August 14. His successor, Sardul Singh Cavesheer, followed his example, but before doing so he issued orders terminating the office of the Acting President. Thus the last vestige of Congress organisation was voluntarily destroyed, "with a view to

facilitate the campaign becoming truly one of Individual Civil Disobedience.”¹³⁷

As Gandhi was refused facilities in prison for conducting the Anti-Untouchability Campaign, he resorted to a fast on August 16, a step incomprehensible to even Nehru.¹³⁸ As Gandhi's condition became very critical he was released unconditionally on August 23, 1933. Gandhi, however, regarded himself as not free to resume Civil Disobedience till the full term of his imprisonment was over, and devoted the period to the furtherance of the Harijan movement.

By that time the Individual Civil Disobedience “was dead like a door-nail.” Referring to the commencement of the New Year, 1934, the official history of the Congress records: “The progress of events in the line of Civil Disobedience was none too satisfactory. The prisoners who were released were fagged. The provincial leaders who had promised at Poona Conference to lead their Provinces if Mass Civil Disobedience were given up and Individual Civil Disobedience continued, did not carry out their pledges, except in a few cases. Those who were released from jails found themselves unable or unwilling to face another conviction.”^{138a} Slowly and silently the movement faded away, and during the upheaval caused by the great earthquake at Bihar on January 16, 1934, it passed away unnoticed into the limbo of oblivion.

Thus ended the Civil Disobedience movement, the third and the last to be led by Gandhi in person. Whether the Anti-Untouchability Campaign which he substituted for it was nobler or more useful to the country and calculated to bring it nearer to the avowed goal of independence within a shorter period, we need not pause to discuss here, but leave everyone to form his own judgment.

The only material issue that faced the Indian public on May 9, 1933, was that the great Civil Disobedience

movement came to an ignoble end, in spite of all the brave and noble words uttered by Gandhi on the eve of his famous march to Dandi. "Civil Disobedience," said he, "once begun this time, cannot be stopped and must not be stopped so long as there is a single civil resister left free or alive."¹³⁹ The most puzzling thing to an Indian was the leader's order to lay down arms and retreat even before the issue of victory or defeat was clearly decided.

The sudden suspension of Mass Civil Disobedience campaign on May 8, 1933, without any rhyme and reason undoubtedly came as a stunning blow to many. But Gandhi's action did not evoke much open criticism at the time, because the whole of India was preoccupied with the question of his health. Only Vithalbhai Patel and Subhas Bose, who were in Vienna and thus at too great a distance to be affected by the passing scenes of the moment, issued a manifesto condemning Gandhi's decision to suspend the Civil Disobedience movement and stating that it virtually undid the work and the sacrifice of the last thirteen years. According to the manifesto, it signified the failure of the Civil Disobedience campaign, as also of Gandhi's leadership, and the country required a more radical policy and leadership. Not much attention was drawn to it, for "even friends thought that it was an outrageous act to criticise the Mahatma when his life was in jeopardy because of the fast."¹⁴⁰

Mr. F. K. Nariman, the Bombay leader, soon after his release made a bitter attack on the ideology and conduct of the Campaign by Gandhi. He also suggested that the "remedy lay in securing for Gandhi, in place of the late Pandit Motilal Nehru, another political task-master,—a plain-speaking outspoken giant and not lip-sealed mummies who always shake their heads like spring dolls, perpendicular or horizontally, according as the Mahatma pulls the

strings straight or sideways."¹⁴¹ But barring a few exceptions like these, the Congressmen, as a whole, openly or tacitly approved of Gandhi's policy and continued to follow his lead.

Judging at this distance of time, in a detached spirit, the whole conduct of Gandhi appears to be a mystery and seems absolutely unjustifiable on the part of an ordinary man who does not "see things in a flash and acts upon impulse" (as is claimed for Gandhi by his devotees),¹⁴² but thinks and acts in the light of intellect and reason. It is inconceivable why, in course of a *fight to a finish* for independence, and after a definite rejection of the claim of R. T. C. or British Government to frame a constitution for India, the Congress or its leader should take notice of any particular item of the constitution as proposed to be framed by the British Government. The Congress or Gandhi could not accept the proposed constitution without stultifying themselves and rendering meaningless the launching of the Civil Disobedience campaign in 1930, or its resumption in 1932. Even the Congress held in Calcutta in March, 1933, reiterated the position that no constitution framed by the British Government "can be worthy of consideration by, or acceptable to, the people of India."¹⁴³ What was then the meaning of all this fuss about a particular provision of the constitution which the Congress was pledged to reject in toto?

But it was something worse than a fuss. By staking his life on the Communal Award Gandhi gave away the whole moral justification of the Civil Disobedience campaign. What was still more deplorable, he sounded the death-knell of the fight for independence for which hundreds of thousands had undergone untold miseries and sufferings. All this was done for the sake of an issue which, whatever its value or necessity, certainly must yield in importance to freedom, and whose only satisfactory solution

depended upon it. It has been urged that he took a vow to resist the dismemberment of the Hindus with his life, and the 'fast unto death' was therefore obligatory upon him. But it may be argued, in the first place, that to one who was equally resolved not to accept, as binding, any constitution framed by R. T. C. or the Government, Ramsay Macdonald's Communal Award should not have been interpreted as a dismemberment of the Hindus. Secondly, the only just and honourable way in which he should have fought it with his life, was to continue the grim struggle which he had begun till his death.

If the first fast was indefensible, the second one, leading to the suspension of Civil Disobedience campaign was not only a blunder of the first magnitude but a great tragedy. After plunging the whole country in a terrible welter of chaos and sufferings, the leader of the Campaign suddenly cries halt and surrenders, simply because his mind was bent upon another campaign of an altogether different kind. One may well wonder whether even a 'saint' has the right to play drakes and ducks with the lives and fortunes of his countrymen in such an irresponsible manner. The only justification that Gandhi or his blind devotees ever vouchsafed for his strange conduct leading to all the terrible consequences, is contained in the two statements which he issued on September 15 and 20, 1932.¹⁴⁴ The fast, we are told, "is intended to sting Hindu conscience into right religious condition." Referring to the great value of fast as a means of purification he says: "Having made a serious attempt to attain self-purification, I have developed some little capacity to hear correctly and clearly 'the still small voice within.' My present penance I have undertaken in obedience to this voice."¹⁴⁵ All these are, of course, above the heads of those who are neither mystics nor saints, and a historian, at least, should not belong to the one or to the other category.

Nor should he accept the view, even though advanced by a man of the stature of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, that Gandhi "was a unique personality, and it was impossible to judge him by the usual standards or even to apply the ordinary canons of logic to him",¹⁴⁶ if the implication is, as it seems to be, that it would be unjust or improper to judge Gandhi in this manner.

An individual, in his private capacity, is certainly within his rights to place implicit faith in a person, accept his opinion and judgment without question, and regard him as an infallible saint or divinity. But such rights or privileges should not be exercised by anyone while openly passing judgment on that person in his public capacity, particularly when he plays an important role in the public affairs of the country. It would be a dereliction of duty on the part of a historian dealing with Gandhi, the political leader, if he fails to judge him by the same standard as should be normally applied to all persons of that category. It has been very painful to the author to pass adverse comments on a man of Gandhi's stature, but he derives comfort from the thought that in doing so he has paid the highest tribute of respect to Mahatma Gandhi by trying to uphold the great ideal of TRUTH which was the most characteristic feature of his life. The author humbly claims that in delineating the life and character of Gandhi he has been inspired solely by a respect for truth, logic and justice.

CHAPTER VII

REVIVAL OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

A. THE FIRST PHASE (1923-8).

I. BENGAL

The history of the revolutionary or the so-called 'terrorist' movement up to 1917 has been discussed above.¹ There was a comparative lull in the activities of the terrorists for some time after that. Armed with the provisions of the Defence of India Act, the police seized a large number of people on mere suspicion, and the terrorist methods adopted by the Government told upon the morale of the small band of men who had been carrying on this unequal fight for more than a decade. The police ruthlessly hunted out the few terrorist leaders still at large. But some of them did not surrender without a good fight, and one such incident is worth recording.²

Nalini Ghosh, a leader of the *Anusilan Samiti*, with about six others, went in hiding in Gauhati (Assam), and lived in two separate houses in two batches. At the early hours of the morning on 9 January, 1918, the police surrounded one of the houses. The order by the Police to open the door was replied by a pistol shot and it was the signal for firing on both sides. The revolutionaries, however, managed to escape by a back door to a hill top where they were joined by the other batch. The police surrounded the hillock and a free fight ensued between the two. When the revolutionaries exhausted their ammunition, all except two were arrested. One of these two, with a few others, were arrested six months later after another

free fight in Dacca. Several others were similarly traced and arrested during 1918, but not before they shot dead some of the police party.

These arrests and police measures did not stamp out the terrorist organizations, but the suspension of their activities, for the time being, generated a false sense of security. Encouraged by this the Government decided to release all the political prisoners on the eve of the introduction of new Reforms, in order to create a favourable atmosphere for their working. A Royal Proclamation was issued on 23 December, 1919,—the very day on which the Government of India Act got the Royal Assent—granting a general amnesty to all political prisoners.

The terrorists who had been interned under the Defence of India Act were all included in the general amnesty. Early in 1920 these were released and the amnesty was gradually extended to most of the leaders of the revolutionary movements.³

The return of the political prisoners—even from the Andamans—early in 1920 was shortly followed by the launching of the Non-co-operation movement by Gandhi. A number of old revolutionaries accepted his non-violent programme and joined the movement. There were, however, others who had no faith in the effectiveness of this programme, but at the intercession of leaders like C. R. Das, they agreed to give Gandhi a chance and suspend revolutionary activities.⁴

The suspension of Non-co-operation movement by Gandhi early in 1922 and his imprisonment, shortly after, were followed by the revival of revolutionary activities. The annual meeting of the Bengal Provincial Conference was held in Chittagong in April, 1922. The revolutionaries from different parts of Bengal took advantage of this to meet together and draw up a plan and programme in secret. The resurgence of revolutionary mentality in 1923

was indicated by the open and frank praise of revolutionaries in the various periodicals in Bengal. "The *Ananda Bazar Patrika* referred to them as selfless youths with indomitable resolution, who kindled the lamp of life by undergoing death. The *Prabartak* extolled Kanai Lall Dutt. Highly appreciative biographical notices of Jatindra Mukherji and his three⁵ associates now appeared in many papers. It was explained, however, that this laudation did not necessarily imply adoption of their methods. The *Sarathi* set forth the following justification: We may not adopt their methods, but are we not on that account to respect their renunciation, their heroism, and their patriotism?"^{5a}

"At the end of July, 1923, 'Red Bengal' leaflets made their appearance. The first issue announced the initiation of a campaign of assassination of police officers, the second impressed on the political leaders of Bengal the necessity for the existence of an active violence party."⁶

The old *Anusilan* and *Yugantar Samitis* were revived and a new revolutionary organization was set up in Chittagong by a young man named Surya Sen. Before the end of 1923 he established a number of branches in different parts of the Chittagong District, and one of his early successful undertakings was the raid on the office of the Assam Bengal Railway in Chittagong. Four young men with revolvers entered the office in broad daylight, took out the sum of Rs. 77,000 from the treasurer, and managed to escape. Surya Sen and a few others were arrested, but were acquitted for want of evidence against them.

The *Yugantar* party also committed several dacoities including raids on two post-offices, in and near Calcutta. A persistent effort was made to kill Sir Charles Tegart, the Police Commissioner (C. I. D.), who was a terror to the terrorists. In January, 1924, Gopinath Saha, engaged for the purpose, shot dead a European, Mr. Day, whom

he mistook for Tegart. When capital punishment was awarded to him he declared, unmoved, that every drop of his blood would serve to spread revolutionary ideas in every household. He wrote to his mother not to lament but to be proud of a son like him, and expressed the hope that every mother might bear a fearless son like him. During the period of a month and a half that he was in jail, his weight increased by five pounds. The courage and self-sacrifice of Gopinath were highly appreciated by the Congress leaders and a resolution to this effect was passed by the Bengal Provincial Conference at Sirajgunge. A similar resolution moved by C. R. Das at the all-India Congress Committee created a tense atmosphere to which reference has been made above.⁷

In March, 1924, the Police discovered a big manufactory of bombs in Calcutta, and seized a large number of bombs full of explosives and shells for the same. Another large manufactory of bombs at Dakshineshwar, about 3 miles to the north of Calcutta, was raided by the Police on 10 November, 1925. They indicated that the revolutionaries had considerably improved their knowledge and skill in the preparation of bombs. There were other centres, too, for preparing bombs. Revolutionary leaflets were regularly distributed in the streets of Calcutta.

The Bengal Government took alarm at the revival of 'terrorist' activities on a large scale and passed a new Ordinance in 1924, arming the Executive with powers similar to those they had under the Defence of India Act. It was followed by arrests on a large scale, and about 187 persons, including Subhas Bose, were put behind the bars. A large number was kept in detention in villages, and movements of all suspects were under surveillance. A Bill was later introduced under which the special powers were to remain in force for five years. As the Legislative Council refused leave to introduce the Bill it was certified

by the Governor.

Attempts were made by the terrorists to kill a number of Police officers (C. I. D.) who took a leading part in tracing or arresting the revolutionaries. Most of these attempts failed, but there was one daring and successful instance in May, 1926, when a Special Superintendent visited some terrorist prisoners inside the Alipore Central jail. A fatal blow was dealt on his head with an iron bar by Pramode Choudhury, a member of the Hindusthan Republican Association in U. P., who was arrested in Dakhineshwar (bomb manufactory) along with several other members of the same association.

II. THE UNITED PROVINCES

As in Bengal, so in U. P., revolutionary activities were brought to a standstill after 1918, but were revived in 1923. In addition to Sachindra Sanyal,⁸ three other Bengalis,—Jogesh Chandra Chatterji, Rajendra Nath Lahiri and Satis Chandra Sinha,—took the leading part in this re-organization which covered the whole Province with a network of revolutionary centres.

It has been stated by some that all this was part of an all-India revolutionary organization, with its headquarters in Calcutta. This view finds some support in the fact that a Conference of the revolutionaries, held at Kanpur in October, 1924, was attended by revolutionary leaders from different parts of India. In any case, it was at this Conference that a central all-India organization was set up under the name of Hindusthan Republican Association. All the powers of control were vested in a Central Committee consisting of representatives from each Province. This Committee was to supervise and guide the work in different Provinces, and to maintain contact with the outside world. Unanimity of all members was required to carry a proposal, but once accepted it must be given effect to without any question. The Conference also drew up a plan and

programme of work. The Association set up Provincial Committees with clear direction as to the programme of work and the method to be followed in carrying it out.

The following brief account of this Association is included in a note on "Terrorism in India" prepared by the Government of India, which was submitted by the Secretary of State for India to the Joint Committee on Constitutional Reforms on 30 November, 1933.⁹

"Probably the most persistent terrorist organization outside Bengal is the Hindusthan Republican Association, subsequently styled the Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association or Army. This was originally started, after the failure of Gandhiji's first mass civil disobedience campaign, by two Bengalis in the U. P. The rules of the Association stated that 'the object of the Association shall be to establish a federated Republic of the United States of India by an organized and armed revolution.' Each Provincial organization was to have its various departments and each was to concentrate on crimes of violence with a view to collect money and arms ; for the enforcement of discipline assassination was made permissible. This Association has since its inception been very loosely knit; at times it has almost ceased to exist, but it has frequently come to notice subsequently, and has even been established in Madras. It has functioned in Bihar, U. P., Punjab and Delhi."^{9a}

It is further stated in this note that as early as 1925, if not before, Sachindra Sanyal was in touch with M. N. Roy, who was charged by Russia with the task of spreading Communism in India as has been related above.¹⁰

In accordance with the decision of the Kanpur Conference the revolutionary movement in U. P. was thoroughly organized by Ramprasad Bismil. The organization followed the same pattern as in Bengal, and the financial difficulties could only be met by committing dacoities. Ramprasad,

however, introduced a novelty. He decided that the object of the dacoity must be to secure the money belonging to Government, and not to any private individual. His most notable exploit was the dacoity on 9 August, 1925, in a railway train proceeding from Kakori towards Alamnagar, in the section Shaharanpur—Lucknow of the Northern Railway, Alamnagar being the last station before Lucknow. About 10 young men who had boarded the train stopped it by pulling alarm chain. The guard was held at the point of a revolver, and indiscriminate shots were fired to keep the passengers in their own compartments. A few entered the mail van, broke open the iron safe (in which money collected from the different stations was kept), and decamped with a large amount. The Government instituted a vigorous inquiry and after a great deal of searches and arrest of many suspects discovered the whole plot.¹¹ Altogether 44 persons were arrested of whom 15 were let off as there was no evidence against them. The remaining 29 were tried by a Special Magistrate, who found 27 of them guilty. These were tried by a Special Sessions Judge. The Kakori Conspiracy Case dragged on for about a year, in course of which the prisoners had to resort to fasting as a protest against cruel treatment to them in jail. Two leading figures were subsequently arrested and tried. Four were sentenced to death, four were transported for life, and four, including two approvers, were acquitted. The rest were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, ranging from 14 to 5 years. There was a great public agitation against the capital punishment and a proposal to commute the sentence to imprisonment for life, moved in the Legislative Council of U. P., was supported by all the non-official members. A few leading citizens of U. P. made an appeal for mercy both to the Governor and the Viceroy, and the condemned accused having unsuccessfully filed an appeal to the Privy Council, sent

a petition for mercy to the Emperor. But nothing availed. On 18 December Ramprasad was hanged, his last words being, "I wish the downfall of the British empire." His colleague Roshanlal bravely went up to the gallows with a copy of the '*Gita*' in his hand and '*Bande Mataram*' on his lips. Ashfaqulla stepped to the gallows with a copy of the *Quran* tied round his neck. Just before the noose was put round his neck, he said, "I tried to make India free, and the attempt will not end with my life," and died with a smiling face.

B. THE SECOND PHASE (1928-34)

I. BENGAL

1. The Chittagong Armoury Raid and its Repercussion

There was a lull in the activities of the revolutionaries after 1927, and the Government felt justified in relaxing the rigours imposed upon them. By September, 1928, the Government released all the detenus who had been interned under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act and Ordinance of 1925, and the Act itself was allowed to lapse in 1930. But within a fortnight occurred the Chittagong Armoury Raid, perhaps the most daring of the revolutionary enterprises in India.

This raid was not an isolated incident, as is generally supposed, but formed part of a comprehensive plan. When the revolutionaries were set free in 1928 they received a hearty ovation all over the country and were for some time almost lionized by the public. Taking advantage of this popular sentiment the released revolutionaries founded different organizations under the patronage of younger leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose. On account of the failures of revolutionary movements in the past the younger generations had lost faith in the old leaders and formed themselves into what was known as Revolt Groups or Advance Groups. They wanted

complete independence of India, and it was as their spokesmen that both Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose fought against the Colonial Status recommended in the Motilal Nehru Report, as mentioned above.¹² Besides, the new groups did not attach much importance to murder of individual officials, but preferred an armed rising. It may be noted that the two thousand volunteers in the Congress session in Calcutta in 1928, who were drilled in military uniform by Subhas Bose, the General Officer Commanding, were mostly recruited from these young revolutionaries.

The plan of armed rising was discussed on the occasion of the annual meeting of the Bengal Provincial Conference held at Rangpur, early in April, 1929. It was decided in a meeting at Calcutta in November, 1929, to launch simultaneous attacks on the armouries in Chittagong, Mymensingh and Barisal. It was in accordance with this plan that Surya Sen organized the raid at Chittagong.

Surya Sen, a resident of Chittagong, while studying in the B.A. Class in Berhampore College in 1916, was initiated into revolutionary ideas by a teacher there. On his return to Chittagong in 1918, he organized a revolutionary party, but joined the Non-co-operation movement in 1921 and became a teacher of the local national school. Hence he was known as Master-da.¹³ After the suspension of Non-co-operation movement he revived the revolutionary organization, as mentioned above. He was imprisoned for two years and went in hiding after release. But he renewed his revolutionary activity after 1928 when members of the revolutionary groups in Chittagong were released along with other detenus.

He had able lieutenants like Ananta Singh and Ganesh Ghosh. They decided "to inspire self-confidence by demonstrating that even without outside help it was possible to fight the Government." They planned "to

raid the Government armoury and seize arms, cut off communications and raid the European club." For a week Chittagong would be free, and then when the Government brought in troops "they would fight without yielding and die fighting." This heroic action, they thought, would inspire new generations to fight for the freedom of their Motherland."¹⁴

In accordance with this plan Surya Sen, after having made regular military preparations, issued a manifesto in the name of the Indian Republican Army, Chittagong Branch. It was an open declaration of war against the British.¹⁵ After giving a detailed account of the atrocities perpetrated by them in India, the Republican army appealed to every Indian to offer his support to its endeavour to destroy the British rule in India by an armed attack. This manifesto was widely circulated in the town of Chittagong on 18 April, 1930.

The same night, at about 10 p. m., "four batches of varying strength set out from the Congress office in Chittagong. One was to capture the Police Armoury, one to capture the Auxiliary Force Armoury, one to massacre the Europeans in the Club and the other to destroy the telephone exchange and telegraph office. The Club happened to be deserted and the party deputed to attack it joined the other groups. The Police Armoury party consisted of about 50 youths clad in khaki, led by Ananta Singh and Ganesh Ghosh, dressed in Officer's uniform. The Police sentry was shot down; the party broke into the Armoury and Magazine and armed themselves with muskets, revolvers, and ammunition. Practically the same thing happened in the Auxiliary Force Armoury, and the sentry together with another sepoy and the Sergeant Major were shot dead. The place was then forced open and pistols, revolvers, rifles and a Lewis gun were taken away."¹⁶

But the raiders, in their hurry, forgot to take the cartridges kept in a separate locked room. This rendered useless the rifles and the Lewis gun which they had seized. While they were engaged in ransacking the Armoury they fired at the carriage of officials, killing a railway guard, two taxi-drivers, and a Constable in the Magistrate's car. After having carried off the arms the raiders soaked the building with petrol and set fire to it. They were repeatedly fired at from the barracks but managed to reach the Police lines. "The telegraph office party seized and chloroformed the telephone operator, hacked the telephone Board to pieces and set fire to it. The Telegraph Master was fired at when he came to the operator's assistance, but he returned with a gun and drove the raiders off before they destroyed the telegraph office. This party then went to the police lines and joined the main party."¹⁷ There they all stood in a line, in right military style, and declared the Provisional Independent Government of India with Surya Sen as President. "A counter-attack under the Deputy-Inspector-General of Police was organized, and although few in number and poorly equipped, it succeeded in forcing the raiders to leave the town and retreat towards the hills. The raiders thus had to abandon their further project of raiding the Government treasury and massacring the Europeans in the town. Meanwhile another party cut all telegraph communications between Chittagong and the outside world, and attempted to interrupt railway communications by removing a rail and derauling a goods train ; yet another party attempted, unsuccessfully, to derail the down mail train to Chittagong at a place 70 miles from Chittagong on the same night. Information of the raid was sent out by wireless from a ship in the harbour and reinforcements reached Chittagong on the 20th April."¹⁸

Fifty-seven revolutionaries, armed each with a revolver

(or pistol) and a musket, after wandering through hills and dales for three days practically without any food, took position on the 22nd morning on a hillock, named Jalalabad hill, but were not attacked by the British force till 5 p. m. Then followed a regular pitched battle which continued till the British force retired about 8 p. m. In the first few volleys¹⁹ from the British machine guns eleven revolutionaries fell. The casualties on the Government side were heavy, but exact figures are not available. It is said that Sir Charles Tegart, while assaulting the raiders, taken prisoners, cursed them and said, "you have killed 64 of our men."

The British forces made three attempts to climb the hill, but were repulsed each time. It was, however, clear to the revolutionaries that they could not carry on this unequal fight for long. So they decided to disperse in several groups and carry on guerilla warfare as long as possible. It is not possible to describe in detail the arrest of individuals or groups and their numerous clashes with the British forces. Only a few may be briefly noticed.

There was a free fight, for several hours, on 6 May, both in land and on the river Karnafuli near Chittagong, in which four out of six revolutionaries were killed and the remaining two surrendered. Another free fight took place at Chandernagore on 31 August, when the Police Commissioner, Sir Charles Tegart, surrounded a house in which a few of the Chittagong raiders were in hiding. One of them was killed and the others were arrested.

Surya Sen and a number of Chittagong revolutionaries were still at large. The British assembled a large force and ransacked the whole of the district, but could not capture the great leader. The Chittagong Armoury raid left a long trail of revolutionary incidents all over the district to which reference will be made later. In the meanwhile it had a great repercussion upon the revo-

lutionaries all over Bengal.

"The news of this coup, unprecedented in the annals of terrorism, gave a fillip to the younger section of the revolutionaries who were already fired with enthusiasm to drive out the British from India by the force of arms. The elderly leaders considered that an adequate supply of arms and man-power had not yet been collected and therefore counselled delay, but after the Chittagong raid the younger section could no longer be restrained. Recruits poured into the various terrorist groups in a steady stream and these included women and young girls who from this time onwards are found assisting the terrorists as housekeepers, messengers, custodians of arms, and sometimes as comrades.

"In May the leaders of the main Yugantar party in Calcutta drew up a programme of terrorism and made arrangements for the manufacture of bombs. The principal features of this programme were :

(1) The murder of Europeans in hotels, clubs, and cinemas, simultaneously in Calcutta and the districts by bombs.

(2) The burning of the aerodrome in Dum-Dum with petrol.

(3) The cutting off of the gas and electric supply of Calcutta, by destroying the gas works and the electric power stations.

(4) The cutting off of the petrol supply of Calcutta by destroying the depot at Budge-Budge.

(5) The disorganization of the tramway service in Calcutta by cutting overhead wires.

(6) The destruction of telegraphic communication between Calcutta and the districts in Bengal.

(7) The destruction of bridges and railway lines by dynamites and hand grenades."²⁰

The result was that in 1930 there was an 'alarming

recrudescence of the terrorist movement in various parts of India, and notably in Bengal.' It continued during 1931 and 1932. The number of outrages committed during 1933 was considerably lower than in any of the three preceding years. There was a still more marked decline in terrorist crimes in 1934. The miserable collapse of Gandhi's Civil Disobedience movement synchronised with this decline. Both were largely due to legislation giving unrestricted autocratic powers to the Police and the Executive, and the terrible measures of repression adopted by the Government.

The Government had re-enacted the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Part Continuance) Act on 1 April, 1930, which continued for five years the sections relating to trial by special procedure. After the Chittagong raid, however, the lost powers of arrest and detention were immediately conferred by Ordinance and this was replaced by Act VI of 1930 on 16 October, 1930. Altogether 2,167 persons were dealt with under this Act, of whom 1,351 were in gaols and detention camps, and 288 in village and home domicil, making a total of 1639, on 30 November, 1933. There were, besides, 19 State prisoners under Regulation III of 1818.²¹

'By the middle of July, 1931, the Government found that the existing legislation was not sufficient to cope with the terrorist menace. On the 9th October, 1931, Act XXIII was passed to provide against publication of matter inciting or encouraging murder or violence. On 29 October the Government of India promulgated Ordinance IX of 1931 widening the scope of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, so that action could be taken not only against persons actually concerned in the commission of terrorist associations, but also against those who are members or helpers of those associations. It also widened the schedule of offences. On 30 November, the Bengal Emergency Powers Ordinance XI of 1931 was issued. Chapter I of the

Ordinance provided for emergency powers which would apply immediately to the district of Chittagong. Military and Police were to combine in operations to round up terrorists and absconders in that district, and to render these operations effective the District Magistrate was given powers, among others, to commandeer property, limit access to certain places, regulate traffic and transport, and impose a collective fine upon recalcitrant inhabitants. Chapter II provided for special tribunals and special magistrates and a procedure designed to overcome delaying tactics. On the expiry of the Ordinances the powers conferred by them were embodied in the Bengal Suppression of Terrorist Outrages Act, 1932, and the Bengal Criminal Law (Arms and Explosives) Act, 1932, passed by the Legislative Council.²²

Early in 1934 was passed the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act which replaced without time limit various temporary Acts about to expire.

Reviewing the situation at the end of 1933 an official Report observes :

“Though the number of fresh arrests has declined in recent months, the present monthly average is still disquietingly high and indicates that considerable recruitment is still going on.

“One reason for this is that subversive propaganda and activities have been so rife in recent years that they have succeeded in creating a revolutionary mentality which has permeated almost every stratum of the literate Bhadrak society. To a certain extent the unemployment problem among the educated middle classes in Bengal has been a powerful accessory to those who have deliberately sought to bring about this result, but the factors which have been chiefly responsible for the propagation of revolutionary ideas are a subversive Press, and successive organised movements for defiance of the laws by the methods variously

known as non-co-operation and civil disobedience."

"Nothing is more noticeable in the history of the revolutionary movement than the connection between the recrudescence of violent propaganda in the Press and of terrorism. Contrary to the expectations of Gandhi his movements have, on many an occasion, broken out into violence, and even when they have, in fact, remained non-violent, succeeded in engendering a violent mentality towards the Government which made young men readily succumb to the arguments of the terrorist recruiters. It is a remarkable fact that a large percentage of the recruits to the terrorist movement are found to have made their political *debut* as civil resisters."²³

"The net result of these facts has been greatly to widen the field of recruitment to the terrorist ranks. Gone are the days when elaborate ceremonies of initiation and administration of vows, before an image of the Goddess Kali, were necessary to ensure the devotion of recruits to the terrorist cause.²⁴ It is sufficient now-a-days to give a boy a few seditious books to read, and to supplement this by instructions from persons who have won his trust and confidence. Further, good moral character is no longer an essential in a recruit. Throughout the Province, students in schools and colleges are now far more deeply permeated by a spirit of unreasoning resentment against the Government, and of defiance of authority, and there are a large number of districts in which some or all of the educational institutions have terrorist groups connected with them under the control of the main leaders. The result is that murders are now committed by youths unknown to the police, at the bidding of their leaders."

Another recent development was the advent of the female terrorist. This was suggested by the Government to be due to the fact that the women took an active part in picketing during the Civil Disobedience movement

in 1930, for "the step from non-violence to violence is a short one. Of those detained under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act 15 are women."²⁵

The same official Report refers to some other ancillary factors which helped the growth of terrorist movement :

"The subversive movements in general and terrorism in particular received encouragement from the Calcutta Corporation. It was captured by the Congress in 1924, and C. R. Das, as Mayor, offered employment to those who had suffered in the "country's cause" mostly as teachers in Corporation Primary schools which multiplied from 19 in 1923-4 to 225 by the end of December, 1931. The attention of the Corporation was drawn to the fact that Corporation teachers took part in the illegal movements and the Corporation Schools were being used for unlawful purposes. The Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, in reply, brought counter-charges of ill-treatment to the teachers by the police. The Corporation passed resolutions expressing sorrow at the death of terrorists and even named streets after them.

"Such attitude of open sympathy to the terrorists by the Corporation and the Bengal Provincial Congress and the public tributes paid by them to persons convicted of terrorist crime have been a perpetual incitement to emotional youth to undertake fresh outrages. Factors such as these did not weight the scale against Government in their campaign af 1916-19."²⁶

2. General Review of Revolutionary Activities.

Some idea of the revolutionary activities in Bengal, in accordance with the programme of the Yugantar party mentioned above, during the period 1930 to 1933, may be gained from the following table : ²⁷

I. Classified Statement of the Number of Cases of Outrages
year by year.

	1930	1931	1932	1933
Murderous Outrages	7	5	5	3
Attempts at Outrages	4	6	14	3
Dacoities	10	23	68	34
Attempted Dacoities	--	2		
Robberies	6	18		
Attempted robberies	1	5		
Bomb-throwing	6	7	3	-
Bomb explosions	1	-	4	3
Armed raids	1	-	-	-
Total	36	66	94	43

II. List of Casualties due to Terrorist Outrages

	1930		1931		1932		1933	
Class	killed	injured	killed	injured	killed	injured	killed	injured
Officials	11	12	5	13	6	10	1	1
Non-Officials	10	14	4	3	6	27	-	-
Terrorists	26	4	-	1	5	3	2	-

i. Murder of Officials

A number of Indians were murdered as they were supposed to be police informers. Some of the most daring attempts to murder officials are noted below, year by year.

Year 1930

1. Reference has been made above to an unsuccessful attempt to kill the Police Commissioner Sir Charles Tegart in 1924. A fresh attempt was made on 25 August, 1930, when two revolutionaries threw bombs at the car of Tegart near Dalhousie Square, Calcutta. One of the bombs exploded behind Tegart's car, which was not damaged and escaped. As a result of the explosion one of the revolutionaries was killed and the other seriously injured. The Police discovered a bomb factory, and arrested quite a large number of members of the Yugantar Party who were tried in the "Dalhouse Square Conspiracy

Case" and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment varying between 20 and 5 years.

2. On 29 August, 1930, Mr. Lowman, Inspector-General of Police, Bengal, and Mr. Hodson, Superintendent of Police, Dacca, visited the Mitford Hospital in Dacca. A student of the attached Medical School shot at them with a revolver at a fairly long range. Both were seriously wounded. Lowman expired after a few days but Hodson recovered. Binay Bose, who fired the shot, was seized by a by-stander but threw him off and managed to escape.

3. The same Binay Bose with two others—all dressed as Europeans—entered the Writers' Buildings, Calcutta, at about 11 a. m. on 8 December, 1930. They rushed into the office room of Mr. Simpson, the Inspector-General of Prisons and shot him dead. As soon as Mr. Nelson, I.C.S., the Legal Remembrancer, attracted by the noise of the firing, came out of his room, he was shot in his thigh and fell down. The revolutionaries then went down the corridor, firing indiscriminately into the rooms of other European officials, one of whom alone, Mr. Townend, I.C.S., was wounded. The three revolutionaries then attempted to commit suicide as they knew that escape was impossible. One of them took Potassium Cyanide and died immediately. Binay and Dinesh shot at their own heads. Binoy died after a few days, but Dinesh recovered and was hanged.

Year 1931

1. On 7 April Mr. J. Peddie, District Magistrate of Midnapore, visited a local school. At about 7 p.m., while Mr. Peddie was attending an exhibition of manual work in the school, he was fatally shot from behind at close range by two young men who managed to escape.

2. Mr. Garlick, the Sessions Judge of 24 Parganas, had sentenced to death Dinesh, one of the murderers of

Mr. Simpson mentioned above. On 27 July, while sitting in Court, a young man shot him through the head and he immediately died. The murderer was shot by a Sergeant on duty and fell down severely wounded. But he committed suicide by taking Potassium Cyanide. A piece of paper was found on his body containing the words: "Down with the Court which unjustly sentenced Dinesh Gupta to capital punishment."

3. Inspector Ashanullah was held chiefly responsible for the horrors that were let loose upon the people of Chittagong after the Armoury raid. He was shot dead on 30 August.

4. On 14 December, Mr. C. G. B. Stevens, the Magistrate of Comilla, was in his Bungalow when two girls approached him with a petition. Mr. Stevens was reading the application when one of the girls shot at him and he immediately fell down dead.

5. Unsuccessful attempts were made to murder Mr. Cassells, Commissioner, Dacca Division (21 August), Mr. Durno, District Magistrate, Dacca (28 October) and Mr. Villiers, the President of the European Association (29 October). The last two were seriously wounded, and the assailants in each case managed to escape.

Year 1932

1. On 30 April, Mr. Douglas, the District Magistrate of Midnapore, while presiding over a meeting in the District Board office, was shot dead. The murderer was hanged.

2. Kamakhya Sen, a Sub-Deputy Magistrate at Munshiganj (Dacca District), had rendered himself notorious by his oppressions on the people. While he was on a visit to Dacca and sleeping in the house of a Deputy Magistrate, he was shot dead on 27 June.

3. On 29 July Mr. Ellison, Superintendent of Police, Tippera, was shot dead at Comilla.

4. A daring attempt was made to kill H.E. Sir John

Anderson, the Governor of Bengal, notorious for introducing the 'Black and Tan' in suppressing Irish terrorism. While, as Chancellor, he was delivering his address at the Convocation of the Calcutta University, a girl named Bina Das shot at him, but a note-book in his pocket diverted the shot and saved his life.

5. Unsuccessful attempts were made to murder Sir Alfred Watson, the Editor of the *Statesman* (5 August and 28 September), Mr. Grassby, Addl. Supdt. of Police, Dacca (22 August), and Mr. Luke, Supdt. Rajshahi Central Jail (18 November).

Year 1933

On 2 September, Mr. Burge, Magistrate of Midnapore, while about to join a football game in the field, was shot dead by two young men (who were shot by the body-guards of the Magistrate) and died later.

Year 1934

A second attempt was made to kill Sir John Anderson, Governor of Bengal, mentioned above. On 8 March he attended the horse-race at Lebong (near Darjeeling) and was going to award a cup to the winner, when he was shot twice by a young man. The Governor remained unhurt and the assailant was wounded and seized. In the meanwhile a girl ran towards the Governor and fired at him at close range. But her first shot missed and she was captured before she could fire again.

ii. Chittagong Revolutionaries (1930-34).

For three years after the Chittagong Armoury Raid the group of revolutionaries under Surya Sen carried on their activities in spite of numerous arrests and amid a veritable reign of terror launched throughout the district.

First, in June 1931, there was a conspiracy to blow off the jail and other office-buildings by means of dynamite with a view to rescuing the revolutionaries—including the

leaders and rank and file of the Chittagong Armoury Raid—who were then confined within the Jail building, and then to immobilize the whole machinery of district administration. But the plot was revealed to the Police by a traitor in the party. Arms, electric wires, explosives, daggers, etc., were unearthed both inside and outside the Jail, while in the Court premises and other prominent places of the town dynamite was found buried underground.

The plot was nipped in the bud, but it is said that the Government were so much terrified that they made a compromise and let off the conspirators with a light punishment.

The trial of the accused in the Armoury Raid Case ended in 1932, and fourteen of them were transported for life to the Andamans. Some of the revolutionaries were in hiding at the village of Patiya, P.S. Dhalghat, which was surrounded on 14 June, 1932, by the Police and a military force under Capt. Cameron. About 10 p.m. Cameron raided the house of a widow named Savitri Devi who harboured Surya Sen and four of his trusted lieutenants who were still at large. Cameron was shot dead while ascending the staircase, and there was a prolonged fight. Two of the revolutionaries died, but so effective was their fight that Surya Sen and two young girls—Pritilata Waddedar and Kalpana Datta—managed to escape.

Three months later, on 22nd September, 1932, this Pritilata Waddedar led a group of revolutionaries to raid the Railway Institute at Pahartali, Chittagong, which was frequented by the Europeans and Anglo-Indians of the town. A large number of ladies and gentlemen, engaged in dance and other merriments, were startled by the sudden explosion of bombs and revolver shots. The Europeans and Anglo-Indians defended themselves with revolvers and crockeries. One, a lady, was killed and thirteen were seriously wounded. Pritilata, being struck by a revolver

shot, took Potassium Cyanide to evade arrest. The rest of her party escaped.

In February, 1933, when Surya Sen was in hiding in a village called Gairala near Chittagong with three others, a large Gurkha force surrounded the house and both sides opened fire. The owner of the house and his brother were killed but the revolutionaries escaped. While Surya Sen got down in a pond to hide himself he was seized by a Gurkha soldier. Thus was the great leader arrested at last. The villager, who had revealed the hiding place of Surya Sen to the police, was murdered in broad daylight.

Surya Sen suffered greatly in the hands of the Police, but the military officer who took him to Dacca is said to have treated him with great respect and consideration. He took off his handcuffs and dined with him at the same table on the steamer. Some British military officers made highly appreciative remarks about his courage and military skill as a general. There is a story current showing how the spirit of Surya Sen was sustained by the love and esteem in which he was held by the common people. Once, while flying before the police, he took shelter from rain under the eaves of a thatched house in a village. Standing there, he overheard the mistress of the house, while lighting the evening lamp under a Tulsi plant—a common custom with the Hindus—, pray to God that Surya Sen might be saved from all dangers. Surya Sen was hanged after trial but his career has shed a lustre on the revolutionary movement in India.

But the death of Surya Sen did not put an end to terrorist activities. On 7 January, 1934, four boys, all in their teens, made a murderous attack on the Europeans assembled to watch a cricket match in Chittagong. They threw bombs on the cricket ground and fired shots. Two of them died on the spot and the other two were hanged after trial.

iii. Clash between the Police and the Revolutionaries.

1. Many revolutionaries from Bengal took refuge in French Chandernagore. The French Mayor, at the instance of the British Government, went on 10 March, 1933, to seize a revolutionary and surrounded his hiding place. When the Mayor was about to enter the house the revolutionary fired and came out, and by indiscriminate shooting escaped through the police net. The Mayor was seriously wounded.

2. On 22 May, 1933, there was a prolonged fight between the revolutionaries and the Police who surprised them while residing in a house in Cornwallis Street, Calcutta. The former included two leaders who had escaped from prison. They fought till their cartridges were exhausted and then got down by the rain-pipe of the house. But they were arrested.

3. Sir John Anderson, the Governor of Bengal, set up a number of 'village guards' to keep watch over the revolutionaries. There was an open clash, in 1933, between the Village-guard of Deobhog in Dacca District and some armed revolutionaries, who killed one guard and wounded a few. All the revolutionaries escaped except one who was tried and hanged.

In addition to the above reference may be made to the clash between the unarmed revolutionary prisoners in the Hijli detention camp (in Bengal) and their sepoy sentries in 1931. Two of the revolutionaries were killed and twenty wounded, four of them seriously.^{27a}

II. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE BENGAL (1928-34)

1. Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association.

The Police terrorism that followed the train dacoity at Kakori—imprisonment of most of the leaders, general round-ups, searches and arrests, harassment of suspects—

had a very adverse effect on the revolutionaries. It is thus described by one of them. "Men who had professed sympathy with our cause would now avoid us. Boys who had talked tall began now to leave the gymnasium we had started in Kanpur for physical culture and as a recruiting centre. The whole province was in the grip of panic."²⁸ The sense of frustration caused by this state of things was heightened by the practical cessation of all political activities by the Congress.

An attempt was made by the revolutionaries still at large to break this stagnant calm. Chandra Sekhar Azad, the sole remaining absconder of the Kakori Conspiracy Case, took the leading part in re-organizing the revolutionary movement. The name of the Association was changed to "Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association" with a Socialist State in India as its objective. The party was reorganized with a Central Committee, and Provincial and District Committees under it. All decisions were to be taken in these Committees, and majority decisions were to be binding upon all. About this time they were also influenced by the events in Russia and the Labour-strikes in Bombay (under Girni Kamgar Union), Calcutta and Kanpur. But armed action was still regarded as the immediate task, specially the murder of the hateful officials, which would break the stagnant calm. When mass movement was unleashed the Association would "link themselves with that movement, act as its armed detachment and give it a Socialist Direction."²⁹

The first over act of importance of the newly organized Association was the murder of Mr. Saunders, the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Lahore. When the Simon Commission arrived at Lahore Railway Station (30 October, 1928), Lala Lajpat Rai, the great Indian leader, was assaulted by the Police in the general *melee* against thousands of people, assembled there, who were showing black

flags to Simon Commission and shouting "Simon, go back". Lajpat Rai's death, shortly after on 17 November, 1928, was generally believed to have been caused by this assault. To avenge his death Bhagat Singh shot to death Mr. Saunders in broad daylight, but managed to escape.

2. Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta³⁰

The next activity of the Association was not only more daring but a very significant one. When, after the murder of Mr. Saunders at Lahore, the people were suffering terribly at the hands of the Police, a feeling slowly gained ground that while the revolutionaries effect their escape and hide themselves, the people have to suffer the consequences of their crimes. In order to remove such a feeling the Association decided to send two members to commit a crime and then court arrest. It was also felt that the crime should have two objects in view ; first, to create a great sensation all over India in order to remove the political lethargy from which the country had been suffering ; and, secondly, to give wide publicity to the aims and objects of the Association and stimulate the revolutionary urge in the country.

Early in April, 1929, the Trade Disputes Bill, intended to curtail the rights of labourers to strike, was being discussed in the Legislative Assembly, Delhi. The Government also sought to introduce the Public Safety Bill, the object of which was to check the Communist movement in India by cutting it off from external influences. As the provisions of this Bill had direct bearing on the Meerut Conspiracy Case,^{30a} then pending before the Court, Vithalbhai Patel, the President of the Assembly, requested the Government to withdraw either the Bill or the Conspiracy Case. As the Government refused to do either, Patel declared that he would give his ruling on the admissibility of the Bill as soon as the Trade Disputes Bill was voted upon.

The public attention was thus focussed on the proceedings of the Assembly, and it was mainly for this reason that the Hindusthan Association decided that Bhagat Singh and his friend Batukeshwar Datta should throw two bombs on the floor of the Assembly Chamber, New Delhi. Care was taken to prepare two such bombs as would not cause any fatal or even serious injury, and it was settled that they should be thrown only if the Trade Disputes Bill was carried, and then, immediately after the result of voting was declared.

Bhagat Singh and his comrade attended the Assembly for a few days in order to select a site where the explosion of the bomb was not likely to hurt anyone seriously. On 8 April, 1929, they took their seats, selected beforehand, in the visitors' gallery. Just when the fateful hour was approaching, Sir John Simon, anxious to hear the President's ruling on the Public Safety Bill, entered the Chamber and took his seat quite close to the place where Bhagat Singh and his friend were sitting. These two exchanged glances and were urged by an instinct to shoot Simon, the indirect cause of the death of Lajpat Rai. But they controlled themselves and decided to carry out the allotted task. As soon as the President declared that the Trade Disputes Bill was carried and proceeded to give his ruling on the Public Safety Bill, Bhagat Singh dropped a bomb on the floor, and within five seconds Batukeshwar threw another. They also fired a few revolver shots and dropped from above copies of the Red Pamphlet on the floor.

No one was killed, four or five persons were slightly hurt, and only one was more seriously injured. The chamber was enveloped in smoke and there was a regular stampede,—members, visitors and officials running helter skelter. Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar had a very reasonable chance of effecting their escape in the melee, but true

to their purpose, they remained standing in the empty hall, and as soon as a few sergeants entered, Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar threw away the revolver and offered themselves for arrest.

On 6 June they jointly made a long statement in the Court and six days later they were both sentenced to transportation for life. They greeted the sentence with loud shouts of *Inquilab Zindabad* (Long live the Revolution) —a slogan first uttered by them while throwing the bombs and destined to become henceforth a regular war-cry in India.

The Red Pamphlet as well as the Joint Statement got a wide circulation all over the country. These two documents, while serving admirably the purposes of propaganda, deserve very close reading as they throw a good deal of light on the aims, objects and ideals of the revolutionary party.

The Red Pamphlet is a short document and we quote below the opening para and the concluding portion :

“It takes a loud voice to make the deaf hear”—with these immortal words uttered on a similar occasion by Villant, a French Anarchist and martyr, do we strongly justify this act of ours.

“Let the Government know that while protesting against the Public Safety and the Trade Disputes Bills and the callous murder of Lala Lajpat Rai, on behalf of the helpless Indian masses, we want to emphasise the lesson often repeated by history that it is easy to kill individuals but you cannot kill ideas. Great empires crumbled while ideas survive. Bourbons and Czars fell while revolutionaries marched triumphantly ahead.

“We are sorry to admit that we, who attach so great a sanctity to human life, we, who dream of a very glorious future, when man will be enjoying perfect peace and full liberty, have been forced to shed human blood. But the sacrifice of individuals at the altar of a great

revolution that will bring freedom to all rendering exploitation of man by man impossible, is inevitable. Long Live Revolution."

In the Joint Statement, which is a fairly long document, Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta give an elaborate justification of their conduct. "Bearing in mind the words of the late Mr. S. R. Das, once Law Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, which appeared in the famous letter he had addressed to his son to the effect that the bomb was necessary to awaken England from her dreams, we dropped the bombs on the floor of the Assembly Chamber to register our protest on behalf of those who had no other means left to give expression to their heart-rending agony. Our sole purpose was 'to make the deaf hear' and give the heedless a timely warning".

Why the Legislative Assembly Chamber was selected for bomb-throwing is thus explained :

"Our practical protest was against an institution which, since its birth, has eminently helped to display not only its worthlessness but its far-reaching power for mischief.It exists only to demonstrate to the world India's humiliation and helplessness and it symbolises the overriding domination of irresponsible and autocratic rule. Time and again the national demand has been pressed by the people's representatives, only to find the waste paper basket as its final destination....Resolutions regarding the repeal of repressive and arbitrary measures have been treated with sublime contempt and Government's measures and proposals rejected as unacceptable by elected members have been restored by a stroke of the pen.....Finally the insult of what we considered an inhuman and barbarous measure was hurled on the devoted heads of the representatives of the entire country and the starving and struggling millions were deprived of their primary right and sole means of improving their economic welfare."

The 'Statement' then emphasizes the fact that the bombs were deliberately prepared in such a manner as would not kill but only slightly injure a person, and this was what actually happened. After narrating how they surrendered of their own accord and were prepared for any penalty, Bhagat and Batukeshwar observed :

"By crushing two insignificant units, a nation cannot be crushed. We wanted to emphasise the historical lesson that *lettres de cachet* and Bastilles could not crush the revolutionary movement in France. Gallows and Siberian mines could not extinguish the Russian Revolution. Blood Sundays and Black and Tans failed to strangle the movement of Irish freedom. Can Ordinance and Safety Bills snuff out the flame of freedom in India ?"

3. The Lahore Conspiracy Case and the Hunger Strikes

The bomb throwing in the Assembly was followed by the discovery of a huge bomb factory at Lahore with materials enough to prepare seven thousand bombs. Another big bomb factory was discovered at Saharanpur in May, 1929. Some active members of the Association, as soon as they were arrested, divulged all the secrets of the Association, and searches and arrests took place all over North India. Within a few weeks almost all the leaders of the Association and a large number of members were arrested and the Government instituted the Lahore Conspiracy Case against them in 1929. Bhagat Singh, who was sentenced in connection with the throwing of bombs in the Assembly Chamber, was also an accused in this case and brought to the Lahore jail.

The Lahore Conspiracy Case has been rendered famous by the hunger-strike of the undertrial prisoners in jail. The idea of the hunger-strike was originally conceived by Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta when they were confined in the Delhi jail after their trial in the Bomb-throwing Case mentioned above. The hunger-

strike was actually begun by them on 15 June when they were transferred to two other jails. Their object was twofold. The first was a political one to which reference will be made in the last section of this chapter. The second was a question of principle. The crime for which the revolutionaries were imprisoned was defined in law as waging war against the king, and they regarded their act as such. So they demanded the right to be treated as war-prisoners and not as ordinary criminals. In a written statement Batukeshwar Datta said that the hunger-strike was not aimed at wresting certain concessions and comforts for jail life, nor was it started simply as a protest against misbehaviour of officials, as was believed by many.³¹

In the course of the Lahore Conspiracy Case the other comrades of Bhagat Singh also began the hunger-strike. The Lahore Conspiracy Case, which began on 10 July, 1929, gave an opportunity to all the under-trial prisoners to meet, in Court, Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar who, being convicts, were kept in a separate jail. They all decided, after discussion, to resort to hunger-strike with effect from the 12th July.

The Government tried forced feeding, but refused the concessions demanded, viz. classification of revolutionaries as political prisoners ; better food and clothing ; supply of books, newspapers, and writing materials ; immunity from hard labour and humiliating work ; supply of oil, soap etc. ; and discontinuance of forcible feeding. The prolonged fast created great commotion among the public, and huge demonstrations were held all over India. The Government at first refused to yield, but after about two months they gave assurance of favourably considering the demands. The prisoners broke their fast save and except Jatin Das. He developed pneumonia, but refused to take food or medicine. He only uttered one sentence : "I shall

stick to the last''. He did stick to the last and died, after 64 days' fast, on 13 September, 1929. A large crowd gathered outside the jail gate to pay respect to the dead body, and the scene was repeated at all principal railway stations when it was conveyed by train to Calcutta. Even the Police Superintendent of Lahore, Mr. Hardy, took off his hat and bowed to the dead body of one who, like the Irish revolutionary, Terence Mc. Swiney, triumphed over the might of British Imperialism by his heroic resolve to die. The family of Terence Mc. Swiney sent condolences on the death of Jatin Das, as mentioned above.³²

The hunger-strike had serious effect on the trial of the Lahore Conspiracy Case. As the prisoners refused to attend the Court, the normal legal procedure could not be followed. Besides, the heroic fast of the prisoners had evidently produced a great moral effect. Two approvers retracted their confessions and a few prominent crown witnesses refused to give evidence against the accused. There was hardly any chance of proving the guilt of the accused. In this predicament the Government promulgated on 2 May, 1930, Lahore Conspiracy Case Ordinance which gave summary powers to a Special Tribunal to try the prisoners in the Lahore Conspiracy Case, untrammelled by any rule or legal procedure, and undisturbed by fear of any appeal against its decision. The accused were *lathi*-charged by the police even in the open Court.

The farce of the trial by the Special Tribunal went on for several months and its judgment was delivered on 7 October, 1930. Three,—Sukhdev, Rajguru and Bhagat Singh,—were awarded capital punishment; seven were transported for life, and a large number was sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The repercussion of Bhagat Singh's death on the Congress session at Karachi which

commenced on 29 March, has been mentioned above.³³

4. Revolutionary Activities after 1929

The Lahore Conspiracy Case gave a death-blow to the Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association. Almost all the prominent leaders were either dead or in confinement, with the exception of about half a dozen who had managed to evade arrest and were in hiding. One of these, Chandrasekhar Azad, now collected a few members and reorganized the Association. Its first activity was directed towards the murder of the Viceroy by way of revenge for the Lahore Conspiracy Case. A few bombs exploded under the Viceroy's Special train near Delhi in December, 1929. The train was damaged but the Viceroy was not hurt.

Chandrasekhar next planned an armed revolution and for this purpose secured more than Rs. 14,000 by an armed robbery on a firm in Delhi, on 6 July, 1930. In course of investigation in this case the police got information about the secret plot of Chandrasekhar. One of his trusted lieutenants was arrested a few days later with a large stock of arms, and the police discovered a bomb factory in Delhi, with a stock of chemicals enough to make explosives to fill about 6,000 bombs. Chandrasekhar fled to the Panjab, and his presence was signaled by the explosion of a series of bombs which killed and injured a few officials. The police made a vigorous but fruitless search for him in course of which they arrested a number of revolutionaries and discovered several depots of arms and small bomb factories. The Government instituted two cases, Second Lahore Conspiracy Case and the New Delhi Conspiracy Case. Although Chandrasekhar was the principal accused, he remained in hiding and the Government offered a reward of Rs. 10,000 to anyone who could seize Chandrasekhar Azad, dead or alive. He was constantly on the move, in an attempt to rally the few workers who were still at large. He arranged to

meet an old worker in the Alfred Park at Allahabad on 27 February, 1931. One of those who knew it communicated the news to the police. About a dozen police in plain clothes surrounded Chandrasekhar as soon as he entered the Park. Chandrasekhar fired at the police and seriously wounded two high officials. But he himself was riddled with bullets and fell dead. Thus ended the career of a great revolutionary in India.

The death of Chandrasekhar was a serious blow to the underground organization in North India. A number of revolutionaries were seized with despair, gave up terrorist activities, and joined the Congress or the Communists. A few even served as informers to the police.

But the revolutionary activities continued in U. P. and the Panjab, as in other part of India, during 1930-34. The preparation of bombs, attempts, often unsuccessful, to murder officials and police informers, revolver fight between the police and the revolutionaries faced with unexpected and impending arrest, and armed robberies were the chief activities.

A few prominent incidents may be mentioned.

i. U. P.

On 1 April, 1932, five revolutionaries were arrested while trying to destroy the Dufferin Bridge over the Ganga near Banaras.

On 16 July, 1932, two bombs were thrown in the Bristol Hotel, Kanpur, where a number of Europeans were engaged in merriments. But the bombs did not explode.

ii. The Panjab.

On 22 February, 1930, a country-made bomb was thrown at the Principal of the Khalsa College, Amritsar, suspected of helping the police, when he was addressing a meeting of the students. One student was killed and eleven were wounded.

On 23 December, 1930, when the Governor of the Panjab was leaving the University Hall after the Convocation, he was fired at and injured in the arm and hip. Two English ladies, one Inspector of Police and one Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police were also wounded, and the last-named subsequently died. The assailant, Har Kishan, was arrested and hanged.

On 11 May, 1932, the wires on the Railway line were cut near Ludhiana.

iii. Delhi.

On 1 February, 1932, a bomb was placed on railway line near the Hardinge Bridge, Delhi, in order to wreck the Special Train carrying the English members of the Lothian Committee. The bomb exploded but there was no damage to the train.

iv. Bombay and Sindh.

In April, 1930, out of sympathy with the G. I. P. Railway Labour Strike, attempts were made unsuccessfully to destroy railway stations and railway bridges, but railway lines were damaged by bombs near Bombay.

On 22 July, an attempt was made on the life of the Acting Governor, Sir Ernest Hotson, during his visit to the Fergusson College, Poona. A student of the College fired pointblank at the Governor who had a miraculous escape, the bullet striking a metal button on his pocket book.

On 30 October, 1932, a passenger from Portuguese Goa was arrested on the S. S. *Hiravati* with four revolvers and a large number of cartridges.

A small bomb factory, set up by a new revolutionary group, called *Anandamandal*, was discovered in 1933. They twice threw bombs at Empire Theatre, Bombay. Another bomb factory was discovered at Ahmadabad. Many copies of a leaflet threatening death to dealers in cloths made in England were also seized.

Many bombs exploded in Sholapur. According to official reports they were thrown by the revolutionaries in sympathy with labour strike in textile mills.

v. Central Provinces.

On 21 August, 1931, a bomb was thrown at the Divisional Commissioner while he was visiting a scout rally at Burhanpur. But the bomb did not explode.

On 24 September, two English military officers, travelling in the Punjab Mail, were struck with knife near Dongargaon Railway station. One of them later succumbed to the injuries. Two revolutionary young men were arrested in this connection and transported for life.

vi. Madras.

A branch of the Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association was established in Madras. On 16 March, 1933, a revolver was found on the seat of the Governor in the Legislative Assembly Hall. It was left there as a symbol of the fate awaiting the British rulers. On 26 April, 1933, four revolutionaries in military dress raided the Travancore National Bank in the heart of the city and decamped with all the money in the treasury. The police arrested 22 persons in connection with these and other incidents and the Madras City Conspiracy Case was instituted against them.

vii. Rajputana and other Localities.

In November, 1934, a young man with a revolver was arrested at Ajmer. According to official reports a member of the Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association, an accused in the Delhi Conspiracy Case who had fled from justice, established a branch here, but almost all its members were arrested.

Some terrorist activities—explosion of bombs—were reported from Peshawar, but they were confined to Hindus. Some armed robberies took place in Assam and Burma,

and there were also attempts to murder officials in Burma. According to official reports the terrorist movement in these two Provinces was "practically confined to Bengalis."³⁴

The official report further observes :

"To sum up, terrorism has its birth in Bengal, and where it has shown its head in other Provinces it can almost invariably be traced to Bengali influences. It is at all events true to say that in no Province but Bengal is there that widespread and deep-rooted terrorist mentality which is essential for its development."³⁵

5. General Review

It would appear from what has been said above that the revolutionary movement, which became a potent force in Indian politics during the *Swadeshi* movement, continued, with checks and breaks, up to the end of the Civil Disobedience movement of Gandhi. The two movements—one violent and another non-violent—went on side by side, and it was almost inevitable that each should be influenced by the other. There was a temporary swing of the revolutionaries to Gandhian non-violence in 1920-21, but the suspension of the Non-co-operation movement brought it to an end. Many old revolutionaries, mellowed by age and experience, remained in Gandhi's camp, or retired from politics, but new recruits joined the revolutionary groups and revolutionary ideas got a firmer grip on the people.

With the passing of time the revolutionary ideas widened in scope and became more and more associated with the political currents of the time. The idea of an armed revolution still swayed the party, but there was a more conscious attempt to bring the organization in a line with the national movement and make revolutionary mentality more broadbased in the country by rousing the political consciousness of the people to the futility of Gandhian way of non-violence and negotiations with the British

Government. As noted above, the revolutionaries pressed the resolution for complete independence in the Calcutta Congress (1928), but Gandhi carried his compromise proposal against them. To counteract Gandhi's move was one of the objects of the hunger-strike conceived and resorted to by Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta in 1929 as mentioned above.³⁶ The general position is thus explained by the latter :

"The hunger-strike by the political prisoners in jail was never an isolated action, detached from the political or national movement of the country. Revolutionary political prisoners always struggled and sacrificed their lives in prisons and exiles in order to awaken the nation and strengthen the national movement of the country. This hunger-strike by the Lahore prisoners and the martyrdom of Jatin Das did make definite contributions to this end. The decision for this hunger-strike was taken by myself and Bhagat Singh when our trial was going on in Delhi jail in connection with the Assembly Bomb Case. The Indian National Congress in 1928 under the presidentship of Pandit Motilal Nehru declared 'Dominion Status' as the goal of the Congress. The extremist section within the Congress, though few in number, pressed for complete independence. Gandhiji effected a compromise between these two trends of thought and assured the country that complete independence would be declared as the goal of the Indian National Congress in the next session, if the British did not accede to the demand of 'Dominion Status' within a year's time. Such was then the political situation in the country. The leaders believed more in the efficacy of negotiation than "direct action". The question of complete independence and of "direct action" for its achievement was thus shelved off in the year 1928. The spirit of inaction prevailed everywhere in the country.

"Under such conditions I and Bhagat Singh thought of starting hunger-strike after our trial in Delhi Assembly Bomb case (June, 1929). We planned for this hunger-strike while we were in Delhi jail and we had this confidence that by taking to such a course, we would be able to arouse the nation from its slumber and infuse the spirit of self-sacrifice among the people of the country and strengthen the forces of direct action against the imperialist government."³⁷

The idea of throwing bombs on the floor of the Legislative Assembly was also partly inspired by the same motive. That these expedients quickened the national consciousness of the people and indirectly helped to create a favourable atmosphere for the growth of revolutionary mentality among ever-increasing circles is abundantly proved by the country-wide enthusiasm evoked by the hunger-strike and martyrdom of Jatin Das well as of Bhagat Singh and his comrades. A spontaneous movement developed and centred round the hunger-strike. June 30, 1929, was observed as Bhagat-Datta memorial day, and meetings were held in many places, specially in the Panjab. The A. I. C. C. issued a circular to observe 18 August, 1929, as "Political Sufferers' Day" all over the country. The people held meetings and organised processions in defiance of section 144 and the *lathi*-charge and other oppressions of the police. The whole country seemed to have reverberated with the new revolutionary cry of *Inquilab Zindabad*.

The tumultuous enthusiasm for the revolutionary heroes particularly stirred the younger section, and even Gandhi had to bend before the new force in the Karachi Congress, as noted above. Gandhi fully realized the new situation and wrote in the *Young India* 'that the year 1929 remained as the period of great awakening among the youth of India.'³⁸

A notable feature of the revolutionary movement

during the period under review is that the ideology of the revolutionaries was more clearly formulated and more widely promulgated. Some idea of it may be formed from the Joint Statement issued by Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta during their trial for the Assembly Bomb Case referred to above. After explaining the reasons for throwing bombs, as quoted above, they declared :

“Others have as keenly felt as we have done, and from under the seeming serenity of the sea of Indian humanity, a veritable storm is about to break out. We have only marked the end of the era of utopian non-violence of whose futility the rising generation has been convinced beyond the shadow of a doubt.”

They then proceeded to explain what was ‘violence’ and what was not :

“Force, when aggressively applied, is ‘violence’ and is therefore morally unjustifiable. But when it is used in furtherance of a legitimate cause it has its moral justification. Elimination of force at all costs is utopian and the new movement which has arisen in the country and of which we have given a warning is inspired by the ideals which guided Guru Govind Singh and Shivaji, Kemal Pasha and Riza Khan, Washington and Garibaldi, Lafayette and Lenin”.

Far more interesting is the ‘comprehensive ideal of revolution’. The revolutionaries had not only destructive but also constructive ideas. They not only wanted to replace British Imperialism by a republican form of Government in India, but they also wanted to place it on a socialistic foundation. This was already indicated by the addition of the word ‘Socialist’ to the original name of the Association. What they meant by socialist structure was fully explained in the Joint Statement :

“Revolution does not necessarily involve sanguinary strife, nor is there any place in it for individual vend-

etta. It is not the cult of the bomb and pistol. By 'Revolution' we mean that the present order of things which is based on manifest injustice must change..... Radical change, therefore, is necessary and it is the duty of those who realize this to reorganize society on a socialistic basis. Unless this is done and exploitation of man and of nations by nations, which goes masquerading as imperialism, is brought to an end, the suffering and carnage with which humanity is threatened today cannot be prevented and all talk of ending wars and ushering in an era of universal peace is undisguised hypocrisy."

The Joint Statement then goes on describing the final outcome of all this—the ultimate goal :

"This is our ideal...If (our warning) goes unheeded and the present system of Government continues... a grim struggle must ensue, involving the overthrow of all obstacles and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat to pave the way for the consummation of the ideal revolution."

The ideological development undoubtedly indicates a growing influence of Communism. But as yet this influence was fully subordinated to nationalism, and the revolutionaries did not allow themselves to sacrifice the national to the international or supra-national ideal as the Indian Communists did in 1942.

Another interesting characteristic of the revolutionary movement is a high degree of development in technical skill as displayed by the preparation of superior types of bombs, to which reference has been made above. This was accompanied by a higher efficiency in military skill and strategy of which a typical example was furnished by the Chittagong Armoury Raid in 1930. As mentioned above, it was conceived in the same spirit which animated Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta and gave a similar

fillip to the growth of revolutionary mentality. But the Chittagong revolution, carried under the guidance of Surya Sen, would also stand out for ever as a unique example of a regular military campaign, conducted with consummate skill by a master strategist and backed by heroic courage and sacrifice, which exercised a profound influence upon the people.

The revolutionary movement did not die out in 1934. The new Constitutional Reforms of 1935 took away the edge of both the violent and non-violent methods in Indian politics. But the revolutionary spirit, like that of Gandhi's *Satyagraha*, was not lost upon the people. When Gandhi sought to revive the Civil Disobedience movement in 1942, but was prevented from launching it by his sudden arrest, the revolutionary spirit raised its head and the cult of non-violence was submerged under that of violence. As we shall see, the wide-spread but shortlived outbreak of 1942 was the product of an admixture of the revolutionary violence and a spirit of non-violent resistance inculcated by Gandhi. The two streams joined together and gave a new form to this, the last battle for India's freedom fought on Indian soil.

CHAPTER VIII

INDIAN POLITICS (1934-37)

I. THE FRAMING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

The third and last session of the Round Table Conference was held in London on 17 November, 1932. The members attending it were much less in number than those in the preceding session, and there was no representative of the Congress. The decisions taken by His Majesty's Government in the light of the Conference were published in a White Paper issued in March, 1933. It was condemned by leaders of all sections of Indian opinion. "One could not see in it any family resemblance to many of the recommendations of the Round Table Conference Committees." This was in flagrant contravention of the assurances given by Lord Irwin in July, 1930, when he said that any agreement "at which the Conference is able to arrive, will form the basis of the proposals which His Majesty's Government will later submit to Parliament." For all the regard that the British Government "paid to the opinions of the Indian members of successive Round Table Conferences, they might never have convened them."¹

The proposals embodied in the White Paper were referred to a Joint Committee of the two Houses of British Parliament who consulted Indian delegates, nominated by the Government. But in spite of prolonged discussions and deliberations, the proposals were not materially changed. A Bill prepared on the basis of the White Paper was introduced in the Parliament on 19 December, 1934, and,

in spite of strenuous opposition of the die-hard section of the Conservatives led by Churchill, was passed on 2 August, 1935.

Every section of public opinion in India expressed dissatisfaction with the Government of India Act of 1935. The spokesman of the Moderate Party, C.Y. Chintamani, observed : 'Indian opinion was almost stunned by the result of years of agitation and cogitation, and many sections of it, including the Liberal, felt and said that it would have been far better if no reform had been attempted.'

The main features of the Act may be summarised as follows : "In the Provincial sphere, Burma was separated from India and two new Provinces, Orissa and Sind, for the formation of which there was a long-standing demand, were created. In view of the federal form of Government envisaged at the Centre, the Provinces were endowed for the first time with a legal personality. Dyarchy was abolished, and all the Provincial subjects were transferred to popular control. Certain 'special responsibilities' were, however, laid upon the Governors as before. Bicameral Legislatures were established in Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihar and Assam, and the other Provinces continued to have only unicameral Legislatures. The official blocs vanished, and the nomination of persons to represent backward classes and other interests ceased. There was no change in principle in the allocation of seats among the different communities and special interests, the Communal Award, as modified by the Poona Pact, regulating the distribution of seats among the former. Property qualifications continued to be the main basis for enfranchisement, a very much higher standard being adopted for the Upper Houses. Franchise for the Lower Houses was fixed at a much lower level than before, and this resulted in more than a four-fold increase in the number of voters."

"As regards the Centre, the Federation of India

was to be inaugurated only after Rulers representing not less than half the aggregate population of the Indian States and entitled to one-half of the seats allotted to them collectively in the Federal Upper Chamber had executed Instruments of Accession."

"As the country was considered to be not yet ready for the transfer of full responsibility at the Centre, a dyarchic executive was provided for, as was hitherto prevalent in the Provinces."² It is not necessary to describe the Federal Government, as proposed in the Act, for it never came into operation, and there was no change in the Central Government, except the establishment of the Federal Court, Federal Public Service Commission and the Federal Railway Authority.

II. REVIVAL OF THE SWARAJYA PARTY

The year 1933 found the Congress straying in wilderness. The Civil Disobedience campaign was slowly dying a natural death, but there was nothing else to take its place. Gandhi had realized the futility of *Satyagraha* as a political weapon. He felt that "the masses have not received the full message of *Satyagraha* owing to its adulteration in the process of transmission." Therefore after "an intense introspection, searching of the heart, and waiting upon God", Gandhi decided that henceforth no one but himself should carry on Civil Disobedience, and the rest should devote themselves to the constructive programme. On April 2, 1934, he drafted a statement to this effect which may be looked upon as the funeral epitaph on *Satyagraha*.

Before this statement was actually issued a number of prominent Congressmen proposed to revive the Swarajya Party to fight the forthcoming elections to the Legislative Assembly on two main issues, namely, (1) repeal of all repressive laws, and (2) rejection of the Constitutional scheme outlined in the White Paper in favour of the National

Indian Politics (1934-37)

Demand outlined by Gandhi at the Round Table

Gandhi not only welcomed the revival of the Congress Party and its decision to fight the forthcoming election, but also felt that it was 'not only the right but the duty of every Congressman' who believes in its utility, to do so.' The decision of 1923, reversed in 1929, was re-asserted in 1934. Gandhi issued his statement, with some modifications, on 7 April. The Working Committee and All-India Congress Committee met in Patna on 18-20 May, 1934, and, as recommended by Gandhi, suspended the Civil Disobedience movement and accepted the entry into Legislature as a part of the programme of the Congress. The Working Committee, in accordance with the resolutions of the A.I.C.C., called upon all Congressmen to give up Civil Disobedience and the movement was officially terminated on May 20, 1934.

The Government of India, being satisfied that the Civil Disobedience movement was really dead, lifted the ban on the Congress organizations, except in Bengal and N.W.F.P., on June 12, and announced a general policy of expediting the release of the Civil Disobedience prisoners.

A Parliamentary Board was set up in accordance with the decision of A.I.C.C. in its meeting at Patna on May 18-19, 1934. This Board naturally asked the Working Committee to formulate its policy with regard to the White Paper proposals and the Communal Award. The matter was considered by the Working Committee in its meeting at Bombay on June 17-18, 1934. The discussion revealed a fundamental difference of views between a section led by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and M. S. Aney, on the one hand, and the majority of the members on the other, regarding the Communal Award.

It made the separate electorate of minorities the general principle rather than an exception, and also allotted to every

other than the Hindu, number of seats far from proportional to its numerical strength. The position of the Muslims in Bengal was specially deplorable. Out of the 200 seats in the new legislature only 80 were allotted to them as against 119 to the Muslims. It was natural that the Muslim opinion would favour the Award while the Hindus would be dead against it. Even the Muslim members of the Working Committee, who only a short while ago prevented Gandhi from accepting a separate electorate, now favoured the Award. To placate them the Hindu Congress members refrained from definitely condemning it. The resolution passed by the Working Committee condemned the White Paper and suggested that the constitution should be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of adult suffrage or as near it as possible, with the power, if necessary, to the important minorities, to have their representatives elected exclusively by the electors belonging to such minorities.

The resolution then added :

“The White Paper lapsing, the Communal Award must lapse automatically. Among other things, it will be the duty of the Constituent Assembly to determine the method of representation of important minorities and make provision for otherwise safeguarding their interests.”

As regards Communal Award it said : “The Congress claims to represent equally all the communities composing the Indian nation and, therefore, in view of the division of opinion, can neither accept nor reject the Communal Award as long as the division of opinion lasts. At the same time, it is necessary to re-declare the policy of the Congress on the communal question. No solution that is not purely national can be propounded by the Congress. But the Congress is pledged to accept any solution, falling short of the national, which is agreed to by all the parties concerned, and, conversely, to reject,

resistance collapsed in three weeks and then Hitler turned towards the West. In quick succession he overran Norway and Denmark, in April, 1940 ; Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg in May, 1940 ; and the Channel ports being threatened, the British Expeditionary Force made the famous evacuation from Dunkirk (May 28 to June 3, 1940). Then came the turn of France. The battle began on 5 June, 1940, and by the end of that month the whole of France was at the feet of Hitler. Though Britain was saved the horrors of a direct invasion, she suffered a great deal from air-bombing.

Both sides gained new allies. First Italy (11 June, 1940), and then Japan (7 December, 1941) joined Germany and formed the 'Axis' against France and Britain, the 'Allies'. On the other hand, the U.S.A. which had been actively helping the 'Allies' with men and arms since March, 1941, declared war against the 'Axis' Powers in December, 1941, as a result of Japan's action. The Italian invasion of Somaliland carried the war to Northern Africa while Germany invaded Greece, Yugoslavia and Crete. Everywhere the Axis Powers gained initial success. But Russia was growing nervous at the astounding success of Germany, and the alliance between these two showed visible signs of crack. Hitler never trusted Russia and suddenly invaded the country (22 June, 1941), presumably in order to finish a potential enemy at the back before the United States could materially strengthen the Allied forces in the West. German forces advanced far into Russia and threatened Leningrad and Moscow. A grim and stubborn fight went on for days in the streets of Stalingrad (August, 1942). But Russia, though yielding ground, firmly held out at Stalingrad. Then the tide of war turned against Germany, and the arrival of U.S.A. forces sealed her fate.

Japan, like Germany, began with astounding success. She practically declared war by destroying the U. S. A.

fleet at Pearl Harbour in the Pacific by a sudden attack on 7 December, 1941, and then overran Malaya, captured Singapore (15 February, 1942), invaded the Philippines and New Guinea, captured Hong Kong, conquered Thailand, and invaded Burma. Rangoon fell on 7 March, 1942, and Japan advanced towards the frontier of India. During the night on 6 April, 1942, the Japanese navy "sank all shipping between Madras and Calcutta and in the harbours thereof, estimated at 100,000 tons."¹ As will be related later, she crossed the frontier, but was forced to retreat, and was ultimately compelled to surrender on 15 August, 1945. This was mainly due to the use of Atomic Bombs by U.S.A. which completely devastated two of her cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August, 1945). In the west, Italy and Germany were overrun by the Allies and the War was brought to an end by the unconditional surrender of Germany on 7 May, 1945.

II. THE CONGRESS REACTION TO THE WAR.

The declaration of war by Britain against Germany automatically made India a belligerent, as in 1914. But the situation was different in 1939, for the popular Ministries were then in charge of Provincial Governments. Yet, to begin with, there was a considerable amount of sympathy and support for Britain. The non-Congress Ministries of the Panjab, Bengal and Sindh pledged their full support to Britain, and their action was upheld by the legislatures. The Indian States, of course, were solidly behind the Government. Among the political parties, the National Liberal Federation and Hindu Mahasabha offered unconditional support to the Government, while the Congress refused to co-operate with it in any way. Between these two extremes stood the Mus'lim League. While its High Command did not offer to support Britain, it had done nothing to prevent the Ministries of Bengal and the Panjab from doing so.

Though the Congress did not issue any statement of policy, Gandhi and Nehru expressed deep sympathy for Britain in her hours of trial. Gandhi wrote : "I am not just now thinking of India's deliverance. It will come, but what will it be worth if England and France fall, or if they come out victorious over Germany ruined and humbled ?".^{1a}

Nehru went a step further and made it quite clear that in his view India should offer not only sympathy but unconditional support to Britain. On 8 September, after a hurried return from China, Nehru declared : "We do not approach the problem with a view to taking advantage of Britain's difficulties.....In a conflict between democracy and freedom on the one side and Fascism and aggression on the other, our sympathies must inevitably lie on the side of democracy.....I should like India to play her full part and throw all her resources into the struggle for a new order."² This is all the more strange because the Congress passed resolutions at Haripura (February, 1938) and Tripuri (March, 1939), declaring British foreign policy as one of deliberate betrayal of democracy, and refusing to permit the man-power and resources of India to be exploited in the interests of British imperialism.^{2a} But there was one leader, Subhas Bose, who stood up boldly in defence of the Congress policy. His party, the Forward Bloc, which was by now an All-India organization, commenced counter-propaganda on a large scale. "As against the Gandhi Wing, the Forward Bloc took the line that the Congress had since 1927 repeatedly declared that India should not co-operate in Britain's war and that the Congress should now put that policy into practice. The members of the Forward Bloc also declared openly that they did not want Britain to win the war because only after the defeat and break-up of the British Empire could

India hope to be free." Apart from the general propaganda carried on by the Forward Bloc, Subhas Bose "made a lecture tour throughout the country, in the course of which he must have addressed about a thousand meetings in the course of ten months,"³

Bose's bold stand had great influence over the Congress. The Working Committee refused to be led by the emotional approach of Gandhi and Nehru, and the latter fell in with their views. The lengthy resolution adopted by the Committee on 15 September, 1939, took the gravest view of the Viceroy's proclamation of war without the consent of the Indian people, protested against the exploitation of Indian resources for imperialist ends, and openly declared that 'India cannot associate herself with a War said to be for democratic freedom, when that very freedom is denied to her.' "The Working Committee", continued the resolution, "therefore invites the British Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard to democracy and imperialism, and the new order that is envisaged, in particular how those aims are going to apply to India and to be given effect to in the present."⁴ The A. I. C. C. endorsed this view on 10 October and demanded that "India must be declared an independent nation and present application must be given to this status to the largest possible extent."⁵

The Muslim League passed a resolution on 18 September, 1939, promising support on condition that no constitutional advance in India should be made without the approval of the Muslim League "which is the only organisation that can speak on behalf of Muslim India."⁶

The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, issued a statement on 17 October, 1939. He reiterated that Dominion Status was the goal of British policy, but pointed out that for the present the Act of 1935 held the field. The only

hope he held out was that at the end of the war it would be open to modification in the light of Indian views, full weight being given to the opinions and interests of the minorities. In order to associate Indian public opinion with the prosecution of the war he proposed "the establishment of a consultative group, representative of all major political parties in British India and of the Indian Princes, over which the Governor-General would himself preside."⁷

The Congress Working Committee regarded the Viceroy's statement as "an unequivocal reiteration of the old imperialist policy" and therefore declared itself unable to give any support to Great Britain, for it would amount to an endorsement of the imperialist policy, which it has always sought to end. *As a first step in this direction* the Committee called upon the Congress Ministers to resign.⁸ All the Congress Ministries accordingly resigned between 27 October and 15 November, 1939.

Both the Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, and the Viceroy tried to win over the Congress leaders by granting more powers to Indians in the administration. But the Congress "declined to consider any steps to further co-operation" unless the British Government clearly declared its policy in favour of Indian independence, and demanded the appointment of a Constituent Assembly. Further futile negotiations followed on the basis of Sir Samuel Hoare's suggestion, on 26 October, to include more Indians in the Governor-General's Executive Council.

Jinnah definitely rejected the idea of any Constituent Assembly as it would be dominated by the Congress. The Viceroy felt relieved by the resignation of Congress Ministries, for they controlled eight out of the eleven Provinces and so had power to impair the war-efforts of the Government. As the eight Provinces were now being ruled by the Governors, there was no longer any need to placate the Congress, and the Viceroy canvassed the support

of the Muslim League. This considerably strengthened the position of the League and it was joined by the waverers among the Muslims. In March, 1940, the Muslim League, at its Lahore Session, made a formal demand for a separate independent State.

III. RESUMPTION OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Subhas Bose observed : "It was generally expected that after the Congress Ministers resigned office, the campaign of passive resistance would begin. But this expectation was not fulfilled. Many people are of opinion that British intrigue was responsible for this. The British Government sent out to India some British Liberals and Democrats in order to influence Congress leaders. For instance, in October, 1939, the well-known writer, Mr. Edward Thompson, visited India and he was followed by Sir Stafford Cripps who came in December."⁹ Subhas Bose and his Forward Bloc, however, did not sit idle all the while. "Besides carrying on a continuous propaganda against co-operation in the war and in favour of commencing a national struggle for independence, the Forward Bloc organised periodic demonstrations for focussing public attention on these issues. For instance, in October, 1939, an Anti-Imperialist Conference was held at Nagpur which was a great success... And at the end of six months, the Bloc's propaganda culminated in a huge demonstration at Ramgarh in March, 1940, where the annual session of the Congress was being held at the time. The demonstration was called the All-India Anti-Compromise Conference. It was convened by the Forward Bloc and the Kisan Sabha (Peasants' Organisation) and it was a greater success than the Congress meeting at Ramgarh which was presided over by Moulana Abul Kalam Azad."¹⁰

The Congress reiterated its objective in even clearer and stronger terms in the Ramgarh session in March, 1940. The resolution adopted by it declared that "nothing

short of complete independence can be accepted by the people of India," and they "alone can properly shape their own constitution." The resolution also held out the threat of resorting to Civil Disobedience, but no positive war-policy was laid down and no definite line of action was determined. On the other hand, the Anti-Compromise Conference at Ramgarh decided to immediately launch a fight over the issue of the war and of India's demand for independence. During the National Week in April (6th to 13th), 1940, the Forward Bloc commenced, all over the country, its campaign of civil disobedience. Prominent members of the Bloc were gradually removed to jail. Early in July Subhas Bose along with hundreds of his co-workers were put in prison. A few days before his arrest, in June, 1940, Bose had made a passionate appeal to Gandhi "to come forward and launch his campaign of passive resistance—since it was now clear that the British Empire would be overthrown and it was high time for India to play her part in the war. But the Mahatma was still non-committal and he repeated that, in his view, the country was not prepared for a fight and any attempt to precipitate it, would do more harm than good to India."¹¹

"On May 20, 1940, Pandit Nehru made an astounding statement in which he said: 'Launching a civil disobedience campaign at a time when Britain is engaged in life and death struggle would be an act derogatory to India's honour.' Similarly, the Mahatma said, 'We do not seek our independence out of Britain's ruin. That is not the way of non-violence.'¹² It was the definite opinion of Subhas Bose that the Gandhi Wing was doing everything possible in order to arrive at a compromise with Britain.¹³ There was probably a great deal of truth in his view. In any case a perceptible change was noticed in the attitude of this Wing when the war situation in Europe took a grave turn against the Allies

and Hitler overran Western Europe (May-June, 1940). It was now in favour of co-operating in war-efforts if the British gave reasonable guarantees to their demand for freedom. This led to a serious split in the Congress rank. Gandhi, true to his creed of non-violence, was against India's participation in war in any case. To him "the issue was one of pacifism, and not of India's freedom."¹⁴ To a majority of his colleagues, however, non-violence was not a creed but a policy, and Abul Kalam Azad, the President of the Congress, echoed the sentiments of most of them when he declared openly "that the Indian National Congress was not a pacifist organization but one for achieving India's freedom," and that the Indians had the "right to take to the sword if they had no other alternative."¹⁵

The Working Committee which met at Wardha on 17-20 June, 1940, was definitely opposed to the view of Gandhi. "Mahatma Gandhi, a resolution ran, 'at this critical phase in the history of man,' desires the Congress to be true to the creed of non-violence and to declare its unwillingness 'that India should maintain armed forces to defend her freedom against external aggression or internal disorder.' The Committee 'are unable to go the full length with Gandhiji; but they recognise that he should be free to pursue his great ideal in his own way and therefore absolve him from responsibility for the programme and activity which the Congress has to pursue', namely, the 'parallel' organisation of self-defence and the maintenance of public security throughout the country by Congressmen on their own account." There were other causes of differences between the Working Committee and Gandhi. Gandhi was opposed to the restoration of ministerial Government in the Congress Provinces and the entry of Congressmen into the Central Council. The Working Committee did not accept this view, and expressed their

willingness to ask Congressmen to accept the Ministry on certain conditions. Meeting again in Delhi from July 3 to 7, they renewed their demand for an immediate and unequivocal declaration of the 'full independence of India', and proposed that "as an immediate step to giving effect to it, a provisional National Government should be constituted at the Centre which, though formed as a transitory measure, should be such as to command the confidence of all the elected elements in the Central Legislature and secure the closest co-operation of the responsible Governments in the Provinces." "The Working Committee", so the resolution ran, "are of opinion, that unless the aforesaid declaration is made and a National Government accordingly formed at the Centre without delay, all efforts at organising the material and moral resources of the country for defence cannot in any sense be voluntary or as from a free country, and will therefore be ineffective. The Working Committee declare that, if these measures are adopted, it will enable the Congress to throw its full weight into the efforts for the effective organisation of the defence of the country."¹⁶ The resolutions were duly adopted by the A.I.C.C. at Poona on 27-28 July.¹⁷

But to differ from Gandhi was a novel thing in Congress politics. So within a month several members recanted, and a group headed by Rajendra Prasad told the President that if the British Government accepted the terms of the Congress and India's participation in the war became a live issue, they would have no option but to resign. As there was no likelihood of such a contingency, no seriousness was attached to the threat of resignation.¹⁸

In the meantime Gandhi's childlike simplicity and deep-rooted faith in the creed of non-violence len him to devote his thought and energy to the single issue that counted in his eyes, namely, to stop the carnage in Europe. On 22 July, 1939 he had written to Hitler making an

humble appeal to him to desist from war.¹⁹ He wrote two open letters to the British people appealing to them that they should not fight Hitler but oppose him by spiritual force. When Gandhi interviewed the Viceroy and placed this suggestion before him, Lord Linlithgow was so much taken aback by this extraordinary suggestion that he even forgot to show the normal courtesy to Gandhi, and sat 'silent and bewildered'.²⁰

Curiously enough, Gandhi's attitude towards the Muslims underwent a radical change about this time. In an article in the *Harijan*, on 15 June, he candidly wrote: "The Congress which professes to speak for India and wants unadulterated Independence, cannot strike a common measure of agreement with those who do not.The British Government would not ask for a common agreement if they recognised any one party to be strong enough to take delivery. The Congress, it must be admitted, has not that strength today. It has come to its present position in the face of opposition. If it does not weaken and has enough patience, it will develop sufficient strength to take delivery. It is an illusion created by ourselves that we must come to an agreement with all parties before we can make any progress."²¹ One would rub one's eyes in wonder and ask in all seriousness, "is it the same Gandhi who was unwilling to attend the Second session of the Round Table Conference without a previous agreement with the Muslims, and constantly gave out that no real progress was possible without a Hindu-Muslim agreement"?²² What a *volte-face* for Gandhi!

Gandhi proceeded even further. "The Muslim League", said he, "is frankly communal and wants to divide India into two parts.... Thus for the present purpose there are only two parties—the Congress and those who side with the Congress, and the parties who do not. Between the two there is no meeting ground without the

one or the other surrendering its purpose.”²³ Though at long last Gandhi, for once, got rid of the phantom which he had been pursuing since he entered Indian politics, here again his idealism got the better of realism. The last sentence, quoted above, may give expression to an excellent national ideal but was certainly not in conformity with facts which a statesman could ignore only at his peril.

Gandhi, who, to the outside world represented the Congress, threw a direct challenge to the Muslim League which Jinnah was not slow in taking up. Gandhi’s article enabled him to convince the Muslims that as a separate nation they had no place in the totalitarian idea of the Congress which demands their absolute surrender to the Congress. He now boldly emphasized the two-nation doctrine and demanded its logical fulfilment by the creation of Pakistan. In short, Gandhi’s article only served to pût Jinnah on a high pedestal and for all practical purposes he now occupied the same position among the Muslims as Gandhi himself did in the Congress Circle. Jinnah took advantage of his position and authority to demand from the Viceroy that in all war-time arrangements the Muslims must be treated on an equal footing with the Hindus, and that no constitutional changes, transitory or permanent, should be made without the previous approval of ‘Muslim India’.

By way of response to the Congress offer of co-operation the Viceroy issued a new statement on 8 August, 1940. After reiterating the October statement about Dominion Status it proposed an immediate expansion of the Governor-General’s Executive Council, and the establishment of a War Advisory Council. It conceded the Congress demand for a Constituent Assembly to frame the Indian constitution, though it was to meet after the war was over. At the same time it accepted Jinnah’s

demand by saying that the British would not accept any system of Indian Government "whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life."²⁴

The "August Offer", however, failed to satisfy either the Congress or the Muslim League. The former justly regarded the guarantee to minority as practically placing in the hands of Jinnah a power to veto all constitutional progress. The latter was definitely opposed to any Constituent Assembly in which the Muslims were bound to be in a hopeless minority. As a matter of fact, as things then stood, the two concessions practically cancelled each other.

The British Government missed the last chance of winning over the Congress to war-efforts—when the majority of the Working Committee even threw Gandhi overboard and extended a helping hand²⁵. As Azad pointed out, there was no common ground between the Congress demand for independence and the Viceroy's offer of an enlarged Executive Council. "The whole conception of Dominion Status for India", said Jawaharlal Nehru, "was as dead as a doornail"²⁶. The Congress Working Committee rejected the offer and declared that the Working Committee's resolution at Delhi, confirmed by the A. I. C. C. at Poona, no longer applied. The Muslim League neither accepted nor rejected it, but its full co-operation as a party in the conduct of the war was made conditional on the Viceroy's acceptance of the fifty-fifty principle.

While the Congress was negotiating with the Government, the Civil Disobedience campaign launched by the Forward Bloc of Bose continued with increasing vigour and many among the rank and file of the Congress, specially the volunteers, joined the campaign. This, as well as the rebuff to the Congress offers of co-operation, undoubtedly lowered the prestige of the Congress. To retrieve the posi-

tion the Congress felt it necessary to start the Civil Disobedience campaign as contemplated in the Ramgarh resolution. This, according to the majority of the Congress leaders, could only be carried on under the leadership of Gandhi. So Gandhi once more regained his supremacy in the Congress. But, as was his wont, he side-tracked the main issue. The left wing "of the Congress, backed by more revolutionary elements outside the party, wanted the Civil Disobedience movement to be organized on the largest possible scale in the hope that it might develop into something like a national revolt. But Gandhi would have none of it."²⁷ He did not make the independence of India the main issue or even a side issue. "India can become independent", said he, "only if she can hold her own when the British go out." So the immediate issue, declared Gandhi, was not 'freedom of India', but 'freedom of speech,' by which he meant 'the right to state freely what we feel about the war.' Elucidating this point still further he said: "I claim the liberty of going through the streets of Bombay and saying that I shall have nothing to do with this war, because I do not believe in this war and in the fratricide that is going on in Europe."^{27a}

Gandhi interviewed the Viceroy on 27 and 30 September, but the latter refused to allow Gandhi and his men "to call upon the people throughout the country to refrain from assisting India's war-effort". So Gandhi began the campaign on 17 October, 1940, by selecting one individual at a time to go out in the street shouting anti-war slogans, and get arrested. On 17 November the individual *Satyagraha* was replaced by what Gandhi called representative *Satyagraha*. The *Satyagrahis* were selected from groups such as the members of the Working Committee, the A. I. C. C., the Central and Provincial legislatures, and eminent Congress politicians, including most of the former Ministers. They appeared in the streets, uttered the slogan, and were

arrested and sent to prison mostly for twelve months. Among the imprisoned *Satyagrahis* numbering about 600 were Abul Kalam Azad and Rajagopalachari.

On 17 December Gandhi suspended the Campaign. It had created little interest and less excitement among the masses.

On 5 January, 1941, the Campaign was resumed. Lists of *Satyagrahis* were prepared by local Congress Committees and about 2,250 were convicted by the end of the month. Then in April ordinary 'four anna' members of the Congress were enrolled. Immediately there was a sharp rise in the number of *Satyagrahis*. More than 20,000 were convicted.

The futility of such a campaign was recognized by most people, and even Congressmen who had suffered imprisonment for it joined with them in an appeal to call off the movement. But Gandhi would never withdraw it, nor convert it into a mass movement as a large section desired, for he feared that the mass action during the war would embarrass the Government.

The political situation arising from Gandhi's activity—or rather inactivity—has been described by Subhas Bose as follows :

“During the year 1941, the Civil Disobedience Movement continued—but without much enthusiasm on the part of Gandhi and his followers. The Mahatma had calculated that by following a mild policy, he would ultimately open the door towards a compromise—but in this, he was disappointed. His goodness was mistaken for weakness and the British Government went on exploiting India for war-purposes to the best of its ability. The Government also exploited to the fullest extent such agents as the erstwhile Communist leader, M. N. Roy, who were prepared to sell themselves to Britain.” ‘When towards the end of 1941, war clouds appeared in the Far Eastern horizon, the British

set free the Congress leaders belonging to the Gandhi Wing, but put in prison those belonging to the Left Wing.' "The Government probably thought that by this dual policy of arresting Leftists and releasing the Gandhites, it would come to a settlement with the Congress.

"The desire of the British Government for a compromise with the Congress was reciprocated by the Gandhi Wing. The Congress Working Committee, meeting at Wardha on the 16th January, 1942, passed a resolution offering co-operation in the war-effort once again. Soon after—that is, in February, 1942—at the instance of the British Government, Marshal Chiang Kai Shek visited India with a view to inducing the Congress leaders to come to an understanding with the British Government. A month later—in March, 1942,—an American Technical Mission, some American diplomats and journalists and several American military units arrived in India."²⁸

Even making due allowance for the fact that Bose was the leader of a rival group, holding very different views, his survey of the situation appears to be a fairly accurate one.

IV. BRITISH POLICY (1940-41).

The 'August Offer' seems to have been the pivot round which the British policy revolved for more than a year. Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State, took pains to expound its underlying principles in a number of speeches. In two respects he struck a fresh note. He asserted that the 'political unity of India,' Britain's greatest gift to her, must not be destroyed. Secondly, he made an appeal to the young idealists, intellectuals, practical men of affairs, and public spirited men of all communities, *outside the two recalcitrant major parties*, to get together and devise the principles of a future constitution suitable to the peculiar condition of India—a constitution that need not necessarily be of English type but of Swiss or American model for example.²⁹

Amery was assailed from all quarters in India, though, as usual, for different reasons. But there was one common factor. There was a general disbelief among Indians regarding the British promises, and they naturally argued that if India was really to be granted full self-government after the war, surely, she could be trusted at once with more than a few extra seats on the Executive Council. Even this reform was long delayed. The Viceroy had to carry on prolonged negotiations with Mr. Jinnah and other leaders for several months, and it was not till July 22, 1941, that the composition of the new Council was announced.³⁰ Although eight out of the thirteen members were Indians, they were neither responsible to the Legislature nor to any political party. The old belief therefore "persisted in nationalist minds that the function of the Council was to register the opinions of the Viceroy, and the function of the Viceroy to do what he was told by Whitehall."³¹ The Defence Council, which was established at the same time, being merely an advisory body, did not make any impression on the Indians. There was therefore hardly any thing tangible which could convince the Indians of the bonafide of the British offers and promises to give a real Dominion Status to the Indians. All this distrust and suspicion were converted into a definite belief in the insincerity and double-dealing of the British by an unfortunate speech of Churchill.

The 'Atlantic Charter', issued jointly in August, 1941, by U. K. and U. S. A. as a statement of their war policy, declared, among other things, that "they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." This clause was heartily welcomed by all sections of Indians. But Churchill hastened to dispel all hope and enthusiasm by announcing

(9 September, 1941) in the House of Commons that the 'Atlantic Charter' had no application to India though, in his opinion, it was in full accord with British policy in India, as embodied in August Offer.'³² If it were so, one might well ask, then why this disclaimer that India was not covered by the Atlantic Charter ?

If Britain had made a deliberate resolve to antagonize all sections of public opinion in India, she could not devise anything more suited to the purpose than this speech of Churchill. The large majority of Indians merely found in it a formal corroboration of what they had all along believed, namely, that the British never meant to make any real concession to India. British dishonesty, said Congressmen, had now been nakedly exposed. The Liberals, including Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, who was the greatest champion of unconditional aid to British war efforts, felt shocked. There were still a few who either could not or did not believe that the British Government had all along been playing a double game, bribing India to do her utmost to help in winning the war with a promise which they intended to repudiate as soon as the war was won. They now consoled themselves with the thought that they had put too favourable an interpretation on the words and promises made by the British rulers, who never intended to grant the type of freedom which India had in view. But none the less they were thoroughly disappointed. The subsequent attitude of the Indians is to be viewed in the perspective of the situation created by Churchill's speech. Henceforth India would never trust or put any faith in the promises of perfidious Albion. Everything must be paid in cash, and no credit was to be allowed. This was the real cause of the failure of Cripps Mission to which we now turn.

V. THE JAPANESE MENACE AND ITS REACTION ON INDIAN POLITICS.

The war suddenly took an alarming turn, so far as India was concerned, by the entry of the Japanese into the war on the side of the Axis powers against Britain. The rapidity with which they captured Singapore, hitherto regarded as almost impregnable, overran Malaya and entered Burma raised their prestige as a military power and brought India within the vortex of the war. For it was quite clear that the Japanese intended to invade India from the east through Burma and Manipur. No doubt was left on this point by the propaganda through Radio that the Japanese were coming to deliver India from the yoke of the British. The Indians had too much knowledge of their own past history and of Japan's treatment of China to believe in Japanese propaganda. They were not, with probably a few exceptions, pro-Japanese. But they were not drawn closer to the British either. To the old causes of anti-British sentiments the Japanese invasion added more. In the first place they could not but feel that the present predicament was entirely due to the British, who dragged them into the war against their will. For, it was argued, the Japanese would never have invaded India if she were not a part of the British empire, and even then could remain neutral like Eire and not forced to become a belligerent. The Indians could not but feel that in their present state of dependence they were only destined to share the evils and sorrows of the British Empire and not its benefits and blessings. Secondly, in spite of the many shortcomings and evils of British rule the Indians balanced them against one inestimable advantage it had offered, namely security from foreign invasions. The fortunes of the war clearly indicated the hollowness of this claim in immediate, and possibly remote, future. Thirdly, the

Japanese victories had considerably lowered the British prestige and destroyed the myth of their invincibility. Many had come also to believe that the days of the British Empire were numbered. Thus the impending threat of the Japanese invasion did not produce the effect of reconciling the Indians with the British. This was clearly reflected in the attitude of the different political parties.

Just before the Japanese had entered into the war, the Government of India had released, on 3 December, 1941, the *satyagrahi* prisoners together with Azad and Nehru—probably the first fruits of the expansion of the Governor-General's Executive Council. Shortly after the Japanese entry into the war (7 December, 1941) the Viceroy made a public appeal for a united national front. But it fell on deaf ears. Events soon showed that the Japanese danger had not in any way favourably changed the attitude of the political parties towards British rule in India.

As regards the Congress, though the Japanese invasion did not change its attitude, it certainly changed its leadership. Once more, as in June 1940, Gandhi feared that the war-conditions would force Britain to offer independence to India on condition of participation in the war, and that the majority of Congressmen would accept it. But he was not prepared to abjure the creed of non-violence even for achieving the independence of India. Accordingly the Working Committee of the Congress, which met at Bardoli on 23 December, 1941, relieved Gandhi of the responsibility of leading the *Satyagraha* movement. It passed a long resolution, reiterating the policy enunciated by A.I.C.C. in Bombay on 16 September, 1940, and expressed as follows the reaction of the Congress to the approach of war to the Indian border :

“The sympathies of the Congress must inevitably lie

with the peoples who are the subject of aggression and who are fighting for their freedom, but only a free and independent India can be in a position to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis and be of help in the furtherance of the larger causes that are emerging from the storm of war."

The Working Committee issued a series of instructions in anticipation of the Japanese attack. The general trend of these instructions was to set up under the Congress an independent organization, outside the Government, throughout the country, in order to help and serve the people in any contingency arising out of the threatened Japanese invasion.

On 5 January, 1942, Gandhi explained his own position *vis-à-vis* the Bardoli resolution :

"I am a servant of the Congress and I want to serve the Congress in consonance with the principles of truth and non-violence. The Working Committee has decided to co-operate with the Government in the war, if Britain grants Swaraj to India. It is not a fact that the Congress has violated the principle of non-violence, but it has only made a small opening just with a view to shake hands with Britain. Rajaji thinks that all of us should go to war fully armed, but it may not be the opinion of all."³³

The net position was that although the Congress shook off the pacifism of Gandhi, it reiterated its old policy of non-co-operation with the war-efforts of the Government so long as the independence of India was not guaranteed.

In Britain the die-hard section took a complacent view of the political situation in India, and hoped to counteract the influence of the Congress by that of the Muslim League. The Duke of Devonshire, Amery's Deputy in the House of Lords, observed ; "The Muslim

League seems definitely to be growing in power and influence and at the moment the power of the Congress Party is diminishing. The claim of the Congress Party is contested and always will be contested by the great Muslim community.”³⁴

Amery also declared that “in the absence of agreement we can no more impose a constitution on India and expect it to survive than we could impose a constitution on Europe.”

The attitude of the Muslim League was stiffened by the enlargement of the Executive Council of the Governor-General without its approval. It passed the following resolution :

“The Working Committee, therefore, consider it necessary to warn the British public and Government that any departure from the policy and the solemn declaration of August 8, 1940, and the pledges given therein to the Mussulmans, would constitute a gross breach of faith with Muslim India, and that any revision of policy or any fresh declaration which adversely affects the demand for Pakistan or proceeds on the basis of a Central Government with India as one single unit and Mussulmans as an all-India minority, shall be strongly resented by the Muslims who will be compelled to resist it with all the forces at their command, which would, at this critical juncture, among other things, necessarily result in a serious impediment of the country’s war-effort.”³⁵ The Muslim press rang with such cries as ‘Pakistan is our deliverance, defence, destiny’; ‘Pakistan is our only demand...and by God we will have it’. It has been aptly remarked by an Englishman that the League, it seemed, “was more concerned with the future partition of India than with its immediate salvation from Japanese conquest.”

The Hindu Mahasabha accepted the challenge of its Muslim counterpart. Savarkar said at Lakhnau on 1 March,

six days before the fall of Rangoon :

"Why hold your threat in abeyance, why not come out with it to-day? Hindus have an ancient culture and have withstood numerous revolts. They are four times the Muslims numerically and have the same arms and penal codes to defend themselves which Muslims have." The Mahasabha, like the Congress, demanded full independence, but unlike it, was ready to co-operate with the Government in making preparations for defence.³⁶

No marked change was noticeable in the policy of the Liberals, either in the annual session of the National Liberal Federation held at Madras on 26-28 February, or in the third session of the non-Party Conference at Delhi on 22-23 February. But the Liberals were fully impressed with the gravity of the Japanese menace and took a more realistic view of the situation than the other political parties in India and the British Government. "On January 3, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, still the acknowledged spokesman of Liberal opinion, dispatched a lengthy cable to Mr. Churchill, signed by fifteen non-Party leaders, insisting that "the heart of India must be touched to rouse her on a nation-wide scale to the call for service," and "urging the acceptance of the Liberal programme—a national all-Indian Government responsible to the Crown, and a higher national status for India in international and inter-imperial relations."³⁷ As could be foreseen, Churchill would be the last man to accept any such programme. He slept over Sapru's cable for more than two months until he was rudely awakened by the booming of Japanese guns. On March 11, 1942, "four days after the fall of Rangoon, Mr. Churchill announced that the War Cabinet had come to a unanimous decision on Indian policy and that, in order to explain it and 'to satisfy himself upon the spot, by personal consultation, that the conclusions, upon which we all agreed and which we believe represent a just and

final solution, will achieve their purpose,' Sir Stafford Cripps, who had recently joined the Government as Lord Privy Seal and become a member of the War Cabinet and leader of the House of Commons, would proceed as soon as possible to India."³⁸ Churchill did not leave anyone in doubt as to the genesis of this new policy. He said at the very outset of his announcement: "The crisis in the affairs of India arising out of the Japanese advance has made Britain wish to rally all the forces of Indian life to guard their land from the menace of the invader."³⁹ But this was only a half-truth. The Japanese invasion began more than two months before, and the fall of Singapore on 15 February brought home to everyone the danger to India. Churchill, however, did not move an inch. Roosevelt, the President of U.S.A., took a more realistic view of the situation and urged upon Churchill to settle matters with India. The help of U. S. A. was then the only hope for the safety of Britain, and Churchill could ignore Roosevelt's advice only at his country's peril. Still he wavered until the fall of Rangoon revealed to him, for the first time, the desperate situation which faced Britain in the east.

That the despatch of the Cripps Mission was largely, if not wholly, due to the pressure of Roosevelt, was merely a conjecture at the time, but it has been proved beyond all doubt by the publication of the secret documents of the Foreign Office, U. S. A.^{39a} The information supplied by these may be briefly referred to below :

As far back as 7 May, 1941, if not before, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, U. S. A., took up with "the British Government the possibility of a prompt recognition of India's aspiration to a freer existence and a full membership in the British family of nations." The President also "indicated his sympathy with this general

line." But although Hull took up the matter twice with the British Government, nothing was done on account of "wide division in the British Cabinet".^{39b}

On 17 February, 1942, two days after the fall of Singapore, the Assistant Secretary of State prepared a long memorandum on the subject,^{39c} the main drift of which would be apparent from the following extracts :

"It seems to me that the State Department must immediately get to work on the changed situation in the Far East arising out of the fall of Singapore. The first item on the list ought to be to tackle the Indian problem in a large way. Pursuant to the President's directive there is now being organized an economic and war supply mission to India....looking towards completion of the Indian program to put a million men into the field by the end of 1942. But, under existing conditions, any such program is not likely to get very far unless the political situation is handled with extreme vigour,.....I suggest, accordingly, that we once more take up with the British...the necessity of making a statement of policy with respect to India ; and I suggest that the United States associate herself with Great Britain in stating that policy. It would seem that the logical thing to do was to have Churchill announce in London that the British plans contemplated the introduction of India as a full partner in the United Nations, and that by prearrangement, the United States—perhaps through the President—promptly and vigorously welcome the step....At the same time, the Viceroy could be directed to hold a constitutional conference of some kind in New Delhi looking towards the evolution of ways and means of recognizing the growing political importance of Indian sentiment as such."

On 25 February, 1942, Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo of China, who visited India shortly before, communicated to Roosevelt that he was personally shocked by the military

and political situation in India. "The danger is extreme", said he, and "if the British Government does not fundamentally change their policy toward India, it would be like presenting India to the enemy and inviting them to quickly occupy India."^{39d}

On 25 February, 1942, the Foreign Relations Committee of the U. S. A. Senate discussed Indian affairs.^{39e} They were impressed by the man-power of India as sources of military strength, but fully realized that "the Indians would not have the desire to fight just in order to prolong England's mastery over them." The Assistant Secretary of State, who attended the meeting, noticed "a serious undercurrent of anti-British feeling" and observed :

"Concerning India, the argument was that we are participating on such a large scale and had done so much for England in Lend-Lease that we had now arrived at a position of importance to justify our participation in Empire Councils and such as to authorize us to require England to make adjustments of a political nature within the framework of her Empire. We should demand that India be given a status of autonomy. The only way to get the people of India to fight was to get them to fight for India.....They [members] ascribed to the authority and position of the United States a power to dictate to England what she should do in arranging her Empire not only in India.....coupled with the statements to the effect that otherwise the United States would be just fighting to preserve the British Empire and that the American people would expect this Government to do everything within its power to obtain military participation by India.....even though we had to go to the extent of dictating to England what she should do with regards to India...."

Evidently as a result of this report Roosevelt sent a cable to W. A. Harriman, his Special Representative in

London with the rank of Minister, the same day, i. e., on 25 February, midnight. Unfortunately, the text of this cable "inquiring about India" is not included in the published documents, but we have the reply of Harriman who saw Churchill the next morning. A few passages from it are quoted below :^{39f} "I have seen the Prime Minister this morning. He told me of the status of the political discussions now going on in London and in India for immediate action and for future..... It will be discussed in the Cabinet today and additional advice will be obtained from India. In the meantime you may be interested to have the following information which he gave me.

1. Approximately 75% of the Indian troops and volunteers are Moslems. Of the balance less than half, or perhaps only 12% of the total are sympathetic with the Congress group. The Moslem population exceeds 100 millions. The fighting people of India are from the northern provinces largely antagonistic to the Congress movement. The big populations of the low-lying center and south have not the vigour to fight anybody. The Prime Minister will not therefore take any political step which would alienate the Moslems.

2. There is ample manpower in India willing to fight. The problem is training and equipping."

Obviously Churchill sought to meet the arguments of the anti-British members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee referred to above.

On 4 March Churchill cabled his promised reply to Roosevelt's cable of 25 February. The text of the first para is quoted below : ^{39g} "We are earnestly considering whether a declaration of Dominion status after the war carrying with it if desired the right to secede should be made at this critical juncture. We must not on any account break with the Moslems who represent a hundred

million people and the main army elements on which we must rely for the immediate fighting. We have also to consider our duty towards 30 to 40 million untouchables and our treaties with the Princes states (sic.) of India, perhaps 80 millions. Naturally we do not want to throw India into chaos on the eve of invasion."

Presumably in reply to this Roosevelt cabled a long message to Churchill on 10 March.^{39h} On the analogy of the growth of the mighty Republic of the U.S.A. out of the loosely united thirteen independent States (which is treated in detail) Roosevelt suggested "the setting up of what might be called a temporary government in India, headed by a small representative group.. .. to be recognized as a temporary Dominion Government.. .. It would be charged with setting up a body to consider a more permanent Government for the whole country". "Some such method", Roosevelt hoped, "might give a new slant in India itself, and it might cause the people there to forget hard feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the danger of Japanese domination, together with the advantage of peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution."

The message concluded as follows in continuation with the above: "Such a move is strictly in line with the world changes of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism.

"I hope that whatever you do the move will be made from London and that there should be no criticism in India that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion.

"For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this, though I want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business, except in so far as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making."

Roosevelt's message was received on 10 March, and the very next day Churchill announced the Cripps Mission

in the Parliament, as stated above. It is a reasonable inference that Churchill accepted the advice or suggestion of Roosevelt, though perhaps not ungrudgingly. He certainly did not welcome it at heart, as the sequel will show. One may be sure that Churchill found himself in full accord with only one half-sentence at the end of this long message of Roosevelt, namely, "It is, strictly speaking, none of my business."

In spite of this modest denial of his part in the whole undertaking, there can be little doubt that though the hand was that of Churchill the voice was that of Roosevelt. As we shall see, the latter took a keen interest in the negotiations of Cripps in India from the beginning up to the very end. The very day on which Churchill announced the Cripps Mission, Roosevelt appointed Louis A. Johnson, formerly Assistant Secretary of War, U.S.A., to be his Personal Representative at New Delhi.³⁹ⁱ Further, the following instruction was sent to the U.S. Commissioner at New Delhi (who was replaced by Louis Johnson) on 14 March :

"The Department is of course extremely interested in the purpose of Sir Stafford Cripps' proposed visit to India and in the reception accorded his offer. You are requested therefore to transmit by telegraph with the least possible delay all information which you may be in a position to obtain regarding the proposed formula and the Hindu and Moslem reaction thereto."^{39j}

VI. THE CRIPPS MISSION

Sir Stafford Cripps arrived at Delhi on 23 March, 1942. The proposals which he brought with him were embodied in a Draft Declaration which may be summarised as follows :

(1). In order to achieve 'the earliest possible realisation of self-government in India', the British Government proposes that steps should be taken to create a new Indian

Union which will have the full status of a Dominion.

(2). Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, a constitution-making body shall be set up. Unless the leaders of the principal communities shall have previously agreed on some other method, this body shall be elected, under the system of proportional representation, by an electoral college consisting of the members of the lower houses of all the Provincial legislatures for which new elections would have been held. The Indian States will be invited to appoint representatives—the proportion between British Indian and States' representatives to correspond with the proportion between their total populations.

(3). The British Government 'undertake to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed' on two conditions. First, any Province or Provinces which are not prepared to accept the new constitution will be entitled to frame by a similar process a constitution of their own, giving them 'the same full status as the Indian Union.' Indian States will be similarly free to adhere to the new constitution or not. In either case a revision of their treaty arrangements will have to be negotiated.

(4). The second condition is the signing of a treaty to be negotiated between the British Government and the constitution-making body to cover all 'matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands', particularly the protection of racial and religious minorities in accordance with the British Government's past undertakings.

(5). Untill the new constitution can be framed, the British Government must retain control of the defence of India 'as part of their world war-effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India in co-operation with the peoples of India.' To that end the British Government 'desire and invite

the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations'.

There is no doubt that these proposals virtually conceded all the reasonable demands of both the Congress and the Muslim League, as far as it was possible to do so under war conditions. As Sir Stafford unequivocally declared in one of his Press Conferences, the proposals meant 'complete and absolute self-determination and self-government for India'. The demands of the Muslim League were also met by the first proviso in para (3) of the above summary.

The Cripps proposals, however, did not appeal to the Congress. Apart from the virtual partition of India which the long-term proposals involved, they were open to another serious objection, namely that the rulers, not the peoples of the Indian States, would determine their future. Cripps offered a reasonable defence for both. The British Government, he said, had no control over the States and had no desire to coerce the Muslims if they did not choose to live in the same dominion with the Hindus. The first was a question of fact which none could dispute. As regards the second, the resolution of the Working Committee, which rejected the proposals on 2 April, contained the following: "Nevertheless the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will."⁴⁰ Yet this part of Cripps proposals was the main target of attack from all sides.

The Hindu Mahasabha declared that 'India is one and indivisible' and refused to be party to any proposal which involved the political partition of India in any shape or form.⁴¹ The Liberal Party also opposed the scheme of partitioning India.

Curiously enough, the proposals which alienated the

rest of India failed to satisfy even the Muslims whom they were intended to conciliate. "The Moslems", said the resolution of the Working Committee of the Muslim League, "demand a definite pronouncement in favour of Partition. Though 'Pakistan is recognised by implication' in the Draft Declaration, its primary object is to create one Indian Union, 'the creation of more than one Union being relegated only to the realm of remote possibility.' Nor in any case can the Moslems participate in a constitution-making body which is not elected by separate electorates and in which decisions—the Committee assumes—are to be taken by a bare majority."⁴²

Apart from the question of partition, the long-term proposals were opposed on other grounds. "The firmest stand was taken by the representatives of the Depressed Classes who denounced the scheme for its failure to provide the necessary safeguards for their interests."

They declared: "The proposals are calculated to do the greatest harm to the Depressed Classes and are sure to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule. Any such result which takes us back to the black days of the ancient past will never be tolerated by us, and we are all determined to resist any such catastrophe befalling our people with all the means at our command."⁴³

The Sikhs, the Anglo-Indians, the Indian Christians and the labour-leaders all demanded sufficient safeguards.

"The only clear acceptance of the British proposals came from Mr. M. N. Roy, whose active, but not very powerful, Radical Democratic Party had been preaching for some time past that the only thing that mattered was to fight the Axis."⁴⁴

As a matter of fact the long-term proposals of Cripps for the future constitution of India received but scant attention of the Congress and other sections of the public. The general feeling was expressed by a pithy saying

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attributed to Gandhi, that they were a "post-dated cheque on a crashing bank", implying a growing belief that Britain will be worsted in the battle. As the Congress resolution put it, "in today's grave crisis it is the present that counts, and even proposals for the future are important in so far as they affect the present."⁴⁵

So in the prolonged discussions which Sir Stafford Cripps had with the leaders of the different parties, the attention was mainly concentrated on the interim proposals. Cripps knew very well that he would have to reckon mainly with the Congress and the Muslim League. "As actually happened, the negotiations were held almost exclusively with the Congress, represented by Azad and Nehru, while the Muslim League stood by and awaited developments."⁴⁶

The chief difficulty in arriving at an agreement on the interim proposals was to fix the power and responsibility to be entrusted to Indian members of the Governor-General's Council, for the administration in general, and for defence in particular.

"It was clear enough that there was to be an Indian Defence Member, in addition to the Commander-in-Chief who would continue to be the Supreme Commander of the armed forces in India; but the point on which the leaders were anxious to secure an assurance was that an Indian Defence Member would have reasonable status and be able to function effectively."⁴⁷ There were prolonged discussions and exchanges of notes on this point. About this time Colonel Louis Johnson, the personal Representative of President Roosevelt, mentioned above, arrived in Delhi. With Sir Stafford Cripps' permission he took an active part in the negotiations on the defence formula. A new formula, sometimes referred to as the 'Johnson formula', was presented to the Congress."⁴⁸

The Congress accepted this formula with some amend-

ments which did not make any substantial change. But it "differed materially from the earlier approach to the problem by His Majesty's Government. In stead of reserving defence as the responsibility of His Majesty's Government and asking the Indian Defence Member to accept certain relatively unimportant subjects, the Working Committee's proposal was to consider the National Government responsible for the whole field of administration, including defence, but to reserve to the Commander-in-Chief, for the duration of the war, certain functions essential for the discharge of his responsibilities and the carrying out of military operations."^{48a}

There were further pourparlers between Johnson and the Congress on the one hand, and Sir Stafford Cripps, the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief on the other. As a result of all this, on the afternoon of 8 April Sir Stafford Cripps finalized his formula and discussed it with the Viceroy. "The latter did not agree generally with Sir Stafford Cripps' approach to the problem, nor was he in favour of the proposed allocation of subjects between the Commander-in-Chief and the Indian Defence Member. Nevertheless, Sir Stafford Cripps telegraphed the revised formula to His Majesty's Government as the basis on which negotiations were proceeding and with a strong recommendation for its acceptance. He urged that without it there was no prospect of success, but on this basis there was considerable chance of securing the agreement of the Congress. Simultaneously, the Viceroy communicated his own views to His Majesty's Government, who decided that it could not agree, especially during the period of war, to lessening in any material respect the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Stafford Cripps felt that he was unable to proceed further, and the negotiations came to an abrupt end."⁴⁹

Although the arrangement for defence proved to be

the most vexed problem that was principally responsible for the failure of Cripps Mission, there were acute differences on some other questions, too.

"When Sir Stafford Cripps had first come out, he had used phrases at his meetings with the Press which had been taken as promising a wholly Indian National Cabinet and in conversation with political leaders he had said that the relations of the Indian Government to the Viceroy were similar to those of the British Cabinet to the King."⁵⁰ But later when questioned on the subject by Azad and Nehru, Cripps frankly admitted that there would be no essential difference between the existing Executive Council of the Governor-General and the proposed new Government. On 10 April Azad wrote a long letter to Cripps which concluded as follows :

"While we cannot accept the proposals you have made, we want to inform you that we are yet prepared to assume responsibility, provided a truly National Government is formed. We are prepared to put aside for the present all questions about the future, though, as we have indicated, we hold definite views about it. But in the present, the National Government must be a cabinet government with full power and must not merely be a continuation of the Viceroy's Executive Council."

Cripps was unable to accept this demand and, after a further exchange of notes, accepted Azad's letter of the 10th April as a clear rejection of the British Cabinet's proposals. On 11 April, when it was known that the Congress would not accept them the Working Committee of the Muslim League also passed a resolution rejecting them. It was Jinnah's complaint that "the talks had been carried on with the Congress leaders over the heads of the Muslims, and other parties had been utterly ignored."⁵¹

There was a general impression at the time that the failure of Cripp's Mission was due to the reactionary

attitude of Churchill who stayed the hands of Cripps at a moment when success was within sight.

This impression is fully substantiated by the secret documents⁵² of the Foreign Office, U.S.A., to which reference has been made above. It now appears that after the rejection of 'Johnson's formula' by the Viceroy and Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief, Johnson saw the latter and had a long discussion. Johnson writes: 'After he got off his high horse Wavell's approval and co-operation were complete. He phoned Viceroy for appointment and went with me to see him. On Wavell's recommendation, Viceroy approved and sent for Cripps. Cripps met with three of us and of course heartily approved.' On the same day, i. e. the 9th, it was informally agreed to at a conference between Cripps, Nehru and the Congress President, though by that time difference had grown between Cripps and the other two over the nature and functions of the National Government to which reference has been made above. What followed is thus described by Johnson: "Cripps is sincere, knows this matter should be solved. He and Nehru could solve it in 5 minutes if Cripps had any freedom or authority. To my amazement when satisfactory solution seemed certain, with unimportant concession, Cripps with embarrassment told me that he could not change original draft declaration without Churchill's approval and that Churchill has cabled him that he will give no approval unless Wavell and Viceroy separately send their own code cables unqualifiedly endorsing any change Cripps wants. I never lost confidence until then. London wanted a Congress refusal."

On 11 April Churchill sent Roosevelt a copy of Cripps' cable communicating the reasons for the failure of the negotiations, and enclosed a copy of his reply heartily congratulating Cripps on his achievements which "have proved how great was the British desire to reach a

settlement." Churchill added : "The effect throughout Britain and in the United States has been wholly beneficial. The fact that the break comes on the broadest issues and not on tangled formulas about defence is a great advantage."

Roosevelt was not, however, taken in by this hypocritical outburst. He immediately (11 April) cabled a long message to Churchill from which a few extracts are quoted :

"I most earnestly hope that you may find it possible to postpone Cripps's departure from India until one more final effort has been made to prevent a breakdown in the negotiations.

"I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with the point of view set forth in your message to me that public opinion in the United States believes that the negotiations have failed on broad general issues. The general impression here is quite the contrary. The feeling is almost universally held that the deadlock has been caused by the unwillingness of the British Government to concede to the Indians the right of self-government, notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust technical, military and naval defense control to the competent British authorities. American public opinion cannot understand why, if the British Government is willing to permit the component parts of India to secede from the British Empire after the war, it is not willing to permit them to enjoy what is tantamount to self-government during the war..... I read that an agreement seemed very near last Thursday night (9th April). If he (Cripps) could be authorised by you to state that he was empowered by you personally to resume negotiations as at that point with the understanding that minor concessions would be made by both sides, it seems to me that an agreement might yet be found."

Roosevelt again suggested that a nationalist Government should be immediately set up (in India) on the model of the Government of the original 13 Colonies in U. S. A.

under the Articles of Confederation, on the understanding that they would ultimately settle their own future. He then concluded as follows: "If you made such an effort and Cripps were then still unable to find an agreement, you would at least on that issue have public opinion in the United States satisfied that a real effort and a fair offer had been made by the British Government to the peoples of India and that the responsibility for such failure must clearly be placed upon the Indian people and not upon the British Government."⁵³

Thus even at that late hour Roosevelt tried his best to prevent the breakdown of the Cripps negotiations. But Churchill was adamant. In his reply to Roosevelt he even offered 'to retire to private life if that would be any good in assuaging American public opinion'.⁵⁴ He said in defence of his policy that he did not trust the Indian Congress. But the negotiations could not be reopened in any case because Cripps had left India.

One of the most intimate associates of Churchill justly remarked: 'The President might have known that India was the one subject on which Winston would never move a yard'. Perhaps 'an inch would be more like it'. Harry Hopkins, who carried on the negotiations with Churchill on behalf of Roosevelt, also felt that 'India was one area where the minds of Roosevelt and Churchill would never meet'.⁵⁵

The British official view was that it was the pacifism of Gandhi that brought about the failure of Cripps Mission. As a matter of fact, Gandhi left Delhi at an early stage of the negotiations and took no further part in them. But some Englishmen asserted that Gandhi telephoned from Sevagram instructing Congress to reject the Cripps offer, and even said they had a record of that conversation. When told about this, Gandhi said, "it is all a tissue of lies. If they have a record of the telephone conversation

let them produce it.”^{55a} It is hardly necessary to discuss the British official view after this denial of Gandhi.

Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, Indian Agent General in U. S. A., in course of a conversation with Mr. Murray, the Adviser on Political Relations, at Washington, on 24 April, 1942, laid the entire responsibility for the failure of the negotiations at the door of the Congress Working Committee, though he had no doubt that Nehru and Rajagopalachari were sincere in their efforts for a successful settlement. He said he was certain that the idea in the back of the minds of the members of the Working Committee was the following: “With the Cripps proposals on record they can never be withdrawn by the British Government. Therefore why accept them now in the present grave situation of India and run the risk of failure which ought to rest on the shoulders of the British rulers. If Britain wins, the offer can always be taken up and tried out, with better chances of success....If Britain loses and the Japanese succeed in occupying India the Indians would be in a better position to negotiate a satisfactory settlement with the Japanese than they would have been if they had fallen in with the British proposals.”^{55b}

The basis for the above view is not known, and a high official like Sir Girija cannot be credited with an intimate knowledge of the Congress members unless there is some positive evidence about it, which is lacking.

On the other hand, the Indian intelligentsia—at least an important section of it—doubted the sincerity of the British Cabinet and held that the Cripps Mission was designed merely to placate American opinion. Even Harold Lasky observed that the “take it or leave it” mood of Cripps was “bound to make it look as though our real thought was less the achievement of Indian freedom than of a *coup de main* in the propagandist’s art among our allies who contrasted American relation with

the Philippines against British relations with India.”^{55c} There is hardly any doubt that the available evidence lends the strongest support to this view, though we must revise the current Indian opinion that Cripps was the villain of the piece. He was merely an agent of Churchill who pulled the wires from behind.

VII. QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT

1. The Genesis

As mentioned above, owing to the difference in the attitude towards the War Gandhi lost his influence and leadership in the Congress in June, 1940. Although Gandhi recovered his position and was asked by the Congress to lead the *Satyagraha* campaign in 1940-41, he was again relieved of this responsibility by the Working Committee on 23 December, 1941. This explains why Gandhi took no active part in the negotiations with Cripps and left Delhi when they were only half way through, as stated above.

But there was a marked change in Gandhi's attitude after the failure of the Cripps Mission. We get the first inkling of this in an article published in the *Harijan* on 19 April, 1942, in which he suggested that the safety and interest of both Britain and India “lie in orderly and timely British withdrawal from India.” For, in that case Japan would probably leave India alone. In other words, Gandhi, for the first time, openly declared that there was an end of all ideas of co-operation or friendly understanding between Britain and India. Subhas Bose had persistently tried to make the Congress adopt this policy, but failed. Now it was the general view of the Congress leaders also with the exception of Jawaharlal, who held very strongly that in any case India must fight with Britain against Fascism. The two views clashed in the meetings of the A. I. C. C. and the

Working Committee (W. C.) at Allahabad (29 April to 2 May, 1942). The W.C. adopted the draft prepared by Jawaharlal Nehru and rejected that of Gandhi, but the resolution finally adopted by the A.I.C.C. was a compromise between the two. The relevant passage runs as follows :

“The present crisis as well as the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps make it impossible for the Congress to consider any schemes or proposals which retain, even in partial measure, British control and authority in India. Not only the interests of India, but also Britain's safety and world peace and freedom demand that Britain must abandon her hold on India. It is on the basis of independence alone that India can deal with Britain or other nations.

“The Committee repudiates the idea that freedom can come to India through interference or invasion by any foreign nation, whatever the professions of that nation may be. In case an invasion takes place, it must be resisted. Such resistance can only take the form of non-violent non-co-operation as the British Government has prevented the organisation of national defence by the people in any other way. The Committee would therefore expect the people of India to offer complete non-violent non-co-operation to the invading forces and not to render any assistance to them.”⁵⁶

These two paras show that Nehru had surrendered, for they repudiated Nehru's view of unconditional support to Britain and violent resistance to the Japanese invaders. It is true that the resolution contained no reference to the following passage in Gandhi's draft : “Britain is incapable of defending India. Japan's quarrel is not with India. If India were freed, her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan”. But these were not very essential points like those on which Nehru had to surrender.

There was now no doubt that Gandhi had again

recovered his undisputed supremacy over the Congress. In spite of the compromise and almost non-committal resolution of the A. I. C. C., he wrote a series of articles elaborating his idea which was soon to crystallise into the 'Quit India' Movement. On May 3, and again on May 10, he wrote: "The time has come during the war, not after it, for the British and the Indians to be reconciled to complete separation from each other.....I must devote the whole of my energy to the realisation of this supreme act.The presence of the British in India is an invitation to Japan to invade India. Their withdrawal removes the bait. Assume, however, it does not; free India will be better able to cope with the invasion. Unadulterated non-co-operation will then have full sway."

"Leave India in God's hands," he said on 24 May, "in modern parlance, to anarchy, and that anarchy may lead to internecine warfare for a time or to unrestrained dacoities. From these a true India will rise in place of the false one we see."⁵⁷ Gandhi said: "I have not asked the British to hand over India to the Congress or to the Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all the parties will fight one another like dogs, or will, when real responsibility faces them, come to a reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that chaos."⁵⁸

No sober statesman would perhaps endorse these idealistic views of Gandhi who, as usual, ignored the realities of the situation and was ready to play with a nation's fate as a child plays with his doll. But the strong reaction of his views on the American journalists, and perhaps also the influence of Nehru and criticism of Rajagopal-achari and other Indian leaders induced Gandhi to modify his views a little. "It was not till May 24 that Gandhi first admitted the possibility of Japan still invading India despite the withdrawal of the British and he advised the

people to offer stubborn non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese, which, he suggested, would be infinitely more effective in the absence of the British.”⁵⁹ “Allied troops, he wrote on June 7, might remain under a treaty with the Government of a free India and at the United Nations’ expense for the sole purpose of repelling a Japanese attack and helping China.”⁶⁰

But there was no fundamental change in Gandhi’s views. He told Azad “in unqualified terms that if the Japanese army ever came into India, it would come not as our enemies but as enemy of the British. He said that if the British left immediately, he believed that the Japanese would have no reason to attack India.” Azad adds : “I could not accept his reading and in spite of long discussions we could not reach agreement. I found that Sardar Patel held the same view and perhaps he had influenced Gandhiji. We therefore parted on a note of difference.”⁶¹ This happened in June, 1942.

Along with the new attitude towards Britain which Gandhi assumed after the departure of Cripps a great change also had come over him so far as the method of activity was concerned. As Azad puts it, his “mind was now moving from the extreme of complete inactivity to that of organized mass effort.”⁶² On June 7 Gandhi wrote :

“I waited and waited until the country should develop the non-violent strength necessary to throw off the foreign yoke. But my attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot afford to wait. If I continue to wait I might have to wait till doomsday. For the preparation that I have prayed and worked for may never come, and in the meantime I may be enveloped and overwhelmed by the flames that threaten all of us. That is why I have decided that even at certain risks which are obviously involved I must ask the people to resist

the slavery.”⁶³

There was a meeting of the Working Committee at Wardha on 6 July, 1942. The memoirs of Maulana Azad, the President of the Congress, throw light on the part played by Gandhi in leading the Congress to his ‘Quit India’ policy. Azad says :

“I reached Wardha on 5 July and Gandhiji spoke to me for the first time about the ‘Quit India’ Movement. I could not easily adjust my mind to this new idea. I felt that we were facing an extraordinary dilemma. Our sympathies were with the Allied powers but the British Government had taken up an attitude which made it impossible for us to co-operate with them. We could side with the British only as a free country, but the British wanted us as mere camp-followers. On the other hand, the Japanese had occupied Burma and were advancing towards Assam. I felt that we must refrain from any word or action which could offer encouragement to the Japanese. It seemed to me that the only thing we could do was to wait upon the course of events and watch how the war situation developed. Gandhiji did not agree. He insisted that the British must leave India. If the British agreed, we could then tell the Japanese they should not advance any further. If in spite of this they advanced, it would be an attack on India and not on the British. If such a situation developed we must oppose Japan with all our might.

“I have already said that I had been in favour of organized opposition to the British at the outbreak of the war. Gandhiji had not then agreed with me. Now that he had changed, I found myself in a peculiar position. I could not believe that with the enemy on the Indian frontier, the British would tolerate an organized movement of resistance. Gandhiji seemed to have a strange belief that they would. He held that the British would

allow him to develop his movement in his own way. When I pressed him to tell us what exactly would be the programme of resistance, he had no clear idea. The only thing he mentioned during our discussions was that unlike previous occasions, this time the people would not court imprisonment voluntarily. They should resist arrest and submit to Government only if physically forced to do so....

"Gandhiji held that the British would regard his move for an organized mass movement as a warning and not take any precipitate action. He would therefore have time to work out the details of the movement and develop its tempo according to his plans. I was convinced that this would not be the case....

"When the Working Committee began its discussions, I elaborated these points in detail. Among members of the Working Committee only Jawaharlal supported me and then only up to a point. The other members would not oppose Gandhiji even when they were not fully convinced. This was not a new experience for me. Apart from Jawaharlal, who often agreed with me, the other members were generally content to follow Gandhiji's lead. Sardar Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Acharya Kripalani had no clear idea about the war. They rarely tried to judge things on their own, and in any case they were accustomed to subordinate their judgment to Gandhiji. As such, discussion with them was almost useless. After all our discussions, the only thing they could say was that we must have faith in Gandhiji. They held that if we trusted him he would find some way out.

"Gandhiji's idea seemed to be that since the war was on the Indian frontier, the British would come to terms with the Congress as soon as the movement was launched. Even if this did not take place, he believed that the British would hesitate to take any drastic steps

with the Japanese knocking at India's doors. He thought that this would give the Congress the time and the opportunity to organize an effective movement. My own reading was completely different....

"Our discussions started on 5 July and continued for several days. I had on earlier occasions also differed from Gandhiji on some points but never before had our difference been so complete. Things reached a climax when he sent me a letter to the effect that my stand was so different from his that we could not work together. If Congress wanted Gandhiji to lead the movement, I must resign from the Presidentship and also withdraw from the Working Committee. Jawaharlal must do the same."

After stating how Gandhi withdrew this letter at the instance of Patel, Azad continues :

"We began to discuss in greater detail the various elements of the proposed movement. Gandhiji made it clear that like other movements, this would also be on the basis of non-violence. All methods short of violence would however be permissible. During the discussions, Jawaharlal said that what Gandhiji had in view was in fact an open rebellion even if the rebellion was non-violent. Gandhi liked the phrase and spoke of an open non-violent revolution several times."⁶⁴

2. "Quit India" Resolution

On 14 July, 1942, the Working Committee passed a long resolution, generally referred to as the 'Quit India' resolution. It renewed the demand that "British rule in India must end immediately" and reiterated the view that the freedom of India was "necessary not only in the interest of India but also for the safety of the world and for the ending of Nazism, Fascism, Militarism and other forms of imperialism, and the aggression of one nation over another....

"On the withdrawal of British Rule in India, respon-

sible men and women of the country will come together to form a Provisional Government, representative of all important sections of the people of India, which will later evolve a scheme whereby a Constituent Assembly can be convened in order to prepare a constitution for the government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. Representatives of Free India and representatives of Great Britain will confer together for the adjustment of future relations and for the co-operation of the two countries as allies in the common task of meeting aggression. It is the earnest desire of the Congress to enable India to resist aggression effectively with the people's united will and strength behind it.

"In making the proposal for the withdrawal of British Rule from India, the Congress has no desire whatsoever to embarrass Great Britain or the Allied Powers in their prosecution of the war, or in any way to encourage aggression on India or increased pressure on China by the Japanese or any other Power associated with the Axis group. Nor does the Congress intend to jeopardise the defensive capacity of the Allied Powers. The Congress is therefore agreeable to the stationing of the armed forces of the Allies in India, should they so desire, in order to ward off and resist Japanese or other aggression, and to protect and help China....

"The Congress would plead with the British Power to accept the very reasonable and just proposal herein made, not only in the interest of India but also that of Britain and of the cause of freedom to which the United Nations proclaim their adherence.

"Should, however, this appeal fail, the Congress cannot view without the gravest apprehension the continuation of the present state of affairs, involving a progressive deterioration in the situation and weakening of India's will and power to resist aggression. The Cong-

ress will then be reluctantly compelled to utilise all the non-violent strength it might have gathered since 1920, when it adopted Non-violence as part of its policy for the vindication of political rights and liberty. Such a widespread struggle would inevitably be under the leadership of Gandhiji. As the issues raised are of the most vital and far-reaching importance to the people of India as well as to the peoples of the United Nations, the Working Committee refer them to the All-India Congress Committee for final decision. For this purpose the A. I. C. C. will meet in Bombay on the seventh of August, 1942.”⁶⁵

Referring to this resolution Subhas Bose comments : “There is no doubt that the Congress resolution came nearest in expressing the wish of the vast majority of the Indian people. It also brought the Congress fundamentally near the stand always taken by the writer, namely, that the destruction of British power in India was the *sine qua non* for the solution of all India’s problems, and that the Indian people would have to fight for the achievement of this goal.

“Although the resolution passed by the Congress at Wardha was interpreted by Gandhi as ‘open rebellion’, it did not entirely bridge the gulf that separated the Congress leadership as a whole from the policy of immediate, uncompromising and all-out fight against the British rule in India advocated by the writer. The idea of the desirability of an understanding with Britain was still in the minds of some Congress leaders.

“However, these people constituted a very tiny minority. Even Nehru, who most ardently wished an understanding with Britain, answered in the negative when asked by foreign correspondents after the Wardha meeting ‘if an American guarantee of the British promise to give India complete independence after the war would meet

the case.' What Congress was interested in, said Nehru, was 'independence here and now'. No doubt this was also the mood of the country."⁶⁶

No one outside Gandhi's immediate circle of devotees could have the least doubt about the attitude of the Government towards the new move of the Congress. Among Gandhi's 'staunch' disciples was Miss Slade, popularly known as Mira Ben, the daughter of a British admiral. She went to Delhi, at the suggestion of Mahadev Desai, the Secretary of Gandhi, to apprise the Viceroy of the purport of the Working Committee's resolution and the nature of the movement proposed by it. The Viceroy refused to interview her as Gandhi was thinking in terms of rebellion. "He made it clear that the Government would not tolerate any rebellion during the war, whether it was violent or non-violent. Nor was the Government prepared to meet or discuss with any representative of an organization which spoke in such terms."⁶⁷

"The refusal of the Viceroy even to receive Mira Ben made Gandhiji realize that the Government would not easily yield. The confidence he had in this regard was shaken, but he still clung to the belief that Government would not take any drastic action. He thought that he would have enough time after the A. I. C. C. meeting to prepare a programme of work and gradually build up the tempo of the movement."⁶⁸

The A. I. C. C. met in Bombay on 7 August, 1942, and considered the resolution drafted by the Working Committee. After two days' discussion it was passed by an overwhelming majority; only a few Communists were against it. The more important parts of the resolution are quoted below (with slight verbal alterations).

"The Committee approves of and endorses the Wardha resolution and is of opinion that events subse-

quent to it have given it further justification, and have made it clear that the immediate ending of British Rule in India is an urgent necessity, both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. A free India will assure this success by throwing all her great resources in the struggle for freedom and against the aggression of Nazism, Fascism and Imperialism.

"The peril of today necessitates the independence of India and the ending of British domination. No future promise or guarantees can affect the present situation or meet that peril. They cannot produce needed psychological effect on the mind of the masses. Only the glow of freedom now can release that energy and enthusiasm of millions of people which will immediately transform the nature of the war. The A. I. C. C. therefore repeats with all emphasis the demand for the withdrawal of the British Power from India."

The A. I. C. C. resolution also sanctioned "the starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale under the leadership of Gandhi," and provided for future contingency in the following words :

"A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instructions or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress Committee can function. When this happens, every man and woman, who is participating in this movement must function for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide urging him on along the hard road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the independence and deliverance of India."⁶⁹

No one except Gandhi, with his childlike faith, and his devotees, blindly attached to him, could have seriously believed that the Government would sit idle while the

A. I. C. C. had proclaimed open rebellion. It is true that Gandhi conceived it to be a kind of non-violent revolt—unarmed revolt as he called it. But everybody knew or should have known that the revolt once begun would not, or rather could not, retain its non-violent character. Gandhi's utterances might easily create the impression that he meant it to be a fight to the finish, whether violent or non-violent. "After the Working Committee passed the resolution at Wardha on July 14, Gandhi said : "There is no room left in the proposal for withdrawal or negotiation. There is no question of one more chance. After all it is an open rebellion." Again Gandhi is reported to have said : "I shall take every precaution I can to handle the movement gently, but I would not hesitate to go the extremest limit, if I find that no impression is produced on the British Government or the Allied Powers." Reference may also be made to Gandhi's speech after the A. I. C. C. had passed the 'Quit India' resolution at Bombay. "Every one of you should from this moment onwards consider yourself a free man or woman and act as if you are free.... I am not going to be satisfied with anything short of complete freedom...We shall do or die. We shall either free India or die in the attempt."

No Government, faced with an impending foreign invasion from outside, would tolerate the growth of Such a rebellion inside, which was sure to hamper the efforts for defence against Japanese aggressions. The Government were closely following the activities of the Congress and made elaborate preparations to nip any active rebellion in the bud. They were presumably waiting till the Congress put itself clearly in the wrong by an open declaration of revolt. 'As soon as the A. I. C. C. resolution was passed, they struck hard. The A. I. C. C. meeting terminated late at night on 8 August, 1942. Before the next day dawned the police arrested Gandhi, Azad, and

all the other eminent leaders of the Congress. Within a week almost everyone who mattered in the Congress organization was in jail. The A. I. C. C. and all the Provincial Congress Committees except in N. W. F. P. were declared unlawful organizations. The Congress headquarters at Allahabad were seized by the police and the Government confiscated the Congress funds. Rigorous control was imposed over the publication of news and comments to such an extent that several newspapers, including the *Harijan* of Gandhi, had to suspend publication.

The Government of India issued a *communique* justifying their action. "The Central Government," said the official *communique*, "had been aware for some days of the preparations being made by Congressmen for a campaign of lawlessness, including attempts to interrupt communications, to foment strikes, to tamper with the loyalty of Government servants and to interfere with recruitment.

"The Government of India have waited patiently in the hope that wiser counsels might prevail. They have been disappointed in that hope. To a challenge such as the present there can only be one answer. The Government of India would regard it as wholly incompatible with their responsibilities to the people of India and their obligations to the Allies that a demand should be discussed, the acceptance of which would plunge India into confusion and anarchy internally and would paralyse her efforts in the common cause of human freedom.

"The *communique* went on to remind the people of India of the British Government's guarantee of self-determination directly after the war and to deny the capacity of the Congress to override the realities of Indian politics and establish the freedom of India at a stroke. The action, it was added, which the Government was

bound to take to uphold law and order and safeguard the war-effort would be 'preventive' rather than 'punitive'.

It was afterwards made known that the Central Government's decision had been unanimous. The Executive Council, it will be remembered, had recently been expanded, and, as it happened, the three official Members (apart from the Viceroy) were absent. Thus the decision was taken by the Viceroy and the twelve unofficial Members, all of whom, except Sir E. C. Benthall, were Indians."⁷⁰

The sudden removal of all types of leaders,—all-India, Provincial, District, and even Taluk—left no responsible men to guide the mass movement announced by the A. I. C. C. But if the Government had thought or hoped that by this means they would be able to crush the movement they soon found out their mistake. They had made a profound miscalculation about the state of popular feeling and the hold of the Congress on Indian public. The news of the arrest of Gandhi and other Congress leaders led to a violent popular demonstration which soon spread over nearly the whole of India.

VIII. THE VIOLENT OUTBREAK OF 1942

A. THE NATURE OF THE OUTBREAK

As soon as Gandhi and his followers were removed to prison, the cult of non-violence, as understood and preached by them, came to an end, never more to figure as a potent force in India's struggle for freedom. Jawaharlal Nehru noted with regret that "the people forgot the lessons of non-violence which had been dinned into their ears for more than twenty years."⁷¹ He forgot or ignored the fact, obvious to many, that though the lesson entered the ears of the people it never entered their hearts. On occasions—and they are not few in number—under the magic spell of Gandhi or out of frenzied devotion to him as to a religious *Guru*, people behaved in a manner which misled

many to believe that their personality and character had undergone a radical transformation, and Gandhi's spirit of non-violence possessed their soul. But this impression received a rude shock when the exit of Gandhi practically synchronised with the exit of almost all restraints to violence. How transient was the apparent conversion even of only a small class of people to the Gandhian cult of non-violence may be judged by the fact that after the year 1942, the cult has never played any active role either in the Congress dominated Indian politics or in the life of the Indian people. It is now a sacred memory at the best, and a catching slogan at the worst.

The arrest of Gandhi and other leaders was immediately followed by peaceful and non-violent popular demonstrations in the shape of *hartals* and processions over nearly the whole of India. The Government adopted stern measures to put them down. The close of shops and restaurants was forbidden by the rules passed under the Defence of India Act, and not only the usual *lathi-charge* but firing was also resorted to in order to disperse processions. This led to violence on the part of the people and the Government had to face a revolt which was unarmed but most violent in character.

There was no regular inquiry by a responsible committee into the disturbances of 1942. The Government refused to accept the public demand for such an inquiry and neither the Congress nor any other body took any steps for it. But we possess both official and popular versions, and there seems to be no doubt or uncertainty about the general trend of events, though details, particularly figures, cannot be always regarded as reliable.

The official version may be summed up as follows :

'Gandhi and other leaders were arrested on the morning of 9 August. On that day there were disturbances in Bombay, Ahmadabad and Poona, but the rest of the country

remained quiet. On 10 August disturbances occurred also in Delhi and a few towns in the U. P. ; but still no serious repercussions were reported from elsewhere. It was from August 11 that the situation began to deteriorate rapidly. From then onwards, apart from the *hartals*, protest meetings and similar demonstrations that were to be expected, concerted outbreaks of mob violence, arson, murder, and sabotage took place ; and in almost all cases these were directed either against communications of all kinds (including railways, posts and telegraphs), or against the police. Moreover, these outbreaks started almost simultaneously in widely separated areas in the provinces of Madras, Bombay, and Bihar, and also in the Central and United Provinces. Finally the damage done was so extensive as to make it incredible that it could have been perpetrated on the spur of the moment without special implements and previous preparation ; and in many instances the manner in which it was done displayed a great deal of technical knowledge. Block instruments and control rooms in Railway stations were singled out for destruction ; and the same technical skill appeared over and over again both in the selection of objects for attack—on the railways, in P & T offices and lines, and on electric power lines and installations—and also in the manner in which the damage was carried out. On the other hand—and this is a significant fact—industrial plant and machinery, even when it was fully employed on Government work, escaped any serious injury.

‘The position was at one time extremely serious in the whole of Bihar except its most southern districts, and in the eastern part of the U.P. In these areas the trouble soon spread from the big towns to the outlying areas ; thousands of rioters gave themselves up to an orgy of destruction of communications and certain classes of Government property ; whole districts, with their small

defending forces of Government officials and police, were isolated for days on end ; a very large part of the E. I. Railway and practically the whole of the B. & N. W. Railway systems were put out of action. For a considerable period, Bengal was almost completely cut off from Northern India, while communications with Madras were also interrupted by the damage done to the Railways in the Guntur district and around Bezwada..... On the other hand Assam, Orissa, the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. remained free from serious trouble throughout the first week after the arrests, and there was comparatively little disorder in Sind.

'In all the affected provinces, students, invariably Hindu students, were in the forefront of the initial disorders. Everywhere the Congress creed of non-violence was ignored and mobs were recklessly incited to extremes of fury. Apart from attacks on communications and various forms of transport such as trams, buses, and motor vehicles, the violence of the mob was directed against certain classes of Government buildings... Municipal, and even private property also suffered, and there was some looting.'⁷²

As regards sabotage activity in U P. "there was widespread destruction of the property of the Railways and Posts and Telegraphs. One hundred and four railway stations were attacked and damaged, 15 being burnt down, 16 derailments were caused, about 100 instances of sabotage to railway tracks were reported.

"Over 425 cases of sabotage to telephone and telegraph wires were recorded. A hundred and nineteen post offices were destroyed or severely damaged, and 32 employees of the Posts and Telegraph Department were attacked. Damage was caused to a large number of Government buildings, records, seed stores and some A. R. P. equipment. Attacks on Government servants resulted in the murder of 16 members of the police force and 332

were injured. Arrests, totalling 16,089 were made in connection with the disturbances throughout the province." The "total amount of collective fine imposed was Rs. 28, 32, 000, the bulk of which was promptly realised. Recoveries by the close of the financial year amounted to slightly over Rs. 25,00,000."72a

'The all-India figures for the sabotages of this kind are given as follows :72b

Railway Stations damaged or destroyed...	250
Post Offices attacked	.. 550
Post Offices burnt	...50
Post Offices damaged	...200
Telegram and Telephoe wires cut at	3,500 places
Police Stations burnt	70
Other Government buildings	85

'There was no general strike and work was soon resumed in mills and factories, with the one important exception of Ahmadabad mills. These were subjected to special political pressure, backed by ample funds.

'During the first two weeks following the arrests the disturbances continued with varying intensity mainly in C. P., Bihar, and U. P.....By the fourth week firm action had largely succeeded in suppressing mass lawlessness, except in Assam, where disorders began to appear similar in nature to those which had occurred earlier elsewhere. Indiscipline in jails was a part of the Congress programme and jail mutinies duly occurred in two provinces. By the sixth week normal conditions had been restored throughout most of the country except in the eastern Provinces.

'With the close of the first phase of violent mass disorders three new tendencies became apparent, viz. (1) orthodox non-violent Civil Disobedience movement ; (2) development of serious crimes, and (3) drift towards terrorism.....Cases of arson, sabotage and of murderous assault on public servants continued. Bombs made their

appearance in C. P., Bombay and the United Provinces. These were at first crude and ineffective, but technical improvement was rapid, and by the twelfth week of the movement bombs and other explosive mechanisms, some of a highly dangerous type, were in use on a fairly extensive scale, particularly in the Bombay Province.'^{72c}

So far about the official account. The following extracts from the official history of the Congress give the non-official version.

"The people grew insensate and were maddened with fury, when the slightest acts of disobedience of orders prohibiting meetings, processions and demonstrations, freedom of association and of opinion were put down, not with a mere *lathi* but with the rifle and the revolver, with the machine-gun and the aerial firing. Within less than twelve hours of the arrests, the old story of brickbats and bullets got abroad.....The mob on their part began to stone running Railways and stop trains and cars, damage Railway stations and set fire to them or property therein, loot grain shops, cut Telegraph wires, rip open the tyres of cars, harass Victoria, bull-oek carts and tongas. Besides these excesses initiated by the people at large, there were hartals throughout India despite the Ordinance prohibiting them, in which the school and college students took a big hand in picketing. Educational Institutions and Universities very soon emptied and closed from one end of the country to another,—from Dacca to Delhi excepting Aligarh and from Lahore to Madras. The Benares University, however, was taken possession of by the military at an early stage in the movement. Instances of paralysing Railway traffic by removal of fishplates of rails or the rails themselves early figured on the field of Civil Disobedience, the Madras Mail being unable to proceed for a number of days and thereafter unable to proceed at nights for some time. A whole length

of 130 miles from Bitragunta to Bezwada was disorganized. In Behar, Monghyr was isolated from all external contact for nearly two weeks. The Railway disorganization was in the extreme in Bihar. The Ahmedabad Mills were all closed while in Bombay only three or four ceased work. Numerous Electric Municipal lamps, Fire brigade signal posts and Municipal carts were shattered and smashed to pieces. Near the Dadar B. B. & C. I. station on Sunday, the 9th August, a car was set on fire. There was a complete cessation for an hour of all Suburban Train Traffic both on the B. B. C. I. and G. I. P. lines on the 9th August....Railway stations, Income-tax offices, school and college buildings, Post offices, Railway godowns became the common objects of mischief by arson. In Behar a mob attempted to storm the Secretariat....

"The traffic was held up in the city of Bombay. Even private cars were not allowed to proceed unless there was a Gandhi cap on the head of at least one of the passengers. The tracks for the tram car wheels were filled with finely ground stone which it was not easy to remove. Chains hung at road junctions were released and tied across tramway and the path was further barred by heavy doors brought from somewhere and fixed across. It has been reported that rails of Railways were fully greased with oil so as to prevent the action of brakes suddenly applied."⁷³

The general picture that emerges from these accounts may be described as a widespread revolutionary upsurge of the people, almost throughout India, that manifested itself mainly in destructive activities. The chief targets of attack were the means of communication—Post and Telegraph offices, Telegraph wire, railway line, etc.—and Government establishments, specially Police Stations and other Office buildings. Though unarmed, the masses, by

sheer weight of number, broke through the cordon and seized the buildings. They were generally successful in rural areas where the Government force was not strong enough to resist them, but failed and suffered heavy casualties in urban areas where they were pitted against the Police and the Military. Ten to twenty thousand people, if not more, marched to small Police Stations and were mercilessly shot down by the Police till they exhausted their ammunitions and were forced to surrender. The triumphant mob, naturally excited to fury by the death of their comrades, sometimes committed excesses; not only were the buildings burned, but, according to official version, Police officials were also killed, sometimes in a most cruel manner. On the other hand, according to reliable records, many captured officials received humane treatment. The records of these popular outbreaks are replete with individual instances of heroism, courage, patriotism and self-sacrifice on the part of the people.

Although the destructive activities figured most prominently in the movement, there were also comprehensive plans to establish *Swaraj* or self-rule in certain areas. These plans sometimes succeeded, for short or long periods, particularly in localities in which the Police were forced to withdraw or surrender to the mob. A few typical specimens may be quoted below.⁷⁴

1. Midnapore (Bengal)⁷⁵

The people of Midnapore played a very important and heroic role in the movement. A National Government was formed in Tamluk Sub-division with a Dictator, aided by several Ministers. It was a sort of parallel Government, dispensing justice, maintaining peace and security, and helping the poor and the distressed. Volunteers were formed into an army which had a fighting branch, Intelligence Branch and Ambulance Corps (with well-trained doctors and nurses). This National Govern-

ment nominally functioned from 17 December, 1942, to 8 August, 1944. It was dissolved in obedience to the direction of Gandhi.

The activities of the people were both violent and non-violent in character. In Tamluk Sub-division, on 29 September, 'thirty culverts were broken, 27 miles of telegraph and telephone lines were cut out and 194 telegraph posts were broken. Three police stations of Tamluk Sub-division were simultaneously attacked.'⁷⁶ During the next few days a number of post offices, dakhungalows, and Police Stations in Contai were raided in quick succession. The records and furniture were burnt along with the thatched rooms. It is, however, to be noted that these were done by several thousands of unarmed men and women marching in a procession. One remarkable instance may be cited. Five big processions approached the town of Tamluk from different directions. As they neared the Police Station the Police made a *lathi* charge. As this could not deter the processionists from proceeding to capture the Police building they were indiscriminately fired at. The crowd dispersed, but a few revolutionaries, ignoring the bullets, marched towards the Police Station.

Another procession was led by a venerable old lady, Matangini Hazra, aged 73. The Government troops opened fire and continued showering bullets for a long time. Matangini held the national flag firmly in her hands and advanced. "The Government troops first hit her on both hands ; her hands dropped but not the national flag which she held tightly ; she advanced, requesting Indian troops to cease firing, give up their jobs and join the freedom movement. Only a bullet she received in reply which ran right through her forehead and she fell dead. As she lay in the dust sanctified by her blood, the national flag was still in her grip, yet flying unsullied. A soldier ran

and kicked the flag to the ground.”⁷⁷ It has been calculated that about 20,000 people, all unarmed, braved the Government forces.

Needless to add that the Government took a terrible vengeance. Outrages on women *en masse* formed its special feature. According to reliable evidence seventy-four women of Mahisadal Sub-division, including a pregnant one, were raped, and one of them died in consequence. Among other allegations mention is made of tortures—“inhuman, filthy and obscene in various ways.” We are told of hundreds of villages plundered and pillaged and their people kept without food, dipped in cold water in winter nights, and beaten till they fell down senseless. Even some small children were cruelly beaten. Decency forbids the mention of other details. The ‘popular’ Ministers of Bengal saw with their own eyes the burnt villages and heard the story of rape and assault from the victims. The Chief Minister, Fazl-ul-Huq, promised an inquiry, but nothing came out of it, presumably because the Governor was against it. There was, however, one Minister, Shyama Prasad Mookerji, who resigned by way of protest and wrote a long letter to the Governor on 16 November, 1942, from which an extract is quoted below :

“The political movement took a grave turn in some parts of Midnapore and none can say anything in respect of any legitimate measures taken to deal with persons guilty of serious offences against the law. But in Midnapore repression has been carried on in a manner which resembles the activities of Germans in occupied territories as advertised by British agencies. Hundreds of houses have been burnt down by the police and the armed forces. Reports of outrages on women have reached us. Moslems have been instigated to loot and plunder Hindu houses; or the protectors of law and order have themselves carried on similar operations. Orders were issued from Calcutta

that it was not the policy of Government that houses should be burnt by persons in charge of law and order. I have ample evidence to show that this order was not carried into effect and even after the unprecedented havoc caused by the cyclone on the 16th October and our visit to the affected areas a fortnight later, the burning of houses and looting were continued in some parts of the district. Apart from the manner in which people were fired at and killed these acts of outrage committed by Government agencies are abominable in character."

2. Ballia

The people of Ballia in U. P. successfully carried into effect a regular programme of cutting off communications and captured the administration. Processions and *hartals* were accompanied by cutting telegraph wires, removing railway lines and destroying bridges. These were done with such thoroughness that by the midnight of 18 August the district authorities found themselves completely cut off from the Provincial administration, and without adequate force to control the popular upsurge. Next day reports reached them that the revolutionary mobs were coming to capture the Collectorate and the Treasury and were determined to break open the jail and release the Congressmen. The Magistrate thereupon visited the Congress leaders in jail and asked for their help in saving the situation. They agreed, and Chitoo Pandey, the Congress leader, with 100 of his followers came out of jail. A great ovation was paid to them in a public meeting at the Town Hall, and the independence of Ballia was declared on 20 August. Chitoo formed an administration, arrested the officers of the British Government, seized the Treasury and Armoury, and took suitable steps to maintain law and order.

But the peoples' triumph was shortlived. The British military forces entered Ballia during the night between

22 and 23 August, and the popular Government was overthrown. Then the horrors of the British Police and Military *raj* were let loose upon the people of Ballia, signalised by an orgy of loot and plunder, rape and ravage, beating and shooting, firing and burning.

Independent peoples' Governments were also established in North Bhagalpur (Bihar) and many other localities. Generally speaking, they did not last for more than a few days. But in some places a parallel Government was carried on for months.⁷⁸

B. THE REPRESSIVE MEASURES BY THE GOVERNMENT

We get a fair idea of the nature and extent of the repressive measures adopted by the Government from the official and non-official statements in the Legislative Assembly. Everything indicates that the Government did not shrink from the atrocities perpetrated by them in suppressing the Civil Disobedience movement of 1930-32, of which an authentic and impartial account has been given above in Chapter VI, Section E. *Lathi* charge, whipping, shooting, imprisonment, pillage, arson, rape, barbarous physical torture of individuals in a variety of ways, and collective fines (imposed mostly on the Hindus) were the order of the day, apart from the special measures of vengeance reserved for localities like Ballia and Midnapore, mentioned above.

A statement issued by A. I. C. C. in November, 1942, refers to "looting and burning of villages, rape and rapine on a mass scale, machine gunning and even aerial attacks."

The Civil Defence Secretary gave details of the time, date and number of air-raids on Calcutta, Chittagong and Feni areas from 16 September, 1942, to 10 February, 1943. The total casualties in air-raids on India since April, 1942, were 348 killed and 459 wounded.

According to an official statement made in the Central

Assembly on 19 February, 1943, firing had been resorted to 538 times up to about the end of the year 1942, as a result of which 940 were killed and 1,830 were injured. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru comments :

“Official estimates of the number of people killed and wounded by police or military firing in the 1942 disturbances are : 1,028 killed and 3,200 wounded. These figures are certainly gross under-estimates for it has been officially stated that such firing took place on at least 538 occasions, and besides this people were frequently shot at by the police or the military from moving lorries. It is very difficult to arrive at even an approximately correct figure. Popular estimates place the number of deaths at 25,000, but probably this is an exaggeration. Perhaps 10,000 may be nearer the mark.”⁷⁹

The official figures for persons arrested, convicted and detained without trial during the period from 9 August to the end of the year 1942, were, respectively, 60,229, and approximately 26,000 and 18,000. The military casualties were 11 killed and 7 wounded.

The number of Police Stations, Offices and houses belonging to Government and private persons burnt by the people in Contai and Tamluk Sub-divisions of the Midnapur District in Bengal were respectively 43 and 38, while 193 Congress camps and houses were burnt by the Government forces in the same region.

Men, rightly or wrongly supposed to be saboteurs at work on the railway lines, were machine-gunned from air at five different places. In at least one case the Government admitted that the coolies were mistaken for saboteurs.⁸⁰

Allegations were made by the Government of specially brutal cruelties perpetrated by the mob. It is a difficult task to find out the exact truth, but a few specific instances may be cited.

1. Jaglal Chaudhury, a minister in Bihar from 1937 to 1939, "personally instigated the burning of a police station in the Saran District and during the attack urged the crowd to tie up the Sub-Inspector in a sack and throw him into the river. He was imprisoned for ten years on this charge.

2. An Australian missionary in Bihar who had done educational and medical work for 25 years was mobbed and he escaped with difficulty.

3. In course of an attack on the police station of Minapur in the Muzaffarpur District (Bihar), the Sub-Inspector was burnt alive.

4. The murder of the Sub-Inspector and four constables at Ashti (C. P.) (after the Police had opened fire, killing five men).

5. Cold-blooded murder of the Circle Inspector of Police, the Sub divisional Magistrate, the Naib Tahsildar and a Constable at Chimur (C.P.) on their refusal to join the Congress and resign.^{80a}

On the other hand, there were serious allegations of torture of the Indians, participating in the movement of 1942, after they were imprisoned. As a specimen we may quote the following extract from a letter written by the Socialist leader Rammanohar Lohia, to Prof. Harold Laski on 3 January, 1946.

"I was ill-treated in one way or other for over four months ; I was kept awake day after day, night after night, the longest single stretch running into ten days ; when I resisted the police in their efforts to make me stand, they wheeled me round on my manacled hands on the matted floor..... If beating and bastinadoing to death or near about it and forcing the human mouth to the uses of a sewer were alone to be considered atrocities, these and worse have taken place. I will give you one or two instances, as readily come to my mind. One man swallowed poison

in a Police outpost of the Bombay Province, another threw himself down a well in a U.P. jail, and of those who died through beating or ill-treatment after their arrest, there is no checking up except that in one Orissa jail out of over 300 in the country, the number of deaths among political prisoners rose to around 29 or 39, I cannot exactly recollect.”^{80b}

In view of the authenticated accounts of the brutality perpetrated by the Government in 1932, as described above, one need not hesitate to accept the charges made against them in 1942. For the same reason it is unnecessary to give further details. If we recall to our mind that Churchill, the Prime Minister of Britain, declared triumphantly in the House of Commons that “the disturbances were crushed with all the weight of the Government” and that large military reinforcements were sent to India, we can easily imagine that there was no limit to the barbarous atrocities perpetrated by the Government in those terrible months of 1942.⁸¹ Up to the beginning of October, 1942, the British “used 112 battalions in putting down recent uprisings.”^{81a}

The terrorist methods of the Government produced a violent reaction even upon the minds of those who did not participate in the popular upsurge and were opposed to it. The industrial workers in many important centres spontaneously declared strikes in protest against Government action in arresting national leaders. The steel factory of the Tatas at Jamshedpur furnishes a notable instance. There the skilled workers, drawn from all over India, stopped work for a fortnight and returned to work only when the management promised to try their best to get the Congress leaders released and a National Government formed. The complete strike in all the Ahmadabad mills continued for three months in spite of all attempts to break it and without any special call from the Trade Union.

There were strikes at other centres, too, though of shorter duration.⁸²

C. CHARACTER AND ORGANIZATION

As mentioned above, Gandhi did not formulate any definite programme of action before he was arrested on 9 August. This is quite clear from a statement of Azad quoted above,⁸³ and is fully supported by Nehru when he says: "Neither in public nor in private at the meetings of the Congress Working Committee did he hint at the nature of action he had in mind, except in one particular. He had suggested privately that in the event of failure of all negotiations, he would appeal for some kind of non-co-operation and a one-day protest *hardal*, or cessation of all work symbolic of a nation's protest. Even this was a vague suggestion which he did not particularize for he did not want to make any further plans till he had made his attempt at a settlement. So neither he nor the Congress Working Committee issued any kind of directions, public or private, except that people should be prepared for all developments and should in any event adhere to the policy of peaceful and non-violent action."⁸⁴ It is somewhat surprising, therefore that Gandhi is stated even by his biographer Tendulkar not only to have drafted a set of confidential instructions but to have placed them before the Working Committee.^{84a} Gandhi's general attitude is, however, clear from his speeches and Nehru's statements quoted above. He asked the people "to do or die", but strictly within the limits of non-violence. He also deprecated not only underground activities but all kinds of secret movements.

The question therefore arises whether the actual occurrences which certainly did not follow the line laid down by Gandhi or adopted in 1930-32, were the result of different instructions issued by other individuals or bodies. It is a fact that instructions were actually issued

by different Congress Committees, but they widely differed from one another, indicating that the Committees had no general instructions before them but followed their own instincts. The Bihar Congress Committee, for example, issued a programme more or less on Gandhian lines.⁸⁵ On the other hand, a circular issued in Andhra contained a detailed programme which had a close agreement with the violent activities that specially characterized the 1942 movement. "It outlined a plan of campaign to be developed in successive stages, the fifth of which was to include the cutting of telephone and telegraph wires, the removal of rails and the demolition of bridges. Other items in the programme were 'to impede the war efforts of the Government' and 'to run parallel Government in competition with the British Government.'"⁸⁶

Such circulars and specific instructions of local Congress Committees must have been many in number and probably varied in the emphasis they laid on violence. Besides, there were statements of important Congress leaders which stressed the gravity of the coming struggle. The Government of India collected and published them in order to fasten the responsibility of the occurrences of 1942 on the Congress.⁸⁷ Some of these are quoted below.

"Gandhi himself started with the declaration : "Do or Die. We shall either free India or die in the attempt."

"Gandhi also made it quite clear that even if violence and rioting occurred during the movement this would not deter him, that he was prepared to go to the extremest limit.^{87a} Gandhi's interpretation of non-violence is also worth noting : "If a man fights with his sword single-handed against a horde of dacoits, armed to the teeth, I should say he is fighting non-violently.....In the same way for the Poles to stand bravely against the German hordes

vastly superior in numbers, military equipment and strength, was almost non-violence." Thus "violence when employed against superior odds automatically becomes non-violence. Surely a very convenient theory for the rebels in 'an un-armed revolt.'

"During the period between the W. C.'s resolution on July 14 and the Bombay meeting of the A. I. C. C. almost all Congress leaders indicated in public speeches the nature of the struggle envisaged by Gandhi. Two things stand out prominently : 'The first is the insistence with which almost all speakers urged that every man should be prepared and willing to act on his own initiative ; the second is the extraordinary attention paid to the student community.' Nehru told the peasants in a mass meeting on July 27 that there would be a mass movement in the country within a very short time and it was the duty of every *kisan* to understand the movement properly and to respond to the call. ...There was no question of congressmen deliberately going to jailThe Congress had now burnt its boats and was to embark on a desperate campaign. ...This will be our final struggle.

"Rajendra Prasad said . 'According to Gandhiji's view the movement would kindle a fire all over the country and would only be extinguished after either obtaining the independence of the country or wiping out Congress organisation altogether.'

"Vallabhbhai Patel, addressing a students' meeting in Ahmadabad, is reported to have asked them to pick any item from the struggles that had been fought so far, since 1919, and also to tell every Britisher to quit India immediately. Congress would not come any more to tell them what to do and what not to do and they must take the initiative and do what seemed proper under the circumstances ; they should consider themselves free men and disobey all Government's orders."

These statements certainly do not prove that either Gandhi or prominent Congress leaders, either individually or collectively, planned the campaign of 1942, as the Government maintained. But it cannot be denied that the statements were calculated to excite the people and, in a way, asked each individual and each local group to choose any programme they liked in order to make the British to 'quit India.' The revolutionary instinct, so natural to the masses, was not only invoked but also, at least indirectly, sanctioned. This might not have been unpalatable to many Congress leaders outside the intimate circle of Gandhi. It may be quite true, as Gandhi contended, that there is no evidence to support the Government view that "the August resolution of the Congress is responsible for the popular violence that broke out" immediately after. But on the whole one has to admit that the Congress leaders cannot be altogether absolved from all responsibility for the outbreak of 1942, which they probably neither planned nor guided. It is true that Gandhi would never have contemplated nor lent his support to any kind of violence. But the same thing cannot be said of all Congressmen or even Congress leaders.

The utterances of the Congress leaders also largely negative the view that the outbreak was a sudden and spontaneous popular reaction to the arrest of Gandhi and other leaders and not a premeditated course of rebellion. In reply to such a suggestion "the Government spokesman in the Central Assembly pointed out that the disorders had begun simultaneously at widely separated points, that the worst trouble had been located in a vital strategic area, that expert technical knowledge had been displayed and special tools used in the assault on communications, and that discrimination had been shown in the conduct of sabotage from which, for instance, the plant and machinery of private industrialists were exempted—all of

which seemed to be evidence of design and preparation.”⁸⁸ Special attention may be drawn in this connection to the circular issued by the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee, mentioned above.⁸⁹

These, however, do not constitute sufficient evidence for the view that the movement of 1942 was planned beforehand and directed by the Congress. There is not even any reasonable ground for such an assumption in view of the well-known views of Gandhi against secret organisation and violence of any kind. For it is difficult to believe that at the moment when Gandhi was again placed at the helm of affairs, any leader of the Congress, whatever may be his personal views, would dare conceive, far less carry out, any such plan as would openly flout non-violence, behind his back. The facts and circumstances, cited by the Government to prove it, easily lend themselves to other interpretations. The following seems to be a more reasonable and probable one.

As we have seen above, the old revolutionary—the so-called terrorist—party continued to play an important part throughout the period when non-violence of Gandhi dominated Congress politics, and had its underground organizations and Associations which repudiated Gandhi’s leadership and his methods. As noted above, a number of revolutionaries had joined the Non-co-operation movement of Gandhi, but were disillusioned after its suspension. Many of them had rejoined the revolutionary groups whose main object was to keep alive the spirit of violence leading to armed rebellion against the British for achieving independence. Reference has been made above⁹⁰ to the Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association and its great heroes, specially Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta, who threw bombs at the floor of the Assembly Hall, New Delhi. They publicly stated that they repudiated non-violence of Gandhi and their chief object in throwing

the bombs was to rouse the nation from the lethargy and inactivity in the national struggle for freedom brought about by the policy of Gandhi. How great was the success of their revolutionary propaganda may be judged from the violent agitation all over India on behalf of Bhagat Singh. It has been admitted by the author of the official history of the Congress, an ardent admiring devotee of Gandhi, that at the time of the Karachi Congress in 1931, it was doubtful whether Gandhi or Bhagat Singh occupied the chief attention of India.⁹¹ There were black flag demonstrations against Gandhi and he had to be taken away from the train before it reached the Railway Station where the demonstrators were waiting to receive him. Indeed Gandhi had to bend his head before the storm and supported the resolution about Bhagat Singh though he opposed a similar resolution a few years before even at the risk of losing his two such staunch supporters as Motilal Nehru and C. R. Das. As a matter of fact, Gandhi fully realized the growing influence of revolutionary ideas over young men, and it is not without good reason that the revolutionaries claimed that they practically, though indirectly, forced Gandhi to renew the struggle for freedom, in 1930 and again in 1942; for he feared that otherwise he would lose the leadership of the country and the initiative would pass into the hands of the revolutionary young men. Gandhi himself admitted that one of his motives in undertaking non-violent *Satyagraha* or Civil Disobedience was to ward off the evils he apprehended from the growing strength of the revolutionary ideas. In other words, he regarded his movement as a safety-valve for youthful energy and patriotic ardour which would otherwise flow through a different channel of a violent kind. It may be safely presumed that the professional revolutionaries had a large volume of support from the masses whose natural instinct of sympathy with them

and their programme was merely checked and restrained, to some extent, by their great veneration for Gandhi. How strong was this revolutionary feeling may be gathered from the fact that shortly after the arrest of Gandhi in 1942, the Socialist wing of the Congress under the leadership of Jayaprakash Narain, who was loved and esteemed by Gandhi, repudiated the Gandhian non-violence and spoke the language of violence and adopted a revolutionary programme, as will be described later.

Such being the situation, it is not difficult to imagine that resentment at the arrest of Gandhi and the absence of his restraining hand violently reacted on the amorphous groups of people who had no specific instructions to follow but were urged to pursue their individual inclinations. The revolutionaries must have taken full advantage of the situation. They had their own organizations and a ready technique of violence to be carried through different stages according to circumstances. We have it on the authority of Horace Alexander that "a section of younger Congressmen, some of whom were impatient with Gandhi's delays and hesitations", tried to procure arms and actually set bomb factories in several places⁹² It was alleged by the Government that the wife of a member of the Working Committee of the Congress was actively engaged in planning "the bomb outrages and other acts of terrorism."⁹³ This shows how narrow was the gap between the mentality of the professed revolutionaries and that of even important members of the Congress. The same thing is proved by the following instructions issued by Jayaprakash Narain when he took up the leadership of the 1942 movement after escaping from prison, as will be related later.

"Dislocation is an infallible weapon for people under slavery and subjection and with which he has all along fought against the ruling power. To efface all such

instruments as have been devised and adopted by rulers for keeping people in bondage and fleecing them, to dismantle all tools and machineries, to render ineffective all means of communications, to reduce buildings and godowns to ashes,—all these come under dislocation. So cutting wires, removing of railway lines, blowing up of bridges, stoppage of Factory work, setting fire to oil tanks as also to *thanas*, destruction of Government papers and files—all such activities come under dislocation and it is perfectly right for people to carry out these....”⁹⁴

This type of mentality in the Congress camp did not originate with Jayaprakash, for we find it also in the Andhra circular, mentioned above. Its genesis need not be traced to any central organization of the Congress, but its adoption may be more readily explained by the well-known revolutionary ideology and tactics familiar throughout India.

The view propounded above readily explains in a rational manner the most peculiar characteristic of the 1942 Movement, namely an indissoluble and indistinguishable admixture of the Gandhian spirit of non-violent mass resistance and the revolutionary programme based on violence.

But whatever we may think of the revolutionary party's influence on the campaign of 1942 at the beginning, there is no doubt that when it was sternly put down within three or four months by the ruthless measures of the Government, it was driven underground, and a definitely revolutionary programme was deliberately adopted. In the second half of October the Police arrested 14 persons at Daltonganj on the charge of organizing “terrorist” plans and seized from one of them a bundle containing two loaded revolvers, 23 rounds of ammunition and five electric torches. During the same month, in Bihar alone, there was a bomb explosion in a village, and the Police seized a country-made pistol with 380 cartridges in a house, 17 boxes

of Mills-grenades in a jungle, and a live bomb with ingredients for the manufacture of explosives. Political absconders, mostly from Bihar, went to Nepal and collected arms and ammunitions.⁹⁵

These were revolutionary activities, pure and simple. Perhaps encouraged by these news and with a view to guiding the activities properly, six political prisoners escaped from the Hazaribagh Central Jail on 9 November, 1942. The most prominent among them was Jayaprakash Narain, the leader of the Socialist group in the Congress, to whom reference has been made above. He secretly visited different parts of India with a view to organizing a Central Action Committee. But the policy and programme he laid down were radically different from those of Gandhi. He openly repudiated Gandhi's policy of non-violence in a letter addressed "To All Fighters for Freedom" and dated "Somewhere in India, December, 1942."⁹⁶ "My own interpretation", said he, "of the Congress position—not Gandhiji's—is clear and definite. Congress is prepared to fight aggression violently if the country became independent. Well, we have declared ourselves independent, and also named Britain as an aggressive power; we are, therefore, justified within the terms of the Bombay resolution itself, to fight Britain with arms. If this does not accord with Gandhiji's principles that is not my fault."

He further observed, in the same letter: "I should add that I have no hesitation in admitting that non-violence of the brave, if practised on a sufficiently large scale, would make violence unnecessary, but where such non-violence is absent, I should not allow cowardice, clothed in Shastric subtleties, to block the development of this revolution and lead to its failure."

It is thus obvious that Jayaprakash and his associates moved far away from Gandhi and veered towards the policy and principle of the revolutionary party. That

the practical programme chalked out by them was in full agreement with this policy would appear from the instructions issued by Jayaprakash, quoted above, which were in right revolutionary style. But that the Congress Socialist group was full-fledged revolutionary in spirit and action was further proved when "a prominent absconding Socialist was arrested at Gaya on 14 November, 1942, and the Police got six live cartridges from him."⁹⁷

Jayaprakash organized a "Central Action Committee" which met in Delhi and approved of his programme. About the genesis and nature of this programme Jayaprakash writes in September, 1943 :

"It is well known that the Working Committee had not prepared a plan of action but merely requested Gandhiji to assume command of the struggle. Gandhiji, in his turn, had also no plan of action. He had sketched the merest outlines in his address to the A. I. C. C. That outline and his articles in the *Harijan* were all that the people had before them and they formed the basis of that detailed programme which was prepared by those Congressmen who were left behind, and who hastily met in Bombay to lay the foundations of that "illegal" Congress organization which has functioned since then. That programme still is the framework of the National Struggle...the conscious basis of the programme which Congress organizations have followed since August, 1942, has been non-violence, as interpreted by the people in authority during this period."^{97a} Although the orthodox followers of Gandhi, like Sucheta Kripalani did not approve of the programme, Jayaprakash stuck to it, visited Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, established a network of secret organizations to carry out his programme of the 'Peoples' Revolution', and finally fixed his headquarters in Nepal, where he trained the *Azad Dasta* or guerilla bands to carry on works of dislocation and paralyze alien administration.⁹⁸

Jayaprakash was joined in Nepal by a number of revolutionaries and they carried on their activities for two months. He was, however, arrested with many of his associates in May, 1943, and put in Hanumannagar jail. But one night a band of revolutionaries, numbering 50 according to Government Report raided the jail and rescued Jayaprakash with six others. He left for Calcutta and tried to establish contact with the Azad Hind Fauz, whose history will be told in the next Chapter. But he was arrested again on 18 December, 1943.⁹⁹

Some revolutionary groups in Bihar continued the work of paralyzing British administration. One of these, under the leadership of Siaram Singh, performed many remarkable feats till 1944.¹⁰⁰ Similar isolated organizations were also formed in many other Provinces. But the movement launched in 1942 lost its vigour even before the end of the year, and no trace of it remained after 1944.

That the movement was practically crushed by force by the Government within two or three months, and failed to achieve any solid or tangible result, not to speak of the end for which it was launched, admits of no doubt. It was clearly recognised by the Congress itself as would appear from an appeal issued by the A. I. C. C. towards the end of November, 1942.

It is admitted at the very outset that it was not an easy task to paralyze the administration in urban areas and therefore, though "the towns were first to flare up into flames, it was inevitable that they should be overpowered with superior military force." Even in rural areas only for one or two months the apparatus of civil administration was brought to a standstill, but after that the popular movement was crushed by brutal military force. It is frankly admitted that "our ranks have been depleted ; our resources, in the form of local assistance in rural areas, and active enthusiastic support from village young men have

been reduced by repression.”

The A. I. C. C. therefore proposed a last ditch fight on the basis of the following programme :

1. The peasantry should refuse to pay the land-tax and obstruct the revenue and police officers to collect the tax. Even a military invasion should be rendered ineffective by flight into the jungles.

2. Non-sale of food-crops and cattle.

3. Non-acceptance of paper money.

4. Emphasising upon the people the danger of food and cloth famine.

5. Organisation of *Swaraj Panchayat* and boycotting of revenue or police officers.

6. Roads, telegraphs and railways to be destroyed to defeat the British military.

But this appeal fell flat on the people. The movement had lost its momentum. The Congress had misfired its last shot and the battle was lost. Valour, courage and heroic self-sacrifice could not make up for the lack of leadership and necessary equipment.

D. GENERAL REVIEW

Gandhi himself deplored the violent character of the outbreak of 1942,¹⁰¹ and both Jawaharlal Nehru¹⁰² and Abul Kalam Azad¹⁰³ publicly expressed the same view. But some orthodox Gandhiites out-Heroded Herod himself. Thus Diwakar described the struggle of 1942 as predominantly non-violent and “incomparable with anything in past history.”¹⁰⁴ He thus places it above the Civil Disobedience movement of Gandhi launched in 1930. He presumably forgets that Gandhi absolved himself from all responsibility for the struggle of 1942, and unless one is prepared to accuse him of deliberate falsehood, no credit—or discredit—for what actually happened in 1942 really belongs to him. This point must be clearly understood in any assessment of the struggle of 1942 or of the part played

by Gandhi in India's battle for freedom. Gandhi had fired his last shot (of course figuratively) in 1932 and missed. For ten years he remained a non-combatant. On 8 August, 1942, he again pulled his trigger but there was no shot because he forgot to put any cartridge in the chamber. Then he retired, finally, from direct and active participation in India's struggle for freedom.

Far from claiming any credit for the unique achievement of 1942—as Diwakar put it—both Gandhi and the Congress offered apology and explanation for the 'madness' which seized the people participating in it. The resolution of the Working Committee of the Congress, dated 11 December, 1945, referred to the events during 1942-45 "as a series of impulsive and heroic, albeit undirected, aberrations."^{104a} Jayaprakash Narain most emphatically asserts that "to fasten the August programme on Gandhiji is a piece of perjury of which only the British ruling class can be capable."^{104b}

It was repeatedly urged both by Gandhi and on behalf of the Congress that the violent items of the campaign would not have come into operation but for the terrorism of the Government. In support of this view it is pointed out that the popular reaction to the arrest of Gandhi and other leaders was very mild on the 9th and 10th and assumed a violent character only on the 11th after the Government had broken up peaceful processions by *lathi-charge* and firing. This view has been clearly expressed by Nehru¹⁰⁵ and also in the official history of the Congress.¹⁰⁶ But it was by no means confined to the Congressmen or even to the Indians. Horace Alexander, a well-known British journalist, who toured India during the period, also says that it was the "repression let loose by the police that goaded to violent fury crowds that intended to act quite peacefully."¹⁰⁷ Gandhi himself wrote to Lord Linlithgow, that it was

43V3

the 'leonine violence' which goaded the people to acts of violence—even to the point of madness. He held "the drastic and unwarranted action of the Government responsible for the reported violence." Indeed the point was emphasized again and again by Gandhi in his prolonged correspondence with the Viceroy from 14 August, 1942, to 7 February, 1943.¹⁰⁸

The followers of Gandhi honestly believed that the failure of 1942 movement was due to the absence of Gandhi. This may be legitimately doubted unless we have good grounds to believe that Gandhi had some brand new weapons in his armoury the potency of which was not tested before. As there is no evidence of this we can only surmise that Gandhi would have adopted some form of non-violent *Satyagraha*.

If the movement had remained strictly non-violent and under the leadership of Gandhi, there is no reason to suppose that it would have been more successful than those of 1921 and 1930 which had such an ignoble end. The non-violent *Satyagraha*, tried under the best auspices, had proved a failure, and it is futile to expect that the British who were not prepared to make any grant of freedom to India while the Japanese were knocking at the door of India would have cared much for the non-violent *Satyagraha* of Gandhi. They had indeed more reasons to be afraid of the violent outbreak of 1942, as by disrupting communications and in various other ways it impeded the war efforts to a very considerable extent. But even then they chose to fight rather than yield. The underlying principle of *Satyagraha*, namely the soul-force and the conversion of the enemy by silent sufferings, would probably have as much or as little influence upon Churchill, as it had upon Willingdon and Jinnah.

But apart from the speculation of what Gandhi's leadership might have accomplished, everyone must fully grasp

the all-important truth that Gandhi and the Congress leaders must, or at least should, have been fully aware of the possibility, if not certainty, of the arrest of Gandhi as soon as the "Quit India" movement took a practical shape or was even resolved upon. That such a contingency was actually foreseen by the Congress leaders is clear from their speeches quoted above, urging upon everybody to act on his own initiative if the leaders were clapped into prison. The absence of Gandhi cannot therefore be accepted as a valid excuse for failure. Far more damaging to the Congress is the plea that the arrangements for the campaign were not completed when the leaders were arrested. It would be perhaps more correct to say that the arrangements were not even begun. But by offering such an excuse the Congress stands self-condemned. It would be universally considered as the height of folly on the part of a Government to declare war before preparing the plan of campaign and making all necessary arrangements for the same. What would be the legitimate verdict of the public on the Congress if on its own admission—what was undeniably true—the A. I. C. C. passed a resolution sanctioning Civil Disobedience on a mass scale, and the leaders publicly urged the people to fight to a finish and "Do or Die", and yet even the *general plan* of the 'unarmed revolt' was not ready, not to speak of the *detailed programme*? Nothing but an almost insane credulity would make one seriously believe that the British Government would allow the Congress leaders, after they have declared open rebellion and asked the British to quit India, to go on making preparations on an elaborate scale to give effect to the formal resolution passed to that effect, without making the most desperate effort to nip it in the bud and crush it with all the force that they could command, particularly at a moment when they themselves were faced with one of the gravest crises in

their history. The Congress leaders must, or should, have known all this before they staked everything on this final campaign, as they put it, with a grim resolve to do or die. They neither did nor died, but cannot absolve themselves from responsibility for the death and sufferings caused to the rank and file during the outbreak of 1942.

It is not unlikely that Gandhi himself, in the solitude of his prison, fully realized this responsibility on his part, and it may be regarded as one of the reasons, if not the main reason, for his undertaking a fast for 21 days for self-purification. At least Azad, one of his closest associates, seems to take this view. After referring to the miscalculations of Gandhi, as shown above, in respect of the campaign of 1942, Azad observes: "He accepted the responsibility for what had happened and as was usual with him, he was planning to undergo the fast as an expiation for the situation. I could not see any sense in his fast on any other hypothesis."¹⁰⁹

The revolt of 1942 threw up one prominent all-India leader, namely, Jayaprakash Narain, mentioned above. His appeal to "All Fighters for Freedom", referred to above, is a revealing document of first rate importance, throwing light on the gradual passing away of Gandhian non-violence which had hitherto dominated the Congress politics. He assigns two causes for the failure of the outbreak of 1942, namely, "lack of efficient organization and of a complete programme of National Revolution." As regards the first, he observes: "The lack of organization was so considerable that even important Congressmen were not aware of the progress of the Revolt, and till late in the course of the rising it remained a matter of debate in many Congress quarters whether what the people were doing was really in accordance with the Congress programme". As to the second, he points out that "*after the first phase of the Rising was over there was*

no further programme placed before the people. After they had completely destroyed the British Raj in their areas, the people considered their task fulfilled, and went back to their homes not knowing what more to do. Nor was it their fault. The failure was ours; we should have supplied them with a programme for the next phase."¹¹⁰

Jayaprakash no doubt hit at the two really weak points, but, as has been pointed out above, these two defects were inherent in the campaign itself as conceived by Gandhi. Incredible as it may seem to a layman, the great saint-cum-political leader, in the year 1942 A.D., launched a *dharma-yuddha* (Righteous War) of the Epic Age in which the adversary was trusted not to attack the enemy until he had time to fully prepare himself for it. The British, however, were only politicians and not saints, and their military tactics were not derived from the *Mahabharata* and the *Manusamhita*. They struck hard and mercilessly, without caring for laws and morality, ancient or modern. The people responded to the cry of "Do or Die", and flung themselves into the last battle for India's freedom as the Congress leaders themselves put it. But left to themselves, without any leadership or plan, programme and organization, they became victims to sufferings and outrages which beggar description, though their courage and sacrifices won them undying fame. The campaign of 1942 would go down in history as an instance of hopeless incompetence and utter mismanagement on the part of the Congress leaders.

But there is also a bright side of what may be termed the last fight for freedom in India against the British. The great revolt of 1942 was really a soldiers' battle. The General bungled, but all glory to the Soldiers who gave a good account of themselves and laid down their lives as martyrs to the cause of their country's freedom. The following tribute paid by Sardar Patel would find an

echo in many hearts : "Never before had such widespread uprisings happened in India in the history of the British Raj, as they did during the last three years. We are proud of the spirit in which the people reacted. ... The leaders were all of a sudden kidnapped from the midst of the people and people acted on the spur of the moment... ... Gandhiji may not be there to guide the next struggle. Non-violence had taken no doubt deep roots, but one had to face the reality that violence was the order of the day in the whole world. It would be like the Devil quoting the scriptures, if the world outside criticised India if she switched over from non-violent to violent attempt to regain independence."

IX. NON-CONGRESS POLITICS, 1943-45

1. THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

The 'Quit India' movement of Gandhi ended in failure and he was not destined to play any further active part in the struggle for India's freedom. Gandhi also miserably failed in the chief object of his political life, namely, the establishment of Hindu-Muslim unity. It was probably beyond the capacity of any political leader to achieve it, and Gandhi's failure need not cause any great surprise. The real surprise is the frequent change in the attitude of Gandhi in this respect in later years. From the very beginning of his political career in India he was the greatest champion of the cause of Muslims, both in and outside India, among the Hindus. As mentioned above, he was even prepared to sacrifice vital interests of India in order to placate the Muslims, and always held that the Hindu-Muslim unity was a *sine qua non* for the achievement of India's freedom.^{110a} But suddenly, on 15 June, 1940, he made a public statement, quoted above,¹¹¹ in which he practically ignored the Muslims as an important political factor in India and even denied the necessity of Hindu-Muslim agreement for political

progress in India. Again, on 18 April, 1942, a few days after the departure of Cripps from India, he wrote in the *Harijan* that the "attainment of independence is an impossibility till we have solved the communal tangle." Curiously enough, in the same article he suggests that the communal differences will disappear "in the very process of securing independence", and if not, "it will then only be the time to quarrel if we must." Further, in that very article he wrote: "If the vast majority of Muslims regard themselves as a separate nation...and want to partition India on that basis, they must have the partition."¹¹² Yet within a fortnight a proposal of Rajagopalachari to negotiate with the Muslims on that basis was turned down by the A. I. C. C. by an overwhelming majority of 120 votes to 15.¹¹³ As we shall see, before a year had passed the same proposal of Rajagopalachari received the blessings of Gandhi who himself carried on direct negotiations with Jinnah on the basis of Pakistan. In the meantime he astounded the whole of India by his declaration on 2 August, 1942, that 'he had no objection to Britain handing over power to the Muslim League or any other party provided it was real independence.'¹¹⁴ But Gandhi did not wait even for a week to learn Jinnah's reaction to his over-generous offer before he launched his 'Quit India' movement.

As could be easily anticipated, the Muslims, generally speaking, kept themselves aloof from the movement. Khaliquzzaman Choudhury, who was justly regarded as one of the few genuine nationalist Muslims, at least at the beginning, writes: "I happened to be at Bhopal about the end of July when Mr. Jinnah also came there and we discussed the 'Quit India' movement and its possible effect on Muslims and our attitude towards it in case the Congress should ultimately decide to launch the campaign. We were in the throes of a dilemma: if we allowed the

campaign to succeed, so enabling Congress to coerce the British Government to yield to its demand to concede independence without any settlement of the Pakistan issue, the Muslim cause would go under for ever : but on the other hand if we opposed the movement there was a great risk of communal riots and widespread violence. After great cogitation we came to the conclusion that complete neutrality in the fight should be observed by the Muslims and no attempt should be made from their side to disturb the peace of the country.”¹¹⁵ Accordingly the Muslim League directed the Muslims to remain completely peaceful and not to indulge in any anti-Congress activities during the whole campaign.

In his big book, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Khaliquzzaman devotes only a single para to the outbreak of 1942 and refers to it as “a very poor show” which “petered out in a very short time.”¹¹⁶ The Muslim attitude was sought to be exploited by the British. Shortly before the outbreak the Inspector General of Police, U.P., asked Khaliquzzaman : “What help will the Muslim League offer to us in this “Quit India” campaign ?” The latter replied : “Would it not involve grave disturbances in the country if the Muslims openly came out to oppose the movement and surely in that case you would not guarantee that they would not be run in under criminal law for arson and murder ?” The Inspector General raising both hands exclaimed ‘how could we do it’ !”¹¹⁷

’ The Muslim point of view has been very frankly and clearly put forth by Khaliquzzaman as follows : “From the outbreak of war ... Gandhiji on several occasions had said, ‘Without a workable arrangement with the Muslims, civil resistance will be resistance against the Muslims’. He was aware that such a workable arrangement had not been arrived at and that the relations between the two communities had become more strained after the visit of

Sir Stafford Cripps. But in spite of that knowledge and in spite of the fact that the Muslims were aware that Rajaji's proposals in the Congress to negotiate with the Muslims on the basis of Pakistan had been rejected, Gandhiji had decided to launch such a campaign, particularly dangerous when the country was threatened by Japanese attack and the fortunes of war were hanging in the balance."¹¹⁸

Immediately after the arrest of the Congress leaders Jinnah issued "a statement deeply regretting that the Congress had declared war on the Government, regardless of all interests other than its own, and appealing to Moslems to keep completely aloof from the movement."¹¹⁹

The League Working Committee met at Bombay on 20 August and passed a lengthy resolution endorsing these views. It was a scathing criticism of the policy pursued throughout by the Congress. The Committee interpreted the action of the Congress as a move to coerce the Government as well as the Muslims to submit to the demands of the Congress whose sole objective had been to secure power for itself and establish the Hindu Raj. The League Working Committee also made an appeal to the United Nations : "Having regard to the oft-repeated declarations of the United Nations to secure and guarantee the freedom and independence of the smaller nations of the world, the Working Committee invite the immediate attention of the United Nations to the demand of 100 millions of Muslims of India to establish sovereign States in the zones which are their homelands and where they are in a majority."¹²⁰

The Hindu Mahasabha, which now dominated Hindu politics in the absence of the Congress, opposed the scheme of Pakistan as strongly as ever. In its annual meeting held in December at Kanpur, the President, Mr. Savarkar, spoke in bitter and provocative language : "The Moslem's duty," he said, "was allegiance to the nation. Their rights and responsibilities were

the same as those of other minorities, and they would be similarly represented on a democratic basis at the Centre. But the 'outrageous and treacherous' demand for Pakistan would not be tolerated."¹²¹ It set up a committee headed by Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 'to make a final effort for an Indo-British settlement on honourable terms.' Mookerjee also carried on talks with Jinnah. But both were fruitless.¹²² The empty outburst of the Hindu Mahasabha only served to strengthen the power and influence of the Muslim League. One important evidence of this was the establishment of the Muslim League Ministry in Bengal, Assam, Sindh, and N. W. F. P. Although the Panjab Ministry had not yet gone definitely into the hands of the League, the sudden death of its Premier, Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, on 26 December, 1942, considerably strengthened the influence of Jinnah even in that Province. Thus he exercised supreme authority over nearly the whole of the region constituting Pakistan, as conceived, by him.

Jinnah was not perturbed by the almost unanimous opposition of the Hindus to the idea of Pakistan, for he very rightly concluded that the ultimate decision lay with the British and not with the Hindus. But some public utterances of two successive Viceroys made him somewhat nervous in this respect. In his speech at the annual meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce on 17 December, 1942, Lord Linlithgow went out of his way to stress the geographical unity of India, adding that a divided India could not carry the weight that it ought to carry, nor could make its way in the world with a confident expectation of success.¹²³ This statement roused great indignation among the followers of Muslim League, and spurred them to fresh activity.

At the session of the All-India Muslim League held in Karachi in December, 1943, was heard a new

slogan, 'Divide and Quit,' presumably as a counterpart of Gandhi's 'Quit India'. The League resolved to "establish a 'Committee of Action' to organize Muslims all over India to resist the imposition of a unitary constitution and to prepare for the coming struggle for the achievement of Pakistan." But undaunted by any such threat Lord Wavell, who succeeded Linlithgow as Viceroy, repeated the latter's view in his first political speech, namely, his address to the joint session of the Central Legislature on 17 February, 1944. He observed: "You cannot alter geography. From the point of view of defence, of many internal and external economic problems, India is a natural unit. That two communities and even two nations can make arrangements to live together in spite of differing cultures or religions, history provides many examples." "This provoked the Muslim League's official organ to remark: "This drawing in of geography, without reference to history and psychology, is a poor compliment to Lord Wavell's gift of statesmanship."¹²⁴

2. THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Next to the Muslim League, the Communist Party of India (CPI) was fast growing to be the most powerful political organization outside the Congress. Its origin and history up to the Meerut Conspiracy Case has been discussed above.¹²⁵ The effect of this Case upon CPI was twofold. On the one hand, the prolonged trial of the Communist leaders from 1929 to 1933 gained for them wide sympathy of the Indian nationalists. Jawaharlal Nehru and Ansari joined the committee set up to arrange for the defence of the Communists under trial; even Gandhi visited them in jail and offered encouragements. More important still was the publicity and propaganda value of the long-drawn trial which the Communists fully exploited.

On the other hand, the CPI suffered a heavy blow,

at least for the time being, by the sudden removal of almost all its prominent leaders. It not only crippled the nascent organization and its activity, but made it difficult for the Communists to face new dangers and difficulties. The chief of these was the new ultra-leftist policy laid down for India by the Comintern. "The CPI's course was now clearly and authoritatively mapped out; it was to dissolve any remnants of the Workers and Peasants Party (WPP), sever connections with all elements of the bourgeoisie, and launch a full-scale attack on Gandhi, Nehru, and the Indian National Congress."¹²⁶ This new policy, pursued during 1928-34, was revealed in the "Draft Platform of Action of the C. P. of India" published in December, 1930. It described the Congress as a "class organization of the capitalists working against the fundamental interests of the toiling masses of our country." It called for "ruthless war on the 'Left' national reformists." "The road to victory", it declared, "is not the method of individual terror but the struggle and the revolutionary armed insurrection of the widest possible masses of the working class, the peasantry, the poor of the towns and the Indian soldiers, around the banner and under the leadership of the Communist Party of India." So far as the present stage of revolution was concerned, its main objects according to the Platform were: "The confiscation without compensation of all the lands, forests and other property of the landlords, ruling princes, churches, the British Government, officials and money-lenders, and handing over for use to the toiling peasantry; cancellation of slave agreements and all the indebtedness of the peasantry to money-lenders and banks." Such a policy was sure to alienate the sympathy of all politically active elements in Indian society. "The Draft Platform was a bill of divorcement from the main nationalist movement."¹²⁷

Thus, during the period 1930-33, when the Civil

Disobedience movement swept the country and the nationalist movement reached the highest peak, the CPI, instead of joining the fight for freedom, did its best to weaken and sabotage the greatest mass campaign India had ever seen.

The CPI established its influence over the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), and in 1931 organized its own Labour Front called the Red Trades Union Congress. But the genuine Trade Unions representing the majority of organized Labour seceded from them. After the Communist leaders convicted in the Meerut Conspiracy case were released, they tried to organize the party and strengthen the Red Trades Union Congress. They called for a wide strike of all textile workers on 23 April, 1934, and it received overwhelming response all over the country. The Government of India took alarm and the Communist Party, along with some dozen Trade Unions under its control, was declared illegal. The Communist Party thereupon went completely underground.¹²⁸

The Communist Party soon realized that the extreme left and anti-Congress views entertained by them had practically isolated them from the political life in India which was gathering tremendous force under the leadership of Gandhi. The Communist High Commands also realized the position and adopted an altogether new plan. It may be described as a policy of infiltration into the Indian National Congress with a view to wrecking it from within. The first step in this direction was to make an alliance with the recently formed Congress Socialist Party dominated by Jayaprakash Narain. The task was not a difficult one. For many Indians, particularly those with a leaning to socialism, felt wide sympathy for Communist principles in general without any attachment to the party itself, and sought from Russia inspiration without active control or direction. The Congress Socialist Party, without any suspicion of the 'Trojan horse' policy on the part of

the Communists, welcomed their proposal and formed a United Front. Rules were laid down for joint action by the All-India Congress Socialist Party, the All-India Trade Union Congress, National Trade Union Federation and the Red Trades Union Congress. This United Front was not only a body for joint action on Party basis ; it also permitted individual Communist to become member of the Congress Socialist Party, and, therefore, also of the Indian National Congress. Thus while the Communist Party, being declared an illegal organization by the Government of India, could not function in its own name, it established its influence in the left wing of the Congress, and used the Congress organization itself for its own propaganda. Several Communists occupied high official positions in the Congress Social Party and some of them became members of the All-India Congress Committee. At about the beginning of 1937 the two Parties concluded the so-called "Lucknow Agreement" which, according to the Socialist interpretation, signified that they would eventually merge in a single organization. Unfortunately, secret documents of the Communist Party came to light which clearly showed that the United Front was being used only as a platform to serve its own ends. It opened the eyes of the Congress Socialists, and matters came to a head in 1938 over the election of the new Executive of the Congress Socialist Party. Jayaprakash Narain made a proposal in which the Communists were given one-third seats. The Communists produced their own list which gave the Communists a clear majority in the Executive. Under the open threat of secession by Jayaprakash and his party in case the Communist list was accepted, the Conference adopted, by a narrow majority, the composite list proposed by him. Two years later, in 1940, the Communists were expelled from the Congress Socialist Party and the United Front was dissolved. But the Communists carried with them the

branches of the Socialist Party in Andhra, Tamilnad and Kerala.¹²⁹

The Communists also infiltrated heavily into students' organizations. The All India Students' Federation was hitherto dominated by nationalist ideas, but a Communist faction soon made its influence felt and the Students' Federation was clearly divided into two groups,—Communist and non-Communist.¹³⁰

The split was complete and the two groups held rival Conferences. The Conference of the Communist students, in December, 1940, led by Hiren Mukherji and K. M. Ashraf, challenged the right of the Indian National Congress to speak for the whole of India and passed a resolution declaring "that the future India should be a voluntary federation of regional States based on mutual confidence." Thus instead of a single nation comprising the people of India as a whole, the Communists upheld the ideal of India as a multi-national State. This resolution was a clear bid to enlist the support of the Muslims by conceding the claim of Pakistan. In various other ways, too, the CPI conciliated the Muslims in an attempt to win them over to Communism. But it did not prove very successful.¹³¹

The Communists had also infiltrated into the Forward Bloc, founded by Subhas Bose, but he, too, like Jayaprakash Narain, soon grew wiser, and rid his party of the influence of the Communists.¹³²

The CPI declared an open war against the Congress leadership. They wanted to "free the national front from the influence of bourgeois reformism and develop the political strength of the proletariat."¹³³ At the Ramgarh session of the Congress (1940) the CPI issued a new statement of policy entitled 'Proletarian Path.'

As a first instalment of the policy chalked out in the 'Proletarian Path' the CPI organized a general strike in the textile industry of Bombay in March, 1941. It

immobilized the majority of the textile mills in the Bombay area, and 150,000 workers were involved at its peak. These pronouncements and activities led the Government to take drastic action against the CPI. They arrested and detained under the Defence of India Rules 480 persons who were "acknowledged Communists or else active supporters of the Communist programme of violent mass revolution." The CPI was disorganized and seriously crippled.¹³⁴

The Communists, all over the world, outside Russia, were puzzled by the Stalin-Hitler Pact in August, 1939. But they had to obey instructions from Moscow. So Hitler ceased to be a Fascist menace, and became a friend of peace, while England and France were the imperialist war-mongers. The Indian Communists were in a more happy position than their comrades in Britain and France. For Indian National Congress, as noted above, declared itself against the war, and the Communists could easily fall in with the popular opposition to the War and pose as genuine revolutionaries and anti-imperialists. As noted above, the CPI zealously played this role.

As a matter of fact the Policy of proletarian Path,' adopted by them, called for a relentless war against the British in India, by a "political general strike in the major industries together with country-wide no-rent and no-tax action," followed by the "storming of military and police stations by armed bands of national militia in rural as well as urban areas, destruction of Government institutions, and actual offensive against the armed forces of the Government on the most extensive scale."¹³⁵

But as soon as Germany invaded Russia on 22 June, 1941, all these were changed as if by the wand of a magician. The authorities of the International Communism demanded that the CPI must support the British war

efforts as they contributed to the defence of the Soviet Union, the Fatherland of Communism. The arrested CPI leaders, who were detained in Deoli camp, accepted this view or 'command', and issued instructions accordingly to the rank and file who were still hiding underground. These protested against this sudden *volte face*, but in vain. After all, blood is thicker than water, and Communism was higher than Nationalism; and so the scattered Communists ultimately fell in with the view of the leaders,¹³⁶ and on 15 December, 1941, passed the following resolution: "We are a practical Party, and in a new situation it is our task not only to evolve a new form of struggle for it, but also to advance new slogans.The key-slogan of our Party (now) is 'make the Indian people play a people's role in the people's war.'¹³⁷ The Imperial War became overnight a People's War by the magic wand of Communism.

The official attitude towards the CPI also underwent a complete change. The Communist leaders were set free, and on 24 July, 1942, the ban against the Communist Party was lifted. Henceforth the CPI functioned as a legal Party and enjoyed the favours of the Government of India. Persons kept in detention on account of Communist activities were employed in high offices, both civil and military, and the Communists were used by the Government as a counterpoise to the Congress. The strange spectacle was thus witnessed in India—the leftist Communist Party being anti-national and pro-imperial, and eating up the very words by which they had so long incited the people against the imperial and war-monger British.

During the great national upsurge of 1942, the Communists acted as stooges and spies of the British Government, and helped them against their own countrymen fighting for freedom. The part played by the Communists can be best understood from confidential correspondence

during the years 1942, 1943 and 1944 between P. C. Joshi, the General Secretary of the Communist Party in India and Sir Reginald Maxwell, Home Member of the Government of India. This file was seen by S. S. Batlivala, a former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, who referred to its contents in an interview given to the press on 22 February, 1946. According to him, it is quite clear from that correspondence that "an alliance existed between the Politbureau of the Communist Party and the Home Department of the Government of India, by which Mr Joshi was placing at the disposal of the Government of India the services of his Party members;" that "the various political drives undertaken by the Party in the name of anti-Fascist campaigns were a part of the arrangement which helped the Government of India to tide over certain crises;" that P. C. Joshi had "detailed certain Party members without the knowledge of the Central Committee or the rank and file of the Party to be in touch with the Army Intelligence Department and supplied the CID chiefs with such information as they would require against nationalist workers who were connected with the 1942 struggle or against persons who had come to India on behalf of the Azad Hind Government of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose."¹³⁸

In a letter published in the *Bombay Chronicle* on 17 March, 1946, Batlivala added further that Joshi had, as General Secretary of the Party, written a letter in which he offered 'unconditional help' to the then Government of India and the Army GHQ to fight the 1942 underground workers and the *Azad Hind Fauz* (Indian National Army) of Subhas Chandra Bose, even to the point of getting them arrested. These men were characterised by Joshi in his letter as 'traitors' and 'fifth columnists.'¹³⁹ Joshi's letter also revealed that the CPI was receiving financial aid from the Government, had a

secret pact with the Muslim League, and was undermining Congress activity in various ways.¹⁴⁰

On the industrial front, the Communists, using the control they exercised over the AITUC, similarly exerted their utmost to keep the workers out of the national unrest. The Party which had called for strikes, strikes and more strikes, now demanded work, work and no strikes.¹⁴¹

The Communists did not rest satisfied with sabotaging the national movement for freedom. They sought to destroy the unity of India. "Not only did the Communists support the demand for Pakistan but went much further by saying that every linguistic group in India had a distinct nationality and was therefore entitled, as they claimed was the case in the USSR, to the right to secede."¹⁴²

As most of the nationalist leaders were in jail or in hiding, the Communists had the field left to themselves, and were able to capture many organizations of the labour, students and peasants. They even infiltrated into the All-India Women's Conference and many members in non-party capacity set up literary and cultural organizations which might serve as centres of propaganda.¹⁴³ But this success was shortlived. After the war was over the Communist Party was thoroughly discredited and lost the good faith and esteem of the people for the anti-national part it had played in the recent struggle for freedom. So when, in 1945, the Congress began to function again, the Communist Party tried to curry favour with Gandhi and the Congress. But Gandhi was not impressed and the Communists were excluded from the Congress.¹⁴⁴

The almost overnight transformation of the Communist attitude towards the War at the bidding of Moscow showed the Communist Party of India in its true colour,

and it failed to win a single seat at the general election to the Central Legislative Assembly in 1945. It lost the influence it had acquired in the Women's Conference and the various cultural organizations. The control over the working class also passed from their hands. For both the Nationalists and Socialists formed their own trade union centres (National Trade Union Congress and the Hind Mazdoor Sabha) which soon outstripped the All India Trade Union Congress in membership and importance.

X. BRITISH ATTITUDE AFTER 1942

When the year 1942 drew towards its close the political condition in India showed an outward calm after the storm. An interesting episode during the period immediately following the outbreak of 1942 was a prolonged correspondence¹⁴⁵ between Gandhi and the Viceroy, beginning on 14 August, 1942, each accusing the other as responsible for the violent disturbances in 1942 which both equally deplored. Gandhi failed to convince Linlithgow of his guilt and was profoundly moved by the "privations of the poor millions due to India-wide scarcity" and the 'tale of woe caused by the repressive measures of the Government' which, according to him, "displaces the Mosaic law of tooth for tooth by that of ten thousand for one". So on 29 January, 1943, he wrote: "If then I cannot get soothing balm for my pain, I must resort to the law prescribed for *Satyagrahis*, namely a fast according to capacity," stating the period to be from 9 February to 2 March, 1943.¹⁴⁶

The Government offered to release Gandhi during the fast—a concession which the latter refused—but declined to set him free. There was a great commotion all over India and prominent Indian leaders appealed to the Viceroy and Prime Minister of Britain; three members of the Governor-General's Executive Council resigned

in protest. But the Government stood firm and Gandhi survived the fast.

Lord Linlithgow retired from his Viceroyalty on 20 October, 1943, after holding that office for 7 1/2 years, longer than any other Viceroy. He left India in the grips of a dreadful famine for which the Government's scorched-earth policy was mainly responsible. There was an all-round economic distress caused by high prices and shortage of essential commodities. As Sapru remarked, Linlithgow left India much more divided than it was when he came here. As against all these there was hardly any positive achievement to his credit. He established peace after the violent outbreak, but it was the peace of the grave. Lord Wavell, who succeeded Linlithgow as Viceroy, was the Commander-in-Chief of India during the August disturbances in 1942.

The Great War was not yet over but the Allies had turned the corner and a victorious end was in sight. This had evidently a great reaction on the Congress. It had boycotted the legislatures, but now those members who were outside jail attended the Central Legislative Assembly and, in alliance with the Muslim League members, defeated a series of Government measures, including the Finance Bill. Even Gandhi's attitude changed. He gave up the demand for 'Quit India', and on 9 July, 1944, granted an interview to Stewart Gelder, a correspondent of the *News Chronicle*, London, in order to convey his new policy to the Viceroy. "It was his purpose", said he, "to help and not hinder the Allied war effort. He had no intention of offering civil disobedience. History could never be repeated; he could not take the country back to 1942. The world had moved on during the last two years and the whole situation had to be reviewed *de novo*. Today he would be satisfied with a national Government in full control of civil administration and would advise

the Congress to participate in such a government if formed.”¹⁴⁷

“On 27 July (1944) Gandhiji wrote to Lord Wavell to the effect that he was prepared to advise the Working Committee to renounce mass civil disobedience and to give full co-operation in the war effort, if a declaration of immediate Indian independence were made and a national government responsible to the Central Assembly were formed, subject to the proviso that during the pendency of the war, military operations should continue as at present, but without any financial burden upon India.”¹⁴⁸

The very next day, 28 July, the Secretary of State for India told the British House of Commons that Gandhi's proposals “obviously did not form even the starting-point for a profitable discussion.”¹⁴⁹ After this rude rebuff Gandhi probably realized that the only hope lay in an agreement with the Muslim League. During his fast in February, 1943, Rajagopalachari saw him in jail and got his blessings to his plan of negotiating with Jinnah on the basis of Pakistan, though it was rejected by the A.I.C.C. in May, 1942, as mentioned above. Rajagopalachari thereupon had been carrying on negotiations with Jinnah. This prepared the ground and so great was the change¹⁵⁰ wrought upon Gandhi that he himself now suggested to Jinnah that they should meet and talk over the matter. Gandhi's letter was most pathetic in tone and shows the importance which the Congress High Command now attached to the Muslim League. It was a striking contrast to the high and mighty attitude displayed by Nehru in rejecting Jinnah's offer of Coalition Ministry in 1937.¹⁵¹ Six years had wrought a marvellous change in the balance of power in Indian politics. Gandhi wrote to Jinnah on 17 July, 1944: “I have *always* been a *servant* and friend to you. Do not disappoint me.”¹⁵² Jinnah turned down

Rajagopalachari's proposal¹⁵³ as offering "a shadow and a husk, a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan,"¹⁵⁴ but he agreed to discuss the matter with Gandhi.

Gandhi's offer to negotiate with Jinnah on the basis of partitioning India created a sensation and particularly provoked the indignation of the Hindu and Sikh minorities in the Panjab and of the Hindus of Bengal. As could be expected, the most bitter criticism was made by the Hindu Mahasabha. Savarkar echoed the sentiments of the Hindus all over India when he asserted that 'the Indian provinces were not the private properties of Gandhiji and Rajaji so that they could make a gift of them to any one they liked.'¹⁵⁵

The Gandhi-Jinnah talks commenced on 9 September, 1944, and continued till the 27th, but the two failed to arrive at an agreement. The concrete offer made by Gandhi was a partition of India into Hindusthan and Pakistan on a basis which did not materially differ from the Plan finally accepted in 1947. The main point of difference was the refusal of Gandhi to accept Jinnah's view that the Muslims formed a separate nation in India with the right to self-determination. The Gandhi-Jinnah talks had only two definite results. In the first place, both Jinnah and his League had an inordinate accession of strength at a time when they needed it most. "The League ministries in Bengal, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province were in none too stable a position. Moreover, the refusal of Khizr Hyat Khan, the premier of the Punjab, to change the 'Unionist Ministry' in the Punjab into a 'Muslim League Coalition Ministry', had not enhanced Jinnah's prestige."¹⁵⁶ But Gandhi's discussion with Jinnah on the basis of the partition of India put the latter on a high pedestal and gave him a position of vantage in Muslim politics. Secondly, the Viceroy, convinced more than ever that an agreement between the Congress and Muslim League was beyond the range of practical politics, took

the initiative to set the stage for the post-war settlement promised by the British. He formulated the plan of a transitional Government at the Centre, which, within the existing framework, would be representative of the political parties and vested with large powers and responsibilities. As it did not meet with the approval of the authorities at home Wavell decided to visit them personally in London. His departure was, however, delayed by two attempts made, respectively, by Sapru and Bhulabhai Desai to frame an agreed constitution for India. Both Jinnah and Ambedkar refused to co-operate with Sapru. The recommendations of the Sapru Committee were opposed by the Muslims for the rejection of Pakistan and recommendation of joint electorates with reservation of seats, and by the Hindus for granting parity to Caste-Hindus and Muslims in the membership of the Constitution-making body and the Central Legislative Assembly.

Bhulabhai Desai, the leader of the Congress Party, and Liaquat Ali Khan, the *de facto* leader of the Muslim League Party, in the Legislative Assembly, reached full agreement on a plan, the basis of which was that Desai and Jinnah should form an Interim Government at the Centre within the present constitutional framework, and appoint all the members of the Executive Council, all of whom, except the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, should be Indians, but not necessarily members of the Legislative Assembly. Desai agreed to the parity of the Caste-Hindus and Muslims in the Executive Council. As Desai claimed that both Gandhi and Jinnah had approved of the plan, Wavell recommended it to the Secretary of State. But while the matter was under discussion between them, Jinnah publicly denied any knowledge of the Desai-Liaquat Pact. Gandhi admitted later that the Pact had received his blessings, but other Congress leaders repudiated it at the time. Desai, like Raja-

gopalachari, had to make an exit from the political stage.^{156a}

Wavell then proceeded to London (23 March, 1945), in order to discuss his plan with the Cabinet. After discussions a general plan was agreed upon. It was also decided to summon a Conference of the leaders of all the parties, and for this purpose to release unconditionally all the members of the Congress Working Committee who were still in prison. Lord Wavell returned to Delhi on 4 June and broadcast his proposals on 14 June. Its main features may be summed up as follows :

A political conference of 21 leaders representing all Parties, would meet at Simla on 25 June to discuss the composition of a new Executive Council of the Governor-General. "It was intended that the new Council would represent the main communities and would include 'equal proportions of Caste Hindus and Muslims.' Except for the Viceroy and for the Commander-in-Chief, who would hold charge of the war portfolio, it would be an entirely Indian Council. The subject of external affairs, which had hitherto been administered by the Viceroy, would be 'in charge of an Indian Member of Council, so far as the interests of British India are concerned.' The new Council would work under the existing constitution ;...It was also proposed to appoint a British High Commissioner in India, as in the Dominions, to represent Great Britain's commercial and other interests in India. Lord Wavell made it clear that the formation of this interim Government would in no way prejudice the final constitutional settlement ;...The main tasks of the new Executive Council would be first, to prosecute the war against Japan ; secondly, to carry on the government of British India (with its manifold tasks of post-war development) until a new permanent constitution could be agreed upon and come into force ; and thirdly, to consider (when the members of the Government thought it possible) the

means by which such agreement could be achieved.”¹⁵⁷

The Press and the public welcomed the proposals, but Gandhi on the one side and Jinnah on the other raised various issues in connection with them. Gandhi took objection to the classification, ‘Caste-Hindus’, whom the Congress was supposed to represent. Jinnah demanded that the Muslim half of the Executive Council must all be members of the Muslim League. The Hindu Mahasabha felt aggrieved, both on account of its exclusion from the Conference, and of the idea of parity between Caste-Hindus and Muslims in the proposed Executive Council.

The members of the Congress Working Committee were released on 15 June and it met in Bombay about a week later. In spite of the misgivings of Gandhi on several points, on which he failed to obtain satisfaction from the Viceroy, the Working Committee decided that the Congress should participate in the Conference.

It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of the discussions in the Conference as it failed to come to an agreement. It will suffice to say that the Conference came to a deadlock over Jinnah’s demand that all the Muslim members of the Executive Council of the Governor-General must be members of the Muslim League. The Congress claimed the right to include in its quota members of all communities. The Congress claim to nominate representatives of the Scheduled Caste was challenged by its representative, Sivaraj, who also demanded that the number of Scheduled Caste members should bear the same ratio to their population as the Muslim members bore to theirs. Jinnah further insisted that some effective safeguards, other than the Viceroy’s veto, should be provided to protect Muslim interest from majority decisions of the Executive Council. It was, of course, impossible to reconcile all these claims. As the Viceroy expressed his inability to accept the demands of Jinnah, the Muslim

League refused to co-operate. On 14 July, 1945, the Conference met for the fifth and last time when the Viceroy announced that the Conference had failed. Thus ended the last effort of settlement by negotiations before the end of the Second World War, and, perhaps also, the last opportunity of preserving the integrity of India.

The failure of the Conference, however, immensely strengthened the position of the Muslim League. It was now quite clear that the Muslim League could make or mar the constitutional progress of India, as the Government gave it the power to veto any constitutional proposal which was not to its liking. It was also hoped and feared by many that its extravagant claim that it alone represented the Muslims of India would, in near future, be conceded, at least in fact if not in theory. No Muslim outside the League had, therefore, any chance of a political career in future. The Muslim League loomed large as the only door through which the Indian Muslims could enter into positions of power and profit. No wonder, therefore, that the "wavering and middle-of-the-road Muslim politicians tended to gravitate to the Muslim League." This was particularly welcome to Jinnah as the supremacy of the League was not yet securely established at the time, as mentioned above.

CHAPTER X

SUBHAS BOSE AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY (I. N. A.)

I. SUBHAS BOSE IN EUROPE

While Cripps was carrying on futile negotiations with the Congress leaders in India, Subhas Bose was engaged in negotiations of a different kind with Germany and Italy which had a far greater influence on shaping India's future destiny. His unwearied activities culminated in one the of most important episodes of the Freedom Movement in India, namely, the formation of the *Azad Hind Fauz* or the Indian National Army, generally referred to as I. N. A. ,

Reference has been made above to the political activities of Subhas Bose and we have seen how, after being twice elected President of the Indian National Congress, his fundamental differences with Gandhi, in respect of both policy and tactics, forced him to quit the Congress and form a new party known as the Forward Bloc.

When the war-clouds were gathering in Europe, Bose correctly read the signs of the time and looked upon the impending war between England and Germany as a great opportunity to strike a blow for the freedom of India. He believed in the wisdom of the old Irish cry—'England's necessity is Ireland's opportunity'—and tried to convert Gandhi and other Congress leaders to his policy of securing the aid of England's enemies to fight against her. But Gandhi's strict adherence to non-

violence, and perhaps, to a certain extent, his sympathy for England in dire distress, stood in the way of accepting Bose's advice, even after war had actually broken out as Bose had foreseen.

The British Government naturally looked upon Bose as a dangerous revolutionary, and arrested him on 2 July, 1940, under Section 129 of the Defence of India Rules. Even while he was in detention in the Presidency Jail, Calcutta, he was undergoing trials in two criminal suits brought against him by the Government. He decided to go on hunger-strike and on 26 November, 1940, addressed a long letter to the Governor of Bengal and his Ministers, two sentences of which read as follows : "The individual must die, so that the nation may live. Today I must die, so that India may win freedom and glory."¹ He commenced his fast on 29 November, 1940, but as he developed alarming symptoms, the Government released him on 5 December.

After his release Bose remained quietly in his own house in Elgin Road, Calcutta, which was under strict surveillance by the Police. He was last seen there on 16 January, 1941, but ten days later it was reported that he was not to be found in the house. His sudden disappearance long remained a mystery but his movements are now fairly well-known.

Bose left his house on 17 January, 1941, at about 1-25 A. M. and proceeded by car to Gomoh. Thence he went by Railway train to Peshawar, and then passing through Jamrud and by-passing the Landikotal Fort reached Garhi. He crossed the Indian border on foot, and motored down to Kabul. He then proceeded to Russia with an Italian passport, and on 28 March, 1941, flew from Moscow to Berlin. (Bose's journey from Calcutta to Berlin, full of thrilling details, was a historic one, and its nearest parallel is the escape of Shivaji from the clutches of Aurangzeb.

Bose was well received by Ribbentrop, the right hand man of Hitler, and proposed that (1) he would broadcast anti-British propaganda from Berlin, and (2) raise 'Free Indian' units from Indian prisoners of war in Germany, while (3) the three Axis Powers would jointly make a Declaration of Indian Independence.

Neither Germany nor Italy agreed to the third proposal, but the other two were accepted. The idea of forming Indian military units got an impetus when Germany declared war against Russia on 22 June, 1941. Bose proposed to raise an Indian legion of three Infantry Battalions and a Company of Irregulars which would form part of the German Fifth Column Organization. He was confident of German victory and visualised the triumphal progress of German army across Russia to Central Asia, when his own legions accompanying it would invade India; he hoped that the Indian soldiers of the British Government would fraternise with them and turn against their own masters. Buoyed up with these ideas Bose asked for all Indian prisoners of war in North Africa to be brought to Germany at once. But at first disappointment awaited him. Although British officers and other loyalist influences among the prisoners had been removed, the Indian soldiers showed marked hostility to Bose when he visited their camp, and his speech was interrupted. Bose persisted in his endeavour, but changed his plan. He privately interviewed individual prisoners and made such a good impression upon them that recruits began to pour in steadily and two units were formed in January, 1942.

| 'Bose's presence in Germany was not at first officially admitted, but it became well-known by the beginning of 1942. He attended parties and the Indian community acclaimed him as its leader—*Netaji*—and greeted him with '*Jai Hind*',—a title and a greeting which have

found a permanent place in Indian vocabulary of the Freedom Movement." Many young men also volunteered for the legion. /

The recruitment for Indian legion and its training were rendered possible by the whole-hearted sympathy and support of the German Government. Hitler's earlier non-committal attitude regarding declaration of Indian independence was probably due to the fact that in the secret negotiations between Germany and Russia at the end of 1940, India was included in the Russian sphere of influence when the British power collapsed. The declaration of war against Russia having freed Hitler from his obligation, he now received Bose with honours and treated him as an equal in German Government's dealings with him. Bose and his associates were permitted to use Berlin Radio for broadcasting to India without any censorship.

Bose had also founded Free India Centres in Rome and Paris and raised the legion to its full strength of 3000. But further activities in Germany were suddenly stopped when Bose heard of the phenomenal success of the Japanese against the British, culminating in the fall of Singapore on 15 February, 1942. He instinctively felt that the Far East would provide a more advantageous base for fight against the British, and his presence was needed there.

II. INDIANS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA.

The outbreak of war in the East in 1941 caused a great stirring among the Indians in these regions. Those living in territories freed from European domination organized themselves into associations with the main objects of contributing their quota to the liberation of India from the British yoke and serving the interests of the overseas Indians during the critical period of transition. Such associations were established in a large number of towns

as well as in villages, and attained great popularity. Out of these associations was born the idea of an Indian Independence League, of which they regarded themselves as branches. A definite shape was given to this idea by the great Indian revolutionary, Rash Bihari Bose, whose early activities in India and flight to Japan have been referred to above.² Rash Bihari settled in Japan, married a Japanese girl and became a Japanese citizen. But he never ceased to work for his motherland and it was mainly due to his inspiration and efforts that a Conference was held at Tokyo on 28-30 March, 1942, for the discussion of political issues.

The Tokyo Conference passed a resolution to form an Indian National Army under the direct command of Indian Officers who would conduct the campaign for the liberation of India. An Indian Independence League of overseas Indians was provisionally established throughout Japanese Asia, and it was decided to hold a fully representative Conference of Indians at Bangkok in June.

This Conference was held in Bangkok from 15th to 23rd June, 1942. It was attended by about 100 delegates from Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indo-China, Philippines, Japan, China, Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Hong Kong and Andamans. Rash Bihari Bose was elected Chairman.

The Tricolour Flag of India was raised by Rash Bihari Bose and the Conference formally inaugurated the Indian Independence League (I. I. L) with a definite constitution. The object of the League was defined to be the attainment of complete and immediate independence of India. The Conference passed altogether 35 resolutions, including one inviting Subhas Bose to East Asia. The delegates, after returning from the Conference held mass meetings in their respective localities and explained the discussions and decisions of the Conference. This created tremendous enthusiasm among the Indians, who started local branches of the Indian

Independence League. There were ultimately over two hundred members of the League in Malaya alone.

The Conference at Bangkok was also attended by the representatives of the Indian soldiers who were captured by the Japanese but had renounced their allegiance to the British and espoused the cause of their motherland. This movement requires a more detailed explanation.

In December, 1941, when the Japanese invaded North Malaya, and defeated the British forces there, Captain Mohan Singh of the First Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment, together with another Indian officer, a British Colonel and a number of soldiers, escaped, but after vainly trying to find their way out of the jungle to the safety zone, surrendered to the Japanese. The two Indian officers were taken to Bangkok by Giani Pritam Singh, a holy man who had set up an association there for the independence of India, of the type described above.

Both Giani Pritam Singh and Major Fuzihara, a Japanese military officer, tried to induce Mohan Singh to work for the independence of India. After a great deal of discussion Mohan Singh yielded to their persuasions. After the fall of Singapore on 15 February, 1942, Col. Hunt, on behalf of the British Government, handed over 40,000³ Indian prisoners of war to Major Fujihara, representative of the Japanese Government, who, in his turn, handed them over to Capt. Mohan Singh. Mohan Singh now asked for volunteers from among the prisoners to join the Indian National Army (I. N. A.) or *Azad Hind Fauz* to be organized by him to fight, along with the Japanese army, against the British, in order to drive the latter from India. Many of them joined the I. N. A., but many refused to do so. It has been alleged that not only undue pressure was put upon the recalcitrant sepoys, but they were subjected to physical torture in varying degrees, in order to force them to join the I. N. A. Specific instances

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of such oppression were given by the British Government during the trial of I. N. A. Officers after the War. There is hardly any reliable evidence in support of these allegations, and it is difficult to ascertain the extent, if any, to which this unjustifiable, nay criminal, course was resorted to by the organizers of the I. N. A. The allegation is stoutly denied by Shahnawaz Khan, who was himself, at first, unwilling to join the I. N. A. formed by Mohan Singh.⁴ The net result of Mohan Singh's efforts was that about 25,000 volunteers offered their services before the Bangkok Conference, and by the end of August, 1942, forty thousand prisoners of war signed a pledge to join the Indian National Army under Mohan Singh. A number of young men, without any previous military training, also volunteered their services, and a Military Camp was opened for training them.

Captain Mohan Singh, after his return from the Tokyo Conference, called a conference of Indian military officers in April, 1942. It was at this conference that he first proposed the formation of the Indian National Army as a part and parcel of the Indian Independence Movement. It was a serious problem asking for a momentous decision on the part of the officers, and after a great deal of discussion and clarification the meeting dispersed without coming to any decision.⁵

In the Bangkok Conference Mohan Singh spoke for several hours, describing in detail "how he got in touch with the Japanese military authorities in Malaya and was able to form a small nucleus of the Indian National Army while the campaign was still going on and actually fought against the British while they were retreating from the north to Singapore."⁶ The Conference adopted the following resolutions, among others :

"1. That an Indian National Army be formed comprising the Indian troops and civilians of East Asia.

Capt. Mohan Singh would be the Commander-in-Chief of this Army of Liberation for India. The Indian Independence League would make arrangements for the supply of men, material, and money required by the Indian National Army, and would request the Japanese Government to supply the necessary arms and equipment, ships and aeroplanes required by the Indian National Army which would be commanded entirely by Indian officers and would fight only for the liberation of India.

“2. That a Council of Action be established for carrying out all necessary actions in connection with the Independence Movement and prosecution of the War of Independence.”⁷

It was decided that this Council would consist of a President and four members. Rash Bihari Bose was elected the President and Mohan Singh, one of the four members, took up the portfolio of the Army as well as the position of the Commander-in-Chief. On the 1st September, 1942, the Indian National Army (I.N.A.) was formally established. The Military Department was organized with almost all its Branches. Arrangements were also made for an intensive training of the men of I.N.A. To the normal physical training of soldiers was added a type of mental training in order to rouse their national spirit and patriotism. For this purpose arrangement was made for lectures on national history with special reference to the condition of India under British rule. The trainees were urged to free their motherland from the foreign yoke and exhorted to adopt the three principles laid down by the Indian Independence League, viz. unity, faith and sacrifice.⁸

Unfortunately the progress of work was considerably hampered by several factors. In the first place, there was a considerable number of Indian Officers who were against the formation of I.N.A. ; some of them ultimately

turned traitor and deserted to the British.⁹ Secondly, there was difference of opinion among the members of the Council of Action. This was accentuated by the inability or unwillingness of the Japanese Government to announce their decision regarding the maximum strength of the I.N.A. and publicly declare their policy towards India in unequivocal terms. Mohan Singh, impatient at the delay, sent in a note to the Japanese Government, "demanding a reply by the 23rd of December, failing which they would take independent action." Rash Bihari Bose and others tried to persuade Mohan Singh not to insist on a reply by a specified date, but Mohan Singh did not yield. Matters were brought to a head by some indiscreet and unfortunate remarks by the Head of the Japanese Liaison Office in Burma to the local Chairman of the Indian Independence League. "Mohan Singh wrote a most unfortunate letter to the President of the Council of Action, and issued an order to the Army which he left in a sealed cover. In this order he wrote that if he was arrested the officers should dissolve the Army (I.N.A.) and destroy all documents. He also enjoined on the Officers and men to take an oath not to join any Indian National Army if it were formed again."¹⁰

The President took a serious view of his action which, he considered, was beyond his powers and was against the discipline of the army, and had him arrested. Two other members of the Council of Action resigned, and thus there remained the President and only one member in the Council of Action.¹¹

There were other troubles also during the succeeding period of six months. The young men were impatient and thousands wanted to be trained; when they were refused either for their unfitness or for want of accommodation, they abused the leaders and decided to form a Youth League with a view to controlling the whole movement. Rash Bihari Bose

had a tough job to reconcile the army and the young men and make them work in unison under the Constitution devised by the Bangkok Conference. "So a second Conference of the representatives of the Indian Independence League Territorial Committees was held in the month of April, 1943. After due deliberations, the Constitution was altered in such a manner as to introduce an administrative system, effecting improvements and despatch in the work."¹² But in spite of his unwearied efforts Rash Bihari Bose proved unsuccessful and he must have heaved a sigh of relief when Subhas Bose appeared on the scene. He voluntarily surrendered his position, power and responsibilities to the young leader, and himself retired from active life. But he never recovered from the great strain of these days, and died after a protracted illness on 21 January, 1945. It is only fair to remember that Rash Bihari Bose had laid the foundations of the organization on which Subhas Bose built up a huge structure.

III. SUBHAS BOSE IN THE EAST.

Subhas Bose sent a Radio message from Germany to the members of the Bangkok Conference accepting their invitation to join them. This did not, however, prove an easy job. The sea was guarded by the British ships and the only possible way was to risk a submarine voyage. For a long time the German Government hesitated, and nearly eight months passed before Bose could leave Germany. His departure was kept a profound secret. He talked frequently of his desire to visit the Russian front and had even recorded two speeches to be broadcast after he left. At last on 8 February, 1943, Bose, accompanied by Abid Hassan (founder of the Indian legion at Frankenburg) left Kiel in a German U-boat. The boat made a wide detour in the Atlantic to avoid the British ships, and met the Japanese submarine, 129, which,

by previous arrangement, was waiting at a place four hundred miles S. S. W. of Madagascar. On 28 April Bose and his colleague were transferred by the rubber dinghy to the Japanese submarine which took them across the Indian Ocean to Sumatra. They were met by a Japanese Officer and arrived at Tokyo on 13 June, 1943.

Subhas Bose was received by the Japanese Premier Tojo on the day after his arrival. Tojo was frank and said that whether India was invaded or not, she would come under Japanese control on the defeat of the British. But, he added, Japan had no demands to make on her beyond the necessities of war, and intended to make her independent. He encouraged Bose's project of forming a Provisional Government which would take control of Indian territory as the Japanese forces moved on. As a result of this discussion Tojo made a declaration about India in the Japanese Diet to the following effect :

"Japan is firmly resolved to extend all means in order to help to expel and eliminate from India the Anglo-Saxon influences 'which are the enemy of the Indian people, and enable India to achieve full independence in the true sense of the term.'"¹³

Subhas Bose spoke from Tokyo, over the Radio, of his determination to launch an armed fight against the British from India's eastern borders. The overseas Indians were thrilled with delight at the prospect of participating in this great venture. When Bose arrived at Singapore on 2 July, 1943, he was welcomed with tumultuous enthusiasm by an immense surging crowd who instinctively felt that at last the Man of Destiny had come to lead them on as victors to liberate their own motherland. On 4 July Rash Bihari Bose handed over the leadership of the Indian Independence Movement in East Asia to Subhas Bose and the latter took over the Presidentship of the Indian Independence League in the presence of

five thousand Indians who represented thirty lakhs of Indian nationals spread all over East Asia. He was hailed as *Netaji*—the supreme leader—as in Germany, and henceforth he was always referred to by this honorific title. Netaji revealed to the gathering his decision to form a Provisional Government of Free India and to lead the Indian National Army towards India. Next day, the formation of the *Azad Hind Fauz* was announced to the world; Netaji reviewed all the forces of the *Fauz*—the Indian National Army (I. N. A.)—and gave it the rousing war cry of “*CHALO DELHI*” (On to Delhi) and “*TOTAL MOBILIZATION.*” On 25 August Netaji formally assumed direct command of the I.N.A. Immediately after taking over the leadership of the movement Netaji put through a comprehensive plan of reorganisation and expansion of the I. N. A. with a view to achieving these two goals.

The Recruitment and Training Departments were hard put to it to give practical effect to these ideas. Training Camps were opened for men as well as women. Commands, orders and instructions were given in Hindusthani. After about six months of intensive training the recruits were absorbed into the I. N. A. Part-time training was also given to a number of young men in various branches and sub-branches—and it acted as a safety-valve to the impulses of youthful energy. Women volunteered in large numbers and formed the Rani of Jhansi Regiment.^{13a}

The civil side of the Provisional Government also engaged his attention. Netaji re-organized the civil departments that were already functioning at the headquarters, viz. General, Finance, Publicity and Propaganda, Intelligence, Recruitment and Training. He not only strengthened these departments, but also added the following new ones : (1) Health and Social Welfare ; (2) Women's Affairs ; (3) National Education and Culture ; (4) Reconstruction ; (5) Supply ; (6) Overseas ; (7) Housing and Transport.

Instructions were issued to improve and expand the League organizations throughout East Asia on the above lines. The total mobilization of Indian man-power, money and material was carried in this way throughout Malaya and other countries. Netaji also addressed a series of public meetings all over Malaya and made regular Radio broadcasts addressed to Indians at home.

Having thus made a good start, Netaji thought of inaugurating the Provisional Government. Delegates from all over E. Asia were summoned to Singapore. After discussing the matter with them Netaji held a public meeting at Cathay Hall on 21 October, 1943. There, before an almost hysteric crowd who stormed the precincts of the Cathay Hall and presented indescribable scenes of overpowering feelings and emotions, Netaji read his famous Proclamation setting up the Provisional Government of Free India at Singapore.

The duty of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind (Free India) was thus described in the Proclamation :

"It will be the task of the Provisional Government to launch and to conduct the struggle that will bring about the expulsion of the British and of their allies from the soil of India. It will then be the task of the Provisional Government to bring about the establishment of a permanent National Government of Azad Hind constituted in accordance with the will of the Indian people and enjoying their confidence. After the British and their allies are overthrown and until a Permanent National Government of Azad Hind is set up on Indian soil, the Provisional Government will administer the affairs of the country in trust for the Indian people."

The Proclamation ended with a passionate appeal : "In the name of God...we call upon the Indian people to rally round our banner and to strike for India's freedom. We call upon them to launch the final struggle

against the British and all their allies in India and to prosecute that struggle with valour and perseverance and with full faith in final victory until the enemy is expelled from Indian soil and the Indian people are once again a free nation.”¹⁴

On 23 October the Provisional Government decided at a Cabinet meeting to declare war on Britain and U. S. A. The declaration was broadcast over Radio by Bose himself and San Francisco Radio communicated it to the world.

“In a few days, nine world powers—Japan, Germany, Italy, Croatia, Burma, Thailand, Nationalist China, the Philippines and Manchuria—accorded their recognition to the Provisional Government of Azad Hind.

“On the 28th of October, Netaji flew to Tokyo where he attended the Greater East Asia Conference in the first week of November, and was received by the Japanese Emperor with all honours due to the Head of the State and the Provisional Government of Free India.

“At the Greater East Asia Conference, Premier Tojo announced on the 6th November, 1943, that Japan had decided to hand over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the Provisional Government of Azad Hind. Thus the Provisional Government acquired its first stretch of territory in Free India.

“Returning to Singapore towards the end of December, after visiting China and the Philippines *en route*, Netaji left for the Andamans where he set foot on the first Free India territory on the 31st December, 1943.”¹⁵ It was decided to rename the Andaman and Nicobar, ‘Shahid’ and ‘Swaraj’ Islands, respectively.

As the activities of the Provisional Government grew, and particularly arrangements had to be made for the ensuing military campaign of the I. N. A. against the British, the need of money grew very acute. It is certain

that the Provisional Government, at no stage, had to circumscribe its activity for lack of funds. But how these funds were raised is a moot point to decide as there are diametrically opposite views. One view has been set forth as follows. "Now, as always, money was the greatest single problem. Thus Netaji was always demanding money from his audiences. At first donations flowed in freely from rich and poor, but the early eager generosity did not last and his persuasion gave way to threats. 'I shall wait for one or two more weeks, and I shall see.' he said on October 17th, 'and after that all the steps that I have to take in the name of India, I shall take.' On October 25th, he addressed the merchants of Malaya with severity: 'Legally speaking there is no private property when a country is in a state of war...if you think that your wealth and possessions are your own, you are living in delusion;.....Your lives and your properties do not now belong to you; they belong to India and India alone.....' But, it was no good: Bose required more than petty cash and recognized that he must make a systematic levy on Indian property. This (Lt. Col. A. C.) Chatterji (who later become Chief Administrator of Occupied Territory") was told to devise: there resulted the 'Boards of Management for Raising Funds.' to which from the beginning of 1944 Indians had to declare their assets. Levies of from ten to twenty-five per cent were imposed and collected with progressive vigour."¹⁶

The more favourable view is thus modestly set forth :

"In the sphere of 'Total Mobilization' of money and materials, Indian Independence League Fund Committees were set up in the Branches and Sub-Branchees, with a Central Board of Management to control and direct them, and to issue final receipts to contributors. As in Manpower, so also in Money and Materials, contributions were voluntary. In order to maintain a sense of equity, a

form of assessment was adopted which was a sliding scale of percentage on total wealth. The Board of Management, as also the Committees in the Districts, was composed of leading citizens of the propertied and monied classes and office-bearers of the League. At the Board meetings, rules and regulations were passed, in accordance with the policy of the Movement and the representations that were made from time to time. The basis of valuation of properties, both movable and immovable, were fixed by the Board. However, there were people who contributed much more than their share, and still others who gave up all that they possessed. A few cases there were of people who evaded payments."¹⁷

The truth probably lies midway between the two. In any case it is now very difficult to ascertain the truth, though we have authentic records of magnificent donations.

IV. THE STATUS OF I. N. A.

There was no doubt in the mind of Netaji and his followers that the main task of the Provisional Government was to take part in the Japanese offensive campaign against British India. Steps were accordingly taken to equip the I.N.A. properly for this purpose. But an unexpected difficulty presented itself at the very beginning. When Netaji first raised the question of I.N.A. participating in the proposed Japanese campaign against Imphal (in Manipur, India), Field-Marshal Count Terauchi, Commander-in-Chief of all the Japanese forces in South-East Asia, was not very willing to accept the proposal. The soldiers composing the I.N.A., said he, would not be able to fight as well as Japanese soldiers as they had been defeated in the battle of Malaya and consequently were demoralised. Further, being accustomed to the ease and luxury of the British army they would not be able to stand up to the rigours of a Japanese campaign. Lastly, they were after all, once British merce-

naries and would find it difficult to resist the temptation of deserting to the British where there were better prospects of pay, food and an early chance of meeting with their families. Terauchi therefore proposed that the Japanese Army should do all that was necessary to liberate India, that Bose himself should assist by enlisting the goodwill and sympathy of the Indian people, that the main part of the I. N. A. should be left in Singapore, and that only espionage and propaganda groups should be used in the field.

This proposal, which virtually meant that Netaji should merely play the role of a fifth columnist, gave a rude shock to him. He made a proud and dignified reply. "Any liberation of India secured through Japanese sacrifices," said he, "is worse than slavery." He talked about the national honour of India, insisted that Indians must make the maximum contribution of blood and sacrifice themselves, and urged that the I. N. A. be allowed to form the spearhead of the coming offensive. Terauchi at last consented to the employment of one regiment as a test case. 'If this regiment came up to the Japanese standard', said he, 'the rest of the army would be sent into action.'¹⁸ It was further understood that some I.N.A. troops should remain attached to the different units of the Japanese army as Irregulars. These included the following :

- I. Field Force.
- II. Armoured Vehicles Battalion. It consisted of troops and armoured vehicles.
- III. Bahadur Group. This consisted of picked men who would be detailed in batches for making raids and doing sabotage work behind enemy lines and bringing back as much information and as many prisoners as possible.
- IV. Intelligence Group. These men were specially trained for infiltrating deep behind the enemy

lines for collecting information, spreading propaganda amongst the British Indian troops and the civil population, contacting revolutionary workers in India wherever possible, and for bringing back information.

- V. Reinforcement Group. It consisted of men who had volunteered to enlist in the National Army but were not directly absorbed in the units that were formed. They were sent out to the different units, as reinforcements were required.¹⁹

V. THE I.N.A. CAMPAIGN IN INDO-BURMESE FRONTIER.

1. General Plan

After the main issue was thus settled Netaji decided, in consultation with the military officers, that a new Brigade, known as No. I Guerilla Regiment, should be raised by selecting the soldiers from the other three Brigades, called after Gandhi, Azad, and Nehru, and that this Brigade should go into action first. The Regiment was raised at Taiping in Malaya, in September, 1943, and Shahnawaz Khan was appointed its commander. The soldiers themselves gave it the name, Subhas Brigade, in spite of the objections of Netaji who repeatedly issued instructions against this nomenclature. The Brigade was properly reorganized and an intensive spiritual and military training was given to the soldiers. Netaji frankly told the troops, both of their high mission to liberate their motherland as well as of the extreme wants, privations, and hardships which they would have to suffer. He advised all those who were not prepared for all these to stay behind, but the soldiers with one voice exclaimed: "Netaji, give us a chance and we will prove to the whole world that the so-called Indian mercenary soldiers can fight as gallantly for the liberation

of their country as any other soldier in the world.”²⁰ Netaji also told the soldiers that they should feel proud that they were Indians and that “never at any time were they to accept any orders, racial superiority, or any other form of domination by the Japanese.”²¹

The first batch of the Subhas Brigade left Taiping on 9 November, 1943, and the last batch on the 24th. The departure of the troops was the first occasion for a unique scene which was repeated later. “All the sick and physically unfit soldiers whom the doctors ordered to be left behind at Taiping came to the station and lay down on rails in front of the railway engine and refused to allow the train to start unless they too were allowed to go to the front. They said, ‘We have given a pledge to Netaji that we will sacrifice ourselves for the sake of our motherland. How then could anyone leave us behind and deny us the privilege?’ It was only after a great deal of persuasion and on an assurance being given that they would be sent up to join the Regiment as soon as they recovered, that they allowed the train to proceed.”²²

The main body of the Subhas Brigade arrived in Rangoon early in January, 1944. The soldiers had to cover at least 400 miles on foot, marching on an average 25 miles a day, with about 80 lbs of load carried on their backs. “In their eagerness to reach the front as soon as possible, they generally covered in two days the distance which the Japanese soldiers took five days to travel.”²³

Netaji arrived in Rangoon on 4 January, 1944, on a Japanese plane, and established his advance Head Quarters there. Three days later he discussed with General Kawabe, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Burma, the plan of co-operation between the I.N.A. and the Japanese army. Kawabe proposed that the ‘I.N.A. forces should

be split up into small groups and attached to all the larger Japanese formations.' This was not agreed to by Netaji and ultimately the following was adopted as the basis of co-operation between the I.N.A. and the Japanese forces :

1. No I.N.A. formation should be split into smaller formations than a Battalion.
2. The command of all I.N.A units should remain entirely in the hands of Indian officers.
3. The Japanese and I.N.A units would follow a common strategy, after it has been previously discussed and agreed to by Netaji and the Japanese Commander-in-Chief.
4. The I.N.A. was to be allotted an independent sector of the front.
5. Every inch of Indian territory liberated would be handed over to the I.N.A for administration.
6. The only flag that would fly over Indian territory would be the Indian Tricolour.²⁴

On 24 January, 1944, General Katakura, Chief of the Japanese General Staff in Burma, met Netaji and Shahnawaj and discussed, behind closed doors, the general strategy of the impending campaign against India, and the role that had been assigned in it to the I.N.A. Among other things, "Katakura revealed that it was a part of the Japanese plan to launch a heavy air attack on Calcutta simultaneously with the advance of land forces. Netaji expressed himself against this. He told the Japanese General that there should be no indiscriminate bombing of Indian civilians as it would lead to much panic and suffering, and would probably shake the confidence of the Indian people in him."²⁵ The idea was accordingly abandoned.

2. Subhas Brigade

After the general plan, was finally settled at this

secret meeting, the Subhas Brigade was placed under the direct command, for purpose of operations only, of the Japanese General Head Quarters in Burma. Its commander, Shahnawaz Khan, saw the Japanese Commander-in-Chief who apprised him fully of the military situation at the Indo-Burma border. Shahnawaz writes :


“He told me that the main concentration of British and American forces was at Sadiya-Imphal-Tamu and Tiddim and that they were preparing to attack the Japanese forces with the object of recapturing Burma. He told me that there were powerful British forces at Aijal (probably one Brigade) and Lungleh (one Brigade) which were threatening the left flanks of the Japanese forces, and were in a position to advance to Kalewa and cut off the main supply line of the Japanese forces, and that the intention of the Japanese army was to attack and capture Tiddim-Tamu and Imphal.”²⁶

The role allotted to the Subhas Brigade was as follows : The Battalion No. 1 was to proceed via Prome to the Kaladan valley in Arakan. The Battalions Nos. 2 and 3 were to proceed via Mandalay and Kalewa to the Chin Hill area of Haka and Falam.

On 3 February, 1944, on the eve of the departure of these Battalions from Rangoon, Netaji delivered his farewell speech to the three thousand soldiers who “in full military kit stood rigidly to attention for an hour and a half and listened to every word he said with rapt attention.” He told them that they would be put to the severest test by the Japanese authorities, and the future of I.N.A.’s role in the battle for India’s freedom would depend upon them. He made a stirring appeal to them in the following words : “Blood is calling to blood ! Arise ! We have no time to lose. Take up your arms...We shall carve our way through the enemy’s ranks, or, if God wills, we shall die a martyr’s death,...The road to

CAMPAIGN OF THE AZAD HIND FAUZ

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Delhi is the road to freedom. On to Delhi." The soldiers assured him that they would never bring shame on India's fair name by turning their backs to the front or retreating before the enemy.²⁷

On 4 February, 1944, the Battalion No. 1 of the Subhas Brigade left Rangoon by train for Prome. From Prome they marched on foot via Taungup and Myo Haing and arrived at Kyauktaw (in Akyab) on the Kaladan river, suffering casualties on the way from aerial bombing of the enemy. Here they formed the base in the middle of March, 1944, and inflicted a defeat upon the much-praised Negro troops from West Africa in the British army, while engaged in constructing a bridge over the Kaladan in order to join the two parallel roads running along the eastern and the western banks of the river. The enemy was driven from the eastern bank, leaving 250 dead in the field and large amount of stores. Sixteen of their boats were also sunk. The casualties of the I.N.A. were 14 killed and 22 wounded.

The Indian Battalion, reinforced by Japanese troops, then advanced along both the banks of the Kaladan for about fifty miles north to Paletwa. After a severe fight they captured it and also another place, Daletme in the neighbourhood. From Daletme they could see the frontier of India forty miles to the west and were very eager to reach it. The nearest British post on the Indian side was Mowdok about fifty miles to the east of Cox Bazar. It was captured by a surprise attack during night (May, 1944) and the enemy fled in panic leaving large quantities of arms, ammunitions and rations. "The entry of the I.N.A. on Indian territory was a most touching scene. Soldiers laid themselves flat on the ground and passionately kissed the sacred soil of their motherland which they had set out to liberate. A regular flag-hoisting ceremony was held amidst great rejoicing and singing

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of the *Azad Hind Fauz* National Anthem."²⁸

On account of the difficulty of supply as well as the impending counter-attack by the British forces, the Japanese forces decided to withdraw from Mowdok and advised the I.N.A. Commander to do the same. The I.N.A. officers with one voice refused to do so. "No, sir," they told their Commander, "the Japanese can retreat because Tokyo lies that way; our goal—the Red Fort, Delhi—lies ahead of us. We have orders to get to Delhi. There is no going back for us."²⁹

The Commanding Officer of the I. N. A. thereupon decided to leave one Company under the command of Capt. Suraj Mal at Mowdok to guard the flag and withdraw the remainder. The Japanese, admiring the spirit—almost a suicidal role—of the I. N. A. men, left one Platoon of their own troops to share the fate of the Indians. These Japanese troops were put under direct command of Capt. Suraj Mal. "It was probably the first time in the history of the Japanese army that their troops had been placed under command of a foreign officer."³⁰ Evidently moved by this heroic sacrifice and the brilliant record of the I. N. A. men, "the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Burma went to Netaji and bowing before him said: "Your Excellency, we were wrong. We misjudged the soldiers of the I. N. A. We know now that they are no mercenaries, but real patriots."³¹

Capt. Suraj Mal and his band of heroic fighters stayed at Mowdok from May to September, 1944. During this period they were constantly attacked by the British forces but always succeeded in repulsing them. On one occasion a small post of 20 men was attacked successively three times during the same day by the enemy, about 150 strong with heavy artillery and mortars, and the last one was preceded by aerial bombardment. All the attacks were repulsed, and when Suraj Mal hurried to the

post with a reinforcement of 50 men, he attacked the British base three miles away at dusk. It was so unexpected that the enemy ran helter-skelter in all directions.

The Battalions Nos. II and III left Rangoon on 4 and 5 February and reached Kalewa via Mandalay. They were instructed by the Japanese General to take over charge of the Haka-Falam front—two Japanese posts in Chin Hills—and their main task was to defend this sector against two British Brigades and thus prevent them from cutting the main supply line of the Japanese forces from Kalewa to Tamu and Fort White. They were also to carry out offensive operations on the Haka-Falam front. The I. N. A. was sorely disappointed that instead of being placed on the vanguard of the main Japanese army invading India—as it was mutually agreed upon—it was side-tracked to a comparatively minor task. The Japanese General plainly gave out that the I. N. A. was put in sole charge of a sector in order to test its efficiency, and if it passed the test it would be placed in front of the main Japanese army invading India.

The I. N. A. took over the charge of Falam and Haka from the Japanese. The area was infested by British Guerilla forces, and the I. N. A. by sudden attacks inflicted severe defeats upon them. Some of their exploits were highly creditable. Special mention may be made of the rout of Major Manning's forces at Klankhua, the successful defence of the post on the Klang Klang Road by 20 men of the I. N. A. against 100, and the capture of the British stronghold at Klang Klang.

The Japanese were satisfied of the military skill and efficiency of the I. N. A. and issued instructions "that the main body of the Brigade would proceed to Kohima and would be prepared, on the fall of Imphal, to advance rapidly and cross the Brahmaputra into the heart of Bengal."³² Accordingly about 150 and 300 men of the

I. N. A. were left, respectively, at Haka and Falam, and the rest marched towards Kohima, the capital of the Naga Hills in Assam, where they arrived towards the last week of May, 1944.

Early in March, 1944, I. N. A. troops of the Bahadur Group and the *Azad Hind Dal* (Free India Party) accompanied the Japanese Manchurian Division to the Kohima sector and the combined forces took Ukhrul and Kohima.^{32a} The *Azad Hind Dal* were intended to take charge of the conquered territory and do everything necessary till a regular Government was established, such as the feeding of the people, restoration of essential public services, the maintenance of law and order, and the reconciliation of the Indian population. As new areas were liberated the *Azad Hind Dal* took charge of them in the name of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind and did good work on the above lines. The Tricolour flag was hoisted on the lofty mountain tops around Kohima.

But by the end of May, when the regular I. N. A. troops arrived at Kohima, the military position of the Japanese forces in this area had changed for the worse. The Japanese air force having been transferred to the Pacific area to fight the Americans, considerable number of troops were sent by air to the besieged city of Imphal by the British. While the Japanese failed to capture Imphal, a powerful force of the British was counter-attacking from the direction of Dimapore and Kohima. The I. N. A. men at Kohima held their post most gallantly and beat back attack after attack. To make matters worse, the monsoon had broken out and it was impossible for the supply services to supply rations to troops in that area. So the Japanese forces retired to Tamu and the I. N. A., much against its will, had to withdraw to the same place (June, 1944). This they did with the greatest difficulty as the tracks were washed away by torrential

rains and the soldiers had to walk several hundred miles through knee-deep mud. A few days later the Japanese forces, and the I. N. A. with them, had to withdraw to the east bank of the Chindwin river. Thus ended the liberating campaign of the Subhas Brigade.

3. Gandhi and Azad Brigades

Of the two other Brigades the Gandhi Brigade started first for the front. It moved to Burma early in March, 1944, and after a short rest at Rangoon proceeded towards Imphal, early in April. Being told by the Japanese that the fall of Imphal was impending and they were perhaps too late for taking part in its capture, the I. N. A. men rushed forward by forced marches. But on arriving at Tamu they learnt that Imphal had not yet fallen and that severe fighting was going on in the vicinity of Palel, lying about half-way between Imphal and Tamu. The Brigade was put in charge of an independent sector to the south of the main Tamu-Palel road and instructed to carry out the Guerilla activity against the enemy forces on the Tamu front. A Japanese Brigade operated on the main road to the east. The first major incident was an attack on the Palel aerodrome by the I. N. A. in co-operation with the Japanese forces. After a heroic fight against heavy odds a section of the I. N. A. captured the aerodrome, but found no trace of the Japanese there. Not being strong enough to hold the aerodrome by themselves they withdrew after destroying all the aeroplanes they found there. The casualties were very heavy and the I. N. A. lost 250 men.

After this the British launched several heavy attacks against the I. N. A. At the sight of the white troops, whom they met for the first time, the I. N. A. men threw challenge to them and they did the same. "A grim battle at close quarters ensued. The British soldiers came almost up to the trenches (occupied by the I. N. A.),

but time and again they were beaten back with heavy losses."³³ The British fell back, but soon attacked again, this time supported by artillery and aeroplanes. The I. N. A. Platoon held firm and the enemy withdrew to their defences. But Lt. Ajaib Singh, the Commander of the I. N. A. Platoon, advanced and having approached the nearest British defence post shouted out challenge to them to come out and fight and not hide behind their defences and barbed wire fences. The British accepted the challenge and another grim battle started which continued till darkness fell.

By the middle of June the I. N. A. troops suffered much for lack of proper food and medicine and had become terribly weak. On the other hand, the British forces, being reinforced, took the offensive. Their first move was to capture the height occupied by the Gandhi Brigade around Mythun Khunou. A whole British Brigade, 3,000 strong, supported by heavy artillery and aeroplanes led the attack against 600 I. N. A. men. The situation became extremely grave as all the commanding heights and strategic points were in the hands of the British. The Commander of the I. N. A. Brigade issued orders to capture the heights at any cost. Lt. Mansukh Lall, commanding a Platoon of 30 men, showed unparalleled heroism in capturing one of these heights. "While leading his small and semi-starved force up the steep ridge, he was wounded 13 times; through exhaustion and loss of blood, he staggered and fell to the ground." His men wavered, but "making a last supreme effort, with 13 bullet wounds on his body, he rose to his feet and personally led the final assault on the height which was to decide the fate of Gandhi Brigade that day."³⁴ The British forces retreated leaving the height in possession of the I. N. A.

Lt. Ajaib Singh also distinguished himself in the

fight. 'His Company advanced and by a very clever manoeuvre encircled the British troops who were besieging the Brigade Headquarters and a Company of the I. N. A. The British troops were caught between two rings of fire and suffered heavy casualties—about 250 killed or severely wounded. The battle had lasted the whole day and when evening came the British broke off their engagement and retired.'³⁵

But though the I. N. A. warded off the British attacks, they had to face a more terrible enemy. Extremely heavy monsoon washed away the Tamu-Palel road, and the only supply line for the supply of rations and ammunitions, was cut off. The Commander of the I. N. A. Brigade, who "was at that time occupying approximately 200 square miles of Indian territory" and administered it through the *Azad Hind Dal* unit sent up by Netaji, refused to withdraw from this liberated area, and explained the whole situation to a Conference of the local Naga Chiefs. The Nagas implored the I. N. A. Commander not to retreat and said: "You are the army of India's liberation. You must not go back. We are extremely short of food ourselves, but we will collect whatever we can for you. We will live or starve to death together."³⁶ The Nagas were bitter against the British as well as the Japanese. They said: "We do not want the British, neither do we want the Japanese in our area. All that we would like to have is our own Raja, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose."³⁷

Early in July, 1944, due to battle casualties, disease and starvation the front line strength of the Gandhi Brigade had diminished from 2,000 to 1,000 men, and these too were in very indifferent health. The British, fully informed of the condition, launched a fierce attack and encircled the entire Gandhi Brigade. Major Abid Hussain managed to break through the encirclement with one Company and, after a fierce battle, extricated the Gandhi

Brigade from a very dangerous and critical situation. In the evening the Gandhi Brigade counter-attacked the enemy. Abid Hussain and two other officers were awarded the much prized medals of *Sardar-e-Jang* for displaying outstanding gallantry in the day's fight.

Shortly after this the war situation changed for the worse, so far as the Japanese and the I. N. A. were concerned, as mentioned above. After the retreat of their forces from Kohima the full weight of the British offensive on a large scale fell on Gandhi Brigade which was eventually ordered to retreat to Kalewa.

The Azad Brigade which left Malaya shortly after the Gandhi Brigade arrived in Rangoon late in April, 1944, and reached Tamu, via Kalewa, about the middle of May. The task allotted to it was that of carrying out intensive Guerilla activity against the British forces around Palel, the area assigned being to the north of the Tamu-Palel road. But before the Brigade could launch any large-scale offensive it had to withdraw along with the Gandhi Brigade under circumstances which we may now proceed to relate.

4. IMPHAL

The main objective of the Japanese offensive in 1944 was the capture of Imphal, the capital city of Manipur. It is situated in a plain surrounded by mountain ranges, narrow roads through which were the only means of entrance into and exit from this area. The Japanese succeeded in blocking these roads and advancing within two miles of Imphal. The British made several attempts to evacuate Imphal, and but for the blockade of all the roads they would have certainly done so. The plan agreed to by the Japanese and Netaji was to capture all the British forces and war material intact at Imphal. "Netaji's own idea was that the I. N. A., as it was then, was not powerful enough to undertake a full-scale invasion of India,

and at the same time fight successfully against a possible Japanese betrayal. He was, therefore, of the opinion that the five British Divisions, composed of nearly one and a half lakhs of Indians, must be captured intact so that they could be persuaded to join the I. N. A. to fight for India's liberation, and that with the captured material all the deficiencies of the I. N. A. in artillery and other essential war material could be made up."³⁸

Three special Auxiliary Units of the I. N. A. were attached to the Japanese force attacking Imphal. Each of these Units had elements from the Bahadur, Intelligence and Reinforcement Groups. Troops of the I. N. A. crossed the Indo-Burma frontier and planted the National Tricolour flag for the first time on the liberated Indian soil on the 19th of March, 1944. There was tremendous enthusiasm and rejoicing and the men, before reaching the frontier, raced and vied with one another to be the first to set foot on the free Indian soil. The enemy retreated largely to Manipur through the Tiddim-Manipur Road. On 21 March Subhas Bose "proclaimed to the whole world that the *Azad Hind Fauz* had crossed the eastern frontier of India and was fighting on the sacred soil of India." On the same day Tojo, the Prime Minister of Japan, stated in the Diet that the Provisional Government would administer the occupied territory.^{38a}

As mentioned above, the Japanese were somewhat over-sanguine about the capture of Imphal at an early date. Possibly the idea was due to the easy capture of Singapore, and would most probably have been realized, but for the entanglements of the Japanese with the Americans in the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese had to withdraw their aeroplanes from the Indo-Burma border to the Pacific zone and this enabled the British to bring full one Division by air from the Arakans. The Japanese calculation was that they would capture Imphal by the

middle of May at the latest and then the advent of monsoon would make British counter-attack impossible, enabling the Japanese to consolidate their position and, if possible, to cross the Brahmaputra into Bengal and Bihar. But the monsoon started before the fall of Imphal and by the end of June, 1944, it became almost impossible to supply rations and ammunition to the forces besieging Imphal. This, together with the constantly increasing pressure of the British reinforcements—rendered easy by the absence of Japanese aeroplanes—forced the Japanese, and the I. N. A. along with them, to withdraw to the east bank of the Chindwin.

Summing up the whole situation Shahnawaz Khan, the Commander of the Subhas Brigade, writes :

“Thus ended the main I. N. A. and Japanese offensive which had been started in March, 1944. During this period the I. N. A., with much inferior equipments and an extremely poor supply system, was able to advance as much as 150 miles into Indian territory. While the I. N. A. was on the offensive, there was not a single occasion on which our forces were defeated on the battlefield, and there was never an occasion when the enemy, despite their overwhelming superiority in men and material, was able to capture any post held by the I. N. A. On the other hand, there were very few cases where the I.N.A. attacked British posts and failed to capture them. In these operations the I. N. A. lost nearly 4,000 men as killed alone.”³⁹

5. General Review of the Campaign

The I.N.A. troops had to undergo incredible sufferings almost throughout their campaign. This was mainly due to insufficiency of transport and consequently of supplies. For example, when the I.N.A. took charge of Falam and Haka, the rations were not available there and had to be brought from the Regimental Headqu-

arters at a distance, respectively, of 50 and 85 miles from these places. The Japanese garrison was supplied by animal transport and coolies, but neither was available for the I.N.A. Haka-Falam is a mountainous area more than 6,000 ft. high. The I.N.A. men had to clamber up these heights, on an average 16 miles every day, to carry food to their comrades on the front line. The ration consisted of merely salt and rice and even these were not available on certain occasions. Sugar, milk, tea and meat were luxuries which the I. N. A. men hardly ever saw."^{39a} The condition of the Indian troops at Falam has been described as follows by their commander, Shahnawaz Khan :

"It was bitterly cold and our men had only one warm shirt and one thin cotton blanket. They spent whole nights sitting around the fire as it was impossible to sleep on account of intense cold. Many of our sentriescollapsed at their post...There was also an acute shortage of medicine and medical staff. The Company had one Naik and two nursing sepoy as the only medical staff....The men's boots were in a poor state, and some men had no boots at all. Their clothes were in tatters."⁴⁰

In Myitha Haka men had no mosquito nets and 60 per cent. of them were in the hospital suffering from Malaria. It was not an unusual thing for the I. N. A. men to go without proper food for days together, living on a type of mountain grass known as Lingra.

The climax was reached when the I.N.A. arrived at Kohima, the capital city of the Naga Hills. Rations were exhausted. Small quantities of paddy collected from abandoned Naga villages boiled with jungle grass served as their food for several weeks. They had not even a little salt to mix with this food of paddy cum grass. All the medicines were finished. Men were attacked by huge flies of which there were millions in the jungles,

and as soon as they had the slightest wounds there were hundreds of maggots in their wounds in half an hour, "and in most cases there was no other alternative for the men than say *Jai Hind* and shoot themselves."⁴¹

The retreat from Kohima was disastrous from every point of view. Shahnawaz says: "Torrential rain had washed away all tracks. The men made fresh tracks which soon became almost a knee-deep mass of mud, in which many of the men got stuck and died there. At that time there was no transport of any type with us. Almost every man was suffering from dysentery and malaria. No one had any strength left in him to help any one else....I saw men eating horses which had been dead four days ago. There were hundreds of dead human bodies of Japanese and Indian soldiers lying on either side of the road."⁴² The British took advantage of the situation and dropped leaflets from the aeroplane holding out all kinds of temptations to the weary I.N.A. men if they rejoined the British army. But they produced no effect,⁴³ and the I.N.A. men walked several hundred miles through knee-deep mud and slush under constant shell and machine-gun fire till they reached Tamu. Even then they were inspired by the hope that they would be sent up to the Palel front to fight for the liberation of their country. But they learnt at Tamu that the Japanese forces and I.N.A. were to withdraw to the east bank of the Chindwin, as stated above. This news broke men's hearts. Shahnawaz, the Commander of the forces, thus describes what followed:

"A strong deputation of officers and men came to me and suggested that the only honourable course left open to them was that all those who were still fit enough to walk a few miles should attack the enemy and perish fighting. The sick, they all realized, would die anyhow. I agreed to their plan, but the Japanese

Liaison officer came to know of it, and sent a frantic message to Netaji who issued strict and final orders to me to come back. As soldier there was no other alternative for me but to obey these orders and return to Kalewa.”⁴⁴

The incident is fully in keeping with the conduct of the I.N.A. soldiers throughout the campaign. Anyone who reads the history of this campaign is bound to be struck with one characteristic feature of the soldiers who dedicated their lives for the liberation of India. They were ready to risk everything, dare everything, and suffer and sacrifice to any extent in order to take part in liberating India. More than once the sick sepoys refused to be left behind when their comrades marched to the forward area lest they be deprived of the great honour and privilege of entering their motherland as her liberator. They sat on the railway tracks to prevent the trains from starting without them, and nothing but the promise to send them to the front as soon as they recovered would move them.⁴⁵

The patriotic feelings of the I.N.A. may also be judged by the remarkable scene that followed the capture of Mowdok within the frontier of India, as described by Captain Shahnawaj.⁴⁶ The emotion of the I.N.A. men, when they first set foot on Indian soil, was thus described by Thivy, a member of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, in October, 1945 :

“The uncontrollable urge to press forward and plant the Tricolour Flag of Free India on the soil of India was so great, that by the early hours of the morning of the 19th March, our valiant troops were rushing down the hillside, racing with one another to be the first to cross the border and fall prostrate to kiss Mother India. Who can describe the ecstatic joy with which that band of India's Freedom Fighters hoisted the National Flag

to the strains of the National Anthem?" The writer continues: "This longed-for news was flashed to all the Territorial Branches of the League, and on the 21st of that month, which was exactly the fifth month of the formation of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, this great occasion was celebrated with eclat by Indians all over East Asia. On this same day, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose issued the historic proclamation particularly directed to our countrymen in India. It informed them that the Army of India's Liberation was now fighting in Indian soil, and it called upon all Indians to give every assistance to, and fully co-operate with, the Army, so that British Imperialism in India is overthrown."⁴⁷

These words indicate the spirit which inspired the Indian Independence Movement in South-East Asia.

Before concluding this topic a brief reference must be made to two other points. First, as to the moral basis of the formation of the I. N. A. Opinions might differ on the conduct of the Indian soldiers who had betrayed the British sovereign to whom they swore allegiance. It was undoubtedly the greatest crime of which a soldier can be guilty. But in the light of what has been stated above it is impossible to deny that in doing so they were inspired by the highest degree of patriotism which, by common consent, is regarded as one of the noblest passions of mankind. Both these facts have to be borne in mind in judging of the I. N. A. men.

Secondly, Shahnawaz Khan has accused the Japanese High Command that they deliberately withheld the regular supply of rations in order to break the morale of the I. N. A. so that they could offer to Netaji a good excuse for not taking the I. N. A. men with them in actual fighting as was their policy from the very beginning.⁴⁸ But he proceeds even further as the following observations will show :

"Lastly, and with a clear conscience I can say that the Japanese did not give full aid and assistance to the Azad Hind Fauz (I. N. A.) during their assault on Imphal. In fact I am right in saying that they let us down badly and had it not been for their betrayal of the I. N. A. the history of the Imphal campaign might have been a different one. My own impression is that the Japanese did not trust the I. N. A. They had found out through their Liaison officers that the I. N. A. would not accept Japanese domination in any way, and that they would fight the Japanese in case they attempted to replace the British. The Japanese were frightened of making the I. N. A. too powerful. They were too confident of themselves and thought that they would be able to capture Imphal without assistance and without much difficulty."⁴⁹

While due consideration must be given to the fact that Shahnawaz was in a position to know all the facts relating to the subject, it is only fair to remember that the Japanese defence against this accusation is not available to us, and even Shahnawaz was not in a position to know or fully grasp the meaning of all the factors which the Japanese had to take into consideration in deciding their policy or which determined their action. It is difficult to entertain such serious and ungenerous charges against a friendly power, which certainly helped and highly honoured Netaji, without the most convincing evidence. For the present we do not possess any such evidence. For, obviously, Shahnawaz Khan, the victim of the so-called treachery of the Japanese, cannot be looked upon as an impartial witness.

6. The Last Phase.

The British began their counter-offensive in the cold season of 1944-45. Arakan was cleared of enemy troops and the British advanced towards Burma. The Japanese retreated. Rangoon, which was left in the hands of the I. N. A. after its evacuation by the Japanese, was occupied

by the British early in May, 1945. The I. N. A. men were disarmed and made prisoners. The Indian Independence Movement in South-East Asia collapsed.

Netaji left Burma in the hope of renewing the fight—a hope that was never to be realized. It is unnecessary to describe in detail his “historic twenty-one-day trek—a mere three hundred miles—from Rangoon to Bangkok, his flight to Singapore to carry on non-stop broadcasting campaign addressed to India against the Wavell offer in June-July (1945), the Japanese surrender of mid-August, and finally his last flight from Saigon.”⁵⁰ After that there is a blank.

Netaji left Saigon with a single companion in a twin-engined Japanese Bomber carrying senior Japanese officers to Tokyo via Dairen in Manchuria. It arrived safely at Taihoku in Formosa at about 2 P. M. on August 18. After lunch it left Taihoku. This is all that is definitely known. What happened after this is uncertain. The Japanese official version, issued at the time, was that almost immediately after the plane had taken off, it caught fire. Netaji, badly burnt, somehow came out of the plane, and was removed to a hospital where he died that very night, between 8 and 9 P. M. This story was discredited in India from the very beginning. The Government of Free India evidently shared the suspicions of the public and appointed a Committee of Inquiry. The majority of the members held that the official version was substantially correct, but one member—the elder brother of Netaji—disagreed and pointed out many serious flaws in the method of inquiry.⁵¹ There the matter rests and the end of this valiant fighter for freedom is shrouded in mystery. A number of Indians believe that he is still alive.

In spite of failure, the I. N. A. occupies an important place in the history of India's struggle for freedom. The formation of this force and its heroic exploits proved

beyond doubt that the British could no longer rely upon the Indian sepoys to maintain their hold on India. The universal sympathy expressed all over India for the I.N.A. Officers, who were tried for treason in the Red Fort at Delhi, gave a rude shock to the British, inasmuch as it clearly demonstrated that the Indians of all shades of opinion put a premium on the disloyalty of the Indian troops to their foreign masters and looked upon it as a true and welcome sign of nationalism. The honour and esteem with which every Indian regarded the members of the I. N. A. offered a striking contrast to the ill-concealed disgust and contempt for those sepoys who refused to join the I. N. A. and remained true to their salt. Incredible though it may seem, it is none the less true, that even the stories of oppression and torture suffered by the latter for their loyalty evoked no sympathy for them in the hearts of the Indians who remained absolutely unmoved. The British were also not unaware of the fact that after the re-occupation of Burma by the British troops there was widespread fraternisation between them and the I.N.A. and "its result was a political consciousness which the Indian Serviceman had never before possessed."⁵² All these opened the eyes of the British to their perilous situation in India. They realized that they were sitting on the brink of a volcano which may erupt at any moment. It is highly probable that this consideration played an important role in their final decision to quit India. So the members of the I. N. A. did not die or suffer in vain, and their leader, Netaji Subhas Bose, has secured a place of honour in the history of India's struggle for freedom.

BOOK V

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER I

NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT

I. THE BRITISH DECISION TO QUIT INDIA

The end of the Second World War in 1945 also marked the end of India's struggle for freedom which had commenced just about a quarter of a century before. The Non-violent Non-co-operation and Civil Disobedience movements had practically come to an end in 1933. The violent revolutionary movement which had started early in the twentieth century spent its force by 1935. A combination of the above two movements in August, 1942, was ruthlessly crushed by the Government before the year was over. Lastly, the efforts of Subhas Bose to fight the battle for India's freedom with the help of foreign powers, culminating in the campaign of *Azad Hind Fauz* or Indian National Army on the eastern frontier of India, came to an end with their retreat along with the Japanese forces in July, 1944. ✓

So, in the early months of 1945, when the end of the War was within sight, the prospect of India's achieving freedom from the British yoke looked very gloomy indeed. The power which refused to grant freedom to India in the darkest hours of its national peril was not likely to concede it in the days of its triumph and glory. Such misgivings must have haunted the minds of Indians in general. But the future of India was being shaped by unforeseen factors.

It did not take Britain long to realize that she had after all won a Pyrrhic victory. She saved herself and her empire by inflicting a crushing defeat upon Germany and Japan, but this fight to a finish exhausted her manpower and economic resources to such an extent that she

could never hope to recover her old power and prestige. Nobody could fail to perceive at the end of the War how the power-politics in Europe had suffered a radical change, and Britain lost her position as a first-rate world power. That position was transferred to U. S. A. and Russia, and both Britain and France sank to the position of a second-rate power, with the menace of Communist Russia gradually lengthening like a shadow over Western Europe. The British imperialism was chastened by these stark realities, and though the die-hard Premier, Churchill, might still refuse to preside at the liquidation of the British empire,¹ the British people and their more sober leaders thought otherwise. The great change that the War had brought over the outlook of the British people was first manifested by the result of the General Election held in Britain in 1945. The world-wide reputation justly earned by Churchill by his magnificent contributions to the Allied victory naturally gave rise to the expectation that the Conservative Party led by him would easily retain its power. But this hope was dashed to the ground by the resounding victory of the Labour Party in the General Election. For the first time in its history the Labour Party secured a clear majority over all other parties combined in the British House of Commons. Accordingly Churchill's Government was replaced by the Labour Government with Clement Attlee as Prime Minister and Lord Pethick Lawrence as Secretary of State for India.

The Labour Government were now in a position to pursue an independent policy. The past attitude of the Labour Party towards India and the changed condition of Britain, referred to above, made it very likely that they would perhaps be inclined to grant freedom to India in fulfilment of the pledges given by the British Government during the War. This was also a fair deduction from

the Election speeches of the Party. In his speech at the Blackpool Conference on 23 May, 1945, Attlee clearly said that 'they would strive earnestly to enable India to get full self-government'.² The following observations of Leonard Mosley fairly reflect the general view of the British public :

"From the moment, in 1945, when the war was over and the post-war world began to reshape itself, no one of clear mind had any doubt that the Indian people would achieve the independence from British rule...Even the Government of Winston Churchill had grumblingly and reluctantly conceded—not, it is true, without some goading from the United States—the need to accord to India the same hopes of freedom as those which British and Indian soldiers fought to achieve in Europe and Asia. With the advent in Britain in 1945 of a Socialist Government under Clement Attlee, the question of India's freedom was never in doubt...It was a policy with which the bulk of the electorate at the time agreed ; and from a purely practical point of view, even the diehards at home and the imperialist British in India could do little to stop it.....The British troops, which might hold the country against rebellion and insurrection, were clamouring, after years of fighting, to go home. And, above all, British power and prestige, in spite of victory, had been diminished by the war. The campaigns in Asia had shown up Britain's weaknesses. After Singapore, Burma and the sinking of her finest ships by the Japanese, Britain would never again be able to demonstrate in Asia the background of strength and influence—the *macht-politic*—which had for so long enabled her to rule a million people with one man-on-the-spot."³

Mosley has made a fair analysis—brief though it is—of the practical reasons or factors which induced Britain to concede independence to India. But he has not suffi-

ciently stressed one important factor. He has referred to the unavoidable absence of British troops 'which might hold the country against rebellion', but has carefully avoided all mention of the Indian sepoy which formed the major part of the British-Indian army and hitherto formed the chief instrument of quelling rebellion in India. The home-sickness of the British troops in India, to which he refers, was only a passing phase and could not be reckoned as a determining factor in formulating a permanent policy. It is likely, therefore, that what Mosley had in mind was that the formation of I.N.A. by Subhas Bose, to whose tremendous popularity in India he refers later, had shattered all hopes for using Indian sepoy in future against Indian rebels, and hence the paramount need of permanently locating such a powerful British army in India as the British could no longer afford to do. But whatever Mosley might have intended to convey, the fact was obvious that if the British could not count on the loyalty or allegiance of the sepoy, and had to rely solely or even mainly on British troops, they might as well give up all hope of ruling India; for they had not the resources, either in men or money, to fight against the resurgent masses of India. The history of the preceding half a century had shown how the gradual awakening of the national consciousness of the Indians had finally developed into a rising of the masses. The Government had a foretaste of what such rising meant and of the damage done to the traditional loyalty of the people both by Gandhi's policy of non-violence and by the violent acts of the revolutionaries in addition to the utmost strain on their resources caused by both. There was almost universal discontent against British rule and the Government had really no friends in the country, barring a few sycophants. The events of 1942 showed what troubles might be caused by the people themselves even though bereft of their

recognized leaders and their guidance. The peoples' war in 1942, overstepping the limits of non-violence put by Gandhi, must have opened the eyes of the British to the terrible dangers lurking ahead. It was sternly put down with the help of the sepoys, but then in 1945 it was quite clear to the British, that though the popular outbreaks were bound to recur from time to time, the sepoys might not be available, in future, to put them down and, what was worse still, the sepoys might even turn against the British as they did in 1944. In the meantime the hammering blows of Japan had shattered beyond recovery not only the British army and navy in the east, but also all the political and military prestige which, even more than material resources, formed the solid foundation of the British rule in India.

Thoughts like these must have been passing through the minds of the majority of the politically minded people in Britain interested in Indian affairs, and the broad practical commonsense, which is a characteristic trait of British character, must have suggested to them that the best course was to quit India with good grace rather than wait to be driven out with ignominy.

But whether this analysis is correct or not, the fact remains that in 1945 the opinion of the British public, except perhaps a microscopic minority of die-hards belonging to the school of Churchill, was ready for the final showdown. The Labour Party had pledged itself to Indian independence more than once, and the task of the Labour Government was rendered easier by the solid support of public opinion behind it.

So a spectacle, somewhat strange in recent Indian politics, presented itself during the period of two years that followed the end of the Second World War in August, 1945. The real struggle for freedom was over, and the battle for India's freedom was henceforth to be fought round the Council table, the principal combatants being

the Hindus and the Muslims and not the Indians and the British. The British were now sincerely anxious to grant freedom to India, but the Indians were slow to take it, for they could not decide among themselves what form it should exactly assume. The role of the British was that of a mediator between two disputants, sometimes degenerating into that of a judge in a boxing bout between two prize-fighters.

II. SETTING THE STAGE

The Labour Party did not let the grass grow under their feet. His Majesty announced in his gracious speech from the throne 'that his Government are determined to do their utmost to promote in conjunction with the leaders of Indian opinion the early realisation of full self-government for India.' The first practical step in this direction was the announcement, on 21 August, 1945, that the elections to the various Indian Legislatures would be held in the cold weather and that the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, would proceed to London for consultation with His Majesty's Government.

Wavell left for London on 24 August and returned on 16 September. Three days later he made an announcement on behalf of His Majesty's Government from which the following passage is quoted :

"It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to convene as soon as possible a constitution-making body, and as a preliminary step they have authorised me to undertake, immediately after the elections, discussions with the representatives of the Legislative Assemblies in the provinces, to ascertain whether the proposals contained in the 1942 declaration are acceptable or whether some alternative or modified scheme is preferable. Discussions will also be undertaken with the representatives of the Indian States with a view to ascertaining in what way they can best take their part in the constitution-making body.

"His Majesty's Government are proceeding to the consideration of the content of the treaty which will require to be concluded between Great Britain and India.

"During these preparatory stages, the Government of India must be carried on, and urgent economic and social problems must be dealt with. Furthermore, India has to play her full part in working out the new World Order. His Majesty's Government have therefore further authorised me, as soon as the results of the provincial elections are published, to take steps to bring into being an Executive Council which will have the support of the main Indian parties."⁴

Sumultaneously Lord Wavell issued a personal message emphasizing the fact that His Majesty's Government were determined to go ahead. They were well aware of the difficulties, but were determined to overcome them. On the same day Prime Minister Attlee broadcast an appeal to the Indians to make a united effort to evolve a Constitution which would be accepted as fair by all parties and interests in India.⁵

The impending elections served, in a sense, to clear the political sky in India. The Muslims outside the Muslim League could clearly feel which way the wind was blowing and flocked to the standard of the League. The number of Nationalist Muslims who still adhered to the Congress was almost negligible. Thus, on the eve of the election, the two rival Parties—the Congress and the Muslim League—stood face to face, representing, broadly speaking, the Hindu and Muslim elements of the population in India. Both the Parties made elaborate preparations for contesting the election. The Muslim League fought on the single issue of Pakistan. The Congress announced that it would contest the elections on the issue of the immediate transfer of power. The Working Committee of the Congress which met in September, 1945, reiterated

the Congress ideal of Indian unity, together with the proviso that it does not imply 'compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will.' The Congress leaders, however, were strongly against conceding the right of secession. They declared that henceforth they would not negotiate with the Muslim League but would make direct contact with the Muslim masses and would try to win them over by assurances contained in their election manifesto.⁶

The Congress had grave difficulties in fighting the elections. It had been in wilderness for more than three years, its organizations had broken down as many leaders and members were still in prison, and its party funds had been sequestered by the Government. But, as on more than one occasion in the past, the blunders committed by the Government came to its rescue just at the psychological moment when its fortunes were at a very low ebb. It was the trial of the Indian soldiers who had joined the Indian National Army (I.N.A.) organized by Subhas Bose in Singapore, whose exploits have been mentioned above. About twenty-five thousand Indian soldiers—prisoners of war in the hands of the Japanese—who had joined the I.N.A., were rounded up after the collapse of the Japanese army in Burma. The military authorities, on the basis of evidence in their possession, brought charges against some of the Officers not only of waging war against the King but also of committing gross brutality on the members of the I.N.A. accused of desertion. Accordingly a Military Tribunal was constituted by an Ordinance and the first batch of three accused officers—a Hindu, a Muslim, and a Sikh—were put on public trial in the historic Red Fort at Delhi. The Indian public did not, so long, know anything of the I.N.A., but now came to regard them as a band of patriotic heroes fighting for the liberation

of their motherland, and a wave of sympathy for them swept the whole of India. There was an I.N.A Defence Fund; also I.N.A. Flag Days. The Congress took up the case of the accused and set up a panel of defence lawyers which included Bhulabhai Desai, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Nehru. The fame of Subhas Bose's I.N.A. and the fact that the Congress had taken up the cause of the accused excited great interest in the trial throughout India. The official evidence, given in course of the trial, brought home to the Indians, *for the first time*, the magnitude of the I.N.A. organization set up by Subhas Bose and the heroic feats performed by I.N.A. men. Popular enthusiasm now rose to the highest pitch. When the Muslim League associated itself with the defence of the accused, the agitation became all-India in character. There was great resentment at the persecution of the 'patriots' and wild popular demonstrations were held over a wide area, from Calcutta to Lahore and Bombay, and from Lakhnau to Madura, occasionally accompanied by popular outburst of violence and the firing of the police. The Government quailed before the storm. The accused were convicted but ultimately the sentence of transportation for life was remitted and they were simply cashiered.

There are some grounds to believe that the Government decision to put the I. N. A. men on trial "met with gratified approval, even from the Congress leaders."⁸ It is difficult to explain their sudden change, for there was no love lost between Subhas Bose and the Congress leaders who were bitterly opposed to his alliance with the Japanese and threatened to fight them if they entered India. It was, therefore, not unnaturally suspected by many at the time that the Congress deliberately used the I.N.A. as an election stunt. Whether this is true or not, there is not the least doubt that the Congress swept the polls at the crest of the wave of enthusiasm created by the I. N. A. trial.

There is little doubt that "the widespread disturbances arising out of the trial of the I. N. A. prisoners, created so dangerous and tense a situation" in India that the British Government decided to take some fresh action.^{8a} On 4 December, the Secretary of State announced in the House of Lords that a Parliamentary Delegation, drawn from all the Parties, under the auspices of the Empire Parliamentary Association, would shortly visit India. They would meet "leading political Indian personalities to learn their views at first hand, as also to convey in person the general desire of the people of England that India should speedily attain her full and rightful position as an independent partner State in the British Commonwealth."⁹ For the first time the British Government officially declared the independence of India as their immediate goal, and there was a wide appreciation of His Majesty's present Government for pronouncing it and making an earnest endeavour to settle the constitutional problem in India as urgently as possible. Nobody, of course, thought much of the Parliamentary Delegation, or expected that any tangible result would follow its visit, which was really exploratory in character.

The Parliamentary Delegation of ten members, led by Professor Robert Richards, arrived in India on 5 January, 1946. It spent about a month in this country and met almost all the important political leaders. Jinnah insisted on two constitution-making bodies, and conceded that he did not want predominantly non-Muslim areas like the Ambala Division of the Panjab to be included in Pakistan. He also assured the Delegation that Pakistan would remain within the British empire with a British Governor-General.

"Nehru in his talks with the Delegation conceded that the British Government might have to declare for Pakistan, but that there would have to be a plebiscite in border districts to confirm it."¹⁰

In the meantime elections to the Central Legislative

Assembly were held, and the results were known towards the end of December, 1945. "The Congress won an overwhelming success in the General constituencies, the Hindu Mahasabha and other opposing candidates preferring in most cases to withdraw rather than risk defeat. The Muslim League won every Muslim seat, the Nationalist Muslims forfeiting their deposits in many instances. The Congress secured 91.3 per cent. of the votes cast in non-Muhammadan constituencies and the Muslim League 86.6 per cent. of the total votes cast in Muhammadan Constituencies. The final figures were, Congress 57 ; Muslim League 30 ; Independents 5 ; Akali Sikhs 2 ; and Europeans 8, making a total of 102 elected seats. In the previous Assembly the figures at the time of dissolution were, Congress 36 ; Muslim League 25 ; Independents 21 ; Nationalist Party 10, and Europeans 8.¹¹

.. "Both parties were jubilant over the victories. The Central Election Board of the Congress in a bulletin issued on 6 January, 1946, declared that the Congress stood vindicated ; it was the biggest, strongest and most representative organization in the country. The Muslim League celebrated 11 January as its day of victory, and Jinnah's message for the occasion congratulated the League on winning all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly."¹²

The results of elections in the Provinces confirmed the deductions made on the basis of the election to the Central Legislative Assembly. They proved that the Congress and the Muslim League were the only two Parties that counted in the country and, generally speaking, dominated, respectively, the Hindu and Muslim communities, except in the N.W.F.P. and Sindh. But it is noticeable that of the four Indian Provinces which were to constitute Pakistan, the separate sovereign Muslim State, the Muslim League had not absolute majority in any, and could form Ministry in only two, Bengal and

Sindh, though in the latter it was more a matter of grace on the part of the Government than a claim of right. Another noticeable result of the elections was the fact that a large section of the Scheduled Castes supported the Congress.

The Viceroy announced on 28 January, 1946, that he would establish a new Executive Council formed by political leaders and also set up a Constitution-making body as soon as possible. But before further steps could be taken, a great sensation was created all over India by the revolt of a section of Indians serving in the Royal Indian Navy, followed by grave disturbances in the city of Bombay. "It started on 18 February, when ratings of the Signal School in Bombay went on a hunger-strike in protest against what their Central Strike Committee described as 'untold hardships regarding pay and food and the most outrageous racial discrimination,' and in particular against their Commander's derogatory references to their national character. They were joined later by ratings from other naval establishments. These persons got completely out of hand. They took possession of some of the ships, mounted the guns and prepared to open fire on the military guards. A very ugly situation developed. Admiral Godfrey, Flag Officer-Commanding, Royal Indian Navy, broadcast to the ratings calling upon them to surrender. At the same time efforts were made to secure guns and planes and to rush reinforcements to the scene. There were even some who tried to fish in the troubled waters. It was due largely to efforts of Vallabhbhai Patel that, on 23 February, the ratings surrendered. In the meantime, contrary to the advice of Congress and Muslim League, strikes and *hartals* were organized in Bombay and unruly crowds went about looting and setting fire to banks, shops, post offices, police posts and grain shops. The police had to open fire several times and the military had to be called in

to assist before order could be restored. Over 200 persons were killed as a result of these disturbances, which had their repercussions in other centres such as Karachi, Madras and Calcutta.

"The Army and the Air Force were not altogether unaffected. There was trouble in several places, though not of a serious character."¹³

The troubles in the Navy began on 18 February, 1946. On the very next day, 19 February, 1946, "Lord Pethick-Lawrence in the House of Lords and Prime Minister Attlee in the House of Commons made a simultaneous announcement that in view of the paramount importance, not only to India and to the British Commonwealth, but to the peace of the world, of a successful outcome of discussions with leaders of Indian opinion, His Majesty's Government had decided to send out to India a special mission consisting of three Cabinet ministers to seek, in association with the Viceroy, an agreement with those leaders on the principles and procedure relating to the constitutional issue. The members of the Mission would be Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty."¹⁴ Whether the decision of despatching a Cabinet Mission was hastened by the revolt of the naval ratings it is difficult to say. It is, however, significant that the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps was also announced just four days after the fall of Rangoon in Japanese hands.

In any case the announcement about the Cabinet Mission was well received throughout India. It was felt that the grant of independence to India was now a certainty and would not be delayed beyond a period that was absolutely necessary to complete the preliminary arrangements.

III. THE CABINET MISSION

The Cabinet Mission arrived at New Delhi on 24 March, 1946. It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of the numerous interviews and meetings held by the Mission. It would suffice to give a summary of the views of the two principal political parties.

"The Congress case was presented on 3 April by its President, Abul Kalam Azad. It proceeded on the basis of independence and on the assumption that the future constitution would be determined by a constitution-making body. It was obvious from the Congress point of view that in the intervening period there should be an Interim Government at the Centre which would be responsible for all subsequent stages, including the setting up of the constitution-making body. With regard to the composition of the Central Government, elections having taken place everywhere, the wishes of the Provincial Governments should be ascertained. In an Interim Government, of say fifteen members, there might be eleven Provincial representatives, and four places might go to representatives of the minorities. This did not necessarily mean that there should be one member from each province; members would be chosen by the provincial governments, but they need not come from within the province nor need they be members of the legislatures.

"Regarding the future constitution, what the Congress had in mind was a federal government with a limited number of compulsory federal subjects such as defence, communications and foreign affairs, and autonomous provinces in which would vest the residuary powers. There should be a list of optional subjects, so that it would be open to any province to decide for itself the extent to which it would be federated over and above the subjects in the compulsory list. The Congress plan was that on the completion of the work of the constitution-making

body, a province should have three choices : (1) to stand out of the constitution, (2) to enter the constitution by federating for the compulsory subjects only, and (3) to federate for the compulsory as well as for the optional subjects."¹⁵

In course of discussion Azad admitted that under his proposal the Muslims would not get more than two or three seats in the Executive Council, but observed that arrangements could be made to give them more. He also suggested that the constitution-making body might be elected by the provincial legislatures voting together as one federal college, rather than elected on the widest possible franchise, as originally proposed by the Congress.

Gandhi, who was interviewed immediately after Azad, gave only his personal views. He denounced Jinnah's two-nation theory as most dangerous, for, in his view the Indian Muslims, save a microscopic minority, were all descended from Indians. He was also opposed to two constitution-making bodies. For the interim period Gandhi suggested that Jinnah should be asked to form the first Government with the ministers chosen from amongst the elected members of the legislature. If he refused, the offer should be made to the Congress.¹⁶

Jinnah argued the case for Pakistan somewhat as follows :

"The differences in India were far greater than those between European countries and were of a vital and fundamental character. Even Ireland provided no parallel. The Muslims had a different conception of life from the Hindus. They admired different qualities in their heroes ; they had a different culture based on Arabic and Persian instead of Sanskrit origins. Their social customs were entirely different. Hindu society and philosophy were the most exclusive in the world. Muslims and Hindus had been living side by side in India for a thousand years, but if one

went into any Indian city one would see separate Hindu and Muslim quarters. It was not possible to make a nation unless there were essential uniting factors.

“How would His Majesty’s Government put 100 millions of Muslims together with 250 millions whose whole way of life was so different? No government could survive unless there was a dominant element which could provide a ‘steel frame.’ This frame had hitherto been provided by the British, who had always retained the key posts in the Civil Service, the Police and the Army. It was necessary to have a ‘steel frame’ for an independent India, but Jinnah could see none. He had therefore come to the conclusion, after years of experience, that there was no other solution but the division of India. There were in India two totally different and deeply rooted civilizations side by side and the only solution was to have two ‘steel frames’, one in Hindustan and one in Pakistan. He agreed that it would be convenient to have common railways,, customs and so forth, but the question was, by what government would those services be controlled? He certainly contemplated treaties and agreements governing such matters, which could be settled once the fundamentals of Pakistan were agreed.”¹⁷

It is impossible to deny that there was a great deal of truth in Jinnah’s assessment of Hindu-Muslim relationship, as has already been pointed out more than once in this and the two preceding volumes of this History. In any case, Jinnah’s view was more realistic than that of Gandhi or Nehru.¹⁸ The only point at issue which Jinnah always cleverly and carefully avoided was whether in view of India’s geographical unity, and the fact that even if Pakistan were formed large numbers of Hindus and Muslims would have to live together in the same State as at present, an earnest attempt should not be made for the two nations to live under the same Govern-

ment under a constitution mutually agreed upon. If Canada with its two warring nations, the English and the French, and Switzerland, an artificial combination of three different nations, could evolve a formula of political integration was that inherently impossible in the case of Muslims and Hindus of India who had lived together within the natural limits of the same country for wellnigh seven hundred years? This question was not squarely faced by either Jinnah or the top-ranking Congress leaders like Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. It was not to the interest of Jinnah to raise this issue, and the Congress leaders were precluded from raising it because they never admitted the validity of the two-nation theory. This is the principal reason why all the past (and future) attempts for the solution of Hindu-Muslim problem proved a failure.

Among the other minorities the two most powerful and vocal ones were the Scheduled Castes and the Sikhs, but they were divided among themselves and neither could present a common demand except that they desired special provisions for safeguarding their rights and interests. The two extremists were Ambedkar who was opposed to any Constituent Assembly as it would be dominated by the Caste Hindus, and Giani Kartar Singh, who demanded a separate sovereign State where the Sikhs would be in a dominant position.

Jinnah assumed a truculent attitude. "On or about 10 April and while these interviews were still in progress, Jinnah called together in Delhi a convention of over four hundred members of the various legislatures recently elected on the Muslim League ticket. A lengthy resolution was passed which demanded a sovereign and independent State of Pakistan, comprising the six provinces of Bengal and Assam in the north-east, and the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west of India; the setting up of two separate

constitution-making bodies by the peoples of Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of framing their respective constitutions, and the provision of safeguards for the minorities. The acceptance of the Muslim League demand for Pakistan, and its implementation without delay, were declared to be the *sine qua non* for Muslim League co-operation and participation in the formation of an interim Government at the Centre. Any attempt to impose a constitution or to force on them an interim Government contrary to their demand would leave the Muslims no alternative but to resist such imposition by all the means possible for their survival and national existence.”¹⁹

Undeterred by these threats the Cabinet Mission calmly thought of various possible alternatives which would secure the essence of the Muslim League demand and at the same time be acceptable to the Congress. Ultimately they decided to offer Jinnah the two following alternatives to choose from.

(1) Pakistan as a sovereign State with the exclusion of those Districts where the non-Muslims formed a majority.

(2) Pakistan, comprising the areas demanded by Jinnah, but only as a separate federation forming a part of Indian Union.

But Jinnah decided against the idea of Indian Union. He declared that the domination of the Muslims by the Hindus could not be prevented in any scheme in which they were kept together, for “no amount of equality provided on paper would work. Equality could not exist between the majority and a minority within the same Governmental system.” Further negotiations followed, but no agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League was found possible. So on 16 May, 1946, the Cabinet Mission issued a Statement containing its own proposals which had received the approval of His Majesty’s Government.

It began with the announcement that "immediate arrangements should be made 'whereby Indians may decide the future Constitution of India and an Interim Government may be set up at once to carry on the administration of British India until such time as a new Constitution can be brought into being.'"

The Cabinet Mission then examined the question of a fully sovereign State of Pakistan as demanded by the Muslim League and pointed out that "the size of the non-Muslim minorities in a Pakistan comprising the whole of the six Provinces enumerated above would be very considerable as the following figures show :

North-western Area	Muslim	Non-Muslim.
Punjab	16, 217, 242	12, 201, 577
N. W. F. P.	2, 788, 797	249, 270
Sind	3, 208, 325	1, 326, 683
Br. Baluchistan	438, 930	62, 701
	<hr/> 22, 653, 294	<hr/> 13, 840, 231
	62.07 per cent.	37.93 per cent.

North-Eastern area		
Bengal	33, 005, 434	27, 301, 091
Assam	3, 442, 479	6, 762, 254
	<hr/> 36, 447, 913	<hr/> 34, 063, 345
	51.69 per cent.	41.31 per cent.

"The Muslim minorities in the remainder of British India number some 20 million dispersed amongst a total population of 188 million.

"These figures show that the setting up of a separate sovereign State of Pakistan on the lines claimed by the Muslim League would not solve the communal minority problem ; nor can we see any justification for including within a sovereign Pakistan those districts of the Punjab and of Bengal and Assam in which the population is predominantly non-Muslim. Every argument that can be used in

favour of Pakistan, can equally in our view be used in favour of the exclusion of the non-Muslim areas from Pakistan. This point would particularly affect the position of the Sikhs."

The Commission then considered the question of a smaller Pakistan by excluding non-Muslim areas. Apart from the fact that the Muslim League regarded it as quite impracticable, the Commission added :

"We ourselves are also convinced that any solution which involves a radical partition of the Punjab and Bengal, as this would do, would be contrary to the wishes and interests of a very large proportion of the inhabitants of these Provinces. Bengal and the Punjab each has its own common language and a long history and tradition. Moreover, any division of the Punjab would of necessity divide the Sikhs, leaving substantial bodies of Sikhs on both sides of the boundary. We have therefore been forced to the conclusion that neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign State of Pakistan would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem."

The Commission then pointed out the serious consequences of the partition of India :

8.19a "Apart from the great force of the foregoing arguments, there are weighty administrative, economic and military considerations. The whole of the transportation and postal and telegraph systems of India have been established on the basis of a united India. To disintegrate them would gravely injure both parts of India. The case for a united defence is even stronger. The Indian armed forces have been built up as a whole for the defence of India as a whole, and to break them in two would inflict a deadly blow on the long traditions and high degree of efficiency of the Indian Army and would entail the gravest dangers. The Indian Navy and Indian Air Force would become much less effective. The two

sections of the suggested Pakistan contain the two most vulnerable frontiers in India and for a successful defence in depth the area of Pakistan would be insufficient.

9. "A further consideration of importance is the greater difficulty which the Indian States would find in associating themselves with a divided British India.

10. "Finally, there is the geographical fact that the two halves of the proposed Pakistan State are separated by some seven hundred miles and the communications between them both in war and peace would be dependent on the goodwill of Hindustan.

11. "We are therefore unable to advise the British Government that the power which at present resides in British hands should be handed over to two entirely separate sovereign States."

The Commission then considered the Congress scheme of Federation of India "under which Provinces would have full autonomy subject only to a minimum of Central subjects, such as Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications."

12. "Under this scheme Provinces, if they wished to take part in economic and administrative planning on a large scale, could cede to the centre optional subjects in addition to the compulsory ones mentioned above.

13. "Such a scheme would, in our view, present considerable constitutional disadvantages and anomalies. It would be very difficult to work a Central Executive and Legislature in which some Ministers, who dealt with compulsory subjects, were responsible to the whole of India while other Ministers, who dealt with optional subjects, would be responsible only to those Provinces which had elected to act together in respect of such subjects. This difficulty would be accentuated in the Central Legislature, where it would be necessary to exclude certain members from speaking and voting when subjects with which their

Provinces were not concerned were under discussion. Apart from the difficulty of working such a scheme, we do not consider that it would be fair to deny to other Provinces, which did not desire to take the optional subjects at the Centre, the right to form themselves into a group for a similar purpose. This would indeed be no more than the exercise of their autonomous powers in a particular way."

After this remarkably statesmanlike review of the proposals put forward by the Muslim League and the Congress, the Commission set forth its own suggestion which reads as follows :

15. "We recommend that the constitution should take the following basic form :

(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States, which should deal with the following subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications; and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects.

(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British-Indian and States' representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members present and voting.

(3) All subjects other than the Union Subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the Provinces.

(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.

(5) Provinces should be free to form Groups with Executives and Legislatures, and each Group could determine the Provincial subjects to be taken in common.

(6) The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should contain a provision whereby any Province could, by

a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten-yearly intervals thereafter."

As regards setting up the constitution-making machinery the Commission rejected the selection of a Constituent Assembly based on adult franchise as it would delay the matter too long. They also decided against utilizing the recently elected Provincial Legislative Assemblies as the electing bodies, for there were two serious objections against it.

18. "First, the numerical strengths of Provincial Legislative Assemblies do not bear the same proportion to the total population in each Province. Thus, Assam, with a population of 10 millions, has a Legislative Assembly of 108 members, while Bengal, with a population six times as large, has an Assembly of only 250. Secondly, owing to the weightage given to minorities by the Communal Award, the strengths of the several communities in each Provincial Legislative Assembly are not in proportion to their numbers in the Province. Thus the number of seats reserved for Moslems in the Bengal Legislative Assembly is only 48 per cent of the total, although they form 55 per cent of the provincial population. We have come to the conclusion that the fairest and most practicable plan would be—

(a) to allot to each Province a total number of seats proportional to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, as the nearest substitute for representation by adult suffrage.

(b) to divide this provincial allocation of seats between the main communities in each Province in proportion to their population.

(c) to provide that the representatives allotted to each community in a Province shall be elected by members of that community in its Legislative Assembly.

"We think that for these purposes it is sufficient to recognize only three main communities in India : General, Moslem, and Sikh."

The operative part of the Commission's Statement, may be quoted in full :

"19. (i) We therefore propose that there shall be elected by each Provincial Legislative Assembly the following numbers of representatives, each part of the Legislative Assembly (General, Moslem or Sikh) electing its own representatives by the method of proportional representation with single transferable vote :

TABLE OF REPRESENTATION

Section A				
Province	General	Muslim	Total.	
Madras	45	4	49	
Bombay	19	2	21	
United Provinces	47	8	55	
Bihar	31	5	36	
Central Provinces	16	1	17	
Orissa.	9	0	9	
Total	<u>167</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>187</u>	
Section B				
Province	General	Muslim	Sikh	Total.
Punjab	8	16	4	28
North-West Frontier Province	0	3	0	3
Sind	1	3	0	4
Total	<u>9</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>35</u>
Section C				
Province	General	Muslim	Total	
Bengal	27	33	60	
Assam	7	3	10	
Total	<u>34</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>70</u>	

Total for British India	292
Maximum for Indian States	93
Total	<u>385</u>

(ii) It is the intention that the States would be given in the final Constituent Assembly appropriate representation which would not, on the basis of the calculations of population adopted for British India, exceed 93, but the method of selection will have to be determined by consultation. The States would in the preliminary stage be represented by a Negotiating Committee.

(iii) Representatives thus chosen shall meet at New Delhi as soon as possible.

(iv) A preliminary meeting will be held at which the general order of business will be decided, a Chairman and other officers elected, and an Advisory Committee (see paragraph 20 below) on the rights of citizens, Minorities and Tribal and Excluded Areas set up. Thereafter the Provincial representatives will divide up into three Sections shown under A, B and C, in the Table of Representation in sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph.

(v) These sections shall proceed to settle Provincial Constitutions for the Provinces included in each Section and shall also decide whether any Group Constitution shall be set up for those Provinces and, if so, with what Provincial subjects the Group should deal. Provinces should have power to opt out of Groups in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (viii) below.

(vi) The representatives of the Sections and the Indian States shall reassemble for the purpose of settling the Union Constitution.

(vii) In the Union Constituent Assembly resolutions varying the provisions of paragraph 15 above or raising any major communal issue shall require a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities. The Chairman of the Assembly shall decide

which, if any, resolutions raise major communal issues and shall, if so requested by a majority of the representatives of either of the major communities, consult the Federal Court before giving his decision.

(viii) As soon as the new constitutional arrangements have come into operation, it shall be open to any Province to elect to come out of any Group in which it has been placed. Such a decision shall be taken by the legislature of the Province after the first general election under the new constitution."

The Cabinet Mission proceeded to point out the important problems, both internal and external, which the Government of India will have to face in the post-war world, and therefore proposed immediately to set up an Interim Government having the support of the major political parties, in which all the portfolios, including that of War Member, will be held by Indian leaders having the full confidence of the people.

It is a sad commentary on the political acumen of the Congress leaders that the most cogent and powerful arguments against Pakistan should have been advanced, for the first time, by the Cabinet Mission whose realistic appreciation of the Indian problem offers a refreshing contrast to the emotional outbursts of both Hindu and Muslim leaders. Even after the Statement was issued, both the Congress and the Muslim League criticised it from their respective doctrinaire attitude. But so great was the wisdom of practical statesmanship displayed in the Statement that neither party was in a mood to reject it, as a whole, but only raised specific issues for discussion. The most important among these, which was ultimately responsible for the break-down of the whole plan, may be stated in some detail. The Congress Working Committee interpreted para 15 of the Mission's Statement to mean that in the first instance, the respective Provinces

shall make their choice whether or not to belong to the sections in which they are placed. The Cabinet Mission, however, pointed out that the Congress in interpreting para 15(5) ignored para 19(iv), and the Commission rightly stressed that "the scheme stands as a whole." This insistence on the original proposal of initial grouping disturbed the Sikhs who felt that they would not have sufficient safeguards against the Muslim majority in the Panjab and N.W.F.P. They rejected the Mission's plan and decided to fight. The Congress also disapproved of the compulsory grouping of Provinces, but was evidently more concerned with the exact status of the Interim Government *vis-a-vis* the Governor-General. On 25 May Azad wrote to the Viceroy suggesting that a convention might be established to recognize the responsibility of the Interim Government to the Central Legislative Assembly. In his reply dated 30 May, the Viceroy gave Azad assurances of "the greatest possible freedom in the exercise of the day to day administration of the country."²⁰

IV. NEGOTIATION FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

The composition of the Interim Government proved to be a bone of contention between the Congress and the Muslim League. The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, accepted the suggestion of Jinnah that there should be 5 each of the Congress and the League, 1 Sikh, and 1 Anglo-Indian or Indian Christian,—altogether 12—in the Executive Council. Nehru, on behalf of the Congress, rejected this scheme 'as it was even worse than the one proposed at Simla Conference', and suggested instead that there should be 5 Congress Hindus, 4 League Muslims, 1 non-League Muslim, 1 non-Congress Hindu, 1 Congress Scheduled caste, 1 Indian Christian, 1 Sikh, and 1 Congress woman, altogether 15. Wavell turned it down and suggested 6 (including one Scheduled caste)

Congress, 5 League and 2 Minorities. This was rejected by the Congress.

In view of the deadlock thus created the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy issued a Statement on 16 June, 1946, setting forth their own proposal to set up an Executive Council of fourteen persons (all of whom were mentioned by name), six belonging to the Congress including a representative of the Scheduled castes, five to the Muslim League, one Sikh, one Indian Christian and one Parsi. The list included the names of Nehru and Jinnah. "The Sikhs rejected the long-term plan and refused to agree to any Sikh representative joining the Executive Council."²¹

The paragraph 8 of the Statement ran as follows :

"In the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join in the setting up of a Coalition Government on the above lines, it is the intention of the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an Interim Government which will be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the statement of May 16th."²²

But the Viceroy went out of his way to assure Jinnah that "the proportion of members community-wise would not be changed without the agreement of the two parties, and that no decision on a major communal issue could be taken in the Interim Government if the majority of either of the parties were opposed to it."²³ The Viceroy also wrote to Jinnah on 22 June, that the Congress would not be allowed to nominate a Muslim in the Interim Government.

It is difficult to account for this complete surrender of the Viceroy to Jinnah. Even one of the most appreciative associates of Lord Wavell was constrained to observe that he made these commitments to Jinnah "without sufficient and timely consideration." But taken along

with his later conduct, his present action may be looked upon as the beginning of a new policy of shift to the Muslims, which wrecked the Cabinet Mission Plan as well as his own career.

The Viceroy's correspondence with Jinnah became public, and, as could be easily anticipated, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution on 25 June, rejecting the plan of Interim Government.

The Committee, however, decided that the Congress should join the proposed Constituent Assembly with a view to framing the Constitution of a free, united and democratic India.²⁴

Immediately after the Congress decision, the Cabinet Mission told Jinnah that the scheme of 16 June had fallen through ; but since both the Congress and the League had now accepted the Statement of 16 May, it was proposed to set up a Coalition Government, including both parties, as soon as possible.

The Cabinet Mission left India on 29 June, 1946. If it had not succeeded in achieving its object, its strenuous efforts extending over more than three months were not altogether barren of results. The Indian constitutional problem had been put in the form of concrete realities and a machinery had been devised to discuss them and come to a decision. More important still, the Indians now felt convinced that the Labour Government in Britain were really anxious to see India free. The question for India was no longer how to achieve freedom, but how to enjoy it without cutting each other's throat.

The All-India Congress Committee met in Bombay on July 6 and 7, and ratified by 205 votes against 51 the settlement with the British, i.e. the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan. Only the Socialist wing of the Congress opposed.

Unfortunately, at this critical moment, when a peaceful settlement of India's future was almost within sight,

it was upset by some indiscreet utterances of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. In 1937 his outright rejection of Jinnah's offer of Congress-League Coalition Ministry ruined the last chance of a Hindu-Muslim agreement. His observations in 1946 destroyed the last chance—though a remote one—of a free united India.

Jawaharlal Nehru, who was elected President of the Congress some time ago, took over the office from Azad at the meeting of the A.I.C.C. in Bombay (6 and 7 July). In winding up the proceedings of the Committee, Nehru made a long speech explaining the position of the Congress *vis-a-vis* the Cabinet Mission plan. He said "that as far as he could see, it was not a question of the Congress accepting any plan, long or short. It was merely a question of their agreeing to enter the Constituent Assembly, and nothing more than that. They would remain in that Assembly so long as they thought it was for India's good and they would come out when they thought it was injuring their cause. 'We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided for the moment to go to the Constituent Assembly.'"²⁵

Later, speaking at a press conference on 10 July, Nehru qualified his statement. He admitted that the Congress was bound by the procedure set down for election of members to the Constituent Assembly. But then he added: "What we do there we are entirely and absolutely free to determine."²⁶ Far more important however were his observations on paras 20 and 22 of the Cabinet Mission's plan. These paras read as follows:

20. "The Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, Minorities, and Tribal and Excluded Areas will contain due representation of the interests affected, and their function will be to report to the Union Constituent Assembly upon the list of Fundamental Rights, clauses for protecting Minorities, and a scheme for the admi-

nistration of Tribal and Excluded areas, and to advise whether these rights should be incorporated in the Provincial, Group, or Union Constitution.

22. "It will be necessary to negotiate a treaty between the Union Constituent Assembly and the United Kingdom to provide for certain matters arising out of the transfer of power."

Referring to these Nehru observed that he would have no treaty with the British Government if they sought to impose anything upon India; as for the Minorities it was a domestic problem and "we shall no doubt succeed in solving it. We accept no outsider's interference in it, certainly not the British Government's interference, and therefore these two limiting factors to the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly are not accepted by us."²⁷ These observations, at that particular moment, were very injudicious and impolitic, to say the least of it. Still more unfortunate were Nehru's observations on the question of grouping the Provinces. He hoped, he said, that there will be no grouping because some States in Groups B and C will oppose it. So far there could be no valid objection. But then Nehru added: "But I can say with every assurance and conviction that there is going to be finally no grouping there, because Assam will not tolerate it under any circumstances whatever. Thus you see this grouping business, approached from any point of view, does not get us on at all."²⁸ Such words, coming from the new President of the Congress, were justly calculated to rouse a genuine fear in the minds of Jinnah that the Congress might accept the Cabinet Mission plan, but was determined not to work it in the proper spirit.

"Dealing with the powers of the proposed Union Centre, Nehru said that Defence and Communications would embrace a large number of industries necessary for their support. Foreign affairs must inevitably include foreign

trade policy. It was equally inevitable that the Union must raise its finances by taxation, rather than by any system of contribution or doles from the Provinces. Further, the Centre must obviously control currency and credit; and there must be an over-all authority to settle inter-Provincial disputes and to deal with administrative or economic breakdowns.”²⁹

These words might be legally and constitutionally true, but if Nehru were determined to scare away Jinnah he could not have devised a better or more ingenious plan. The grouping of Provinces and a weak Centre with residuary powers to the Provinces or Provincial groups were, in the opinion of Jinnah, the only two meritorious features of the plan, which might make amends for sacrificing the idea of a sovereign Pakistan. Nehru's assertion or explanation negatived the latter and neutralised, to a very large extent, the value of the former.

In view of the importance of Nehru's statement and its tragic consequence of putting “Hindus and Muslims back in two fuming and suspicious camps,” it would not be improper to refer to the views of two Englishmen, both intimate friends of Nehru, and one of whom was the author of what Nehru regarded as his best biography. Leonard Mosley says :

“And on 10 July, after he (Nehru) had been elected President, he called the Press together for a conference to discuss his policy as the new head of Congress. It was a moment in history when circumspection should have been the order of the day. There was much to be gained by silence. The fortunes of India were in the balance, and one false move could upset them. Nehru chose this moment to launch into what his biographer, Michael Brecher has described as “one of the most fiery and provocative statements in his forty years of public life.”

After giving a summary of Nehru's statements, quoted

above, Mosley continues :

“Did Nehru realize what he was saying? He was telling the world that once in power, the Congress would use its strength at the Centre to alter the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought fit. But the Muslim League (as had Congress) had accepted the Plan as a cut and dried scheme to meet objections from both sides. It was a compromise plan which obviously could not afterwards be altered in favour of one side or another. In the circumstances, Nehru's remarks were a direct act of sabotage. Whether he meant them to be so, in the mistaken belief that Jinnah and the Muslim League were not really a force to be reckoned with or whether they were the ham-handed remarks of a politician who did not know when to keep his mouth shut will never be known.”³⁰

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who had just relinquished the Presidency of the Congress in favour of Nehru referred to the latter's press conference as “one of those unfortunate events which change the course of history,” and categorically states that “it was not correct to say (as Nehru did) that Congress was free to modify the (Cabinet Mission) Plan as it pleased.”³¹

Every political leader, perhaps with the single exception of Jawaharlal Nehru, should have easily anticipated Jinnah's reaction to his statement. Azad sums up the whole position as follows :

‘Jinnah had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan as there was no alternative. Jawaharlal's statement came to him as a bombshell.’ He “issued a statement that the Muslim League had accepted the Plan as it was assured that the Congress had also accepted the scheme and that the Plan would be the basis of the future constitution of India. Now that the Congress President had declared that the Congress could change the scheme through its majority in the Constituent Assembly, this would mean

that the minorities were placed at the mercy of the majority.”³²

Even the Congress realized the folly of its President. The Working Committee which met on 8 August was faced with a dilemma. As Azad put it : “To repudiate the President’s statement would weaken the organization but to give up the Cabinet Mission Plan would ruin the country. Finally, we drafted a resolution which made no reference to the Press Conference but reaffirmed the decision of the A.I.C.C.”³³ accepting the scheme in its entirety, thus indirectly repudiating Nehru’s statement. The British Cabinet also made a genuine effort to undo the mischief caused by Nehru’s statement. On 18 July the Secretary of State in the House of Lords and Sir Stafford Cripps in the House of Commons unequivocally assured Jinnah that the Government would stick to the Cabinet Mission Plan of 16 May as it stood.

But Jinnah remained unmoved. He held “that Jawaharlal’s statement represented the real mind of Congress. He argued that if Congress could change so many times, while the British were still in the country and power had not come to its hands, what assurance could the minorities have that once the British left, Congress would not again change and go back to the position taken up in Jawaharlal’s statement ?”³⁴ He was particularly afraid that the Congress by virtue of its majority in the Constituent Assembly “will wreck the basic form of the grouping of the Provinces and extend the scope, powers and subjects of the Union Centre” in violation of the paras 15 and 19 of the Statement of 16 May. This cannot be regarded as an altogether baseless fear, and seems to be the real background of the changed attitude of Jinnah and the Muslim League Council which met at Bombay on 27 July. In his opening speech Jinnah reiterated the demand for Pakistan. The Council, on 29 July, rejected the Cabinet

Mission Plan and decided to resort to 'Direct Action' for the achievement of Pakistan.

The resolution on the 'Direct Action' reads in part as follows : "Whereas the Congress is bent upon setting up Caste-Hindu Raj in India with the connivance of the British ; and whereas recent events have shown that power politics and not justice and fair play are the deciding factors in Indian affairs ;...now the time has come for the *Muslim Nation* to resort to *direct action* to achieve Pakistan to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated future Caste-Hindu domination."

Then comes the operative part which reads as follows :

"This Council calls upon the Muslim nation to stand to a man behind their sole representative and authoritative organization, the All-India Muslim League, and to be ready for every sacrifice.

"This Council directs the Working Committee to prepare forthwith a programme of direct action to carry out the policy enunciated above and to organize the Muslims for the coming struggle to be launched as and when necessary.

"As a protest against and in token of their deep resentment of the attitude of the British, the Council calls upon the Mussulmans to renounce forthwith the titles conferred upon them by the alien Government."³⁵

These two momentous resolutions were passed by the Council of the Muslim League without any dissent.

In the meantime the Viceroy had made one further proposal for an Interim Government which would consist of 6 (including one Scheduled caste) from the Congress, 5 from the League and 3 representatives of Minorities nominated by the Viceroy. A letter containing the above proposal was written to both Nehru and Jinnah on 22

July. But in view of the resolutions of the Council of the Muslim League on 29 July Jinnah's reaction to it was a foregone conclusion. In his reply dated 31 July Jinnah refused to accept the proposal of the Viceroy.

But, for the first time in recent history, the British Cabinet refused to allow Jinnah and his League to put a veto upon constitutional progress in India.

On 6 August the Viceroy wrote to Nehru that, "with the concurrence of His Majesty's Government he had decided to invite him to make proposals for the formation of an interim Government on the basis of the assurances contained in his letter of 30 May to Azad."

In his reply to Jinnah's letter of 31 July, the Viceroy informed him "that in view of the League resolutions of 29 July, he had decided to invite the Congress to make proposals for an interim Government and he was sure that if they made a reasonable offer of a coalition, he could rely on Jinnah for a ready response."³⁶

The Congress Working Committee, meeting in Wardha on 8 August, authorized Nehru to accept the invitation to form an Interim Government. The Viceroy accordingly issued a communique on 12 August inviting the President of the Congress to form the Provisional Government. Nehru accepted the invitation and wrote to Jinnah offering five seats out of fourteen, in the Interim Government, to nominees of Jinnah. But the negotiations broke down as Jinnah did not agree to the appointment of a non-League Muslim in the Government even out of the Congress quota.

V. THE DIRECT ACTION OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

In pursuance of the resolution of the Muslim League Council, passed on 29 July, the Working Committee of the League called upon the Muslims throughout India to observe 16 August as 'Direct Action Day', when meetings would be held all over the country to explain the

resolution. This looked innocuous enough. But the real spirit of the 'Direct Action' was expressed by Jinnah himself immediately after the resolution was passed by the League Council. He said :

"What we have done today is the most historic act in our history. Never have we in the whole history of the League done anything except by constitutional methods and by constitutionalism. But now we are obliged and forced into this position. This day we bid goodbye to constitutional methods." "He recalled that throughout the fateful negotiations with the Cabinet Mission the other two parties, the British and the Congress, each held a pistol in their hand, the one of the authority and arms and the other of mass struggle and non-co-operation." "To day," he said, "we have also forged a pistol and are in a position to use it."³⁷

Whatever Jinnah might have in view when he uttered these words, the 'Direct Action' was interpreted in the light of these remarks by the Muslim League in Bengal with the full backing and support of the Muslim League Ministry under Mr. H. S. Suhrawardy, ruling over that unfortunate Province. The 'Direct Action' in certain localities in Bengal was merely a camouflage for an organized anti-Hindu campaign of loot, arson and indiscriminate murder of men, women and children in broad daylight with impunity. The worst holocaust took place in Calcutta. The League Ministry had declared 16 August as a public holiday. Long processions were taken out by the Muslim League along the prominent streets of Calcutta, and suddenly the members of the procession began to attack and loot the Hindu shops. Then the horrors of Muslim goondaism in its worst form were let loose upon the Hindus in the predominantly Muslim areas in Calcutta. The Hindus were taken unawares and had the worst of it at the beginning; they were butchered

like sheep, their women were ravished, and their houses looted and occasionally burnt. It has now been proved beyond all doubt that this great killing and outrage were deliberately organized beforehand with the active support of the League Government. It was even then openly alleged that the Chief Minister, Suhrawardy, shielded the worst ruffians in Calcutta and encouraged them to do their worst without any fear. Azad writes: "I found there (Dum Dum, Calcutta) a large military contingent waiting in trucks. When I asked why they were not helping to restore order, they replied that their orders were to stand ready but not to take any action. Throughout Calcutta, the Military and the Police were standing by, but remained inactive while innocent men and women were being killed."³⁸

This was indeed the strangest and the saddest part in the whole tragic episode !

The British Governor, all the while in Calcutta, sat inactive, and the Central Government did not take any effective step even though they received secret official reports that the Muslim League Government was at the back of the whole affair. This unwillingness of the British Government to maintain law and order for which they were still responsible under the existing Constitution rendered the Hindus desperate and forced them to organize themselves. Then followed what may be described as a Civil War between the Hindus and Muslims, members of each community indiscriminately killing those of the other whenever any opportunity offered itself. When it was realized by the Government that the butchery, pillage and arson were no longer one-way traffic, they cried halt and peace was restored after about a week. No regular inquiry was made, but according to a rough official estimate at the time, nearly 5,000 lives were lost, over 15,000 persons were injured, and about 100,000 were

rendered homeless.

According to Mosley, "between dawn on the morning of 16 August 1946 and dusk three days later, the people of Calcutta hacked, battered, burned, stabbed or shot 6,000 of each other to death, and raped and maimed another 20,000."³⁹

The *Statesman* wrote on the Calcutta riot of 16 August :

"The latest estimate of dead is 3,000, who have lain thick about the streets. The injured number many thousand and it is impossible to say how many business houses and private dwellings have been destroyed. This is not a riot. For three days, the city concentrated on unrestrained civil war. Upon whom the main guilt for it rests is manifest. ... Where the primary blame lies is where we have squarely put it—upon the Provincial Muslim League Cabinet...and particularly upon the Chief Minister."^{39a}

During an interview with the Viceroy Maulana Abul Kalam Azad "severely criticized the Bengal ministry (Premier Suhrawardy in particular) and alleged that, although the Government of Bengal had apprehended trouble, they had not taken sufficient precautions ; that they had been much too late in enforcing Section 144 and a total curfew, and in calling out the troops. The declaration of a public holiday on 16 August had made the hooligans of Calcutta's underworld believe that they had the licence of the Government to behave as they liked."^{39b}

VI. INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Far-sighted observers could realize that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to bridge the river of blood that flowed between the Hindus and the Muslims in Calcutta during August, 1946. Azad mournfully observes that "the turn that events had taken made it almost impossible to expect a peaceful solution by agreement between the Congress and the Muslim League." He justly regards

this as "one of the greatest tragedies of Indian history", and, "with the deepest regret", lays the main responsibility for this at the door of Jawaharlal Nehru, though he adds : "Jawaharlal is one of my dearest friends and his contribution to India's national life is second to none".⁴⁰ But Nehru does not seem to have fully realized the consequences of his own folly. While Calcutta was the scene of an unprecedented holocaust, Nehru was busy negotiating with the Viceroy about the Interim Government. On 17 August, i.e., the very next day after the "great killing" had begun, but not ended, nor shown any sign of abating, he submitted his proposals to the Viceroy, and after discussion for a week the personnel of the Interim Government was announced on 24 August, 1946, in the following *communique*.

"His Majesty the King has accepted the resignation of the present members of the Governor-General's Executive Council. His Majesty has been pleased to appoint the following :

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Mr. M. Asaf Ali, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose, Dr. John Matthai, Sardar Baldev Singh, Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, Syed Ali Zaheer and Covesji Hormusji Bhabha.

"Two more Muslim members will be appointed later. The Interim Government will take office on September 2."⁴¹

In a broadcast on the same day, the Viceroy made an earnest—almost pathetic—appeal to the Muslim League to join the Government. "The door of coalition is not closed," said the Viceroy, and he gave all possible assurances to remove misgivings about the Congress tyranny, but Jinnah refused to budge an inch.

Shortly after the announcement of the Interim Government, Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, visited Calcutta. What he saw and learnt there filled him with dismay. He was convinced that if some sort of agreement between

the two major communities was not brought about soon, the Calcutta happenings would be repeated in varying degrees of recklessness all over India. At this psychological moment Khwaja Nazimuddin, a prominent leader of the Muslim League in Bengal, suggested that if the Congress would make an unequivocal statement that Provinces could not opt out of groups except as laid down in the Statement of 16 May, there was just a chance that the Muslim League might join the Interim Government and the Constituent Assembly. Immediately after his return Wavell saw Gandhi and Nehru on 27 August and gave them an account of what happened in Calcutta. He told them that the only way to avoid similar tragedy all over India was to set up coalition Governments both in Bengal and at the Centre. He handed over to Gandhi and Nehru the draft of a formula which he thought might satisfy the Muslim League. It ran thus :

“The Congress are prepared in the interests of communal harmony to accept the intention of the Statement of May 16th, that provinces cannot exercise any option affecting their membership of the sections or of the groups if formed, until the decision contemplated in paragraph 19 (viii) of the Statement of 16th May is taken by the new Legislature after the new constitutional arrangements have come into operation and the first general elections have been held.”⁴²

What transpired at the meeting is not accurately known, but neither Gandhi nor Nehru was prepared to accept the formula. Menon has given a long account of the discussion. Leonard Mosley, who had access to official records not yet made public, has referred to the conversation in some detail from which the following extracts are quoted :

“Give me a simple guarantee that you accept the Cabinet Mission Plan”, asked Wavell. “We have already

said that we accept it", replied Gandhi, "but we are not prepared to guarantee that we accept it in the way that the Cabinet Mission set it out. We have our own interpretations of what they propose."

Said Wavell : "Even if those interpretations differ from what the Cabinet Mission intended ?

Replied Gandhi : "But of course. In any case, what the Cabinet Mission Plan really means is not what the Cabinet Mission thinks but what the interim Government thinks it means."

Wavell : "It is a moment—possibly the last we have—to bring the League and the Congress together. And all I ask is a guarantee (that no minorities in the groups should be allowed to opt out of them before the ten-year period specified by the Cabinet Mission Plan).

Nehru : "To accept this is tantamount to asking Congress to put itself in fetters."

Wavell : If so why did you accept it (C.M Plan) at all ?

Gandhi : "What the Cabinet Mission intended and the way we interpret what they intended may not necessarily be the same."⁴³

At the request of the Viceroy Nehru placed the formula before the W.C. of the Congress. They stuck to their old view but added that any dispute as to the interpretation of the clauses relating to grouping might be referred to the Federal Court and that they would abide by its decision. In his letter to the Viceroy, dated 28 August, communicating this to the Viceroy, Nehru added that the Viceroy's reference to the non-summoning of the Constituent Assembly unless the course suggested by him was adopted by the Congress had produced a feeling of resentment in the Working Committee. The Home Government, however, did not agree with the Viceroy. They asked him not to take any steps which

were likely to result in a breach with the Congress, and to form the Interim Government with the personnel already announced. So the Interim Government was sworn in on 2 September. On the eve of the new Government's assumption of office, a murderous attack was made on Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, one of the Ministers, and communal riots broke out in Bombay and Ahmadabad. The League had realized that violence did pay, so far at least as the Viceroy was concerned.

The firm attitude of the British Cabinet evidently made some impression on Jinnah, for on 13 October, the Muslim League agreed to join the Interim Government. On 14 October Jinnah sent the names of five nominees of the Muslim League. They were Liaquat Ali Khan, I. I. Chundrigar, Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, and Jogendra Nath Mandal. Mandal belonged to the Scheduled caste and was a Minister in the Muslim League Government of Bengal. The inclusion of a Scheduled caste member was obviously a reply to the right claimed by the Congress to nominate a Muslim.

There was, however, no Coalition Government in the real sense of the term. "The League's representatives in the Interim Government refused to accept either Nehru's leadership or the convention of collective responsibility. The Interim Government, as Liaquat Ali Khan described it, "consisted of a Congress bloc and a Muslim bloc, each functioning under a separate leadership."⁴⁴ The Muslim members were in the Government, but not of the Government, or rather, against it. The result was that there were constant wranglings within the Cabinet which presented the sad picture of one composed of an almost equal number of members belonging to two hostile groups who differed on almost every matter of importance. It seems to have been the constant endeavour of the Muslim members to discredit the Congress in every possible way. As Liaquat

Ali, the leader of the Muslim group in the Cabinet, held the Finance portfolio, he had the right to scrutinize every proposal of every department. He fully utilized this power to make it difficult for any Congress member in the Cabinet to function effectively. The proposals of taxation introduced in the Budget were inspired by a deliberate motive to damage the interest of the businessmen, most of whom were Hindus. There was almost an open rupture in the Cabinet over this, but it was somehow averted by the modification of the proposals.

Events outside also made it clear that there was no real improvement in communal feelings. About the middle of October, 1946, there was an organized attack on the Hindus of Noakhali and Tippera districts, in East Bengal, the population of which was predominantly Muslim. The attacks were "made by people armed with guns and other deadly weapons; roads had been dug up and other means of communication cut off to prevent ingress and egress; canals had been blocked and strategic points were being guarded by armed insurgents.

"Two of the Muslim League's nominees to the Interim Government were openly indulging in belligerent speeches."

One of them, Ghazanfar Ali Khan, declared on 19 October :

"We are going into the Interim Government to get a foothold to fight for our cherished goal of Pakistan, and I assure you that we shall achieve Pakistan. The disturbances which have occurred in many parts of the country after the installation of the purely Congress Government at the centre have established the fact beyond any shadow of doubt that the ten crores of Indian Muslims will not submit to any Government which does not include their true representatives. In the Interim Government all our activities shall be guided by two considerations,

that is, to convince the Congress that no Government in India can function smoothly without the co-operation of the Muslim League and that the League is the sole representative of the Indian Muslims. The Interim Government is one of the fronts of the direct action campaign and we shall most scrupulously carry out the orders of Mr. Jinnah on any front that we are called upon to serve."

In other words, even responsible leaders of the Muslim League, selected by Jinnah for administering the Interim Government, held "that the events in East Bengal were but part of the all-India battle for Pakistan."⁴⁵

But as in the Direct Action in Calcutta, the killings soon ceased to be merely a one-way traffic. There were severe reprisals by the Hindus in Bihar, the population of which was predominantly Hindu, and to a lesser extent in Āhmadnagar and Ahmadabad. It is unnecessary to describe in detail the horrors enacted in these places, particularly in Noakhali and Bihar, as the outrages beggar all description. Murder, arson, looting, and outrages on women, specially abduction and forcible conversion of Hindu women—all on a massive scale—formed the usual pattern. One thing, however, deserves special notice. The outrages by the Hindus in Bihar, horrible though they were, were sternly repressed by the Government and the personal interference of the Viceroy and Nehru, in striking contrast to the outrages by the Muslims, first in Calcutta and then in Noakhali, which were allowed to run their own course.

The Muslim outrages in Noakhali, however, brought out the real elements in the greatness of Gandhi, the Saint. He voluntarily undertook the task of pacifying the Muslims, in his own characteristic non-violent way, and for that purpose proceeded to Noakhali and stayed there for about four months, trudging on foot from village

to village, preaching the cult of non-violence to the Hindus and Muslims, and instilling courage and confidence among the thousands of Hindus who had been forced to leave their hearth and home. It was a sight for the gods to see, and perhaps no other episode in the life of Gandhi exalts his saintly character to such a high degree and stamps his personality with those qualities which found expression in the epithet 'Mahatma' unconsciously bestowed upon him by the populace. There is ample evidence to show that Gandhi's tour had very little effect on the improvement of communal relations,^{45a} but its value is to be judged not by the result, but by the spirit which prompted it. Further, it is to be remembered that it was beyond human endeavour to bring about a cordial—or even normal human—relation between the Hindus and Muslims after the Direct Action of 1946. Gandhi made a similar tour in Bihar also.

Differences between the Congress and the League came to a head over the summoning of the Constituent Assembly. The Viceroy had accepted Jinnah's offer to join the Interim Government on condition that the League should rescind the resolution of 29 July rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan. But Jinnah showed no earnest desire either to summon a meeting of the Council of the League, or to join the Constituent Assembly. He evaded a final decision on various pretexts and urged upon the Viceroy to announce immediately the postponement of the Constituent Assembly *sine die*. But the Secretary of State stood firm and on 20 November invitations were issued for the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly to be held on 9 December. Jinnah called upon the representatives of the Muslim League not to participate in the Constituent Assembly and emphasized that the Bombay resolution of the Council of the League, passed on 29 July, still stood. Naturally the Congress leaders demanded

that the League should either accept the Cabinet Mission Plan and come into the Constituent Assembly, or quit the Interim Government.

With the prospect of a civil war throughout India the Secretary of State made one more effort to bring about an agreement between the two major parties by inviting their representatives to London. A Sikh representative was added at the suggestion of the Viceroy. Nehru, Baldev Singh, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, together with the Viceroy, arrived in London on 2 December, 1946. As could be easily anticipated the interpretation of para 19 (v and viii) of the Cabinet Mission Plan proved to be the stumbling block and no settlement could be achieved.

But though no agreement was arrived at, the British Government gave its verdict in favour of the interpretation put upon the disputed clauses by the Muslim League, after taking legal advice. But the Statement issued by the British Government on 6 December, 1946, also conceded the right of each party to refer all questions of interpretation, including that of the disputed clauses (19, v and viii), to the Federal Court, whose decision shall be final.

So far the Statement seems to be fair to both sides. But the sting was in the tail. The Statement added :

“Should a constitution come to be framed by a Constituent Assembly in which a large section of the Indian population had not been represented, His Majesty’s Government could not, of course, contemplate—as the Congress have stated they would not contemplate—forcing such a constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country.”⁴⁶

This very important declaration was accompanied by an assurance to Jinnah in the presence of Nehru, that if the decision of the Federal Court was contrary to the British Government’s interpretation they would have to

consider the position afresh.⁴⁷ This cut the ground from under the feet of Nehru who had agreed to abide by the decision of the Federal Court even if it went against the Congress. It is therefore no wonder that "Nehru took the line that the Statement amounted to a variation and extension of the Statement of 16 May and that he and his colleagues would have to consider the whole situation." It was undoubtedly a triumph for Jinnah. He was assured on two important points. First, that the interpretation of the disputed clauses, whatever the decision of the Court, was ultimately bound to be in his favour. Secondly, the Muslim League need only boycott the Constituent Assembly in order to render nugatory any decision that it might arrive at 'regarding the Constitution of an Indian Union.' Jinnah further strengthened his position by staying on in England where he made a number of speeches warning Englishmen that the only alternative to grant of Pakistan was a civil war in India.

VII. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The Constituent Assembly met on 9 December, 1946, but the Muslim members did not attend. Rajendra Prasad was elected President, and Nehru moved the 'Objectives Resolution.' "It envisaged the Indian Union as 'an independent Sovereign Republic,' comprising autonomous units with residuary powers, wherein the ideals of social, political and economic democracy would be guaranteed to all sections of the people and adequate safeguards would be provided for minorities and backward communities and areas."

But its discussion was postponed till 20 January, 1947, to enable the representatives of the Muslim League and the Indian States to participate in the Constituent Assembly. During the interval an emergency meeting of the A. I. C. C. was held at Delhi on 5 January. It agreed to accept the procedure contained in the Statement made

by the British Government on 6 December, 1946, but added :

“It must be clearly understood, however, that this must not involve any compulsion of a Province and the rights of the Sikhs in the Punjab should not be jeopardised. In the event of any attempt at such compulsion, a Province or a part of a Province has the right to take such action as may be deemed necessary in order to give effect to the wishes of the people concerned.⁴⁸

The Constituent Assembly reassembled on 20 January, 1947, and had a session of six days. Nehru's resolution on 'Objectives' was passed and some important committees were appointed. On 31 January the Working Committee of the Muslim League met at Karachi and passed a lengthy resolution denouncing the composition and procedure of the Constituent Assembly as *ab initio* void, invalid and illegal, and declining to call a meeting of the Council of the League to reconsider the resolution passed on 29 July, 1946.⁴⁹ This meant in effect that the League not only rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan and boycotted the Constituent Assembly, but was also committed to the policy of 'Direct Action.' The Congress and the Minority communities therefore made a demand to the Viceroy, on 5 February, for the resignation of the League members from the Interim Government.

The Muslim League was not in a mood to oblige the Congress, and the Viceroy was sympathetic to its point of view. But on 13 February Nehru wrote a strong letter to the Viceroy reiterating his demand for the resignation of the members of the Muslim League from the Interim Government.⁵⁰ Two days later Vallabhbhai Patel stated in a press interview that otherwise the Congress would withdraw from the Interim Government.⁵¹ Everybody could realize that either course would be followed by disastrous consequences, in the shape of communal fight,

almost leading to civil war, in which it was doubtful if the loyalty of the Indian elements in the Army and the Civil Services could be relied upon.⁵²

It was at this grave crisis which faced India that the British Prime Minister Attlee rose to the height of his stature. Probably no other British Minister, certainly not Churchill, possessed that courage, foresight, and sympathy for India which inspired Attlee. Azad, who was in close touch with the British authorities at the time, writes: "Mr. Attlee was of the view that a stage had been reached where suspense was most undesirable. It was necessary to take a clear-cut decision and he decided that the British Government should fix a date for the withdrawal of British power from India. Lord Wavell did not agree regarding the announcement of a date. He wished to persist with the Cabinet Mission Plan, for he held that it was the only possible solution of the Indian problem. He further held that the British Government would fail in its duty if it transferred political power before the communal question had been solved. Passions had been roused to such a peak in India that responsible people were carried away. The withdrawal of British power in such an atmosphere would in his view lead to widespread riots and disturbances. He therefore advised that the *status quo* should be maintained and that every attempt should be made to compose the differences between the two major parties. It was his firm conviction that it would be dangerous and unworthy if the British withdrew without a previous understanding between Congress and the League.

"Mr. Attlee did not agree. He held that once a date-line was fixed, the responsibility would be transferred to Indian hands. Unless this was done, there would never be any solution. Mr. Attlee feared that if the *status quo* was continued, Indians would lose their faith in the

British Government. Conditions in India were such that the British could not maintain their power without an effort which the British people were not prepared to make. The only alternatives were to rule with a firm hand and suppress all disturbances, or transfer power to the Indians themselves. The Government could continue to govern, but this would require an effort which would interfere with the reconstruction of Britain.⁵³ The other alternative was to fix a date for the transfer of power and thus place the responsibility squarely on Indian shoulders.

"Lord Wavell was not convinced. He still argued that if communal difficulties led to violence, history would not forgive the British. The British had governed India for over a hundred years and they would be responsible if unrest, violence and disorder broke out as a result of their withdrawal. When he found that he could not convince Mr. Attlee, Lord Wavell offered his resignation."⁵⁴

(On 20 February, 1947, Attlee made a statement in the House of Commons which decided the fate of India. After a brief review of the failure to bring about an agreement among the different parties in India, Attlee observed :

"The present state of uncertainty is fraught with danger and cannot be indefinitely prolonged. His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that it is their definite intention to take necessary steps to effect the transference of power to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June, 1948."

Keeping in view the possibility of the Muslim League abstaining from the Constituent Assembly till the last, Attlee added that in such a contingency "His Majesty's Government will have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over ... in the best interests of the people." In order to perform this delicate and difficult task Attlee

announced that Admiral the Viscount Mountbatten has been appointed Viceroy in succession to Lord Wavell with effect from March, 1947.⁵⁵

This remarkable Statement finally set at rest all doubts and uncertainties about the future line of action to be adopted by the British Government in handing over the Government of India to her own people. But it "whipped up the tempo in the political field." The Muslim League now made a desperate attempt to secure control over the Provinces which it planned to be attached to Pakistan. Direct Action was started in Assam, but it was not attended with success. The Muslim League, however, established its Ministry firmly in Sindh and the Congress influence in N.W.F.P. declined to a considerable extent. In the Panjab the Muslim League, unable to remove the Coalition Ministry of the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs under Malik Khizr Hyat Khan, followed the tactics of Direct Action. The Ministry was forced to resign and the Governor asked the League to form the Ministry. Immediately, Master Tara Singh, the Akali leader, called upon the Hindus and Sikhs to declare war. "If we can snatch the Government from the Britishers," said he, "no one can stop us from snatching the Government from the Muslims. We shall not allow the League to exist. We shall rule over them and keep the Government fighting. I have sounded the bugle. Finish the Muslim League."⁵⁶

Violent communal riots broke out practically all over the Panjab, forcing the Governor to take over the administration of the Province in his own hands. Street-fighting in Lahore developed into a frenzy of stabbing and killing which soon spread to other towns such as Multan, Rawalpindi, Amritsar, etc. The trouble also spread to the N.W.F.P. Shocking atrocities that outraged humanity and a heavy toll of life and property

marked the Direct Action in the Panjab as in Bengal. Nehru, who visited Rawalpindi, reported : "I have seen ghastly sights and I have heard of behaviour by human beings which would degrade brutes." According to official account 2,049 persons were killed and over 1,000 seriously injured in course of a fortnight. Mountbatten's Press Attache, visiting Rawalpindi, stated that the destruction in the Hindu and Sikh quarters was "as thorough as any produced by fire bomb raids in the war....The Muslims of the areas were quite pleased with themselves."^{56a}

It was in this dismal situation that the Working Committee of the Congress took a realistic view and passed the following resolution, foreshadowing the Partition of India, on 8 March, 1947 :

"During the past seven months India has witnessed many horrors and tragedies which have been enacted in the attempt to gain political ends by brutal violence, murder and coercion. The tragic events have demonstrated that there can be no settlement of the problem in the Punjab by violence and coercion, and that no arrangement based on coercion can last. Therefore it is necessary to find a way which amounts to the least compulsion. This would necessitate division of the Punjab into two Provinces so that the predominantly Muslim part may be separated from the predominantly non-Muslim part."

The W.C. welcomed the statement of Attlee, accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan with the interpretations put upon it by the British Government, and made an appeal to the Muslim League to discuss with the Congress methods of ensuring a peaceful transfer of power. The Muslim League, however, did not make any favourable response either to the Congress appeal or to Attlee's statement of 20 February.

The resolution of the W.C. recommending partition of

the Panjab was not agreeable to a section of the Congress. "The Congress President explained in a press interview that the Congress had only suggested a division of the Punjab as a means of putting an end to violence, and that the same remedy would hold good for Bengal if the circumstances in that province were similar."⁵⁷

CHAPTER II.

FREEDOM AND PARTITION OF INDIA

I. THE CONGRESS LEADERS ACCEPT PARTITION

Lord Mountbatten assumed the office of Governor-General on 24 March, 1947. He invited Gandhi and had five interviews with him between 31 March and 4 April. Gandhi made a quaint proposal which is on a par with his suggestion during the Second World War that Britain, instead of fighting Hitler, should offer peaceful *Satyagraha*. He advised Mountbatten, during his very first interview, to dismiss the existing Executive Council and give Jinnah the option of forming a Government with members of his own choice who might be all Muslims. It is hardly necessary to add that the suggestion astounded the whole of India and was most unceremoniously rejected by the Congress. Gandhi thereupon not only withdrew his proposal but also withdrew himself from politics, leaving all future negotiations to the Working Committee.

Mountbatten was a practical man with realistic approach. He soon realized that in the present circumstances, the Cabinet Mission plan was unworkable and a partition of India was inevitable. This was, in a way, foreshadowed by the resolution of the Congress W. C. passed on 8 March. Nevertheless, it must have caused a great wrench of heart to the Congress leaders to give up the ideal of Indian unity,—a free India whole and entire—for which they had fought and died for more than half a century. But stern facts stared them in the face and one by one they yielded to the pressure of necessity. The first to accept definitely the idea of Partition and

the plan of Mountbatten was Sardar Patel. His experience of working with the League members in the Executive Council had convinced him that the Pakistan mentality was so strong among the Muslims that it was impossible to work with the Muslim League. At last the naked truth dawned upon him and he said that "whether we liked it or not, there were two nations in India. He was now convinced that Muslims and Hindus could not be united into one nation. There was no alternative except to recognize this fact. In this way alone could we end the quarrel between Hindus and Muslims. He further said that if two brothers cannot stay together, they divide. After separation with their respective shares they become friends. If, on the other hand, they are forced to stay together, they tend to fight every day. It was better to have one clean fight and then separate than have bickerings every day."⁵⁸ Sardar Patel also felt that the British officials lacked the will to prevent communal outbreaks, though they had the power to do so. He "came to the fateful decision that unless the country was partitioned chaos and anarchy would spread throughout the land."⁵⁹

Jawaharlal Nehru at first reacted violently against the Partition, but was gradually reconciled to it. Azad suggests that he was influenced by Vallabhbhai Patel and Lord and Lady Mountbatten. There may be some truth in it, but as regards the reasons which finally induced him to accept it we have the testimony of Nehru himself which should outweigh everything else.

Leonard Mosley writes :

"Pandit Nehru (in 1956) told Michael Brecher, his biographer, the reasons for accepting the Partition of India :

"Well, I suppose it was the compulsion of events and the feeling that 'we could'nt get out of that deadlock or morass by pursuing the way we had done ; it became worse and worse. Further a feeling that even if we got

freedom for India with that background, it would be a very weak India, that is a federal India with far too much power in the federating units. A larger India would have constant troubles, constant disintegrating pulls. And also the fact that we saw no other way of getting our freedom—in the near future, I mean. And so we accepted it and let us build up a strong India. And if others do not want to be in it, well, how can we and why should we force them to be in it.” Mosley continues :

“But perhaps Pandit Nehru came nearer the truth in a conversation with the author in 1960 when he said :

‘The truth is that we were tired men, and we were getting on in years too. Few of us could stand the prospect of going to prison again—and if we had stood out for a united India as we wished it, prison obviously awaited us. We saw the fires burning in the Punjab and heard every day of the killings. The plan for partition offered a way out and we took it.’

“He added : ‘But if Gandhi had told us not to, we would have gone on fighting, and waiting. But we accepted. We expected that partition would be temporary, that Pakistan was bound to come back to us. None of us guessed how much the killing and the crisis in Kashmir would embitter relations.’”⁶⁰

When we remember that Nehru looked upon Brecher as his best biographer and was very intimate with Mosley, we may reasonably put a great value upon their version of what Nehru himself said. The two statements, though somewhat different, are not self-contradictory, and perhaps both contain a great deal of truth.

The most striking change was that of Gandhi. As some obscurity and uncertainty still exist in this matter, it is better to review the facts whose authenticity cannot be questioned. Gandhi arrived in Delhi on 31 March to see Mountbatten. Azad writes in his Memoirs :

"I went to see him at once and his very first remark was, 'Partition has now become a threat. It seems Vallabhbhai and even Jawaharlal have surrendered. What will you do now? Will you stand by me or have you also changed?'

"I replied, 'I have been and am against partition. Never has my opposition to partition been so strong as today. I am however distressed to find that even Jawaharlal and Sardar Patel have accepted defeat and, in your words, surrendered their arms. My only hope now is in you. If you stand against partition, we may yet save the situation. If you however acquiesce, I am afraid India is lost.'

"Gandhiji said, 'What a question to ask? If the Congress wishes to accept partition it will be over my dead body. So long as I am alive, I will never agree to the partition of India. Nor will I, if I can help it, allow Congress to accept it.'

"Later that day Gandhiji met Lord Mountbatten. He saw him again the next day and still again on 2 April. Sardar Patel came to him soon after he returned from his first meeting with Lord Mountbatten and was closeted with him for over two hours. What happened during this meeting I do not know. But when I met Gandhiji again, I received the greatest shock of my life, for I found that he too had changed. He was still not openly in favour of partition but he no longer spoke so vehemently against it. What surprised and shocked me even more was that he began to repeat the arguments which Sardar Patel had already used. For over two hours I pleaded with him but could make no impression on him."⁶¹

Abul Kalam Azad was an intimate friend and a close associate of Gandhi, and his views about Gandhi must always carry great weight. Nevertheless, available documents

seem to indicate that Gandhi's conversion to the idea of Partition was neither so sudden nor so complete as the statement of Azad implies. Gandhi seems to have actively opposed the idea of Partition till the very last. He had been preaching against the Partition in his Prayer meetings⁶² and the Muslim leaders made a complaint on the subject. Even so late as 4 June, 1947, Lord Mountbatten was apprehensive about Gandhi in this matter, and invited him to come round to the Viceregal Lodge just before the Prayer meeting. The net result of the interview may be judged from what Gandhi said in the Prayer meeting. "The British Government is not responsible for Partition," he said. "The Viceroy has no hand in it. In fact he is as opposed to division as Congress itself, but if both of us—Hindus and Moslems—cannot agree on anything else, then the Viceroy is left with no choice."⁶³

It appears from some of his conversations that Gandhi believed that India was behind him in his opposition to Partition, but unfortunately the Congress leaders were not. The consequences of rejecting the Partition would be to entrust the administration to the hands of a new set of leaders. But Gandhi thought it would be most unwise, if not impossible, to remove the old and tried leaders. This was the burden of his speech in the A. I. C. C. on 14 June.⁶⁴

On the other hand, one naturally wonders why Gandhi, if he felt so strongly against the Partition, did not try to force the Congress leaders into accepting his views. Fischer writes: "In the summer of 1948, I asked Nehru, Patel and others in India why Gandhi had not attempted to prevent Congress from accepting Pakistan; if nothing else had availed he might have coerced them by fasting. It was not Gandhi's way, their composite reply ran, to compel agreement even on the most crucial issue."⁶⁵ It is difficult to accept this view, for Gandhi

not unoften took to fast and enforced his views on many issues of much less importance. Besides, it should be remembered, that Nehru himself told Mosley⁶⁶ that he and others would not have accepted Partition if Gandhi had told them not to. Fischer is probably nearer the truth when he observes: "The only alternative would have been to reject Pakistan, leave the Government and stake everything on a restoration of the people's sanity and peaceful inclinations. But Gandhi saw that (Congress) leaders had no faith in this alternative. He might have induced them to vote for his view in Committee; he could not have infused them with faith in it except by proving that Hindus and Moslems could live together amicably. The burden of proof was on Gandhi. And time was running out fast."⁶⁷ In other words, Gandhi at last realized that he had been leaning throughout on the two broken reeds of Hindu-Muslim unity and mass non-violence—and that these were nothing but will-o'-the-wisp which he had been pursuing throughout his political career.

The acceptance of the Partition by Gandhi and other prominent Congress leaders like Nehru and Patel is generally regarded as inexcusable and inexplicable, and many look upon it as a sudden and unexpected decision at the last moment which plunged India into unspeakable misery. Such an opinion is due to the fact that those leaders were always guided by a false notion of Indian nationality based on Hindu-Muslim unity, and persuaded the people to ignore the reality and cherish this ideal. But those who carefully review the history of Hindu-Muslim relations from the beginning of the 19th century, Pakistan can only be regarded as the logical culmination of political development in India. It has been pointed out more than once in the three volumes of this work that there were fundamental differences between the Hindus

and Muslims of India which stood in the way of their fusing into one nation, as this term is normally understood. This was emphasized by the separate electorate, originally devised by Minto, but later accepted by the Congress. Since then the Congress had, *in practice* if not *in theory*, recognized the two-nation theory propounded by Syed Ahmad in the 19th century and Jinnah in the 20th. As far back as 1934 the Congress pledged itself to reject any scheme of solving communal problem *vis-a-vis* Indian constitution which was not agreed to by the Muslims.⁶⁸ In 1942 Gandhi wrote in the *Harijan* that if the vast majority of Muslims want to partition India they must have the partition;⁶⁹ and in 1944 he actually carried on negotiations with Jinnah on this basis.⁷⁰ In 1945 the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution that it could not think "of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will."⁷¹ The eminent Hindu leader Rajagopalachari⁷² actually suggested the idea of Pakistan as the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem and even Nehru conceded the possibility of Pakistan in January, 1946.⁷³ Early in March, 1947, the Working Committee of the Congress itself suggested the partition of the Panjab, and (therefore also of) Bengal, on communal basis.⁷⁴

In addition to all this Mountbatten very effectively used one strong argument in favour of the partition of India to win over the Congress leaders. In all the plans discussed so far there was one point in common, namely that there should be a weak centre, with a very limited authority, while residuary powers should be vested in the Provinces. This was a concession to the Muslims, who were apprehensive of Hindu majority in the Centre. In a country like India, with diverse languages, races and religions, and people in different stages of political and

51V3

cultural evolution and with different historical traditions, a strong central authority was needed to keep down the fissiparous tendency which has been a permanent feature of Indian politics since the beginning of recorded history. The separation of Muslim Provinces would give an opportunity to the rest of India to evolve a constitution with a strong Central Government. So Pakistan would not be an unmixed curse. What it would take away in quantity, would be compensated by the solidarity it would give to the rest. What idealism would suffer, real politics would gain. Azad observes : "Lord Mountbatten advised that it would be better to give up a few small pieces in the north-west and the north-east and then build up a strong and consolidated India. Sardar Patel was impressed by the argument that co-operation with the Muslim League would jeopardize Indian unity and strength. It seemed to me that these arguments had influenced not only Sardar Patel but Jawaharlal. The same arguments repeated by Sardar Patel and Lord Mountbatten had also weakened Gandhiji's opposition to partition."⁷⁵

The general principles of Partition having been agreed upon, the question arose of the minorities of the Panjab and Bengal. Jinnah insisted upon the transfer of these two Provinces wholesale to Pakistan. But the Congress leaders, though agreeing to the creation of Pakistan, were adamant on the point that the non-Muslims in the Panjab and Bengal living in districts contiguous to Hindusthan and forming a majority of population in these areas, must be given the option to choose between Pakistan and Hindusthan. This would mean the creation of two separate Provinces of East Panjab and West Bengal. When Jinnah protested, it was pointed out that this was in strict accordance with the terms of the Lahore resolution of 1940 demanding Pakistan.

While this discussion was going on, a proposal was

made to the effect that Bengal should be made a sovereign and independent State. The Chief Minister of Bengal, Suhrawardy, and Sarat Chandra Bose, elder brother of Subhas Chandra Bose and leader of the left wing of the Congress party, sponsored the scheme. This, however, received little support from either the Congress or the Muslim League. On the other hand, the Congress and the Muslim League organizations in Bengal endorsed the proposal for creating a separate Province of West Bengal.⁷⁶

II. THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Mountbatten was so deeply moved by the rapid deterioration in communal relations that he was eager to effect the transfer of power without any avoidable delay. He sent his plan to London on 2 May, 1947, and received it back on 10 May with the approval of the Cabinet in a modified form. This plan envisaged the division of India into quite a large number of autonomous States to start with. But Nehru, to whom Mountbatten showed it confidentially in advance, was dead against such a Balkanization of India. It was at this stage that V. P. Menon, a high official in the Viceroy's Secretariat, dealing with the various reform proposals for a long time, put up a plan which he had drawn up during the regime of Wavell, but of which no notice was taken by the Secretary of State to whom it was sent. It was based on the partition of India into two States enjoying Dominion Status, the predominantly non-Muslim areas in the Panjab and Bengal being excluded from Pakistan. This plan, being approved by Nehru, was accepted by Mountbatten. Thereafter the Viceroy had consultations with Nehru and Patel on behalf of the Congress; Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan on behalf of the League; and Baldev Singh on behalf of the Sikhs. In the light of these consultations the new plan was finalized. On 18 May the Viceroy proceeded to London. The Cabinet approved the new plan and issued a Statement

the main points of which may be summarised as follows :

'The question of Partition will be settled by the following procedure :

I. BENGAL AND THE PANJAB

'The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Panjab (excluding the European members) should meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the Province.

'The members of the two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the Province should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favour of partition, division will take place and arrangements will be made accordingly.

II. SINDH

'The Legislative Assembly of Sindh (excluding the European members) will, at a special meeting, take its own decision as to whether its constitution should be framed by the existing, or a new and separate Constituent Assembly.

III. N. W. F. P.

'With regard to the North-West Frontier Province it will be necessary, in view of its special position, to give it an opportunity of reconsidering its position if the whole or any part of the Panjab decides not to join the existing Constituent Assembly. A referendum will be made, in such a case, to the electors of the present Legislative Assembly to choose between the existing Constituent Assembly and a new and separate one.

IV. BRITISH BALUCHISTAN

'British Baluchistan, in view of its geographical situation, will also be given a similar opportunity of reconsidering its position.

V. ASSAM

'Though Assam is predominantly a non-Muslim Province, the district of Sylhet, which is contiguous to Bengal, is predominamtly Muslim. If it be decided to partition Bengal, a referendum will be held in Sylhet district to decide whether the district should continue to form part of the Assam Province or should be amalgamated with the new Province of East Bengal. •

'In case a partition of the Panjab and Bengal be decided upon a Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor-General to demarcate the exact boundary line.

'His Majesty's Government are willing to hand over the power even earlier than June, 1948, the date originally proposed. His Majesty's Government propose to introduce legislation during the current session of Parliament for the transfer of power in 1947 on a Dominion Status basis to one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken under the plan. This will be without prejudice to the right of the Constituent Assemblies to decide in due dourse whether the parts of India which they represent will remain within the British Commonwealth.'77

Lord Mountbatten returned to India on 31 May and discussed the Statement with the Party leaders on 2 and 3 June. The leaders having accepted it the Prime Minister announced the plan in the House of Commons on 3 June, 1947. The Viceroy also spoke over the All India Radio on the evening of 3 June, and immediately after it the Statement of His Majesty's Government was broadcast and released to the Press.

Lord Mountbatten held a Press Conference on 4 June and announced that the transfer of power would be effected, not in June, 1948, as declared in the Statement of 20 February, 1947, but much earlier than that, and

probably about 15 August, 1947.

The Working Committee of the Congress met on 3 June, 1947, and approved of the new plan announced by the Viceroy. The most intriguing problem before the Committee was the future of the N. W. F. P. In spite of the opposition of the Muslim League, the Congress Government under the Khan brothers had been functioning still. The new plan would place the Khan brothers and the Khudai Khidmatgars at the mercy of the League who looked upon them as mortal enemies. When therefore even Gandhi supported the plan in the W. C., Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan "was completely stunned and for several minutes he could not utter a word. He then appealed to the Working Committee and reminded the Committee that he had always supported the Congress. If the Congress now deserted him, the reaction on the Frontier would be terrible. His enemies would laugh at him and even his friends would say that so long as the Congress needed the Frontier, they supported the Khudai Khidmatgars. When however the Congress wished to come to terms with the Muslim League, it gave up its opposition to partition without even consulting the Frontier and its leaders. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan repeatedly said that the Frontier would regard it as an act of treachery if the Congress now threw the Khudai Khidmatgars to the wolves."⁷⁸

This statement—if it has been correctly reported by Azad—cannot be regarded as having fairly or accurately represented the actual state of things. Lord Mountbatten had declared in unequivocal language that the people of the N.W.F.P. would be given an opportunity, like the non-Muslim minorities in Bengal and the Panjab, to decide for themselves whether they would opt for Pakistan or Hindusthan. This was a fair and square proposal, and if Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan had

as much hold over the people as his statement implied there was no reason why he should have hesitated to accept it. Once having opted for Hindusthan he could have negotiated with the friendly Congress party for the future status of N.W.F.P. either as a free Pathan State or as an autonomous State under Hindusthan. If the Congress then failed to meet his reasonable demands he would have been justified in hurling the abuses which he did against the Congress. Further, it is interesting to note that even in 1944, Gandhi offered to Jinnah a separate Pakistan State including N.W.F.P.⁷⁹

But Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan evidently knew full well that blood was thicker than water and on a straight issue of joining either Hindusthan or Pakistan, the Muslim population of N.W.F.P., in spite of their profession of loyalty to the Congress, would overwhelmingly vote for Pakistan. He was therefore unwilling to accept the proposal of plebiscite. It is consequently difficult to maintain that the Congress treatment of its Muslim followers in N.W.F.P. was more harsh or unjust than its treatment of the non-Muslim followers in Bengal and the Panjab.

Azad tells us that Gandhi was moved by the appeal of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan in the meeting of the Congress Working Committee on 3 June. Gandhi even told the Viceroy that he would not support the plan for Partition without a satisfactory assurance of fair treatment to the Khudai Khidmatgars by the Muslim League. For, how could he desert those who had always stood by the Congress in the days of difficulty and distress?⁸⁰ It would be interesting to know whether Gandhi had expressed similar feelings in the Committee for the non-Muslim minorities of Bengal and the Panjab. They, too, had stood by the Congress in weal and woe, and in one respect deserved more pity. If the Muslims of N.W.F.P. were as devoted to the Congress ideals as they were

represented to be, they had the remedy in their own hands, for the decision would be made by plebiscite. The Hindus and Sikhs in the W. Panjab and the Hindus of E. Bengal had no such remedy. It was really these peoples whom the Congress, *with far greater justice*, might be described as having thrown to the wolves.

Lord Mountbatten had a personal discussion with Dr. Khan Saheb. The latter demanded that if there was to be plebiscite, the voters should have the right to vote for a separate independent State of their own,—Pakhtoonistan. Mountbatten pointed out that the original suggestion of Attlee Cabinet to give option to each Province to declare for Hindusthan, Pakistan, or independence, was turned down by Nehru as Balkanization of India. An exception could not now be made for a single Province, except with the consent of both the parties. But while the Congress was agreeable to Abdul Gaffar Khan's proposal, Jinnah strongly opposed it and characterized the demand for an independent Pakhtoonistan (or Pathanistan) as insidious and spurious. He, however, declared that the N.W.F.P would enjoy full autonomy in Pakistan. This did not satisfy the Khan brothers and they advised their followers to boycott the referendum when it took place. The plebiscite was in favour of joining Pakistan.

III. THE CONGRESS ACCEPTS PARTITION OF INDIA.

The Congress Working Committee met on 12 June, 1947, and prepared a draft resolution for All-India Congress Committee which met at New Delhi on 14 and 15 June, 1947, and accepted it.⁸¹ Some extracts of this resolution are quoted below :

“The Committee welcomes the decision of the British Government to transfer power completely to the Indian people by next August.....

“In view...of the refusal of the Muslim League to

accept the Plan of May 16, and to participate in the Constituent Assembly, and further, in view of the policy of the Congress that 'it cannot think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will', the A.I.C.C. accepts the proposals embodied in the announcement of June 3.

"The Congress has consistently upheld that the unity of India must be maintained. The picture of India we have learnt to cherish will remain in our minds and hearts. The A.I.C.C. earnestly trusts that when present passions have subsided, India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be discredited and discarded by all.

"The proposals of June 3, 1947, are likely to lead to the secession of some parts of the country from India. However much this may be regretted, the A. I. C. C. accepts this possibility, in the circumstances now prevailing."

Pandit Govind Vallabh Pant, who moved the resolution in the A. I. C. C., said that 'this was the only way to achieve freedom and liberty for the country. It would assure an Indian Union with a strong centre..... The Congress had worked hard and sacrificed everything for the sake of unity. But there was a limit beyond which it could not go. The choice today was between accepting the statement of June 3 or committing suicide.'

Pandit Pant maintained that 'it was the declared policy of the Congress not to coerce any unwilling areas to join the Union.' 'It was,' he said, 'better to accept the Statement of June 3 than fritter away their energies in trying to keep unwilling people in the Union.'

The resolution was seconded by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. He said 'that the decision of the W. C. was not the right decision, but the Congress had no alternative,

as the present state of indecision and drift could not be allowed to continue any longer, specially in view of the internal strife and disorder and the obstinacy of the Muslim League. The Congress stood by the ideal of a United India, but it was also committed to the principle of self-determination and was against coercing any unwilling areas to join the Union. He felt sure that the Partition would be short-lived and the seceding parts of India would, in the very near future, hurry back to the Indian Union.'

The Congress President then announced that notice had been given of 12 amendments, but eight of them, being of the nature of direct opposition, were out of order. In course of the discussion that followed there was strong opposition to the resolution from several members. Choitram Gidwani, the Sindh Congress leader, in a forceful speech asserted 'that the unity of India was much more precious than the advantage of a strong centre. He characterized the resolution as downright surrender to brute force and violence.'

Among the opponents the most impressive and impassioned speech was that of Purshottamdas Tandon. He said: 'Acceptance of the resolution will be an abject surrender to the British and the Muslim League. The W. C. has failed you, but you have the strength of millions behind you and you must reject this resolution. The decision of the W. C. was an admission of weakness and the result of a sense of despair. The Partition would not benefit either community—the Hindus in Pakistan and the Muslims in India would both live in fear.'

The point of view expressed in the last sentence was also stressed by Maulana Hafizur Rahman who vehemently opposed the resolution.

Dr. Kitchlew, President of the Panjab Provincial Congress Committee, opposed the resolution and characterized it as a 'surrender of nationalism in favour of communalism.'

When passions were rising high against the resolution, Gandhi intervened in the debate and spoke for about forty minutes. 'He advised the House to accept the resolution. They must remember that the W. C., as their representative, had accepted the plan, and it was the duty of the A. I. C. C. to stand by them. The acceptance of the plan did not involve the Congress Working Committee alone. There were two other parties to it, the British Government and the Muslim League. If at this stage the All-India Congress Committee rejected the Working Committee's decision, what would the world think of it? The consequences of rejection would be the finding of a new set of leaders, who could not only constitute the Congress Working Committee, but also take charge of the Government. They should not forget that peace in the country was very essential at this juncture. The Congress was opposed to Pakistan and he was one of those who had steadfastly opposed the division of India. Yet he had come before the All-India Congress Committee to urge the acceptance of the resolution on India's division. Sometimes certain decisions, however unpalatable they might be, had to be taken.'

Nehru who spoke on the second day asserted 'that the most urgent task at present was to arrest the swift drift towards anarchy and chaos by the establishment of a strong Central Government. He said that there was no question of any surrender to the Muslim League. The Congress had all along been against coercing any unit to remain under the Indian Union. It was wrong to suggest that the Congress Working Committee had taken fright and therefore surrendered, though it was correct to say that they were very much disturbed at the prevailing madness. Partition was better than murder of innocent citizens.'

Following Nehru Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in

a vigorous speech extended his full support to the June 3 Plan. He entirely disagreed with the view of Azad that the Cabinet Mission Plan was better and said 'that, looking at the Cabinet Mission's proposals today in the light of his experience in the Interim Government during the past nine months, he was not at all sorry that the Statement of 16 May had gone. Had they accepted it, the whole of India would have gone the Pakistan way. Today they had seventy-five to eighty per cent. of India, which they could develop and make strong according to their genius. The League could develop the rest of the country. He denied that the W. C. accepted the Plan out of fear. Any course other than the one which the W. C. had suggested would not only be injurious but would also make the Congress the laughing stock of the world. Here was a chance for India to attain her independence. Was she going to throw it away'?

Acharya Kripalani, the Congress President, in his concluding speech, also refuted the charge that the Working Committee had taken the decision out of fear. He said :

"The Hindu and Moslem communities have vied with each other in the worst orgies of violence...I have seen a well where women with their children, 107 in all, threw themselves to save their honour. In another place, a place of worship, fifty young women were killed by their menfolk for the same reason. I have seen heaps of bones in a house where 307 persons, mainly women and children, were driven, locked up and then burnt alive by the invading mob. These ghastly experiences have no doubt affected my approach to the question. Some members have accused us that we have taken this decision out of fear. I must admit the truth of this charge, but not in the sense in which it is made. The fear is not for the lives lost, or of the widows' wail, or the orphans' cry, or of the many houses burned. The

fear is that if we go on like this, retaliating and heaping indignities on each other, we shall progressively reduce ourselves to a stage of cannibalism and worse. In every fresh communal fight the most brutal and degraded acts of the previous fight become the norm."

The resolution of Pant, when put to the vote, was carried, 157 voting for it, 29 against, and 32 members remaining neutral.⁸²

The Council of the All-India Muslim League met in New Delhi on 10 June, and approved of His Majesty's Government's Statement of 3 June. "The Council was of the opinion that, although it could not agree to the partition of Bengal and the Panjab, or give its consent to such partition, it had to consider His Majesty's Government's plan for the transfer of power as a whole. The resolution gave full authority to Jinnah to accept the fundamental principles of the plan as a compromise and empowered him to take all steps and decisions in that connexion."⁸³

But though the two principal Parties, the Congress and the Muslim League, accepted the June 3rd Plan, the extremists of both communities sharply reacted against it. "The Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha met in Delhi and passed a resolution which declared: "India is one and indivisible and there will never be peace unless and until the separated areas are brought back into the Indian Union and made integral parts thereof." The Mahasabha even called for an all-India 'Anti-Pakistan Day.'⁸⁴

Thus at last the curtain fell on the question of Indian unity. Curiously enough, very little attention was devoted by the Congress leaders to the pitiable condition of the Hindu and Sikh minorities in Pakistan. When the point was raised, the members from Sindh, who vehemently opposed the resolution of Pant, were given all kinds

of assurances and were told in private discussion, that if they suffered in any way in Pakistan India would retaliate on the Muslims in India. Soon this kind of propaganda was used, as a regular means, to remove opposition against Partition. "It was being openly said in certain circles that the Hindus in Pakistan need have no fear as there would be 45 millions of Muslims in India and if there was any oppression of Hindus in Pakistan, the Muslims in India would have to bear the consequences."⁸⁵

IV. INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT

As could be easily anticipated, East Bengal and the West Panjab, as well as Sindh, Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. opted for Pakistan, while West Bengal and the East Panjab opted for India. In Sylhet a majority of the voters—239,619 to 184,041—were in favour of separation and joining East Bengal.

On 4 July, 1947, the Indian Independence Bill was introduced in the House of Commons. High tributes were paid to both Attlee and Mountbatten by members on both sides of the House. The Bill was passed without any amendment on 15 July, and by the House of Lords on the following day; it received the Royal Assent on 18 July.

The main provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, may be summarised as follows:

1. Two independent Dominions, known respectively as India and Pakistan, shall be set up as from the 15th day of August, 1947.

2. The territories of the two Dominions were defined in such terms that Pakistan was to comprise Sindh, British Baluchistan, N.W.F.P., the West Panjab and East Bengal. (The exact boundaries of the last two were determined by two Boundary Commissions, each consisting of two nominees of the Congress and two of the Muslim League,

and a Chairman, Sir Cyril Radcliffe. As the members could not agree, the Chairman gave his award).

3. "For each of the new Dominions, there shall be a Governor-General who shall be appointed by His Majesty for the purposes of the government of the Dominion :

"Provided that, unless and until provision to the contrary is made by a law of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions, the same person may be Governor-General of both the new Dominions."

4. The Legislature of each of the new Dominions shall have full power to make laws for that Dominion, and no Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, nor any Order in Council passed after 15 August, 1947, shall have any validity in either of the two Dominions. In short, the jurisdiction of the British Parliament over India will cease from that date.

5. With effect from 15 August, 1947, His Majesty's Government will cease to have any responsibility for the government of British India ; and all treaties and agreements between His Majesty's Government and the rulers of Indian States or any authority in tribal areas shall lapse. The words "Emperor of India" shall be omitted from the Royal Style and Titles.

6. The Constituent Assembly of each Dominion shall exercise the powers of the Central Legislature and the existing Central Legislative Assembly and the Council of State would be automatically dissolved.

In accordance with the above provisions Lord Mountbatten became the Governor-General of the Dominion of India, and M.A. Jinnah, the Governor-General of the Dominion of Pakistan.

It is unnecessary to discuss the various steps that were taken to give effect to the partition of the country. This stupendous task was entrusted to a Partition Committee, later replaced by a Partition Council, with equal

number of representatives from the Congress and the Muslim League, and with Lord Mountbatten as Chairman. This Council continued even after the Dominions of India and Pakistan came into existence on 15 August, 1947. The Partition Council worked through a Steering Committee of two members and was assisted by ten expert committees of officials, covering the entire field of administration. An Arbitral Tribunal was set up for the settlement of all differences between the two Governments.

The question of the international status of the two Dominions also proved a thorny problem. "The Congress claimed that the Dominion of India would continue as the international personality of pre-partition India. The Muslim League, on the other hand, maintained that the existing Government of India would, on 15 August, disappear altogether as an entity and would be succeeded by two independent Dominions of equal international status, both of which would be eligible to the existing rights and obligations."⁸⁶

The matter was referred to U.N.O. and in accordance with its recommendations Lord Mountbatten promulgated on 14 August, 1947, the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order, 1947, according to which membership of all international organizations, together with the rights and obligations attached to such membership, devolved solely upon the Dominion of India. Pakistan was left to apply for membership of such international organizations as she chose to join.

In the meanwhile the Constituent Assembly of India continued to function. As mentioned above, its first three sessions were boycotted by the members belonging to the Muslim League. "After the acceptance of partition, however, Jinnah and the League leaders agreed that Muslim League members from the non-Pakistan provinces should participate in the Constituent Assembly... When the

Constituent Assembly began its fourth session on 14 July, the Muslim League members from the non-Pakistan provinces took their seats and declared themselves to be loyal and law-abiding citizens of India."

Another important step was the solution of the problem of the Indian States. Under the Indian Independence Act the British Paramountcy was to lapse on 15 August. After protracted negotiations settlement was arrived at and the rulers of all the States geographically contiguous to India, with the exception of Hyderabad, Junagadh and one or two other States in Kathiawar with Muslim rulers, signed the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement with India, before 15 August, 1947. Thus though the two wings were lopped off, the heart of the Indian Dominion gained in strength and solidarity. The credit for thus establishing 'a unified political structure in the new Dominion of India' must go principally to Sardar Patel and his lieutenant, V. P. Menon, who has given a very interesting account of the integration of States. It was a great, though silent, revolution which did not attract as much notice as it deserved, being cast into shade by the still greater revolution which brought freedom to India. By the waving of a magician's wand, as it were, there tumbled down in a heap hundreds of States, big and small, some of which traced their existence to the ancient Hindu Age.

V. THE INAUGURATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

On 7 August Jinnah left India for Karachi, and the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, which met on 11 August, elected him as its President. The Assembly also conferred upon him the honorific of Quaid-e-Azam (great leader), a title which had been attached to his name by his followers for several years past. Lord Mountbatten flew to Karachi on 13 August and addressed the Constituent Assembly the next day. Pakistan officially became a Dominion on 15

52V3

August, 1947, when Jinnah was sworn in as Governor-General, and the new Pakistan Cabinet headed by Liaquat Ali Khan was also sworn in.

The Constituent Assembly of the Indian Union met in Delhi on the night of 14 August. It was a red-letter 'night' in the annals of Modern India. After the British domination for 190 years India once again became a free country. There was no doubt a tinge of sorrow, in the minds of some, for the Hindus of East Bengal and the Hindus and Sikhs of the West Panjab who were denied enjoyment of the blessings of liberty for which they had made supreme sacrifices. But gratitude has no place in politics. No tears were shed for the lands, the sacrifice of whose children paved the way for the liberty of the rest of India. If there were any wailings of their people they were drowned by the shouts of joy which heralded the liberation of the rest of India.

In an atmosphere, tense with excitement, Nehru addressed the members. "At the stroke of the midnight hour," said he, "when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still larger cause of humanity."⁸⁷

The Constituent Assembly then appointed Lord Mountbatten the first Governor-General of the Dominion. After the meeting was over, Rajendra Prasad and Nehru went to the Government House and conveyed to Lord Mountbatten the request of the Constituent Assembly. Lord Mountbatten feelingly replied; "I am proud of the honour and I will do my best to carry out your advice in a constitutional manner." Lord Mountbatten was sworn

in as Governor-General on the morning of the 15 August, and the new Cabinet headed by Nehru was sworn in by the Governor-General. Lord Mountbatten then drove in state to the Chamber of the Constituent Assembly. Rajendra Prasad, the President of the Assembly, read messages of congratulation from all over the world, and Lord Mountbatten read out the King's message felicitating the birth of the Dominion of India. Lord Mountbatten then addressed the Assembly. Rajendra Prasad gave a suitable reply in course of which he said that "while our achievement is in no small measure due to our own sufferings and sacrifices, it is also the result of world forces and events and, last though not the least, it is the consummation and fulfilment of the historic tradition and democratic ideals of the British race." This is a great truth, which is not always realized, nor remembered, by the Indians.

It is hardly necessary to say that August 15 was hailed with joy all over India, and no words can adequately describe the tumultuous scenes of wild rejoicings witnessed in every city and every village. Lord and Lady Mountbatten, driving in state, were greeted with resounding cheers by the enthusiastic crowds that lined the streets. This heralded a new era of goodwill between India and Britain. Stories of many hard and bitter struggles between India and Britain, and of animosities between the Indians and the British fill the pages of this work. Let it end with a note of goodwill, trust, and confidence which manifested itself on the streets of Delhi on 15 August, 1947.

How the author wishes that he could have closed this volume with a similar note in respect of the relation between India and Pakistan. But that was not to be. Instead of an era of goodwill, the independence ushered in one of communal hatred and cruelty of which there

is perhaps no parallel in the recorded history of India. It is unnecessary to recount that story of shame and barbarity as it falls beyond the period under review. It will suffice to quote a few lines written by Leonard Mosley, by way of indicating the price which India paid for her freedom :

"Both sides had signed, on 20 July, at Mountbatten's behest, a declaration that they would respect the rights of minorities. But Mountbatten was right in suspecting that they did not know what they were signing. The Sikh policy was to exterminate the Muslims in their midst. The Muslims, with their eyes on the rich Sikh farm-lands, were content to drive the Sikhs out and only massacre those who insisted on remaining. It is sad to have to admit that in their deliberate disobedience of their signed pledge they were encouraged by the British Governor of West Punjab, Sir Francis Mudie, who wrote to Mr. Jinnah on 5 September, 1947 :

'I am telling everyone that I don't care how the Sikhs get across the border ; the great thing is to get rid of them as soon as possible.'

"600,000 dead. 14,000,000 driven from their homes. 100,000 young girls kidnapped by both sides, forcibly converted or sold on the auction block."

Mosley continues :

"It need not have happened. It would not have happened had independence not been rushed through at such a desperate rate. A little patience and all the troubles might have been avoided....Jinnah was dead within a year. A little patience. A refusal to be rushed."⁸⁸

This seems to be too optimistic a view. The question whether Mountbatten or his critics were right may be safely left to the verdict of history.

FOOTNOTES

As a general rule books are referred to by the surname of the author whose full name and the title of the book will be found in the Bibliography. Two or more books by the same author are distinguished by Arabic numerals added after the surname, and the same numeral will also be found in the Bibliography.

The following further abbreviations have been used in the footnotes in addition to those in the earlier Volumes.

Hist. Congr.	<i>The History of the Indian National Congress</i> , by Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya.
IAR	<i>The Indian Annual Register</i> .
ICND	<i>Landmarks in Indian Constitutional and National Development (1600-1919)</i> , by G. N. Singh.
Muslim League	<i>The Muslim League</i> , by Lal Bahadur.
Pakistan	<i>The Birth of Pakistan</i> , by Dr. Sachin Sen.
Rebel India	<i>Rebel India</i> , Edited by Bejan Mitra and Phani Chakraborty (Calcutta Book Company), 1946.
Sources	<i>Sources of Indian Tradition</i> , published by the Columbia University (1958).

BOOK IV, CHAPTER I.

1. Cf. Vol. I, p. 505.
- 1a. Montagu, 156.
2. Cf. Vol. II, 282-98, and also Chapter VIII.
3. *Sedition Committee Report*, Ch. XVII.
4. For details, cf. ICND, 667 ff.
5. Gandhi—I, 126.
6. The account of Gandhi in South Africa is based on Louis Fischer's book, *Gandhi, His Life and Message for the World*. The passages quoted are also from this book.
7. Sitaramayya—II, 111.
8. Ibid, 101.
9. Diwakar—II, 17 ; III, 26.
10. Diwakar—I, 5.
11. Cf. Vol. II, 131.
12. Ibid, 176-79.

13. Gandhi—I, 457.
14. Gandhi—II, 21.
15. Ibid, 10.
16. Ibid, 12.
17. Cf. Vol. I, 355.
18. Gandhi—I, 521-22, 526-8.
19. Ibid, 531-38.
20. Tendulkar, I. 293
21. Gandhi—I, 562.
22. *Young India*, (published in U.S.A.), III. 14.
23. *Mahatma Gandhi—The Man and His Mission* (Natesan Publication), p. 55.
24. Gandhi—I, 576.
25. *Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee* set up by the Congress in 1922.
26. *Young India* (U.S.A.), III 151. *ICND*, 664
27. *Young India* (U.S.A.), II. 155.
28. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 164.
29. Ibid, 163.
30. *ICND.*, 679.
31. Horniman. 89-92.
32. Chisolm—II, 177-8
33. *Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee*, 56-7.
34. Ibid, 57.
35. Motilal Nehru's Address as Congress President at Amritsar, 1919.
- 35a Ibid. Another such Englishman was Horniman, many quotations from whose book are given later.
36. *IAR.*, 1921, p. 26
37. The passages within inverted commas in the last four paragraphs are quotations from Horniman, pp. 125-30.
38. The account of atrocities in other places that follows is based upon the Reports of the Hunter Committee and the Congress Committee and Horniman's account which is also based mainly on the former.
39. Photographs of public floggings and of public cage are given in Horniman's book, pp. 120, 154.
40. Horniman, 150-54.
41. For a detailed account of the bombing and machine-gunning, cf. Horniman, 142-49.
42. *ICND.*, p. 686, f.n., 4.
43. *IAR.*, 1921, Part III, pp. 39-41.
44. *Young India* (published in U.S.A.), III. 77.
45. This is given in *IAR*, 1921, Part I, p. 45. The date, 28 May, is

- given in both *Hist. Congr.* (I. 198) and *India in 1921-22* (p. 37). J. S. Sharma gives the date as 20 May as well as 28 May (pp. 468-9).
46. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 167. *IAR*, 1921, p. 221.
 47. *Hist Congr.*, Vol. I, 171.
 48. *Ibid*, 146, 148.
 49. The following account is based on the Government of India Act, 1919, and the *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, Part II, from which many passages have been quoted.
 50. *IAR*, 1920, Part I, pp. 379, 384.
 51. Cf. Vol. II, pp. 331 ff.
 52. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 156 ; *Sources*, 769-70.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER II.

1. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 189. According to an official report Provincial Khilafat Committees had commenced to spring up in 1919. The first of these, of which Mohammad Chotani was President, was constituted in the Bombay Presidency. At a meeting on the 11th of November it changed its title to the 'Central Khilafat Committee of India, Bombay'. At about the same time the Delhi Khilafat Committee, of which Ajmal Khan was President, decided to convene an All-India Khilafat Conference which was held at Delhi on 23 and 24 November. It was presided over on the 23rd by Fazlul Huq. "Gandhi attended the meeting on the 23rd and presided over it on the 24th." If this be true the statements in lines 8-9 should be modified accordingly.
2. *IAR*, 1921, p. 156.
3. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 191. Italics mine.
4. *Ibid*.
5. Pradhan, 151-2.
6. *Sources*, 770. It is interesting to note in this connection that even Dr. A. Ansari, one of the few Muslim leaders that remained in the Nationalist camp till the end, wrote : "It is difficult for any non-Indian Moslem to realise what Pan-Islamism means to Indian Moslems. ...Pan-Islamic sentiment has been one of the Indian Moslem's most sacred and exalted passions," (Introduction to the *Conflict of East and West* by Halide Edib).

7. *Sources*, 777.
8. *Hist. Congr.*, I.199. Also cf. Hasrat Mohani's Presidential Address at the Ahmadabad Session of the Muslim League, December, 1921.
9. Nair, Sankaran, 28.
- 9a. That the Indian Muslims tried to enlist the support of the Amir of Afghanistan and opened negotiations with him for that purpose is clear from the statement of Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, a leading Muslim politician of the time. Cf. his recently published book, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 42. Cf. also Ambedkar, *Pakistan*, p. 144, and the following passage in a confidential official report :

"At the end of April (1919) his (Amir Amanullah's) Foreign Minister sent confidential instructions to the Afghan envoy at Simla that endeavours should be made to obtain the allegiance of both Hindus and Muhammadans to the Amir in return for which Afghanistan would assist them in their struggle for independence "
10. Nair, Sankaran, p. 38. Cf. Montagu's statement in the House of Commons in May, 1921 (*IAR*, 1922-23, Vol II, p. 43). Muhammad Ali denied the allegation though he admitted, "I am a Muslim first and everything else afterwards." For the whole controversy arising out of the alleged threat of Afghan invasion, cf. *IAR*, 1922, pp. 206-12. But cf. also the preceding footnote. The official report referred to in the preceding footnote contains the following : "A very violent speech was delivered by Muhammad Ali in Madras in which he openly stated that he would assist an army invading India from Afghanistan, provided that the invaders came to free the country and withdrew after accomplishing their task." The proviso is, of course, a mere eye-wash and it is difficult to believe that anyone, far less Muhammad Ali, could seriously believe it.
11. The official report, referred to above, gives a detailed account of the Pan-Islamic Movement in India which became a live force in 1911, being stimulated by the events of that year. It refers to the following specific incidents. During 1914 several Turks visited India. "During their tour in India they conveyed the impression that they were in the confidence of the Young Turk Party and that their visit to India had been undertaken with the express intention of cementing the relationship between the Pan-Islamic Party in India and the Young Turk Party in Constantinople. At Delhi they associated with Dr. Ansari and the Ali Brothers." Another party had been sent in August "to stir up Indian Muslims." Turkey also endeavoured "to spread pro-Turk and Pan-Islamic ideas in India through the press. A weekly Turkish paper, the *Jihan-i-Islam*, published in Arabic, Turkish and Urdu and edited

by an Indian Muhammadan, found its way in considerable numbers into India before the War, and the avowed object of this periodical was to promote intercourse between Muhammadans and to encourage Indians to trade with Muslim countries."

12. Some of these have been quoted above.
13. Quoted in *Pakistan*, 73. The mystic statement of Gandhi is explained by the following passage contained in an official report : "In March last (1919) an understanding was arranged between M. K. Gandhi and Maulana Abdul Bari to the effect that the Hindu politicians would espouse the cause of Turkey and the Muhammadans would refrain from slaughtering kine."
14. Ibid.
15. Nehru's statement will be quoted later.
16. The *Young India* (edited by Ganhi), 4 May, 1921 (quoted in *Pakistan*, p. 72). In reply to B. C. Pal's criticism Gandhi said : "I would rather see India perish at the hands of Afghans than purchase freedom from Afghan invasion at the cost of her honour. To have India defended by an unrepentant Government that keeps the Khilafat and the Punjab wounds still bleeding, is to sell India's honour." (*IAR*, 1922, pp. 211-12). The logic of this is not apparent to one who is not a mystic saint. Gandhi's nationalism seems to differ essentially from the modern conception of it. In an appeal to the Musalmans of India published in the *Independent*, dated Allahabad, 2nd October, 1921, after the arrest of Ali brothers (which, he said, left him 'without his arms') he observes : "The brave brothers are staunch lovers of their country but they are Musalmans first and everything else after and *it must be so with every religiously minded man*. It would be interesting to know whether Gandhi's followers, who are anxious about national integration, are prepared to subscribe to the views contained in the words italicized by me.
17. Nair, Sankaran, pp. 37-46.
18. Ambedkar, *Pakistan*, pp. 144 ff.
19. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 371, 378.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER III.

1. See pp. 57-9.
2. *IAR*. 1921, Part I, p.103.

- 2a. But cf. Ch. I, f.n. 45.
3. *IAR*, 1921, Part I, pp. 105 ff.
4. *Ibid*, 108.
5. *Hist. Congr*, I. 198; Ram Gopal, *Lokamanva Tilak*, p. 445.
6. Bapat, *Reminiscences of Tilak*.
7. *Hist. Congr*, I. 198.
8. *IAR*, 1921, Part I, pp. 194 ff.
9. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 12-14; Nehru, *Towards Freedom*, 52-3.
10. *IAR*, 1921, Part I, p. 116.
- 10a. *IAR*, 1921, Part I, p. 206, *Italics mine*.
11. Gandhi says with reference to his resolution on the Non-co-operation movement passed in the Special session of the Congress at Calcutta in 1920: "In my resolution non-co-operation was postulated only with a view to obtaining redress of the Punjab and the Khilafat wrongs. That, however, did not appeal to Sjt. Vijayaraghavachari.

'If non-co-operation was to be declared, why should it be with reference to particular wrongs? The absence of Swaraj was the biggest wrong that the country was labouring under; it should be against that that non-co-operation should be directed, he argued. Pandit Motilalji also wanted the demand for Swaraj to be included in the resolution. I readily accepted the suggestion and incorporated the demand for Swaraj in my resolution" *My Experiments with Truth*, p. 610. Vijayaraghavachari, and many others, clearly perceived what Gandhi failed to see, that India's chief problem was the attainment of political independence,—everything else being merely a side-issue. Gandhi seems to have been still under the spell of loyalty to the British rule.

A somewhat different version is given by Choudhry Khaliquzzaman. Referring to the Special session of the Congress at Calcutta in 1920, and the resolution on Non-co-operation moved by Gandhi, he observes: "As soon as Gandhiji's resolution came under discussion Mr. Bipendra (sic. Bipin) Chandra Pal, under a misconception that Muslims would not accept it, proposed that along with the Khilafat the word Swaraj might also be introduced. Gandhiji was not prepared for it for he said, 'there should be no question of bargaining; if we have to express our sympathy with the Muslim cause we should do it without any thought of recompense.' The Muslims, who had attended this session in very large numbers, rushed to Maulana Shaukat Ali to ask him to beg Gandhiji not to oppose the amendment. Maulana Shaukat Ali persuaded Gandhiji after some reluctance to accept the amendment." *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 55-6.

This does not tally with the statement of Gandhi that the suggestion came from Vijayaraghavachari and he *readily* accepted it. We cannot, therefore, without any further evidence, accept the statement of Khaliquzzaman even though he was present in the Congress session.

- 11a. That on this date Gandhi did not consider the Panjab atrocities as adequate cause for N.C.O. is proved by his attitude of co-operation with the Government, as against that of C.R. Das, in the Amritsar session of the Congress held in the last week of December, 1919 (see above,p. 51).
- 11b. Attention may be drawn to the italicised words in Gandhi's letter to the Viceroy, quoted above in p. 75, and the last sentence in the resolution of the National Liberal Federation quoted above in p. 70, to the effect the N.C.O. would not do any good to the Turks. Mrs. Annie Besant says: "It will be remembered that Mr. Gandhi, in March, 1920, had forbidden the mixing up of non-co-operation in defence of the Khilafat with other questions ; but it was found that the Khilafat was not sufficiently attractive to "Hindus", 'so at the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held at Benares on May 30 and 31, the Punjab atrocities and the deficiencies of the Reforms Act were added to the list of provocative causes.' *The Future of Indian Politics* (quoted by Ambedkar in *Pakistan*,p.139).
12. Report,p.8 ; cf. *Hist. Congr.*. I.198-9.
13. See pp. 71-3.
14. Karmarkar, 286.
15. Pradhan, 153.
16. *Hist. Congr.*, 1. 194. The full text of the Manifesto is quoted in pp. 193 ff.
17. Bapat, op. cit., III. 142.
- 17a. In view of what has been stated above regarding the gradual evolution of the idea and programme of N.C.O. it is very unlikely that a detailed programme of it could be placed before a meeting on 18 January, 1920. This is also not compatible with the resolution of the Central Khilafat Committee on 2 June (see p.72).
18. As noted above (p. 71), this is contradicted in the official history of the Congress.
19. Bapat, op. cit., I. 253.
20. For the different views quoted, cf. Bapat, op. cit., 115, 140, 514, and Preface.
- 20a. Introduction, *Freedom's Battle. Gandhi's speeches*, p. ix. Quoted in Raghuvamsi, 2nd Edition, 1959, pp. 154-5.

21. *IAR.*, 1921, Part I, p. 206. Italics mine.
22. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 205. Italics mine.
23. See pp. 44-5. Annie Besant, *India Bond or Free*, p.191.
- 23a. *IAR.*, 1921, Part I, pp. 137-8.
- 23b. There are some differences in the text of the resolution as given, respectively, in A. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 202 ff., and B. *Congress in Evolution* by D. Chakrabarty and C. Bhattacharya, pp.33 ff. A uses the word 'Muslims' instead of 'Mussalmans' used in B. In this passage A omits the words 'or indirectly' which occur in B.
- 23c. See preceding note. A omits the words 'House of Commons and specially in the'.
- 23d. A omits the words 'showed virtual support of the'.
- 23e. A has 'Mahatma' instead of 'Mr'. as in B.
24. This is the voting figure given in in *Hist. Congr.* , I. 202 ; but others give the figures as 1855 to 873, 1866 to 884, etc.
- 24a. Ambedkar writes : "The Resolution of non-co-operation was carried by 1886 votes against 884. The late Mr. Tairsee once told me that a large majority of the delegates were no others than the taxi drivers of Calcutta who were paid to vote for the non-co-operation resolution." *Pakistan*, p. 141 f.n. Though the political parties were not above such tactics, it is difficult to believe that the hired taxi drivers could turn the scale so much in favour of the resolution. ,
- 24b. See above, pp. 78-9.
25. Louis Fischer-I, p.68.
26. *Nation*, 300.
27. Cf. the passage from Rajagopalachari's writings quoted above (p.81).
28. See p. 51.
29. *India in 1921-22*, p. 36.
30. Louis Fischer-I, p. 56.
- 30a. See p.97.
- 30b. The reason behind all this is perhaps the view expressed by Pattabhi Sitaramayya quoted above, in p. 66.
- 30c. B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan*, p. 144. Italics mine. The Muslim attitude in this respect may be judged from the letter of Kidwai published in the *Leader*, March, 1922. "It is a great pity that most of the Indian Muslims...have yet failed to understand the full import of the Khilafat question. It is an international question....It cannot be surprising if Mr. Gandhi and other Hindu leaders fail to understand the international significance of Islam,.....(many of his Muslim followers do the same).... I cannot help reminding Mr. Gandhi that, his programme of removing untouchability or picketing

- liquor shops or boycotting Councils and Universities or even of wearing nothing but Khaddar cannot have the slightest effect on the Khilafat question.... As an old Indian 'Nationalist' of the 'extreme' wing I can say this without being misunderstood that the most urgent question for India to-day is the Khilafat question. That is the *danger point* and Hindus and Muslims should both unitedly attend to the solution of that question first and when a calm atmosphere is obtained Indians of different shades of political and religious views should meet in a conference to draw up a constructive and definite scheme for Swaraj."
- 30d A Muslim political leader says: "The Congress session in Nagpur was almost a Muslim session of the Congress for I believe the number of Muslims was so large as to give it a Muslim colour". Khaliquzzaman, p.57
31. *The Indian Struggle*, I.67. Mr. B C. Pal was very much annoyed and took C.R. Das to task for changing his views overnight without consulting the Party or its leading members (H. Das Gupta, *Bharater Jativa Congresss*, III. 37).
32. Ishwari Prasad, *Modern India*, 408.
33. Ibid.
34. *The Report of the Civil Disobedience Enquiry Committee* (hereinafter referred to as the Report). For the origin and nature of this Committee, see pp.207-8. According to an official report, the reduction of excise revenue in the Panjab, Bihar and Orissa, and Bombay was, respectively, 33,10, and 6 lakhs of Rupees.
35. *IAR*. 1922,p.250.
36. report, p. 70. It serves as a typical illustration of the naivete', almost pathetic in character, which characterized Gandhi—obviously the result of judging others by his own standard.
37. *IAR*. 1924,II.205.
38. *IAR*. 1921,p.245. National Schools and Colleges were, however, established. Their number in 1921-22, according to official Report, was as follows :

Province	Number of Institutions	Number of scholars (in thousands)
Madras	92	5
Bombay	189	17
Bengal	190	14
U.P.	137	8 (Figures up to 31 July)
Panjab	69	8
Bihar & Orissa	442	17
C.P.	86	6 (do)
Assam	38	2

Curiously enough, these numbers do not correspond, even roughly, with the number of scholars who had boycotted recognized institutions. Their number, in thousands, in the above Provinces was, respectively, 1,2,11,3,1,2,2,1. Altogether out of 670,000 scholars (in round number) about 23,000 withdrew, of whom more than 2,030 (excluding Bengal, for which no figure is available) returned to the institutions.

39. Muhammad Ali's speech at Madras in 1921. Montagu referred to it in the House of Commons (*IAR*. 1922-3, II. 55). Muhammad Ali, however, sang in a different tune in his speech as Congress President at Cocanada in 1923. He said that "he would resist an aggressor, be he the Muslim or non-Muslim." Was it due to the fact, stated by himself, that while his Madras speech was considered as highly treasonable by the British officials, it had not found favour with the Afghans (Congress Presidents' Addresses, II. 705-6.) On this point see above, pp. 63-6 and f. n. 10.
40. See p. 65.
41. See pp. 64-5.
42. For this episode, cf. *IAR*. 1922, pp. 223 ff.
43. *Ibid*, 238.
44. *Ibid*, 267.
45. *Ibid*, 270; *Hist. Congr.*, I, 217-8.
46. *India in 1921-2* p. 87.
47. *Hist. Congr.*, I, 216.
48. *Ibid*, 218.
49. *The Indian Struggle*, II, 89-90.
50. *IAR*. 1922, pp. 377, 384.
51. *Ibid*, 307.
52. Pradhan, 183.
53. *The Indian Struggle*, II, 94 ff.
54. *Ibid*, 97-8.
55. *India in 1921-2*, p. 93.
56. *The Indian Struggle*, II, 99-101.
57. *India in 1921-2*, p. 94.
58. *Hist. Congr.*, I, 233-35.
- 58a. See pp. 180-2
59. *Young India*, October, 1919.
60. *The Indian Struggle*, II, 108.
- 60a. Khaliquzzaman, who was then in the same jail with Motilal Nehru, writes: "Pandit Motilal was furious when he woke me up early the next morning and expressed his deep resentment and anger at what had happened. He handed to me the *Leader* which he had in his hand and shouted, 'Look here what has happened'. He further said: 'This ends the movement; there was no need

to call off the movement because some people in a big country like India have lost their balance of mind and committed violence" (p. 63),

61. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 38-9.
62. Quoted by Pradhan, p. 196.
63. *India in 1921-2*, pp. 104-5.
64. See pp. 90-91.
65. *IAR*. 1922, pp. 340-1.
- 65a. *Ibid*, 341.
66. *IAR*, 1922, pp. 382-83.
67. See pp. 139 ff.
- 67a. *IAR*. 1922, pp. 321-24
68. *IAR*. 1922-3, p. 793
69. *IAR*. 1922-3, pp. 803-806.
70. *IAR*. 1921, Part I, p. 156.
71. *IAR*. 1922, p. 190; 1922-3, p. 780.
72. *IAR*. 1922, p. 192.
73. *IAR*. 1922-3, pp. 64-5.
- 73a. See p. 156.
74. Published in the *Leader* of Allahabad, on 9 February, 1922.
75. *India in 1921-2* p. 61.
76. *India : Bond or Free*, pp. 194-5. Sir Sankaran Nair also narrates the misdeeds of Gandhi's followers (*Gandhi and Anarchy*, pp. 96 ff.).
- 76a. See pp. 8-10.
77. Chintamani, 132.
78. *Accounts and Papers*, 1922, Vol. XVI, p. 108 (Parliamentary Papers)
79. *HCIP*, Vol. IV, p. 164.
80. *India in 1921-2*; *IAR*. 1921, p. 41.
81. Sankaran Nair, op. cit., Appendix III.
82. *Ibid*, Appendix V.
83. *Ibid*.
84. *New India*, 6 December, 1921. Report, dated Calicut, 7 September, published in the *Times of India*.
85. *Gandhi and Anarchy*, p. 40.
- 85a. The following passage occurs in a confidential report of the Intelligence Bureau, Government of India : "The Moplah rebellion broke out in August after Khilafat agitators, including Abul Kalam Azad and Hakim Ajmal Khan, had been making violent speeches in that area. Ever since the Majlis-ul-Ulema Conference at Erode in April, the feelings of the Moplahs had been steadily growing with respect to the Khilafate, while the non-violent Non-co-operation movement was receding more and more into the background.

A Khilafat Ulema Conference had been held at Ponnani about the middle of July at which the highly exciting speeches, followed by clear suggestions for the proclamation of a republic in the event of a hostile British attitude towards Angora, provided the requisite torch to the inflammatory and fanatical Moplahs." The same Report gives an extract from the speech of one of the leaders of the Moplahs from which a few sentences are quoted as specimens : "We have extorted Swaraj from the white men.... We shall give Hindus the option of death or Islam. We have the example of the Holy Prophet that it is a good act to kill for God's work.....

"The Jews and Christians, as believers in revealed book, may be tolerated, but the idolatrous Hindus can only be allowed to live in a Muslim State on sufferances...The time for establishing the Khilafat has come."

The detailed account given above shows that these professions were carried into practice.

86. *IAR*. 1923, Supplementary, p. 194.
87. Subhas Bose, *The Indian Struggle*, II, pp, 144-5. P. C. Ray, *Life and Times of C. R. Das*, p, 204.
88. Cf. Vol. I, p. 354.
89. *IAR*. 1922, p. 755.
90. *Ibid*, 772.
91. *Hist. Congr.*, I, 256-7.
92. Mahadev Desai, *The Story of Bardoli* Also cf. R. Diwakar, *Satyagraha in Action*, p. 70.
- 92a. See p. 122.
93. *The Indian Struggle*, II, pp. 115-7
94. *Hist. Congr.*, I, 249.
95. *IAR*. 1924, I 37-40.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER IV.

1. See above, p. 107.
2. *IAR*, 1924, II. 55.
3. Cf. Vol. I, pp. 373 ff.
4. See p. 114.
5. See p. 222.
6. The text of the Manifesto is given in *IAR*, 1923, Vol. II, pp. 219-20,

7. *IAR*, 1925, p. 40.
8. Rao, B. Shiva, Chapter VI; Appendix I, III.
9. *IAR*, 1925, Vol. I, p. 245.
- 9a. See below, pp. 255-6.
10. *IAR*, 1924, Vol. I, 601-04.
11. For a comparison of the three original propositions of Gandhi with the amended resolutions, as finally passed, see *IAR*, 1924, II. 132.
12. *Ibid*, I, 620-1.
13. *Ibid*, II. 184.
14. *The Indian Struggle*, II, 156-7.
15. *Ibid*, 157.
16. *IAR*, 1926, I. 17.
17. *Ibid*, 40, 27.
18. *Ibid*, 50.
19. *Ibid*, II, 3 .
- 19a. It is significant that the Hindu Mahasabha was noticed for the first time in *IAR* in 1923, in connection with its annual session on 30 December, 1922 (*IAR*, 1923, p. 943).
- 19b. Cf. p. 271.
20. The account of Communism is mainly based on the following : M.R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India*, London, 1954. G.D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India*. Bombay, 1960.
21. Annie Besant, *India Bond or Free*, 210 ; *IAR*, 1924, I. 74 ff., 703 ff.
22. See above, p. 265.
23. Cf. Vol. II, p. 252.
24. Besant, op. cit.
25. *IAR*, 1923, Supplement, p. 59. *Congress Presidential Addresses*, G. A. Natesan & Co, Madras, 1934. Second Series, p. 673.
26. *Congress Presidential Addresses*, 673-4.
27. *Ibid*, 699-700.
28. *IAR*, 1923, Supplement, 192.
29. *IAR*, 1924, II. 25-6.
30. For the Kohat riot, cf. *IAR*, 1924, II. 25-32, 308, 421, 434, 481, 486; *IAR*, 1925, 97-106.
31. For full text, cf. *IAR*, 1924, I. 63.
32. *Ibid*, II. 147-160 (a).
33. *IAR*, 1926, II. 312.
34. This is the official version. According to *IAR*, 1925 (p. 182) only 14 were killed and 7 wounded.
35. *Statutory Commission's Report*, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 106. The account of the communal riots given in this chapter is mainly based on this and the *IAR*.
36. *Ibid*, p. 99.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER V,

1. See pp. 227, 236-8.
2. *IAR*, 1924, Part I, pp. 265, 268.
3. See p. 235.
4. *IAR*, 1925, Vol. I, p. 314.
5. See pp. 251-4.
6. *IAR*, 1925, I. 338 ff.; 1926, II. 121-35.
7. *IAR*, 1924, I. 790-94.
8. *British Rule in India Condemned by the Britishers Themselves* (published by the Indian National Party, London, 1915), p. 36. This book contains a large collection of statements made by eminent Britishers regarding the deplorable condition—both political and economical—of India under British rule.
9. *IAR*, 1924, II. 8-10.
10. *Ibid*, 138.
11. *IAR*, 1924, I. 672.
12. Cf. Vol. II, pp. 494-5.
13. The full text is given in *IAR*, 1924, II. 289-98.
14. It is fully in keeping with the police methods described by Sir Sankaran Nair, Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council (see p. 296) and a body of Britishers who came to India in 1932 (pp. 414, 426-72).
- 14a. The alleged tortures include inserting pin in the flesh and nails, keeping a man hanging with heads down for days together, flogging a man till he becomes unconscious and then again as soon as he regains consciousness, etc. Ram Manohar Lohia, a political leader, has narrated his own experience (see p. 659), which was by no means unusual as similar tortures were reported by other political prisoners. Cf. also the gruesome details narrated by the India League Delegation and summarised in pp. 422-472.
15. Cf. Vol. II, p. 122.
16. *IAR*, 1926, II. 132.
17. Cf. Vol. I, pp. 353 ff.
18. Nevinson, 115-16.
19. *Ibid*, 116.
20. *Ibid*.
21. *Ibid*, Italics mine.
22. *Ibid*, 117.
23. *Ibid*, 118.

24. Sir Walter Strickland, Bart., *British Justice and Honesty* (1913), p. 4.
25. *IAK*, 1922, 256-7.
26. Nevinson, 118.
27. *Ibid*, 229.
28. *Ibid*, 228-9.
29. *Ibid*, 230.
30. *Ibid*, 43.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER VI

1. Gwyer, 208.
2. *Ibid*, 210.
3. Nehru's attitude towards Jinnah, as delineated by Leonard Mosley, (cf. Book IV, Chapter VIII, f. n., 15.) is both interesting and instructive. Mosley thinks that Jinnah's return to Indian politics was mainly due to an earnest appeal of Liaquat Ali Khan on behalf of the Muslim League (Mosley, pp. 66-68).
4. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 215.
5. *Ibid*, 220-22.
6. This has been discussed in detail in the next chapter. Only a brief reference is made here to some stirring events which added to the political tension of the time.
7. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 226-7.
8. *Ibid*, 223.
9. *Ibid*, 229.
10. *Ibid* 230-1.
11. See pp. 263-4.
12. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 238-41. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 350 ff.
13. Louis Fischer-II, II. 10.
14. Cf. next Chapter.
- 14a. See pp. 336-7.
15. Subhas Bose moved that "the Congress should aim at setting up a parallel Government in the country and, to that end, should take in hand the task of organizing the workers, peasants and youths." But this resolution was defeated (*The Indian Struggle*, II. 244).
16. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 54.

17. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 245.
18. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 363-4.
19. The eleven items of reforms include total prohibition, abolition of salt tax, reduction of land revenue, military expenditure and high salaries of officials, abolition of the C. I. D., and discharge of all political prisoners. Ibid 366.
- 19a. Ibid.
20. Ibid, 368-9.
21. The full text of the letter is given in *Hist. Congr.*, I. 372-6.
22. See. p. 45.
23. 'Ishwari Prasad, 427.
24. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 55 ; *Toward Freedom*, 156 ff.
25. For full text, cf. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 377. Italics mine.
26. According to some accounts, 75 (*Hist. Congr.*, I. 383), or 78.
27. Louis Fischer-II, II. 15-16. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 378 ff.
28. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 398 ff.
29. Ibid, 425.
30. Ibid, 413.
31. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 258, f. n , 1.
32. Legislative Assembly Debate, 14th July, 1930 (quoted in *Hist. Congr.*, I. 410).
33. *The Indian Struggle*, II 260-61; *Hist. Congr.*, I. 41, 412, 420.
34. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 412.
35. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 262.
36. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 413.
37. Ibid, 413.
38. Ibid, 414.
39. Ibid, 415-18.
40. Ibid, 418-20.
41. Ibid, 420.
42. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 260, f. n., 2.
43. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 399-400.
44. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 263-4.
45. Shamrao Hivale, *Scholar Gipsy—A Stndy of Verrier Elwin*, pp. 15, 44, 57.
46. Miller, Webb, *I Found no Peace*, Chapters 16, 17; pp. 192-96.
47. Ibid, 197-99.
48. Ibid, 200-202.
49. Ibid, 202-6.
- 49a. See, p. 322.
50. Coupland, I. 117. The account of the sub-committees that follows is based upon Coupland, I. 117-20.
51. *Pakistan*, 95-6.

52. Coupland, I. 121.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. *Report of the Sapru Committee*, p. 15.
56. Coupland, I. 122.
57. *Sapru Committee Report*, 15-6.
58. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 424-5.
59. Gwyer, 232. For details of the pact of which only a summary is given below, cf. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 438-42.
60. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 66-70.
61. Cf. Subhas Bose's view on the subject (*The Indian Struggle*, II, 237-8).
62. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 381.
63. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 283-89.
64. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 456.
65. Ibid.
66. See above, p. 249. It is difficult to understand Gandhi's views in this respect. Once while a revolutionary was on trial at Nagpur Gandhi requested a prominent lawyer of this place to take up the defence and also offered to pay his fees. The lawyer said: "But Bapu, this man is accused of arrant and flagrant violence, so why?" The reply in Hindi was to the effect, "Bhai, courage and determination (*himmat*) must be honoured" (*Hindusthan Standard, Puja Annual*, 1963, pp. 152-3). Yet Gandhi was deady opposed to the resolution about Gopinath Saha which meant nothing more than this.
67. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 458.
68. Ibid, 466.
69. Ibid, 468.
70. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 299-301.
71. See above, p. 328.
72. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 480-81.
73. Ibid, 473-4. Italics mine.
74. Ibid, 472-3.
75. Ibid, 474-7, 488.
76. Ibid, 478.
77. Ibid, 479, 484.
78. For the full text, cf. Ibid, 487.
79. Ibid, 488-92.
80. Ibid, 489.
81. Ibid, 378.
82. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 495.
83. Ibid, 511-12.

84. Ibid, 512-14.
85. Ibid, p. 516 ; pp. 514-17 give the details.
86. Ibid, 518.
87. Verrier Elwin, *Truth about India, Can We get it ?*, p. 38.
88. Ibid.
89. See f.n. 87, for the name of the book.
90. Ibid, 34-5. For a fuller account of what happened in NWFP, see Verrier Elwin's Report, published by the Friends of India, 46 Lancaster Gate. London.
91. The whole of section 2 is based upon the *Delegation Report*, (mentioned in the next section), pp. 469-71.
92. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 528.
93. Ibid, 529, where further details are given.
94. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 378.
- 94a. The ground was that the Governor in Council was satisfied that "the amount was intended to be used for the purposes of the Gujarat Provincial Congress Committee or the Gujarat Prantik Samiti". The fund was held in the joint names of V. J. Patel and Mavlankar. The latter made a written protest denying the allegation, but in vain.
95. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 341-2.
96. *Delegation Report*, 76.
97. Referred to hereafter as 'Report'.
98. Report, 28.
99. Ibid, 29.
100. Ibid, 33.
- 100a. Briefly referred to above, in pp. 347-8.
101. Report, 5-6.
102. Ibid, 5, f. n. This case illustrates the worthlessness of the official statements in such matters.
103. Report, 493.
104. Ibid, 495.
105. Ibid, 496-500.
106. Italics mine.
107. The Report adds the following footnote :
 'The ordinances by definition made even private gatherings into public meetings. Law courts have in several instances decided that these actions for which police arrested or beat Congress men are not illegal. Chairmen and officials of municipalities in India have been penalised for hoisting the Congress flag over municipal buildings.
108. The Delegation explains it as follows: 'The Ordinances gave powers to the Executive officers to keep any person in detention

for fifteen days on mere suspicion. At the end of the period the person against whom no charge was preferred was released, but he was sometimes re-arrested in a few minutes or a few hours after release.

'In this way the period of detention could be extended at the sweet will of the Executive officers. Sometimes the released person was asked to report to the police station, usually three times a day. Cases are on record where arrests have taken place before the end of the time allowed for reporting, and where the time allowed is not even sufficient to enable the person to go from the prison to the specified police station. The aim of the procedure is to create a legal offence which was punished with imprisonment, ranging between twelve and eighteen months.'

109. The Report adds the following footnote :

"The Police everywhere appear to have made a practice of releasing women prisoners at night, often late".

110. Footnote : "This appears to be a common police story. We were told even more amusing one on the frontier, but it was too ridiculous to be even a good story, and the Inspector-General of Police whom we met afterwards denied it.

111. Footnote : "These include collected statements as well as cases mentioned to us. We have refrained from using collected reports as evidence here, though from the widespread nature of the allegations and circumstantial evidence, it stands to reason that they represent facts."

112. Footnote : "The Report is in Bengali and a copy of it is in the Assembly Library. Mr. Mitra had attempted to obtain publication of these facts in the press, but no paper would dare to print them."

113. Footnote : "The *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, an old established paper of Calcutta, was ordered to deposit Rs. 6,000 as security for publishing the news."

114. Footnote : "Intimidation of women by the military and punitive police were reported to us in a number of villages in Bengal".

115. Footnote : "We were supplied with one bucket of water for six of us per day for washing purposes"—Vidya Devi Varma, Woman ex-prisoner, Bareilly jail. Evidence, U. P. Committee Report.

116. Footnote : "U. P. Committee Report.—Hari Singh (Bareilly jail) stated : "In oil mills political prisoners were made to run like bullocks. They had to eat while they were doing work". Altar Singh of Muzaffarnagar, Bareilly jail, stated that he worked on the oil mill from 6 A. M. to 5 P. M. Had to work while suffering

from fever. Reported to Superintendent and punished for short labour."

- 116a. Assembly Debates, Vol, VII, no. 5.
- 116b. Footnote : "Most of the incidents took place while we were in India".
117. The statement of the official is quoted in the Report. p. 413.
118. *The Indian Struggle*, II.103.
119. Cf. Sapru Report, 17 ; Ambedkar-II, Chapter III ; *Hist. Congr.*, I, 494 ff.
120. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 495.
121. "For the full text of the letter, cf. *ibid*, 539-41.
122. It was released on 16 August, according to Gwyer, 261. The date of announcement is given as 17 August in *Hist. Congr.*, I. 532.
123. For the full text of the Communal Award, cf. Gwyer, 261-5.
124. For the full text of the letter, cf. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 542-3.
125. For full text, cf. Gwyer, 265-6.
126. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 72-3.
127. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 361.
128. *Ibid*, 361-2.
129. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 538-9.
130. Speaking of Gandhi's condemnation of secrecy, K. F. Nariman observes : "By what rule of modern warfare or sport are we bound to disclose our plans and schemes to the enemy ?...Secrecy of one's plans and future action is the very essence of all modern national movements and struggles". *The Indian Struggle*, II. 367.
131. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 560-61.
132. *Ibid*, 562. Subhas Bose gives the following account of this Conference : "Two groups were represented at the Conference—one in favour of calling off the movement altogether and the other in favour of resuming it with full vigour. The former group had probably a majority and most of the members of this group were in favour of reviving the Swarajist policy of carrying the fight inside the Legislatures which had been abandoned at the Lahore Congress in December, 1929. Nevertheless, at the end, the Conference decided to give in to the Mahatma". *The Indian Struggle*, II. 364.
133. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 562.
134. *Ibid*.
135. For Nariman's comment, cf. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 367-8.
136. Jawaharlal Nehru possessed the power of independent rational thinking, as his many adverse comments on Gandhi's action would show, but he always ultimately yielded to the personal magnetism of Gandhi.
- 136a. *Hist. Congr.*, I. 563.

137. Ibid.
138. Nehru observed : "It seemed an extraordinarily trivial matter for such a tremendous step. It was quite impossible for me to understand his decision". *Nehru on Gandhi*, p. 84.
- 138a. *Hist. Congr.* , I, 565.
139. *Hist. Congr.* , I. 381.
140. *The Indian Struggle*, II. 363.
141. Ibid, 368.
142. Referring to Gandhi's Dandi march, Pattabhi Sitaramayya observes : "It was also prophetic visualisation of what was to come to pass. Perhaps Gandhi himself had no full conception of what was to follow. He saw things as if by a flash and framed his conduct by impulse. To the righteous man, these two are the supreme guides of life, not reason nor intellect." *Hist. Congr.* , I. 378. The same writer remarks elsewhere : "Gandhi's plans have all along been revealed to him by his own instinct, not evolved by the cold, calculating logic of the mind. His inner voice is his mentor and monitor, his friend, philosopher and guide." Ibid, 371. Similar view was expressed by Jawaharlal Nehru (p. 487).
143. *Hist. Congr.* , I. 557.
144. Ibid, 547-52.
145. Ibid, 535.
146. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 78.

BOOK IV. CHAPTER VII.

1. Vol II, pp. 265-327, 387-489
2. This and the other incidents mentioned in this chapter are, unless otherwise stated, described on the authority of memoirs published by the revolutionaries. The accounts given by different authors sometimes differ in minor details, but their general accuracy is,
 - in most cases, proved by official reports.
3. *Report* (see f n., 9), p. 325.
4. See p. 123.
5. It should be four; cf. Vol, II, p. 444 where the name Nirendra is wrongly printed as Jitendra.
- 5a. *Report*, 327.

6. Ibid, 328.
7. See p. 249
8. For his earlier activities, cf. Vol. II, 301 ff., 455 ff.
9. This is referred to as *Report* in these footnotes.
- 9a. *Report*, 320.
10. See p 262.
11. According to Khaliquzzaman an Indian member of the C. I. D. "unearthed the conspirators in mere five days" (p. 78).
12. See p. 317.
13. 'Da is an abbreviation of *Dada* (elder brother).
14. Kalpana Dutt, *Chittagong Armoury Raids—Reminiscences*, p. 7.
15. The full text is given by Suprakash Ray, p. 649.
16. *Report*, 327.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. According to some accounts, eleven died in the very first volley. The youngest of the lot, nicknamed Tengra, a boy in his early teens, and younger brother of Lokenath Ball, the leader, was one of the first to be mortally wounded by a shot. His dying words to his brother were: "I am going, fight till the last."
20. *Report*, 328.
21. Ibid, 332, 336
22. Ibid, 335.
23. Ibid, 336.
24. Cf. Vol. II, pp. 282-3.
25. *Report*, 337.
26. Ibid, 339.
27. The details of I and II are given in the *Report*, pp. 342-52. The figures refer to Bengal. A separate list is given for other Provinces in pp. 353-61, year by year. The figures given in *India in 1930* (p. 540) are somewhat different.
- 27a. See p. 417.
28. Ajay Kumar Ghosh, *Bhagat Singh and his Comrades*, p. 2.
29. Ibid, p. 4.
30. The Account of Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta given in this section and the next is based on *I.A.R.*, 1929, Vol. I, pp.78-80, and the documents and information supplied to the author by Batukeshwar Datta, who is happily still alive. The author takes this opportunity to express his obligations to Sri Datta.
- 30a. See p. 263.
31. The statement was supplied by Sri Datta.
32. See p. 319.
33. See pp. 393-4.

34. *India in 1933-34*, p 48.
35. *Ibid*, p. 321, para 5.
36. See p. 517.
37. This is an extract from a published article, kindly supplied by Sri Datta.
38. Quoted in the *Weekly Pratap*, October, 1929, p.1. I am indebted to Sri Datta for this quotation.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER VIII

1. Chintamani and Masani, 174.
2. Gwyer, I. pp. xliii-xliv.
3. As will be shown later, Gandhi made a complete *volte face* in 1940 (p. 604), but then it was too late.
4. *Hist. Congr.*, I 579-86.
5. *Ibid*, 601-2.
6. *The Times of India*, 24 April, 1930 (quoted in Coupland, I. 111)
- 6a. Coupland, II. 121.
7. See p 314.
8. See p. 326.
9. *Hist. Congr.*, I 485-6. cf. p. 393.
10. Rajendra Prasad, 140.
11. *Ibid*, 140-41.
12. *Muslim League*, 225.
13. Coupland, II. 14.
14. Cf. the Presidential Address of Nawab Habibullah. *IAR*, 1936, I. 305.
- 14a. Cf. Vol. I, pp. 32 ff., 465 ff.
15. Nehru had a very poor opinion of Jinnah and the Muslim League. Leonard Mosley, to whom he seems to have unburdened his heart, observes : "His (Nehru's) contempt for Jinnah was ill-concealed (the contempt was reciprocated) and his dislike of the aims and intentions of the Muslim League was such that he seriously underestimated its strength. Of the Muslim League he once said, in a conversation with the author : 'it was an organization which was both very strong and very weak. It could always bring its followers out on the streets, always cause trouble, always threaten violence. But it had no other *raison d'etre* than a negative anti-Hindu feeling. And of Jinnah he said : ...He was a snob. ...He had no real

feelings about the Muslims. He wasn't really a Muslim at all. I know Muslims. I know the Koran. I have Muslim relatives and friends. Jinnah couldn't even recite a Muslim prayer and had certainly never read the Koran. But when he was offered the leadership of the Muslim League, he saw the opportunity and accepted it. He had been a comparative failure as a lawyer in England and this was a way out." Mosley, 26. For a somewhat different attitude, cf. Nehru-II, 339 ff. For Nehru's estimate of the League, see pp. 563-4.

16. See p. 385.
17. *Hist. Congr.*, I, 603.
18. Coupland, II. 10-11.
19. See p. 481.
20. For the spread of Communism in India, see pp. 262 ff.
21. *The Indian Struggle*, III. 16-7. The predominance of the Socialist group in the Congress is admitted by Gandhi himself in his statement of 17 September, item 3, quoted above on p. 538. Gandhi threatened to retire from the Congress "if they gained ascendancy as they may." This supports the charge that under Gandhi's leadership the Congress was losing its democratic character.
22. *Ibid*, 10.
23. *Ibid*, II. 366.
24. *Ibid*, 430.
25. *Ibid*.
26. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 11.
27. *Nehru on Gandhi*, 78
28. *Ibid*, 91.
29. *Ibid*, 64.
30. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 30.
31. *Ibid*, 31.
32. *Ibid*, 33.
33. *Ibid*, 36.
34. Report of the Sapru Committee (23 ff.), which gives other details.
35. *Ibid*, 27-8.
36. For a detailed account of the work of the Ministries, cf. Coupland, Part II.
37. *Ibid*, 110.
38. *Ibid*, 111.
- 38a. Khaliquzzaman (pp. 161-2) refers to the Congress offer as a death warrant. Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi who discusses this point in detail, refers to the pithy saying of Nehru, mentioned above, as adding insult to injury (p. 89)
- 38b. Azad says in his Memoir (pp. 160-62) that the breakdown of the

negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim League in U.P. was due to the refusal of Nehru to take more than one minister from the League although hopes were held out that two would be taken. Azad observes that Nehru's attitude was due to fondness for abstract theory which was also responsible for his most unfortunate statement about the Constituent Assembly on 10 July 1946 (cf. pp. 770-74).

39. Nehru-II, 332.
40. Cf. Vol. I, pp. 32 ff., 465 ff.
41. Nehru-II, 331. Cf. also Mosley's observations quoted above, in f.n. 15.
- 41a. Ibid, 335.
- 41b. See pp. 581-3.
42. See p. 60.
43. Coupland, II. 181.
44. Ibid.
45. Jinnah, 295-3.
46. Coupland, II. 182.
47. Ibid, 182-3.
48. Rajendra Prasad, 154-5.
- 48a. Ibid, 155.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid, 146-7.
51. Coupland, II. 188.
- 51a. Azad, 22.
52. *Sources*, 763-8 ; *Pakistan*, 140
53. It is interesting to note that five years before Iqbal Lala Lajpat Rai suggested "the creation of Moslem Provinces in the north-east and north-west of India...to set at rest the ceaseless Hindu-Muslim bickerings and jealousies in some Provinces." *Modern Review*, 1925, Part I, p. 189.
54. Halidè Edib, a Turkish lady, visited India in 1935 and recorded her impressions in a book entitled *Inside India*, published in 1937. She gives an interesting account of her interview with Rahmat Ali long before the scheme of Pakistan was looked upon as a practicable proposal or a living political issue, even by the Muslim leaders.
- 54a. Coupland, Part II. 206.
55. See p 264.
56. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 72; *Nehru on Gandhi*, p. 78.
57. *The Indian Struggle*, III, 19.
58. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 106 f. n.
59. Ibid, 106.
60. Ibid.

61. Ibid, 110-11.
62. Ibid, 113-4. The stormy scenes are described in *IAR*, 1939, I. 327-30.
63. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 32.
64. *The Indian Struggle*, III, 19-20.
65. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 115.
66. Ibid, 116-7.
67. Ibid, 118.
68. Ibid.
69. *The Indian Struggle*, III, 21, 23.
70. Ibid, 23-5.

BOOK IV, CHAPTER IX

1. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, p. 628.
- 1a. *The Harijan*, 9 September, 1939; quoted in Coupland, II. 214.
2. *The Statesman*, 10 September, 1939; quoted in Coupland, II. 214.
- 2a. See above, pp. 579, 582.
3. *The Indian Struggle*, III. 28-9.
4. Coupland, II. 215. *IAR*, 1939, II. 226-8.
5. *IAR*, 1939, II. 231.
6. Coupland, II. 216.
7. Ibid, 217.
8. Ibid, 217-8. Italics mine.
9. *The Indian Struggle*, III. 32.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid, 33.
12. Ibid, 34.
13. Ibid.
14. Azad, 33.
15. Ibid, 34.
16. Coupland, II. 239-40.
17. Ibid, 240.
18. Azad, 35.
19. The letter was published in the *Harijan*, 9 September, 1939; quoted in Coupland, II. 214, f. n., 1.
20. Azad, 36.
21. Coupland, II. 242.

22. See pp. 387-88.
23. 'Coupland, II. 242.
24. Ibid, 243-4.
25. Coupland (II. 245) gives arguments both for and against such a view.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid, 248.
- 27a. Ibid, 247.
28. *The Indian Struggle*, III, 37-8.
29. Coupland, II. 258.
30. Ibid, 259-60.
31. Ibid, 260.
32. Ibid.
33. *Hist. Congr.*, 293-4.
34. Ibid, 298.
35. Coupland, II. 267.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid, 268.
38. Gwyer, II. 519.
39. Ibid.
- 39a. The documents are published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1942*, Vol. I, pp. 593 to 750.
- 39b. Ibid, 603.
- 39c. Ibid, 602-4.
- 39d. Ibid, 605-6.
- 39e. For the full report, cf. Ibid, 606-7.
- 39f. Ibid, 608.
- 39g. Ibid, 612.
- 39h. Ibid, 615-6.
- 39i. Ibid, 617-8.
- 39j. Ibid, 619.
40. Azad, 62.
41. Coupland, Part II. 279-80.
42. Ibid, 279.
43. Ibid, 280.
44. Ibid.
45. Menon, 132.
46. Ibid, 126.
47. Ibid, 127.
48. Ibid 128.
- 48a. Ibid, 129.

49. Ibid, 128-30.
50. Ibid, 130-1.
51. Ibid, 133.
52. See f.n., 39 a (hereafter referred to as *Documents*).
53. *Documents*, pp. 630-34.
54. Louis Fischer-II, 111-2.
55. Ibid.
- 55a. Ibid, 110.
- 55b. • *Documents*, 640
- 55c. *Hist. Congr* , II, 326, 331.
56. Coupland, II, 288-9.
57. Ibid, 290.
58. Statement published by the Government of India on the Congress Party's Responsibility for the Disturbances in India, 1942-3. *Parliamentary Report, Accounts and Papers*, 1942-3, Vol. IX (hereafter referred to as *Statement*) It is reproduced in *IAR*, 1942, pp. 237-54
59. Ibid.
60. Coupland, II, 291.
61. Azad, 72-3.
62. Ibid, 72.
63. *Statement* (See f n., 58 above)
64. Azad, 73-77.
65. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 340-42.
66. *The Indian Struggle.*, III, 41-3.
67. Azad, 81.
68. Ibid, 82.
69. *Hist. Congr.*, II, 342-46.
70. Coupland, II, 297-8.
71. Nehru-II, 429.
72. *Statement*.
- 72a. *Hist. Congr.*, II. 375
- 72b. Ibid, 376.
- 72c. *Statement*.
73. Ibid, 373-4.
74. The account that follows is mainly based on unofficial publications mentioned in the Bibliography and the footnotes.
75. The account of Midnapore is chiefly based on *Rebel India*, Edited by Bejan Mitra and Phani Chakraborty (1946), and a Bengali book, *August Viplab*, by Tarinisankar Chakravarty (1946).
76. *Rebel India*, p. 24.
77. Ibid, 25.

78. Nehru observes: "It was extraordinary how British authority ceased to function over many areas, both rural and urban, and it took many days and sometimes weeks for a 'reconquest', as it was often termed. This happened particularly in Bihar, in the Midnapur District of Bengal and in the south-eastern districts of the United Provinces." (Nehru-II, 431).
79. Nehru-II, 430-31. The figures quoted by Nehru are different from those given in *Hist. Congr.* (quoted above) on the authority of the statement by Home Minister.
80. *Hist. Congr.*, II. 377.
- 80a. Coupland, II. 302.
- 80b. *Rebel India*, p. 212.
81. Nehru-II, 427.
- 81a. According to the statement of K. C. Mahindra of the India Supply Mission in U. S. A. According to Sir G. S. Bajpai only 57 battalions were employed (*Documents*, pp. 737, 735).
82. Ibid, 427-8 Alexander, Horace, *India since Cripps*, p. 47.
83. See pp 637-8.
84. Nehru-II, 419. The same view is emphatically asserted by Jayaprakash Narain and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. The relevant passages are quoted in pp.673, 663 and 667-8.
- 84a. Tendulkar (VI, 212-15) reproduces these instructions which are fairly comprehensive and cover three printed pages.
85. K. K. Datta, *Freedom Movement in Bihar*, Vol. III, p. 37.
86. Coupland, II, 303, f n , 1
87. *Statement* (see f n. 58).
- 87a. For these and other statements of Gandhi, see above, p. 644.
88. Coupland, II 303.
89. See p. 662.
90. Cf. Chapter VII.
91. See p. 384.
92. Horace, Alexander, op. cit., 49.
93. *Correspondence with Mr. Gandhi, August 1942-April 1944*, published by the Government of India (1944), p. 1.
94. K. K. Datta, op. cit., p. 444.
95. Ibid, 266-7.
96. For the text of the letter, cf. Ibid, 436 ff.; also *Rebel India*, 194.
97. K. K. Datta, op. cit., 267.
- 97a. Letter "To All Fighters of Freedom, *Rebel India*, 222-3.
98. K. K. Datta, op. cit., 272-3.
99. Ibid, 273-5.
100. For details, cf. ibid, 275 ff.

101. *Correspondence* (See f.n., 93), pp.3-4. The Congress made a grievance that this letter 'condemning acts of violence' was not published by the Government in time. "If it had been published in its entirety then and there, Gandhi's condemnation of the acts of violence by people outside would have had telling and forthright effect in subduing them" (*Hist. Congr.*, II. 485).
102. Nehru-II, 427. The relevant passage has been quoted above, in p. 646.
103. Azad, 90.
104. Diwakar, 100.
- 104a In a long letter addressed to the President, Indian National Congress, on 7 January, 1946, Achyut Patvardhan and Aruna Asaf Ali made an emphatic protest against such a view of "the momentous events of the past three years" (*Rebel India*, p. 206).
- 104b. Letter "To All Fighters of Freedom," dated 1 September, 1943 (*Rebel India*, p. 223).
105. Nehru-II, 427.
106. *Hist. Congr.*, II. 373.
- 107] Horace, Alexander, op. cit., p. 44.
- 108 *Corrspondence* (see f. n., 93), pp. 8, 9, 11.
109. Azad, 91.
- 110 Letter dated December, 1942 (*Rebel India*, pp. 194-5).
- 110a See pp. 65-6, 96, 387-8.
111. See p. 604.
112. Coupland, II. 298: Italics mine.
113. Ibid, 289.
114. Ibid, 299. On 8 August, 1942, on the eve of his arrest Gandhi wrote to the same effect to a Muslim businessman in Bombay (ibid).
115. Khaliquzzaman, 282-3.
116. Ibid, 286,
117. Ibid, 286.
118. Ibid, 285.
119. Coupland, II. 299.
120. Ibid, 300.
121. *The Times*, 31 December, 1942 (quoted in Coupland, II. 304).
122. Menon, 113-4.
123. Ibid, 145.
124. Ibid, 154.
- 125 See pp 262-5.
126. *Communism in India*, by Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller (hereafter referred to as '*Communism*'), p 140.
- 127 Ibid, 145-6,

- 128 Masani M. R., *The Communist Party of India*, pp 51-3.
129. Ibid, 66-71; *Communism*, 179.
130. Masani, op. cit., 71-2.
131. *Communism*, 188-9.
132. The split between the CPI and the Forward Bloc was probably due to other causes also. It has been suggested that the former looked upon the latter, like all other leftist parties, as a rival and the split was part of an attempt to reduce the prestige of a rival which had to be prevented from seizing the opportunity to build a mass following based on a radical programme' (*Communism*, pp. 180-81).
133. Ibid, 181
134. Ibid, 181-4
135. Ibid, 181-2
136. Ibid, 192-8; Masani, 79-80
137. *Communism*, 198
138. Masani, 82-3.
139. Ibid, 83-4
140. *Communism*, 219. The authenticity of the letter is denied by the CPI, and there is no positive evidence of its existence. Batlivala challenged the CPI to publish the correspondence, but the challenge was not accepted.
141. Masani, 84.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid, 85
144. Ibid, 85-6
145. *Correspondence* (see f n., 93).
146. Ibid, 9.
147. Menon, 160
148. Ibid, 160-61.
149. Cf. ibid, 161, for further details of the speech.
150. For the contradictory views of Gandhi on the subject, see pp.678-9.
151. See p 563.
152. Menon, 163. Italics mine.
153. For details, cf. Menon, 162
154. Ibid, 163.
155. Ibid.
- 155a. Ibid, 164-5.
156. Ibid. 163.
- 156a. Ibid, 176-9
157. Ibid, 182-3

BOOK IV, CHAPTER X.

This Chapter is based mainly on the following books and articles to which reference is made in the footnotes by the name of the author.

BOOKS

1. Maj-Gen., Shahnawaz Khan, *I. N. A. and its Netaji* (Delhi, 1946).
2. Hugh Toye, *The Springing Tiger* (Bombay, 1957).
3. A. C. Chatterji, *India's Struggle for Freedom*, (Calcutta, 1947).

ARTICLES

1. S. A. Ayer, The Indian Independence Movement in East Asia (*Netaji Research Bureau, Bulletin*, Vol. II, No 1, July, 1961, pp. 2-16).
2. John A. Thivy, *A Short Sketch of the Indian Independence Movement*, Hanoi, 1945 (unpublished). Reference in the footnotes is to a typed copy kindly lent by the Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta.

FOOTNOTES

1. Subhas Chandra Bose, *Crossroads*, pp 343-3.
2. Cf. Vol. II, pp 454 ff
3. Toye (p. 7) gives the number as 45,000
4. Shahnawaj, pp. 41-44; Toye, p. 9.
5. Chatterji, p 17.
6. Ibid, 20.
7. Ibid, 20-21.
8. Ibid, 35, 42-3.
9. Ibid, 46, 51 ff.
10. Ibid, 48-9.
11. Ibid, 50.
12. Thivy, p. 5.
13. Toye, 79.
- 13a. For full details, cf. Chatterji, Chapter VIII (pp. 120-29).
14. Ayer, p. 7.
15. Ibid, 8-9.
16. Toye, 95.
17. Thivy, 9.
18. Shahnawaj, 99-100; Toye, 83, 85.

24. Ibid, 108, 110.
25. Ibid, 111.
26. Ibid, 112.
27. Ibid, 113; Toye, 103.
28. Shahnawaj, 116.
29. Ibid, 118.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid, 134.
- 32a. Chatterji, 180.
33. Shahnawaj, 151.
34. Ibid, 153-4.
35. Ibid, 154.
36. Ibid, 155.
37. Ibid, 156.
38. Ibid, 160.
- *38a. Toye, 102, 107. Chatterji (183) gives the date as 4 February, which seems to be wrong. Subhas Bose's Special Order of the Day, dated 1st January, 1945, and Tojo's statement, quoted at the end of the para, support the date 19th March.
39. Shahnawaj, 159.
- 39a. Ibid, 124.
40. Ibid, 126.
41. Ibid, 135.
42. Ibid, 137.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid, 138.
45. Ibid, 105, 135.
46. See pp. 721-2.
47. Thivy, 27.
48. Shahnawaj, 125.
49. Ibid, 161.
50. Ayer, p. 11.
51. A Committee was appointed by the Government of India "to enquire into and report to the Government of India on the circumstances concerning the departure of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose from Bangkok about the 16th August, 1945, his alleged death

as result of an aircraft accident and subsequent developments connected therewith." Shri Suresh Chandra Bose, elder brother of Subhash Chandra Bose, who was a member of this Committee, wrote a long dissentient Report and published it separately. The Chairman, Shahnawaz Khan (the Commander of the Subhas Brigade, I N. A., one of the officers tried in the Red Fort, Dehli, and then a Parliamentary Secretary) and other members of the Committee held that Netaji's death was established.

52. Toye, 170. Toye adds: "The British Prime Minister himself was compelled to recognise the new feeling: 'Today', said Mr. Attlee on March 15th, 1946, 'the national idea has spread...not least perhaps among some of those (Indian) soldiers who have done such wonderful service in the war'. According to Toye, this 'political consciousness' or 'national idea' was partly responsible for "the serious naval mutinies and the unrest in the other two Services early in 1946" (Ibid, 170-1).

BOOK V, CHAPTERS I-II

1. Cf. Churchill's famous dictum of 10 November, 1942: "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside at the liquidation of the British Empire".
2. I am indebted to Dr. D. K. Ghosh for this information.
3. Leonard Mosley, p. 12.
4. Menon, 218-9.
5. Ibid, 219-20.
6. Ibid, 222.
7. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to discuss the trials of other men of the I. N. A. and the wisdom of the Government decision to try the I. N. A. prisoners of war. For a critical discussion of this point, cf. Philip Mason's "Foreword" to *The Springing Tiger* by Hugh Toye; and also Leonard Mosley, p. 136.
8. Hugh Toye, op. cit., p. ix.
- 8a. Menon, 223. Toye observes: "There can thus be little doubt that the Indian National Army, not in its unhappy career on the battlefield, but in its thunderous disintegration, hastened the end of British rule in India. The agitation which surrounded the trials turned the issue of independence for India into an instant, burning question once more" (p. 175).

9. Menon, 223-4.
10. Ibid, 227.
11. Ibid, 226.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid, 228-9.
14. Ibid, 234.
15. Ibid, 237-8.
16. Ibid, 239-40.
17. Ibid, 240-41.
18. Gandhi's view (p. 755), based on the fact that the majority of Muslims was descended from the Hindus, is as puerile as that of Nehru, who ignored Hindu-Muslim problem because it is based on religion which can be changed (p. 564).
19. Menon, 246-7.
- 19a. These figures indicate the number of the paragraph in the Statement by the Cabinet Mission on 16 May, 1946.
20. Ibid, 273.
21. Ibid, 274-76.
22. Gwyer, II. 603.
23. Menon, 276-7.
24. Gwyer, II 610-11.
- *25. Menon, 280.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid, 280-1.
28. Ibid, 281.
29. Ibid.
30. Mosley, 27.
31. Azad, 154-5.
32. Ibid, 155-6.
33. Ibid, 156.
34. Ibid, 157-8.
35. Gwyer, II. 621. *Italics mine.*
36. Menon, 289-90.
37. Ibid, 284.
38. Azad, 159.
39. Mosley, 11.
- 39a. Ibid, 38. Cf. in this connection the speech of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee in the Bengal Legislative Assembly on No-Confidence motions against the Ministry on 20 September, 1946.
- 39b. Menon, 296.
40. Azad, 159-60.

41. Gwyer, II: 643.
42. Menon, 302.
43. Mosley, 42-3.
44. Menon, 320-1.
45. Ibid, 319; *IAR*, 1946, II. 270.
- 45a. For the communal relations in Noakhali after Gandhi's tour in Noakhali, cf. Pyarelal, II. Chapter III. A more detailed account is given by N. K. Bose (*My Days with Gandhi*, pp. 210-18). Gandhi left Noakhali on 2 March, 1947. On April 2 he received the following message from his chief lieutenant at Noakhali : "There have been five cases of arson between March 23 and yesterday. Yesterday's case happened at Mohammadpur in Ramganj Thana. It was an attempt to burn alive three families consisting of twenty-one persons, male, female, children of the house, who for safety slept all in one room. This room was fastened from outside and this thatched hut and other huts of the house simultaneously set on fire. The inmates escaped by breaking through mat wall."

On receiving report of another similar case two days later, Gandhi sent the following reply : "Case seems to be for exodus or perishing in flames of fanaticism. Hope you will not advise my coming to advise on choice. Hold council with workers and act promptly" (Bose, 210-11). Bose has also quoted a confidential official report about the condition of Noakhali in May, 1947 (pp. 293-304). It is clear that Gandhi's strenuous efforts failed to make any change in the heart of the Muslims.

46. Gwyer, II. 660-1.
47. Menon, 329-30.
48. Ibid, 332-3.
49. Gwyer, II. 606.
50. Menon, 337.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid, 338.
53. This, if true, is a very significant admission supporting the view mentioned above, in pp. 744-5.
54. Azad, 177-8. Azad's analysis of Attlee's attitude is supported by the speeches of the Government members in the House of Commons in course of the debate on Attlee's statement of 20 February, 1947 (Menon, 340 ff.).
55. Gwyer, II. 667-9.
56. G. D. Khosla, *Stern Reckoning*, p. 100.
- 56a. K. L. Panjabi, *The Indomitable Sardar*, p. 122.
57. Menon, 347.

58. Azad, 185.
59. Panjabi, op. cit. , pp. 122-26. According to some it was not Mountbatten who converted Patel to the idea of Partition, but the fact was just the other way. Thus Mosley writes :
 'The idea of Partition originated with Menon (1946) and was agreed to (December, 1946) by Patel who had bitter experience of working with Muslim colleagues in the Interim Government. His first move was to induce the Working Committee to pass, at the beginning of March, 1947, a resolution recommending the partition of the Punjab into two communal States, Muslim and Hindu.
 'Patel wrote to a member of the Working Committee : "A strong centre with the whole of India—except E. Bengal and part of the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan—enjoying full autonomy under the Centre will be so powerful that the remaining portions will eventually come in."
 'This line of reasoning appealed to Nehru. To him Patel's resolution was a stratagem rather than an admittance of the fact of partition. It would merely show the Muslims what must be faced if they insisted upon Pakistan which would be a truncated State so painfully mutilated that it could never be viable. The resolution was deliberately taken up when Gandhi and Azad would be unable to attend the meeting.
 'When Mountbatten explained the full implication of the resolution Patel feigned ignorance and allowed himself to be persuaded that by accepting the division of the Punjab he had recognized the principle of Indian partition ; and it was even more slowly and unwillingly that he appeared to accept Mountbatten's contention that this was, perhaps, the way out after all.'
 Patel and Menon "had talked of the real meaning of the Resolution long before it was submitted". "In fact while ostensibly walking innocently into Mountbatten's parlour, Patel was busily spinning a web of his own". Mosley, 98 ff.
 It is difficult to say how far Mosley's version is correct. For Menon's plan, see later, p. 803.
60. Mosley, 248.
61. Azad, 186-7.
62. Allan Campbell-Johnson, 97; Menon, 371.
63. Campbell-Johnson, 110.
64. N. K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism*, 284, 294.
65. Fischer-II, II. 219-20
66. See p. 797.
67. Fischer-II, II. 220. Fischer's explanation receives some support in the following extract from Gandhi's written message to the prayer meeting on 15 June, i. e. the day after Gandhi had supported the resolution about Partition in the meeting of the A. I. C. C.

"One more question has been and is being asked. If you are so sure that India is going the wrong way why do you associate with the wrong-doers? Why do you not plough your lonely furrow and have faith that if you are right, your erstwhile friends and followers will seek you out? I regard this as a fair question I must not attempt to argue against it. All I can say is that my faith is as strong as ever. It is quite possible that my technique is faulty" (*Harijan*, 29-6-1947, p. 209).

Somewhat less mystic is the conversation that N. K. Bose had with Gandhi about two months after the A. I. C. C. meeting. Bose writes :

"I had the temerity to ask him why he had refused to give the necessary lead to the country when he felt so strongly on the question of division. As far as I can remember, for there is no record to this effect in my diary, his answer was that if every time the Congress committed a mistake, he had to step in to set it right, then India would never learn the art of democracy" (*Days with Gandhi*, p. 251) Gandhi certainly chose a very wrong moment to leave his spoilt children to learn the art of standing on their own legs without prop or support.

68. See pp. 534-5.

69. See p. 679.

70. See pp. 694-5.

71. See p. 748.

72. See p. 679.

73. See p. 750.

74. See p. 793.

75. Azad, 188.

76. For a detailed account, cf. Pyarelal, II. Chapter VIII. N. K. Bose, *My Days with Gandhi*, pp. 227 ff.

77. For the full text of the Statement, cf. Menon, 510-15; Gwyer, II. 670-75.

78. Azad, 193.

79. See p. 695.

80. Azad, 193.

81. For the account of the A. I. C. C., including the summary of the speeches, that follows, cf. *IAR*, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 122-137.

82. These are the figures given by Menon (p. 386) and also found in *IAR*, 1947, Vol. II pp. 133, 137. According to Azad, 29 voted for it and 15 against (p. 198). According to Panjabi (p. 126), there were 153 votes for and 29 against with 36 abstentions. Azad's figures are obviously wrong.

83. Menon, 383.

84. Ibid, 382

85. Azad, 198.

86. Menon, 404.

87. Ibid, 413.

88. Mosley, 244-6.

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Cf. Section I. entries under Holmes; Kaye; Majumdar, R. C.; Malleson; Sen Surendranath; Chaudhuri, S. B.

There is a vast literature on the subject for which the readers may consult the bibliographies in the books of Majumdar, R. C., and Sen, Surendranath.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE (1919 to 1947)

Figures within bracket at the end refer to the page in the text.

1919

February, 24	The <i>Satyagraha</i> Pledge signed (14).
March, 18	The Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Acts, based on Rowlatt Bills, Passed (2).
„ 30	<i>Hartal</i> at Delhi (15-18).
April, 6	All-India <i>hartal</i> (16).
„ 10	Arrest of Gandhi and riots (22).
„ 13	Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh (26).
„ 15-20	Martial Law in the Panjab (29).
„ 18	Gandhi suspends <i>Satyagraha</i> (42).
June, 18	Text of the Reform Bill issued.
July, 21	Gandhi abandons <i>Satyagraha</i> (42).
November, 23-4	All-India Khilafat Conference at Delhi, Presided over by Gandhi, threatens Non-co-operation (56).
December, 23	The Government of India Act receives the Royal assent. Royal Amnesty to Political prisoners announced by a Royal Proclamation.
„ 27	Amritsar Session of the Congress (50).
„ 30	Moderate Conference in Calcutta (50)

1920

January, 19	Khilafat Deputation to the Viceroy (56).
March, 10	Gandhi issues a manifesto suggesting Non-violent Non-co-operation (NCO) to the Khilafatits (57).
„ 17	Indian Khilafat Deputation to Lloyd George (57).
„ 19	Day of National mourning observed by the Khilafatists.

April, 17	Khilafat Conference at Madras approves of Gandhi's idea of NCO (67).
May, 12	All-India Khilafat Committee Meeting at Bombay. Gandhi urges NCO (67)
„ 15	Peace Terms to Turkey announced.
„ 28	Central Khilafat Committee adopts NCO.
„ 28	Report of the Hunter Committee published and Government decision announced.
„ 30	All-India Congress Committee (A.I.C.C) meeting at Banaras decides to hold a Special session of the Congress in Calcutta to consider adoption of NCO.
June, 1-2	Muslim Conference at Allahabad resolves to adopt NCO—Gandhi offers co-operation (71-2).
August, 1	All-India strike organized by the Khilafatists by way of inaugurating NCO. Gandhi returns his war-medals to the Viceroy (75).
August	<i>Hijrat</i> or mass-migration of the Muslims to Afghanistan.
September, 4	Adoption of NCO by the Congress at its Special session in Calcutta.
December, 26-31	The Nagpur session of the Congress accepts NCO.
1921	
May, 29	The apology of the Ali brothers to the Viceroy (117)
August	Moplah Outbreak.
November, 1	Ali brothers sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment.
17	Prince of Wales landed at Bombay ; riots in Bombay and all-India <i>hartal</i> .

December		Arrest of C. R. Das, Motilal Nehru, Lajpat Rai and other leaders and about 25,000 Congress workers.
„	24	Prince of Wales arrives in Calcutta.
„	27-8	Congress session at Ahmadabad.

1922

February, 1		Gandhi communicated to the Viceroy the decision of Bardoloi to embark on Mass Civil Disobedience (151).
„	5	Mob violence at Chauri Chaura (156, 180).
„	11-12	Working Committee (W.C.) of the Congress suspends Mass Civil Disobedience.
„	24-5	A.I.C.C. endorses the decision of the W. C.
March, 18		Gandhi sentenced to six years' simple imprisonment.
August, 2		The "steel frame" speech of Lloyd George (227).
December, 26-31		Congress session at Gaya rejects the Council entry resolution.

1923

January, 1		Resignation of the Congress President, C. R. Das.
September, 15-19		Special session of the Congress at Delhi approves of the Swarajya Party's programme of Council entry.
December, 16-7		Hindu-Muslim Pact by the Swarajya Party in Calcutta.
December, 28		The Congress session at Cocanada begins.

1924

- January, 30 The first meeting of the Second Legislative Assembly ; attended by the Swarajya Party.
- February, 5 Gandhi released unconditionally on grounds of ill health (p. 235, where the date is wrongly printed as February, 4).
- 8 Motilal Nehru moves his famous resolution on the constitutional changes in the Central Legislative Assembly.
- „ 18 The motion carried in the Assembly (236)
- May, 22 Gandhi's statement re Council entry. Rejoinder of C R. Das and Motilal Nehru.
- June, 27 A.I.C.C. meeting at Ahmadabad. Fight between Gandhi and the Swarajists over the new constitution of the Congress (246)
- October, 25 Bengal Ordinance promulgated by the Governor-General.
- November, 21-22 All-Parties' Conference at Bombay.
- „ 23 Pact between Gandhi and the Swarajya Party.

1925

- March, 29 C. R. Das issues a manifesto condemning violence—pourparlers with the Government.
- June, 16 Death of C. R. Das.
- August, 22 Vithalbhai Patel elected President of the Central Legislative Assembly.
- December, 26-28 Kanpur session of the Congress—the members of the Swarajya Party directed to walk out of the Legislatures (which they did in March, 1926).

1926

- April, 3 Conference of all political parties except the Congress.

September

Split in the Swarajya Party. Secession of the Responsivists and Independent Congressmen who form a Coalition Party (258).

1927

November, 8

Appointment of Simon Commission.

December, 26-28

Madras session of the Congress declares independence as India's goal and takes steps to summon an All-Parties' Conference to draw up a constitution for India.

1928

February, 3

Arrival of Simon Commission. All-India *hartal*.

,, 16

The Central Legislative Assembly passes the resolution to boycott the Simon Commission.

August, 28-31

All-Parties' Conference at Lakhnau accepted the recommendations of the Committee, appointed by it under the Chairmanship of Motilal Nehru, to draw up the Constitution for India.

December, 22

All-Parties' Convention in Calcutta (313-4).

,, 29-31

Congress session in Calcutta accepts the Constitution drafted by the Nehru Committee.

Gandhi promises Swaraj within one year.

1929

January, 1

All-Parties' Conference of the Muslims at Delhi (314).

April, 8	Bhagat Singh and Batukeshwar Datta throw bombs in the Assembly Hall at Delhi.
July, 10	Lahore Conspiracy Case
„ 12	The accused under-trial prisoners resort to hunger-strike
September, 13	Death of Jatin Das as a result of hunger-strike in Lahore jail.
October, 31	Viceroy's Declaration on Dominion Status and the summoning of a Round Table Conference (R.T.C.) (322).
December, 23	Gandhi and others meet the Viceroy and reject the invitation to R. T. C.
„ 29	Lahore session of the Congress begins. It declares complete independence as the goal, resolves to boycott the Legislatures, and approves of Civil Disobedience.
1930	
January, 1	The session of the Congress ends. Jawaharlal Nehru, as President of the Congress, hoists the tri-colour flag of Indian independence on the bank of the Ravi at Lahore.
„ 26	The Independence Day observed.
March, 12	Civil Disobedience inaugurated by Gandhi's march to Dandi for making salt.
April, 5	Gandhi arrives at Dandi with his party.
„ 18	Chittagong Armoury Raid.
June, 7	Report of the Simon Commission issued.

November. 12

Inauguration of the First R. T. C.

1931

January, 19

The First R. T. C. adjourned.

,, 26

Gandhi and the members of the W. C. released.

February, 6

Death of Pandit Motilal Nehru.

February, 17 to
March, 4

Gandhi-Irwin talks.

March. 5

Gandhi-Irwin Pact.

,, 23

Bhagat Singh and his two comrades hanged.

,, 29

Karachi session of the Congress approves of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. Hostile demonstration against Gandhi (384).

April, 1-2

The Congress W. C. elects Gandhi as the sole representative to the R. T. C.

August, 29

Gandhi leaves India to attend R. T. C.

September, 7

Second R. T. C. begins.

,, 12

Gandhi arrives in London.

December, 11

Second R. T. C. closes.

,, 28

Gandhi lands at Bombay.

,, 29

Viceroy turns down Gandhi's request for an interview.

1932

January, 1

The Congress W. C. revives Civil Disobedience.

,, 4

Gandhi arrested. Government issues four new Ordinances.

August, 17

Announcement of the Communal Award made by Ramsay MacDonald.

September, 20		Gandhi begins 'fast unto death' as a protest against Communal Award.
„ 25		Poona Pact.
November, 17		Third R. T. C. begins.
December, 24		Third R. T. C. ends.
1933		
May, 8		Gandhi begins his 21 days' purificatory fast. Suspension of Civil Disobedience Movement. Gandhi released from prison.
August, 1		Beginning of Individual Civil Disobedience. Gandhi arrested and imprisoned for one year.
„ 17		Gandhi begins fast for not being granted facilities to carry on the Harijan upliftment work.
„ 23		Gandhi released.
1934		
May, 20		Civil Disobedience Movement officially terminated by the Congress.
October, 26-8		Congress session at Worli, Bombay, after three and a half years.
1935		
August, 4		New Government of India Act receives Royal assent.
December, 28		Golden Jubilee of the Congress celebrated all over India.
1936		
April, 14		The Congress session at Lakhnau.
December, 27-9		The Congress session at Faizpur.

1937

July, 7 Congressmen permitted to take office and form Ministry (560-61).

1938

February, 19 Congress session at Haripura (No session in 1937).

1939

March, 10-12 Congress session at Tripuri.
April, 29 Subhas Bose resigns the Presidency of the Congress.

September, 3 Outbreak of the Second World War.

„ 15 Congress W. C. asks Britain to declare her War-aims.

October, 10 A. I. C. C. endorses the above.

„ 17 Viceroy declares War-aims of Britain (598).

„ 22 W. C. asks Congress Ministries to resign.

„ 26 Secretary of State offers to expand the Governor-General's Executive Council.

October, 27 to November, 15 All the Congress Ministries resign.

1940

March, 19 Congress session at Ramgarh.

„ 22 Muslim League session at Lahore demands Pakistan.

April-May German Blitzkrieg—Collapse of Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium.

May, 10 Churchill replaces Chamberlain as Prime Minister in Britain.

May, 28 to June, 3	The British forces evacuate Dunkirk.
June	Germany overruns France.
„ 11	Italy joins the Allies.
„ 17-20	Session of the Congress Working Committee. Gandhi released from his responsibility of guiding the policy of the Congress (602).
July, 2	Subhas Bose arrested.
August, 8	Viceroy's new offer—Expansion of his Executive Council, setting up War Council and Constituent Assembly (605).
October, 17	Individual <i>Satyagraha</i> started.
November, 17	Representative <i>Satyagraha</i> .
December, 17	<i>Satyagraha</i> suspended.
1941	
January, 5	Resumption of <i>Satyagraha</i> .
„ 17	Subhas Bose escapes from his home detention in Calcutta.
March, 28	Subhas Bose arrives in Berlin.
June, 22	Germany declares war against Russia.
July, 22	Enlarged Executive Council of the Governor-General announced.
September, 9	Churchill's declaration that the Atlantic Charter was not applicable to India.
December, 7	Japan joins the War against the Allies.
„ 23-30	W. C. relieves Gandhi of the responsibility of leading the <i>Satyagraha</i> movement (613), and lays down the future policy and programme of the Congress.

1942

February, 15	Fall of Singapore.
March, 7	Fall of Rangoon.
„ 11	Churchill announces Cripps Mission.
„ 23	Sir Stafford Cripps reaches Delhi.
„ 28-30	Conference of Indians in South-East Asia at Tokyo, organized by Rash Bihari Bose, invites Subhas Bose.
April, 12	Cripps, unsuccessful, leaves India.
„ 29	Evacuation of Burma.
June, 15-23	Congference of Indians at Bangkok.
July, 14	'Quit India' Resolution passed by W. C.
August, 8	'Quit India' Resolution passed by A. I. C. C. Arrest of Gandhi and other leaders, followed by violent outbreaks all over India.

1943

February, 8	Subhas Bose left Germany in a U. Boat.
June, 13	Subhas Bose arrives at Tokyo.
July, 2	Subhas Bose arrives at Singapore.
„ 4	Subhas Bose takes over the leadership of the Indian Independence Movement from Rash Bihari Bose.
September	No. 1 Regiment of I.N.A. raised in Malay.
October, 21	Provisional Government of Free India established at Singapore.
November, 6	Greater East Asia Conference, at Tokyo where Tojo, the Japanese Premier, announced that Andaman and Nicobar Islands would be

- handed over to the Provisional Government of Subhas Bose.
- November, 9 The first batch of I. N. A. leaves for War Front.
- December, 31 Subhas Bose visits the Free Indian Territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

1944

- January, 4 Subhas Bose arrives at Rangoon.
- February, 4 I. N. A. commences fight.
- March, 19 I. N. A. crosses over to Indian territory.
- July, 26 The Japanese army and the I. N. A. retreat.
- 27 Gandhi offers terms to Viceroy who rejects them.
- September, 9-27 Gandhi's unsuccessful negotiations with Jinnah.

1945

- March, 23 Wavell reaches London to consult the Cabinet.
- June, 4 Wavell returns to India.
- „ 25 Simla Conference opens.
- July, 14 Simla Conference closes.
- August, 24 Wavell goes to London.
- September, 15 Surrender of Japan.
- „ 16 Wavell returns to India.
- „ 19 Wavell announces British Policy.
- December Election to the Central Legislative Assembly.

1946

- January, 5 British Parliamentary Delegation arrives in India.

January, 18	Wavell's announcement of New Executive Council and a Constitution-making Body.
February, 18	Mutiny of Naval Ratings.
„ 19	Announcement of Cabinet Mission.
March, 24	Cabinet Mission arrives at Delhi.
May, 16	Cabinet Mission issues a Statement.
June, 16	Cabinet Mission's statement on Interim Government.
„ 29	Cabinet Mission leaves India.
July, 7	Jawaharlal Nehru becomes President of the Congress.
„ 10	Nehru's Press Conference, which finally alienated Jinnah.
„ 22	Viceroy's proposals for Interim Government.
„ 29	Muslim League rejects Cabinet Mission Plan and adopts the policy of 'Direct Action'.
„ 31	Jinnah rejects Viceroy's proposals.
August, 8	Congress accepts Viceroy's invitation to join Interim Government.
„ 16	'Direct Action' of the Muslim League. Calcutta Killing.
September, 2	Interim Government of Nehru sworn in.
October	Severe communal riots in Noakhali and Bihar.
October, 14	Muslim League joins the Interim Government.
December, 2	Congress and League leaders arrive at London.
	Statement of policy by the British Government (787).
	The Constituent Assembly meets.

1947

January, 5	A. I. C. C. accepts the British statement of 6 December.
„ 31	Muslim League rejects the statement.
February, 20	The historic statement of Attlee, the British Premier, granting freedom to India (791).
March, 8	The Congress W.C. passes a resolution for dividing the Panjab on communal basis, thereby foreshadowing the Partition of India (793).
„ 23	Wavell leaves India.
„ 24	The new Viceroy Mountbatten assumes charge.
May, 18	Mountbatten proceeds to London. The Cabinet approves of his plan on the basis of the Partition of India.
June, 2-3	The Indian leaders approve of the Plan.
„ 3	Announcement in India and Britain of the final decision of the British Government regarding the transfer of power (804).
„ 3	The Congress W. C. approves of the Plan (806).
„ 4	Mountbatten's announcement that the transfer of power would be effected probably about 15 August.
„ 10	The Council of the Muslim League accepts the Plan.
„ 14-15	The A. I. C. C. session at Delhi accepts the Plan, recommended by all the important leaders, including

	Gandhi, Azad, Nehru, Patel, Kripalani, and Pant (808).
July, 18	The India Independence Bill receives the Royal Assent.
August, 15	India becomes free as a Dominion of the British Commonwealth.
	Creation of the new State of Pakistan with the same status.

SUCCESSION OF GOVERNORS-GENERAL (1900-47)

Name	Date of the assumption of office.
Lord Curzon	6 January, 1899
Lord Minto	19 November, 1905
Lord Hardinge	23 November, 1910
Lord Chelmsford	5 April, 1916
Lord Reading	2 April, 1921
Lord Irwin	3 April, 1926
Lord Willingdon	17 April, 1931.
Lord Linlithgow	18 April, 1936
Lord Wavell	20 October, 1943
Lord Mountbatten	24 March, 1947

I N D E X

- Abbas Tyabji, 38, 340
 Abdul Bari, 324
 Abdulla Haroon, Sir, 549
 Abdur Kab Nishtar, 783
 Abdur Rahim, Sir, 404
 Abercrombie, 407 ff.
 Abid Hassan, Major, 709, 727 ff.
 Abul Kalam Azad, 67, 144, 220 ff., 285, 569, 571, 577, 580, 600, 602, 606, 608, 613, 616, 636 ff., 672, 676, 754 ff., 767, 773 ff., 778 ff., 790, 796 ff., 802, 806 ff.
 Achyut Patwardhan, 556
 Adamson, 288
 • Afghanistan, 62 ff., 80, 115
 Aga Khan, 314
 Ahmad Siddiq Khatre, 68
 Ahrars, 566
 Ajaib Singh, Lt., 726
 Ajit Singh, 319
 Ajmal Khan, Hakim, 67, 148, 172, 211, 219, 278
 Akali Movement, 142, 200
 Akali Sikhs, 751
 Alexander, A. V., 753
 Alexander Horace, 667, 673
 Ali Brothers, See Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali
 Ali Imam, Sir, 315
 Alla Baksh, 577
 All-India Anti-Compromise Conference, 600 ff.
 All-India College Students' Conference, 108
 All-India Congress of Students, 320
 All-India Congress Committee : 1921 ♦ Bezwada, 102 ; Bombay, 103, 125 ; Lakhnau, 207) ; 1922 (Calcutta, 216) ; 1923 (Gaya, 219 ; Bombay, 221 ; Nagpur, 221) ; 1924 (Ahmadabad, 246 ff. ; Bombay, 267) ; 1925 (Delhi, 242) ; 1926 (Delhi, 256 ff.) ; 1929 (321, 329) ; 1930 (330 ; Sabarmati, 334).
 All-India Independent Muslim Conference, 577
 All-India Khilafat Committee, 262
 All-India Khilafat Conference, 56
 All-India Kisan Sabha, 554
 All-India Liberal Federation, 147, 312, 315
 All-India Moderate Conference, 35
 All-India Muslims' Conference, 544 ff., 548, 574
 All-India Non-Brahmin Federation, 261
 All-India Spinners' Association, 255, 542
 All-India Students' Federation, 554, 687
 All-India Trade Union Congress, 554, 685
 All-India Village Industries' Association, 542
 All-Parties' Conference, 312 ff.
 All-Parties' Conference of the Muslims, 314 ff.,
 Ambedkar, Dr. B. R., 66, 69, 474, 696, 757
 Amery, L. S., 609 ff., 615
 Amrit Kaur, 347
Anrita Bazar Patrika, 43, 463
 Amritsar, 15, 24 ff., 40
Ananda Bazar Patrika, 490

- Anandamandal, 522
 Ananta Singh, 496 ff.
 Anasuya Ben, 19
 Andrews, C. F., 29, 116, 204
 Aney, M. S. , 480, 482, 533, 535 ff.
 Ansari, M. A. A. , 71, 78 ff., 172, 211, 281, 312, 315, 387, 389, 393, 547 ff. , 683
 Anti-Imperialist Conference, 600
 Anusilan Samiti, 488, 490
 Arabinda Ghose, 10
 Asaf Ali, 78, 780
 Ashfaqulla, 495
 Ashraf, K. M. , 687
Asian, The, 305
 Assam, 154, 183, 203 ff., 805
 Atlantic Charter, 610 ff.
 Attlee, Clement, 742 ff., 747, 753, 790 ff.
 August Offer, 605 ff., 609, 611, 615
 Azad, See Abul Kalam Azad
 Azad Brigade, 717, 725 ff.
 Azad Dasta, 679
 Azad Hind Dal, 724
 Azad Hind Fauz, 671, 690, 700, 705 ff., 729, 735, 748
 Azad Hind Government, 690, 712
 Bengal, 348, 350 ff., 398 ff. , 426, 457, 467, 488 ff., 495 ff., 551, 587, 777 ff., 801 ff.
 Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 130
 Bengal Ordinance, 290, 298
 Bengal Provincial Conference, 489
 Benthall, Sir E. C., 646
 Bepin Chandra Pal, See Pal, B. C.
 Besant, Mrs. Annie, 41, 44 ff., 72, 84, 88, 97, 184, 197, 261, 265 ff., 295
 Bhagat Singh, 319, 383 ff , 513 ff , 525, 665
 Bhagavandas, Dr., 385
 Bhopal, Nawab of, 368
 Bhulabhai Desai, 696, 749
 Bina Das, 508
 Binay Bose, 506
 Birkenhead, Lord, 251ff., 254, 291 ff., 300, 311
 Blackstone, 290
 Bomanji, 334
 Bombay, 15 ff. 346 ff., 365, 426, 522, 572
Bombay Chronicle, 109, 690
 Brailsford, H. N., 341, 353, 401
 Brecher, Michael, 772, 796
 Babu Genoo, 348
 Baldev Singh, Sardar, 780, 787, 803
 Baldwin, S , 290, 309
 Ballia, 656
 Bardoli, 151, 154 ff., 205 ff., 354, 404, 613
 Basanti Devi, 134 ff., 210
 Bassein jail, 298
 Batlivala, S S., 690
 Batukeshwar Datta, 319, 513 ff., 525, 665
 Cabinet Mission, 753 ff.
 Calcutta Corporation, 504
 Calcutta Municipal Act of 1923, 230
 Campbell, Miss Mary, 340
 Carberry, Major, 33 ff.
 Chakravarti, B., 258
 Champaran, 13
 Chandernagore, 499, 511
 Chandra Sekhar Azad, 512, 520 ff.
 Chatterji, Lt. Col. A. C., 714
 Chauri Chaura, 156, 180 ff.

- Chelmsford, Lord, 1, 41, 113
 Chetti, R. K. Sanmukham, 542
 Chhatari, Nawab of, 549
 Chiang Kai Shek, 609, 618
 Chintamani. C. Y., 71, 233, 268
 Chiraranjan Das, 134
 Chirol, Valentine, 26 ff.
 Chitoo Pandey, 656
 Chittagong, 154, 171, 210, 398, 490, 508 ff.
 Chittagong Armoury Raid, 495 ff., 528
 Choitram, Dr., 79, 249
 Choitram Gidwani, 810
 Chotani, 68
 Chundrigar, I. I., 783
 Churchill, Winston, 293, 380, 531, 610, 616 ff., 620 ff., 660, 742 ff.
 Citizens' Protection League, 123
Civil and Military Gazette, The, 305
 Civil Disobedience Movement, 16, 21, 122 ff., 130, 147 ff., 256, 318, 326 ff., 380, 397 ff., 411 ff., 554, 580-606 ff., 684, 741
 Commonwealth of India Bill, 45
 Communal Award, 473, 485, 531, 533 ff., 543, 548
 Communist Party of India, 262 ff., 320, 513, 528, 554, 578, 642, 683 ff.
Comrade, The, 61
 Congress (Indian National) Party ;
 Gandhi Wing, 556, 585 ff., 591 ff., 597-601, 609,
 Left Wing, 317 ff., 321, 330, 585 ff., 593, 607.
 Nationalist, 542
 Radical, 579
 Socialist, 554 ff., 578 ff., 586, 667, 685
 Congress Democratic Party, 78
 Congress Khilafat Swaraj Party, 219 ff.
 Congress (Indian National) Sessions :
 1918 (Bombay), 21, 44, 51; (Delhi) 44, 51, 81
 1919 (Amritsar), 50 ff., 56, 81, 89 ff., 100, 288
 1920 (Calcutta), 35, 76, 83 ff., 185, 209, 212; (Nagpur), 95 ff., 185, 209, 213
 1921 (Ahmadabad), 147 ff., 195 ff., 213
 1922 (Gaya), 186, 216 ff.
 1923 (Delhi), 221 ff., (Cocanada), 222, 248 ff., 273 ff., 545
 1924 (Belgaum), 224
 1925 (Kanpur), 242, 255 ff.
 1926 (Gauhati), 259 ff.
 1927 (Madras), 311, 315
 1928 (Calcutta), 316 ff., 337, 525
 1929 (Lahore), 318, 325 ff., 381
 1931 (Karachi), 381 ff., 519
 1932 (Delhi), 413
 1933 (Calcutta), 476 ff., 485
 1934 (Bombay), 541, 554
 1936 (Lakhnau), 556; (Faizpur), 558, 584
 1938 (Haripura), 578 ff., 597
 1939 (Tripuri), 580 ff., 597
 1940 (Ramgarh), 600 ff., 607, 687
 Connaught, Duke of, 226
 Covesji Hormusji Bhabha, 780
 Cripps Mission, 611, 617, 622 ff.
 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 600, 617, 622 ff., 753, 774
 Curzon, Lord, 296
 Dadabhai Naoroji, 93
 Dandi, 336, 338, 482, 484
 Das, C. R., 38, 50 ff., 64 ff., 88, 95, 97, 99 ff., 107, 109, 123, 127, 134

- ff., 142 ff., 158, 173, 200, 204, 210.
 216 ff., 244 ff., 247, 251 ff., 281,
 291, 385, 472, 489, 504
 Das, S. R., 233
 Dayananda Saraswati, Swami, 74
 Delhi Manifesto, 323 ff.
 Devadas Gandhi, 223, 454
 Devadhar, Mr. G. K., 357
 Devonshire, the Duke of, 614
 Dhangopal Mukherjee, 340
 Dharasana, 340, 356 ff.
 Dhires Chandra Chakravorty, 462
 Digby, William, 93
 Dinesh Gupta, 506
 Diwakar, R. R., 672 ff.
 Doveton, Capt., 31
 Dufferin, Lord, 552
 Dyer, Brig. General, 26 ff. 41, 293
- Edih, Madame Halide, 572
 Elwin Verrier, 359, 402 ff.
 Emerson, Mr., 401
Englishman, The, 131, 302
 European Association, 41, 301, 406 ff.
- Fazl-i-Husain, Sir, 369 ff., 549
 Fazl-ul-Huq, 38, 370, 549, 571, 655
 Fischer, Louis, 157, 325, 799 ff.
 Fisher, Mr., 57
 Forward Bloc, 585, 591, 597, 600 ff.
 606, 687
Free Press Journal, The, 463
 Frontier Gandhi, See Ghaffar Khan
 Fuller, Sir Bamfylde, 296
- Gandhi, M. K. See Mohandas
 Karamchand Gandhi
 Gandhi-Irwin Pact, 376 ff., 380 ff.,
 391
 Gandhi Movement (in U.S.A.), 365
 Gandhi, Mrs., 476
 Gandhi Brigade, 717, 725 ff.
 Ganesh Ghose, 496 ff.
 Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, 385
 Gelder, Stewart, 693
 George, Lloyd, 53, 57, 227, 288
 Ghaffar Khan, Abdul, 339, 397, 403
 ff., 549, 806 ff.
 Ghazanfar Ali Khan, 783 ff.
 Ghosh, P. C., 112
 Giani Kartar Singh, 757
 Giani Pritam Singh, 705
 Girdhari Lal Lala, 28
 Girija Shankar Bajpai, Sir, 632
 Girni Kamgar Union, 512
 Gokhale, G. K., 11 ff., 111, 305
 Gokul Chand Narang, 168
 Gopinath Saha, 249, 385, 490 ff.
 Goswami, T. C., 241
 Gour, Dr., 261
 Govind Vallabh Pant, 564 581, 809
 Gujarat Provincial Khilafat Confer-
 ence, 119
 Gujranwala, 23. 33, 110
 Guntur, 154
 Gwyer, Sir Maurice, 571
- Hafizur Rahman, Maulana, 810
 Haig, H. G., 411, 441 ff., 571
 Halifax, The Earl of, 306
 Hardinge, Lord, 1, 7
Harijan, The, 576, 604, 633, 645,
 670, 679, 801
 Har Kishan, 522
 Harkishen Lal, 266

- Harriman, W. A., 619 ff.
 Hasrat Mohani, Maulana, 149, 197 ff.
 Heramba Chandra Maitra, 166
 Hidayatullah, 370
 Hind Swaraj, 11
 Hindu Mahasabha, 261 ff., 279 ff., 544, 571, 596, 615 ff., 624, 681 ff., 698, 751, 813
 Hindu-Muslim Conference, 71, 77
 Hindusthan Republican Association, 492 ff.
 Hindusthan Socialist Republican Association, 493, 511 ff., 523, 665
 Hiren Mukherji, 687
Hitaishi, 305
 Hoare, Sir Samuel, 395, 415, 418, 433, 548, 599
 Hogg, Dr., 449
 Home Rule, 55, 288
 Home Rule League, 81
 Hopkins, Harry, 631
 Horniman, B. G., 34
 Hriday Nath Kunjru, 233
 Hull, Cordell, 617
 Hunter Committee, 37, 39; Report of, 20, 26, 29, 68
 Hussain, Mr., 357
 Hyndman, H. M. 41, 44
 Indian Independence League, 704 ff.; Territorial Committee, 709
 Indian Independence Movement, 706, 736
 Indian National Army, See Azad Hind Fauz
 Indian National Congress, 44, 52, 79, 85 ff., 88, 187, 189, 247, 268, 279 ff., 310 ff., 315, 323, 373, 378, 380, 395, 481 ff., 533 ff., 559 ff., 570 ff., 576 ff., 581 ff., 596 ff., 602 ff., 613 ff., 620 ff., 684, 691, 747 ff., 801 ff.
 Indian Nationlist Party, 257 ff.
 Indian Republican Army (Chittagong Branch), 497
 Iqbal, Muhammad, 277, 572, 574
 Irwin, Lord, 322, 337, 375 ff., 400, 404, 415, 530, 548
 Iyengar, S. Kasturiranga, 172, 211
 Jagjivan Ram, 780
 Jaglal Chaudhury, 659
 Jalalabad Hill, 499
 Jallianwalla Bagh, 1, 16 ff., 39 ff.
 Jamiat-ul-Ulema Conference, 200, 276
 Jamnadas Dwarakadas, 85, 268
 Jamnalal Bajaj, 205
 Jatin Das, 319 ff., 518, 526
 Jatindra Mukherji, 490
 Jawaharlal Nehru, 65, 71, 73, 160, 174, 277, 313, 316 ff., 321, 324 ff., 336, 343, 375, 377 ff., 383, 393, 475, 487, 495, 552, 554 ff., 563 ff., 570, 584 ff., 592 ff., 597, 601, 606, 613, 626, 632 ff., 646, 658, 661, 663, 672 ff., 683, 749 ff., 767, 770 ff., 780 ff., 787 ff.,

- 796, 803 ff., 811, 818 ff.
 Jayakar, M. R., 38, 156, 219, 256 ff., 260, 369
 Jayaprakash Narain, 556, 667 ff., 673, 676 ff., 685 ff.
 Jinnah, M. A., 85, 88, 97, 156, 234, 236, 240 ff., 271 ff., 313 ff., 324, 368, 370, 388, 535 ff., 543 ff., 552 ff., 566 ff., 599, 605, 610, 679, 681 ff., 694 ff., 750, 755 ff., 767, 773 ff., 777, 780, 786 ff., 803 ff., 815 ff.
 Jinnah, Fourteen points of, 546 ff., 570
 Jogendra Mandal, 783
 Jogesh Chandra Chatterji, 492
 Johnson, Col., 32
 Johnson, Louis A., 622, 626 ff.
 Joshi, P. C., 690
 Joynson-Hicks, 295
Justice, The, 44
 Kaira, see Kheda
 Kakori Conspiracy Case, 494
 Kalpana Datta, 509
 Kamala Nehru, 347
 Kanai Lal Datta, 490
 Kelkar, N. C., 103, 219, 256 ff.
 Khaliquzzaman Choudhury, 649 ff.
 Khaparde, G. S., 98, 261
 Kheda (or Kaira) District, 14, 404
 Khersai, 350 ff.
 Khilafat Agitation, 54 ff., 67 ff., 92, 115, 190 ff., 544, 565
 Khilafat Committee, Central, 314
 Khilafatists, 116, 119, 183, 271
 Khizr Hyat Khan, 695, 792
 Khudai Khidmatgars, 397, 549, 806
 Khusiram, Lala, 23
 Kishan League, 177
 Kishans, 578
 Kishan Sabha, 600
 Kitchlew, Dr. S., 24, 110, 324, 810
 Knight, Mr. Holford, 99
 Kripalani, Acharya, 638, 812
 Krishak Praja Party, 549
 Labour Party of Britain, 288 ff., 306, 308, 322 ff., 742 ff.
 Lajpat Rai, Lala, 35, 67, 71, 85, 100, 108, 110, 136, 158, 173, 258, 266, 280 ff., 310, 318, 513
 Lahore Conspiracy Case, 517 ff.
 Lansbury, 293
 Lasky, Harold, 632, 659
 Lawrence, Lord Pethick, 293, 753
Leader, The, 43
 Lec Commission, 236 ff., 288
 Liaquat Ali Khan, 696, 783 ff., 787, 803, 818
 Liberal Party (of England), 306
 Linlithgow, Lord, 598, 604, 673, 692 ff.
 Lucknow Liberal League, 139
 Lutyens, Lady Emily, 268
 Lytton, Lord, 244, 253, 297
 Macdonald, Ramsay, 288 ff., 309, 322, 334, 368, 373, 395 ff.
 MacLagan, Sir Edward, 35
 Madan Mohan Malaviya, 12, 36, 56, 71, 88, 97, 116, 143 ff., 150, 156, 217, 256 ff., 262, 320, 347, 401, 413, 430 ff., 474, 476 ff., 533, 535 ff.